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Abstract. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the crown 
went through some rather marked change during the course 
of the period, starting with the Bill of Rights and 
effectively ending with the Act of Settlement in 1701. In 
1689 the crown had an extensive prerogative and a limited 
executive, in 1702 it had a more limited prerogative 
(although it did come into operation until after Annets 
1714 
death) and an extensive executive. Thereafter, there was 
no deterioration in the crown's position during the 
subsequent decades to the period's end. The importance of 
the crown has been underestimated because of the limited 
amount of direct research on it as a political entity. 
This thesis makes advances in terms of both factual 
knowledge and historiography. Its body falls into two 
principal parts. The first of these are three structural 
analyses of crown patronage in relation to the peerage- 
titles, central office and local office. The second is a 
broad political narrative. The analyses show that the 
crown was a very definite presence in high politics. Over 
the period as a whole the crown defined the limitations 
that its political managers had to operate within 
these. As the period progressed crown prejudices, 
especially with relation to the peerage, grew more marked 
rather than declining in the Revolution Settlement's wake 
as has been the general interpretation previouslY. In the 
narrative. the reigns of William III, Anne and George I 
are principally innovative in terms of historiography. For 
George II's reign there is such advance but also a far 
higher share of new material, the latter part of the 
period having had far less research on it than the former 
one. A notable example of this is the patterns of 
occurrence and general character of Post-1727 tory 
tergiversation. 
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I. Introduction. 
I. I. The Subject. 
Eighteenth-century British history has been perceived 
as the period in which the tumults of the 
seventeenth-century were recovered from and the groundwork 
for the changes of the nineteenth-century were laid. The 
period 1689-1760 was meant to have witnessed the 
alteration of the Stuarts' personal monarchy into the 
Hanoverians' limited one. By the 1740s George 11 was 
perceived as having only a limited scope in which to act 
in the political field; he was forced to part with the 
second earl Granville in both 1744 and 1746 and had two 
ministries of his own choice fail to be viable- the 
Granville-Bath one in 1746 and the Waldearave one in 1757. 
There is a level of truth in the assumption that 
Georze II was a politically passive monarch in comparison 
with his crandson and successor Georce III. The contrast 
between the two was articulated by Richard Pares in the 
1951-1952 Ford Lectures. The amount of work that has been 
done on the politics of 1760-1790 contrasts markedlv with 
the lack of such in the three decades that preceded it. 
The Pares view was principally an affirmation of what had 
gone before and because of the quality of his work on 
Georse III his remarks on Georce II were allowed to stand 
as cood. 
No challenge was mounted until John Owen's perceptive 
1973 essay "George II Reconsidered. " Owen decisively 
argued that the two reigns shared far more continuitv than 
anyone had previously stated. In the sixteen years since 
the piece was Published no one has sought to overturn 
7 
Owen's argument. If one accepts it one has to accept that 
either Georce III was a weaker monarch than has been 
assumed or that George II was a stronger one than Pares's 
work would suggest. This thesis seeks to make a case for 
the latter and to contend that Pares9s dismissal of George 
II is fallacious. 
In 1955 Ian R. Christie wrote an article in 
.0 HistoryToday which was In line with Pares's comments. The 
piece was entitled "The Personality of George II-" In it 
he used three contemporary authors on the politics of the 
reign -Chesterfield, Hervey 
flattered the king although 
to note, was sympathetic to 
ascribe much-of George II's 
spouse queen Caroline since 
The article was essentially 
and Waldegrave. None of these 
the iast, Christie was careful 
the kinx. Christie went on to 
troubles to the death of his 
she was an ýLdept politician. 
sound; this thesis does not - 
seek to contend that Georze II was necessarily a-more able 
politician than his wife or that he had hidden cerebral 
depths. 
However, the article did have two faults. The first 
is that it accepted a Paresian interpretation of the king 
as a politician and the second is that the article makes 
the mistake of extending its discussion of the 
fpersonalityl to the 'kingship. ' It is to be accepted that 
the 'style of the kingship' would in large part be derived 
from the nature of the monarch's 'personality' but that 
the tsubstance of the kingship' was derived principallY 
from the contemporary state of the 'crown. ' 
The Monarch is the individual who holds the crown at 
a given juncture. whereas the crown itself is an 
institution which exists quite Independentlv of anv person 
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who holds it. The three sources were writing in a 
contemporary political framework that was-so self-evident 
to them that they felt no compulsion to articulate the 
framework in which the events thew were describing 
happened. It is the historiants task to be aware of that 
framework when he/she uses those sources. Neither Pares 
nor Christie Properly appreciated that framework, and if 
they had they would have seen that the contrast between 
Georce I and Georce II was in style and not in substance. 
Irrespective of how one views George 11 the crown was 
the way it was in his reign as the reBUlt of changing 
during the period 1689"1760. In 1760 the annual meeting of 
parliament and the effects of the Act of Settlement were 
accepted facts of political life, in 1689 it was to. be 
another five years until the passaze of the Triennial Act, 
another twelve years until the Act of Settlement was 
passed and another twenty-five years until the latter came 
into full operation. Over the course of the period as a 
whole the prerogative became more limited. This thesis 
seeks to investigate- Whether that change can be detected 
in how the monarch who held the crown dealt with domestic 
politics and, if so, Whether that change can tell us 
anythina about the nature of the crownts position in 
British politics. 
The thrust of this work is not so much to comprehend 
how four separate monarchs (queen Mary has for this 
purpose been subordinated to her husband William) treated 
the peerage. Rather it is to see how a single institution 
dealt with change and how that process affected its 
relationship with the peerage as a consequence. As stated 
above the crown is an institution whidh is quite separate 
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from those who possess it. It existedlbefore any of the 
four were monarchs and it existed after their deaths. The 
personalities of the four are not to be iznored but the 
emphasis Of this work is to comprehend their actions in 
domestic politics and the forces which shaped those 
actions. The amount of Primary material that eXiStB on 
their attitudes to the peerage as such in English is small 
to the point of non-existence. 
The landed aristocracy were all those who had an 
income, derived from estates, which was sufficient to 
maintain them in a manner that was recognized by 
contemporary society as putting them in a particular 
class. The nobilitv were those who were possessed of 
titles which were inheritable. The peerage were a 
sub-croup of the nobility. Thev were those who possessed a 
title in either the English, the Scottish. the, Irish or 
the British peerage. However, not all nobles or even'peers 
necessarily had the financial means by which they could be 
classed as aristocrats in the econoniic sense of the word. 
But there is also a social connotation to the term whereby 
it is reasonable for them to be included. 
The terminal dates of the period are October 23rd 
1689, when the 1689-1690 session of parliament opened, and 
October 25th 1760, when George II died. The peerage that 
this thesis studies consists both of any man who prior to 
the Union with Scotland in 1707 held an Enclish title and 
of any man after the Union who held an English title or a 
British one. Irish and Scottish titles are excluded unless 
the holder had either of the two mentioned varieties of 
title in addition. With the 1689 passage of the Bill of 
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Rights it became the practice for the privileges of 
peerage to be confined to those who had sworn the oaths. 
Where statistical work has been done, the peerage has been 
treated as a whole so that catholics and minors who were 
possessed of titles, but not the privileges of them, are 
incorporated. 
The peerage form a good subject for study since they 
were a continuous element in the period's political life 
through their membership of the House of Lords. The Lords, 
through its smaller membership, was the more amenable of 
the two Houses of parliament to crown/covernmental 
influence. This susceptibility was aided by the 
distribution of both places and honours. They were 
traditionally close to the crown. 
6n the outbreak of the 
First Civil War the madority of them had sided with it 
rather than with parliament; during the Exclusion Crisis 
the susceptibility of the House of Lords to the blocking 
Commons at the crown's behest had proven a useful weapon 
for Charles II in his defeat of the First Whizs. This 
relationship stemmed from the peerage possessing an 
extra-parliamentary relationship to the crown, they were 
held to be its 'natural counsellors, ' a force that might 
aid good government. Therefore, they are a good means of 
monitoring the crown. How it and they interacted in the 
wake of the Revolution Settlement is a good engine for 
trying to understand how the Settlement influenced the 
Politics that followed it. 
, 
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1.2. Historiographical Context of Thesis. - 
If a historian undertakes a study which touches on 
the seventeenth-century peerace an awareness of the work 
of Lawrence Stone is necessary. This thesis has been 
conducted with such an awareness. However, since it 
oricinates from someone whom he would probably term a 
"young antiquarian empiricist" awareness of his work does 
not mean that his work should be mentioned automatically 
if there is no reason for it to be cited or to be 
discussed. There are points of contact, e. g. titles, but 
the work is written from the point of view of someone who 
wishes to throw light on the British high politics of 
1689-1760 whereas his work is intended to elucidate the 
nature of English high society of 1558-1641. His 
techniques could produce a rich harvest but there is no 
point in applying them if they are not pertinent to the 
problem under investigation. 
In this thesis, in best stereotypical Namierite 
fashion, ideolozy and idealism have been lain aside as 
subdects for study in their own richt. This is not because 
they are worthless but rather to make the subject a 
manageable entity with a reasonably coherent character. 
Their existence has been borne in mind during, the initial 
research, during the Primary analwsis and during the 
writing up. The work of Elton. Russell and Kenyon was not 
done to belittle these factors but rather to allow them to 
be better understood through trying to place them nearer 
their own environment so that they might be given a fuller 
.2v context Stone may rest asBured that this thesis is happ. 
to be perceived as a lesser tributary of the great stream 
of narrative. Among other things, it concludes that the 
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place of the crown has been misunderstood and therefore 
understressed. Erzo, the political comprehension of these 
years would be distinctly advanced by better appreciation 
of the personalities of the monarchs who reigned during 
it, ... if such is possible. 
The distribution of secondary literature can be 
attributed firstly to the period having come to be seen by 
many political historians as something of a historical 
'backwater. ' It is only natural for such gad-fly creatures 
to be attracted to 'events. ' The 1715 and 1745 Jacobite 
Risings have distinctly less appeal than the Civil Wars of 
the seventeenth-century. This is because the former were 
neatly contained by governmental forces whereas the latter 
ripped open the very chest of British society and 
politics. 
For the years after the Period there is an expansion 
in the amount of source material. The Aspinall and 
Fortescue edited letters of George III compare with the 
sparse Jottints and sporadic annotations of his 
grandfather and predecessor George Il. The grandson's 
reign contains such broad internationally important 
1. 
historiosraphical marvels as the American Rebellion-and 
the French Revolution while on the domestic front there 
were the beginnings of the Reform movements. These last 
were to transform British society and politics where the 
Enclish Revolution had failed. To underscore the period's 
lack of appeal, it is to be noted that John Wilkes was 
characteristically so perverse as not to start publishing 
'The North BritonO until 1762. 
Yet some political historians have felt able to 
ignore the bright lights of the early seventeenth-century 
13 
and later eighteenth-century. Since the Second World War 
the historical research conducted on comprehendinz 
post-Revolution politics has had a leaning towards 
understanding the politics of the Commons and its 
membership as a vehicle for advancing a wider 
understanding. This stems from the way in which particular 
historians, through their teaching, their research or 
both, have influenced a number of susceptible intellects 
so that some fields have been investigated 
disproportionatelv in comparison to the amount of work 
done on other ones. 
The most important steering ficure was Lewis Namier. 
Althouzh his "The Structure of Politics at the Accession 
of George 11111 had been published in 1929, it was not 
appreciated as the historiographical milestone that it is 
until the 19508.3 Once "Structure" had assumed its true 
place there occurred something of an intellectual 
snowball. There is a good reason for such- stimulating 
work stimulates. In 'The History Men' John Kenyon has 
identified at the heart of the Namier influenced aroup- 
John Brooke, John Owen and Romney Sedgwick with Ian 
Christie as a 'fourth man' fizure. However, these made up 
Just the core. 
There is a stronz case that can be made for the 
transfer of approach from supervisor to supervised. From 
the fifties it is possible to identify a host of theses 
which were heavily'indebted to Namier in terms of subject 
matter. In view of the subject matter of this thesis a 
particular pertinent surmizable case of this process is 
Jonathan Clark. Clark was supervised in the late seventies 
by 'fourth man' Christie. Namier, Christie and Clark have 
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all omitted full direct discussion of the peeraze in their 
work: in "Structure" Namier confines them to an incidental 
position with the exception of the secret service chapter; 
Christie's culpability can be illustrated by his 1987 
piece "The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the Forty-Five: A 
Note"; 5 Clark wrote in 1986 that "One of the shortcominzs 
of "The Dynamics of Chance" was its failure to attend more 
closely to the House of Lords, and althouzh I am still not 
clear that such a study would be particularly revealing, 
the attempt should have been made. 116 
The influence of Namier was perpetuated in terms of 
subject matter by J. H. Plumb. The latter is said to have 
opined of the former that he was a "great research worker, 
no historian. t@7 PlUmb was interested in an earlier part of 
the century than Namier but shared his interest in usinx 
the Commons and its members as an engine for investigating 
politics. There is more of the air of a bon mot about 
Plumb's opinion of Namier than there is of a considered 
assessment. In 1960 Plumb wrote that Turberville's ""The 
House of Lords in the Eighteenth Century" is a most 
unsatisfactory book. The Lords need'to be studied as Sir 
Lewis Namier and his colleacues have studied the 
Commons.,, 8 It would seem that 'great research workers' 
f. have their place in the order of affairs. 
The publication of Plumb's "The Growth of Political 
Stability in England, 1675-172590 beautifully reaped the 
benefits of the 1965 Robbins Report. Through recommending 
that university education should be available to all those 
who could benefit from it there followed an enlargement in 
both the numbers of undergraduate students but also in the 
number of university lecturers who were employed. Linda 
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Colley has charted the liberal-socialist tradition of 
writina political history in which "Stability" can be 
placed in her 1986 article "The Politics of 
Eighteenth-Century British History. 199 
Colley suzzests that part of the reason for the 
tradition's decline may lie in a correlation between the 
character of political history which is written and the 
political tone of the day; if times can be said to be 
inclined to the political left then it is elements of 
change that are examined and if thev can be said to be 
inclined to the political right then it is ones Of 
continuity. This may contain some truth but the principal 
reason for ignoring elements of continuity was that the 
literature of the period had, thanks first to "Structure" 
and then to "Stability", built up a momentum which led 
researchers to gravitate towards it. 
Colley may have been a tvictim' of this in that her 
research work was supervized by Plumb and. as with 
Christie and Clark, the supervizor may well have limited 
the scope of the research. In terms of subdect her book 
"In Defiance of Oligarchy" possesses the same failure to 
appreciate the place of the peerage as occurs in Clark's 
"The Dynamics of Chance. 
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1.3. The State of the Secondary Literature, 1989. 
Two years before the publication of Namier's 
"Structure" A. S. Turberville produced "The House of Lords 
in the XVIIIth Century. " This was a chronological 
extension to his 1913 volume "The House of Lords in the 
reign of William 111.11 Turberville's works are very much 
products of their age. The 1927 book is analytical but 
essentially pedestrian. It belongs to a lighter. less 
sophisticated epoch than does Namier's scholarship. 
Whereas Namier was labourint outside the academic fold, 
having to rely on the generosity of individuals who both 
trusted in his innate ability and who believed in the 
cultural value of his work, Turberville was inside. The 
difference is perhaps illustrated by the way in which 
Turberville's work was published by the Oxford University 
Press whereas Namier's was brought out by the commercial 
company MacMillan. Turberville's preface contains a thanks 
to Professor Walter Raleigh. Raleigh's chair at Oxford was 
in literature not history. 
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The existence of Turberville's work has probably been 
a factor in preventing serious research on the matter 
until recently. There has been a need for a review of the 
subject since at least the 1950s, but the influence of 
Namier and Plumb in terms of subject matter has almost 
certainly prevented one. However, of late a rich secondary 
literature has begun to amass on the eighteenth-century 
peerage and aristocracy. 1977 saw the completion of 
P. C. Walters's Leicester University M. Phil.. The 
dissertation is a study of the House of Lords at the time 
of the Excise Crisis. It has some interesting material and 
is designed to try to allow us to understand the crisis. 
: 17 
However, because the study has no broader comprehension of 
either the politics that surrounded the event or of the 
peerage as a political entity. The work-is limited to 
being an exercise in the 'history as change' school. 
1978 witnessed the publication of Michael McCahil-l's 
"Order & Equipoise. " The work shows the potential for 
studying the eizhteenth-centurv peerage and presumably 
that of the nineteenth too. The book is firstly different 
from this thesis in being on a time-span a third of the 
same length. There is no overlap since it is the vears 
1783-1806 that are under consideration nor is the 
methodology particularly similar. It shows that there is 
room for a variety of research on the peeraze in the 
eichteenth-century all of which can be original. 
The mid-1980s was when the flood (or may be Just its 
first wave) burst. 1984 saw the publication of John 
Cannon's "Aristocratic Century. " Chapters one and four of 
Cannon's book are the items with which this thesis has 
most in common in the current literature in terms of 
time-span and subject. His other four chapters are nearer 
to Stone in subJect. It is a pioneerina work containina 
much fresh material. It is of importance both as a work of 
orizinal scholarship and throuch its providinx a framework 
which other historians can use in order to help construct 
their thoughts with respect to the peerage in the 
eighteenth-century and the centuries either side of it. 
One of the bookts particular strengths is Cannon's breadth 
of reading which allows him to make thoughtful comparisons 
with the continental nobilitv. 
Michael Bush's "The English Aristocracy" is a sister 
volume to his 1983 and 1988 works on the European 
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aristocracy. It has litle direct bearing to this thesis 
but contains intestinz material nonetheless. It is 
essentially pitched as an introductory survey to a 
literature that has a long way to go in terms of being 
written. An even more abstract work was also published in 
1984- Jonathan Powis's "Aristocracy" which is an essay of 
the broadest variety. 
1986 saw "The Aristocracy in England, J-66o-igi4l, come 
out. Its author is the economic historian J. V. Beckett. It 
is a large interesting work which draws upon the 
literature which has come to exist in the socio-economic 
field in large part in the wake of H. J. Habbakuk's 1940 
article "English Landownership, 1680-1740""3' and which was 
stimulated further by two books published in 1963 
G. E. Mincay's "English Landed Society in the 
Eighteenth-Century" and F. M. L. Thompson's "English Landed 
Society in the Nineteenth Century. " Beckett's chapters 
two, eleven and twelve can be added to those recommended 
in Cannon's book although they show very clearly that they 
were written in its wake. Cannon concentrates more closely 
on the peerage than he does and therefore gains more in 
pertinency to this thesis whereas Beckett uses the 
aristocracy in its true broader sense and therefore is 
more diffuse. 
The most recent work is Anita Rees's informative 1987 
Ph. D. on "The practice and procedure of the house of lords, 
1714-1784-11 The work is verv much in the thematic mould of 
her supervisor P. D. G. Thomas, who produced "The House of 
Commons in the Eighteenth Century" in 1971. 
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1.4. Argument of Thesis. 
This thesis seeks to make a successful case for an 
expansion of contemporary understanding of the British 
political history of 1689-176o. The period's high politics 
have been handled in such a way so that casual observers 
take a part of its character to be the whole. This 
dissertation seeks to contend that the period's overall 
framework should be appreciated and that any pertinent 
discussions of its high politics should take place with at 
least an appreciation of-the existence of that structure. 
This dissertation is not meant to undermine the imbalanced 
concentration of historiography on Party and electoral 
matters but rather to complement it; the scales are to be 
balanced not by seeking to dismiss the initial weight but 
rather complementing it with a counter-weight. 
The author makes no claims to have advanced 
historical technique but merely to have applied it to a 
field which has long been overlooked. This work builds on 
the foundations of part of Cannon's "Aristocratic 
Century. " Criticisms of his work are made with a full- 
agreement of his right to use, as he should wish the 
'broad in character and of a pioneering nature' loophole. 
The debt this work owes to Cannon is clearly illustrated 
in the heavy use of structural analysis, he having shown 
its Potential for breaking new ground. 
12 
Each of the four reigns studied here is capable of at 
least a Partial re-interpretation in the light of this 
work. Work by the likes of Henry Horwitz, Geoffrey Holmes 
and even J. H. Plumb himself can be called into question. If 
chances are to be made to the insights that the work of 
such people have made. it is of a shift of emphasis and a 
20 
greater acknowledgement of context. This thesis is pitched 
to show the room for action rather than to enzaze in full 
on every front where revision is possible. 
The words 'argument' and 'ease' have been used above 
quite specifically. This is not so much an instance of 
taking advantage of the speculative license that research 
dissertations are allowed. Rather, it is because certain 
parts of the argument can be reached by the logical use of 
structural analysis but they are not additionally 
substantiated from literary sources. A principal reason 
for the lack of work on the crown in this period stems 
from none of the four sovereigns being given to writing 
about British political affairs or musing in a manner such 
as Frederick the Great of Prussia in his 3.752 "Political 
Testament. " 
A central contention of this thesis is that there was 
preferential employment of peers who had inherited their 
titles over peers who had been recruited in them. The 
nearest that the primary sources come to supporting this 
is a remark by Hervey that George II preferred to award 
Place according to the rank of a coronet rather than the 
merit of the head it sat upon. 
13 This was not literallY 
týrue but it does point to Georze havinx preJudices as to 
the peeraze and their employment which can be 
substantiated by structural analysis. This thesis seeks 
not necessarily to uncover unshakeable veritY, although it 
would be sad to think that some of the ideas advanced will 
not Permanently enter the secondary literature, but rather 
to advance a number of reasoned and logical conjectures, 
the forwarding of which will hopefully further 
understanding of the politics of these years. 
21 
The line of arzument runs as follows. Throuzh the 
medium of the Revolution Settlement the crownts 
prerozative, was made smaller. The traditional assumption 
was that this meant that the crown had lost political 
cround. This assumption'iB too SiMPliBtiC, which in turn 
means that the arcuments built upon it tend to be 
erroneous in at least part. It is correct to assume that 
the technical scope for action became more restricted. 
However, there were positive cains. The scope that 
remained could be used far more effectively than it could 
be before. What was lost either could not be used at all 
or could only be used within strict limits. 
In its nature the price paid was more abstract than 
material. That the crown had to meet regularly with 
parliament was innovative but the crown garnered extensive 
rewards for doing so. The pre-Revolution strength of 
parliament is to be held in mind, James II tried to 
remodel parliament because he was not able to ignore it. 
The post-Revolution lack of crown/parliament conflict was 
marked, by the way in which the latter never totally 
refused to vote supply, nor failed to, pass the Mutiny Act 
nor supply bills if they were critical (William III lost a 
few money bills but nothing that caused governmental 
finances to grind to a halt). The non-use of the royal 
veto by the early Hanoverians was a'sign of the general 
harmony of their relations with parliament. It is to be 
remembered that the Settlement exacted a price from the 
political nation: it had to provide the means by which it 
could be defended which meant a considerable expansion of- 
the executive and the provision of financial support for 
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that growth. Regular representation led to heavier 
taxation. In terms of having a larger executive and having 
it properly financed the crown indubitably benefitted from 
the Settlement. 
The prerogative contracted and the executive 
expanded. The crown of the early Hanoverians did not have 
the same range of prerogative powers which that of James I 
and Charles I had enjoyed. However, the early Stuarts were 
unable to pull off distant military engagements such as 
Cape Passaro or Dettingen with the ease that the monarchy 
of the first two Georges could. Foreign policy was 
considered to be in the prerogative's sphere both before 
and after the Settlement. The early Hanoverians had to 
face some fairly hostile criticism Of their conduct of it 
in parliament. But then so too had the early Stuarts. 
Because of what had occurred in the early 
seventeenth-century. by the early eighteenth it was 
accepted that whatever the de Jure state of affairs on the 
topic might be parliament had a de facto right to be 
heard, such was an accepted fact of political life 
irrespective of the Revolution Settlment. The criticism 
never reached such a pitch under the two Georges where 
parliament itself sought to conduct the nation's foreign 
policy. At the same time the crown's position was such 
that it had to be aware of parliament's pertinent 
prejudices in the matter; however, the crown had never' 
been able to consider an active foreign policy without 
parliament's concurrence. That there had been an 
improvement in the crown's position was witnessed b. Y it 
having to make decisions about what sort of foreign PolicY 
to have rather than whether to have an active one or not. 
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The chance wrought by the Settlement is demonstrated bY 
the England of Charles II having been a pensioner of 
France, whereas the Britain of George II was the 
pension-master of European alliances against France. 
If it is possible to view the crown as having 
positively gained from the Settlement, which it is, then 
such puts the traditionally received faristocracy as 
beneficiaries' concept into Play. The aristocracy, and 
more specifically the peerage. it is generally agreed, 
came to enJoy more positions of power after the Revolution 
than they had had before it and that this was more true in 
the-studied period9s second half than in its first. The 
nature of that enjoyment is where a mistake in 
comprehension has been made. The aristocracy/peerage 
exercized power, they did not control it. They did not 
appoint themselves, the crown was not forced to appoint 
them, the crown chose to appoint them. Why the crown chose 
to appoint them is not evidenced by contemporary sources 
and this thesis then wanders into educated conjecture. 
There were two complementary factors in operation 
with the supposed 'oligarchical' invasion of office. The 
first is that the Settlement largely ended the old 
court/country conflict over the prerogative which James I 
and the two Charleses had had to deal with. Oxford, the 
father of the Act of Settlement, was the, last person who 
first rose to prominence through country hostility and who 
was then taken onto the court side in the way that 
Strafford had before the Civil Wars and Interregnum and 
Sir Richard Temple had after them. After the Settlement 
the crown no longer needed to raise its own servants to 
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additionally act with the turncoats as its defenders in 
parliament. Therefore, there was no longer the same 
pressinc in of new men to hold senior OffiCeB, whether 
they were from country or court backgrounds. Under the 
Hanoverians, with a general lack of political pressure, 
the crown was freer to choose what it did than it had been 
before the Revolution. Under the two Georzes such minor 
contretemps as it experienced occurred only during times 
of war, times when its financial needs made it more 
vulnerable than it would otherwise have been. In terms of 
international relations Britain was Mostly at peace over 
the years 1714-1760. 
The second factor in operation was that the two 
Hanoverians. especially George II. had an elevated concept 
of the standing of nobility. This is where the argument is 
at its least literary and is most based on structural 
analysis. An appreciation of the way in which Bedchamber 
lordships and senior offices were distributed to the 
peerace shows that the Georzes had a bias in favour of 
conferring those offices on peers who had inherited their 
titles rather than ones who had been recruited to them. 
The data is too convergent for any other interpretation to 
be probable. Not only were new men no longer able to force 
their way in but the crown also positively sought to give 
honours and office to inheritors. By having peers. and 
especially inheritors, as its senior servants, the crown 
displayed its own assuredness, its power and its 
harmonious relations with the nation. The peeragets 
enjoyment of power was a by-product of the Settlement 
rather than the direct product of it. 
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1.5. Structure of Thesis. 
This thesis has two principal parts- three thematic 
sections and a chronoloxical narrative of the period, 
which has two offshoots. The purpose of the broad division 
is to allow for clarity of approach. The first of the 
thematic sections describes the distribution of 
recruitments and promotions, the second how Bedchamber 
places and senior offices were civen out and the third the 
pattern of tenure of lord lieutenancies and custodes 
rotulorum and the character of departures from 
lieutenancies. 
John Cannon's chapter on recruitment includes John 
Kenyon's observation that "Britain's rise to world power 
was matched by paralysis or deepening ossification at 
home. " 14 Kenyon's remark can be taken to refer to the 
broad stultification of British Politics which occurred 
durinx the eighteenth-century and which only started to be 
altered in 1832. Cannon Zoes on to cite Harold Perkin's 
opinion that Britain was peculiar in Europe because its 
aristocracy was open to penetration by individuals with 
bourceois backcrounds. In "Aristocratic Century" Cannon 
expresses himself unhappy with Perkin's view and seeks to 
test its unity with Kenyonts observation by means of 
investigating peerage creation. The particular methodology 
he uses is to see whether recruits possess #peerage 
connections' of the kinship variety. The resulting 
conclusion that he comes to is that Kenyon's paradox 
stands intact and that IlaBBertions of the uniquely liberal 
character of eighteenth-century English society should be 
treated with some reserve.,, 
15 
Cannon's work is right in terms of the connections 
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but in terms of the broader argument it fails to 
Penetrate. He perceives his recruits as being 
representative of Perkin's aristocracy. There is a 
definite difference between Cannon's lpeerazel and 
Perkin's 'aristocracy' which the former is rather 
strangely not taking into consideration. The sole cause of 
recruitment was not to act as a monitor to socio-political 
or socio-economic change during the Period under 
consideration. rather it was indicative of the far more 
specific field of high politics and even then is something 
that has to be read carefully. The interestina problem 
over recruitment is how the immediate character of high 
politics was reflected through the individual creations of 
its participants, or those of their kinsmen and clients. 
Cannon sought to re-assesB the verity of Kenyon's 
ossification paradox when it would Perhaps have been more 
profitable to assess the reason for its existence. 
Beckett's work deals with the aristocracy rather than 
peerage. His subject'is large and his approach principally 
discursive rather than analytical. The work is not 
designed to illuminate early eighteenth-century high 
politics which is the purpose of this thesis, therefore, 
the connection between the two is superficial. However, 
the broader subject which Beckett chose to investigate 
sives more elucidation on those whom Perkin was 
discussinc. 
This thesis has arbitrarily excluded a number of 
offices and honours that peers received in this period. A 
systematic study which included them would considerably 
add to the number of trees without clarifyinx our 
perception of the political wood. The same is true of the 
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functions of the offices. Firstly, the material on such is 
rather uneven since a number had only very nominal duties 
while others had considerable power and influence. And 
secondly, for those offices which did have functions there 
already exists a zreat deal scattered abbut the secondary 
literature, notably in the work of Thomson. Beattie, 
Bucholz and the Webbs. Even if such did exist and it were 
original material it would only serve to create a slightly 
diverse and somewhat curved focus. For the same reason the 
influence of the peerage in the localities, notably as to 
their electoral influence there, has also been omitted. 
Cannon opines that the influence that the peerage 
were able to wield in parliament palled "in comparison 
with the power they wielded directly as office-holders, in 
day-to-day charge of the country, with a firm grip on the 
executive. , 
16 He goes on to argue that the level of 
peeraze representation in the executive is in correlation 
to their control of it. This share did not start to 
decline until long after George II's death. Beckett sees 
no reason to contest this view and felt able to write that 
"By 1760 Encland was effectively an oligarchy. "17 This 
misinterpretation grows from the political historians, of 
the period having collectively agreed on a view which is 
wrong in its exclusivity. Such has happened because the 
primary evidence can be interpreted as supporting the 
olizarchy theory. 
Consideration of the subject allows one to see that 
Cannon is barking up the wrong tree, the tree of 
oligarchy. Cabinets in both the early eighteenth-century 
and the mid-nineteenth-century were peer dominated. In the 
former, with the momentary and misunderstood exception of 
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1746, they did not resign en masse, in the latter they 
did. If the peerage domination is the constant there must 
be a variable elsewhere. The variable is crown influence, 
in the former period it was far stronger than it was in 
the latter one. Cannon overlooked it in the way that Pares 
and Christie had before him because it Was so much of the 
background that it did not need looking at and 
unfortunately it was also so very much of the essence. He 
is correct in illustrating that the peerage held a high 
proportion of senior offices. Unfortunately. the logical 
question that an enquiring mind seekinz to build on his 
work is liable to go on from this to ask is- Why did the 
peerage occupy such a high proportion? The real problem to 
be zone on to is- Whether they did so at will, and if not, 
Why did the crown let them? 
The evidence supportinx the olizarchy view can be 
used to also argue that the establishment of the Supremacy 
was not only beneficial to the whig party but that it was 
also beneficial to the crown's interests. The oligarchy 
was not a self-perpetuating one but rather it was a 
limited group who were appointed by two kings who 
purposefully selected their leading ministers principally 
from those magnate families which were pliant and admitted 
other people as they felt was appropriate. The evidence 
can be used in a systematic manner to support this. 
There is hard material evidence that Walpole was 
careful to limit his influence in terms'of having allies 
in senior offices and that he was perfectly prepared to 
promote the candidature of an individual who was not 
positively disposed towards himself. He did this because 
he realized that by doinx so he was maintaininc his own 
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overall relationship with George II even if he was also 
helping to promote as colleagues men who were politically 
antagonistic to himself. That such has not been 
appreciated before is in part the product of Plumb having 
chosen to terminate his biography of Walpole in 1734. Had 
he persisted he would have at least brought the matter 
into scholarly consideration. 
Cannon touches on the Bedchamber in a broader 
argument which is a part of an argument to account for the 
increase of 'the party of the crown' in the Lords during 
the course of the eighteenth-century. In doing so he takes 
rather a restricted view of the subject. Bedchamber lords 
were not an innovation of George 1, William III had had 
them. 18 The growth of offices occurred because Anne did 
not have male Bedchamber. therefore, Oxford could not 
expand it. therefore, he dragged into peer tenure a number 
of offices which had previously been held by commoners, 
e. g. tellerships of the Exchequer and the mastership of the 
Buckhounds. 
An interesting feature is the way in which the number 
of peers holding Bedchamber places increased during the 
course of the three reigns in which they occurred. The 
timing of these increases, especially under the two 
Georges, was indicative of a close relationship between 
the Bedchamber and the needs of the ministry in the Lords. 
The Bedchamber had at least a correlative relation with 
the ministry. The traditional view has been to Bee the 
Bedchamber as exclusively the kinc*s preserve. Pares 
articulated such and it has remained accepted. There was 
clearly some form of connection since political historians 
are aware that Bedchamber lords were watched in the House 
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as a means of monitoring the crown's attitude on 
controversial issues. Cannon recites this. 
18 
The dismissal of Clinton from the Bedchamber durinc 
the Excise Crisis for acting against Walpole in the matter 
is well known. Long overlooked and of equal importance is 
that the crown did maintain within the Bedchamber 
individuals who were occasionally politically 
idiosyncratic even though such behaviour was not 
necessarily in the contemporary ministryts best interests. 
The Bedchamber was a more complex beast than has 
previously been appreciated; it was closely connected with 
the crown's attitude to British politics. The crown 
shifted from a personal Bedchamber to a larger more 
impersonal one which accepted the kinsmen and connections 
of its leading members. Such could be argued to be a sign 
of a deterioration in the crownts position. paradoxically, 
it WaB one of itB strenaths. 
The relationship of the lords lieutenant and the 
custodeB rotulorum to one another has been somewhat 
misunderstood. In 1984 Cannon wrote "The justices were 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the advice of the Lord 
Lieutenant of the county. " Had "Aristocratic Century" been 
published a year later he could have availed himself of 
Norma Landauts work "The Justices of the Peace. " She more 
correctly covered the same ground with "In law, the CuStos 
rotulorum was head of the commission. But, in fact, the 
Lord Chancellor determined the composition of the peace. " 
She goes on to astutely comment that the perceptions of 
the state of the the relationship of the lieutenancy to 
the custos in the late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century may in large part have been derived 
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from evidence from the sixteenth- and 
nineteenth-centuries. 19 
The way in which the two offices were held chanced 
during the course of the period as a response to political 
developments over its course. That they were of political 
importance is not surprizing in view of the way in which 
the lieutenancies had been remodelled by James II during 
his reign. In addition, the expansion of the executive 
under William and Anne saw a large increase in the amount 
of patronage in the localities; by 1760 this was firmly 
integrated in the Old Corps political machine, whereas in 
1689 only some of was in existence and the Old Corps lay 
distinctly in the future. 
As with the Bedchamber, instances of the system under 
strain help to give insight into the changes that were 
taking place in politics. The frequency and manner of 
peers departing the lieutancies were indicative of the 
contemporary character of politics. A lot of sackines 
pointed to something different from a few resignations as 
did they both from a state where there were no departures 
from the office except by means of death. 
The years 1689-1760 can be seen as having a, theme in 
the lack of an aboriginal male sovereign. The country was 
ruled by an Englishwoman, a Dutchman and two Germans. All 
three men grew to political maturity outside of the 
British Political enviroment. Anne as a woman had 
considerable social prejudice militating against her. This 
can be exemplified by the way in which William had 
commanded in the Low Countries in person whereas she had 
to delegate such responsibility to the first duke of 
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Marlborough. The absence of a male native monarch occurred 
in a time when the crown underwent a marked change in its 
relations with parliament. 
William III's desire to engage in an ambitious 
foreign policy led him to compromise part of the crown's 
prerogative base in order that he might be allowed in 
return the financial means to conduct that policy. 
Parliament wished to avoid the threat of absolute monarchy 
that the Stuarts had seemed to threaten at times. 
Therefore, parliament was careful to ensure that it had 
possession of the legal basis for financing the executive. 
Thereby, when it felt that the crown's political behaviour 
was beyond the bounds of what was acceptable to the 
political nation as a whole, it could ensure that the 
crown heeded its opinion. If the crown refused to contain 
itself accordingly, the legal supports financing the 
executive could be withdrawn giving the crown the clear 
choice of either being inactive or financing its 
activities by what would indubitably be illegal means. 
Relations between crown and parliament were not the 
only theme that exists to be understood in these years 
even if it is the one that this thesis will concentrate 
on. During the first half of the period a state of of 
political agitation can be said to have existed. This 
varied in intensity, reaching peaks both in the late 1690s 
and in the early 1710s. The second half of the period was 
quieter than the first. It had variants within itself, the 
years before the 1748 treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle being 
noisier than those after. 
The study of the Commons has produced only a partial 
view. The two Houses of parliament had different 
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characters. The Lords was more sedate and reflective in 
nature than the Commons. The divisions in the Lords were 
not regularly re-underlined by general elections; the 
court had a proportionately larger presence there than in 
the Commons; there was never more than a token country 
element in the Upper House. Because the Commonsts 
membership was determined by zeneral elections it was far 
more influenced by the vehemence and the confrontational 
attitudes of low politics, in comparison the Lords 
acquired its membership via either inheritance or 
recruitment. The proportionately lower level of crown 
influence in the Commons meant that it was more open to 
being persuaded by force of argument, therefore, it was 
generally more tolerant of bluster and exclamation. A 
study of the Lords allows the structural elements in 
politics to be more easily perceived in relation to the 
eye-catching activitieB of inter-party warfare. If the 
battle is to be properly understood, the existence of the 
battlefield must first be duly acknowledged. 
The narrative section does not concentrate 
exclusively on the proceedings within the Upper Chamber. 
Rather, it looks at the full range of high politics in 
which the peerage engaged- parliamentary, court and 
ministerial. These fora are used to construct a broad 
narrative. Chronology is not strictly adhered to, thematic 
structures are used within a broad linear form. The reigns 
of William and Anne each have a single united narrative 
whereas those of two Georges are split by party. This is 
because in the early Hanoverian period the tories were 
excluded from government virtually all of the time, 
therefore, non-integrated treatments are the clearest 
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vehicles for discussing politics. 
The works of a number of political historians are 
touched upon. It is to be stressed that, with the 
exception of Turberville, there is no specific secondary 
literature on the peerage in high politics. Some 
dissertations are able to relate to quite a full 
literature of that type; a county study could be related 
to work of John Morrill, David Underdown, Andrew Coleby, 
Ann Hughes, Norma Landau, Alan Everitt, Clyve Holmes and 
Anthony Fletcher. There is a dearth of such material to 
relate to. Therefore, the points of contact with 
individual historians tend to be chronologically confined 
rather than systematically related to through the section. 
Much of the material is well known to political 
historians. What gives it originality is that the raw 
information can be related to itself in a manner so as to 
give an original interpretation, one which is new in 
character. Fresh material is used to illustrate various, 
matters which have largely'been overlooked. This fresh 
material has been found largely in sources as commonplace 
as Hervey and Coxe. The reign of George II has received 
less scrutiny from political historians than those of 
William, Anne and George I. Therefore. the text contains 
proportionately more fresh material on the years after 
1727 than on those before it. 
That there were two parties is undeniable. They were 
both still extant at the end of George II's reizn; indeed, 
this thesis contains fresh evidence to confirm Collevfs 
contention that the tory party survived as an organized 
and coherent entity until at least 1760. What this thesis 
35 
seeks particularly to advance is that there has been a 
failure to appreciate the parties' relationships with the 
crown and that this had an important bearins on why the 
Supremacy came into beinX and what its true nature was. 
With the departure of James II the pre-1679 elements 
in the composition of the two parties were free to 
surface. The tory party contained Proportionately far more 
members of the Caroline country Party than the whiX one 
did. The Settlement stirred up the backwoods tories to try 
to guard against further encroachments on the old order. 
Defensive opposition became the party's principal 
attitude. However. the leadership that had formed as 
lieutenants to Charles II were unable to, provide any 
alternative because James II had proved them wrong as to 
the merit of their previous principal Political plank and 
because they had their own fierce internal divisions which 
the Stuarts had fostered as a means of controlling them. 
The surviving whiz leadership had weathered adversity 
and then seen itself vindicated in its aim of seeking to 
exclude James. Persecution had led the whig leaders to be 
better integrated with their membership than the tory 
leadership were with the tory rank and file. The original 
whig leaders and their lieutenants were like the tory 
leaders in being courtiers. The difference was that the 
whics had found intolerable the prospect of a catholic 
James as king with respect to their own futures at court, 
although wider concerns did also play a part. 
In the early 1690s the inter-party division was 
principally of a historical character, the past issue of 
Exclusion coloured contemporary stances. The court/country 
axis dominated during the later 1690s. It initially masked 
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the new party division which was born in the wake of the 
Triennial Act, one that was very much along the lines of 
the old party division. The virtually full continuity of 
personnel has masked the substantive variances between the 
parties' pre- and post-Revolution characters, variances 
that transformed the parties into new entities rather than 
leavinx them as continuations of what had been before. The 
court/country axis was about whether the crown should be 
further limited, the new party axis was about whether 
active government should then be engaged in. The whigs 
were positively open to such, whereas the tories were far 
more equivocal. The whics' openness aided their 
predisposition to pro-court stances over the conduct of 
foreign policy and occasional conformity. 
This rather underplays the place of issues of 
principle, which is a charze lonc made at works that make 
heavy use of structural analysis. The reasons for such in 
this instance is firstly clarity and secondly that certain 
aspects of politics have been misunderstood about the 
character of the period's politics because of an undue 
stress on the independent nature of the two parties' 
respective characters. Overall, party has been civen too 
much weight of its own when in fact the two parties were 
derived from the contemporarY state of politics and the 
nature of past politics. Parties were never of a 
homogeneous nature, for some they were a career vehicle 
for others they were a means of expressing their opinions 
on a variety of issues; one persons heartfelt crievance 
was another personts posture of solidaritv with the 
aggrieved. The issues which went to give the parties 
character were not continuously at the forefront of 
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politics, indeed, there were stretches of time when there 
was not much to distinguish the two parties other than 
their historical differences. If one reads the political 
correspondence of those who participated in high politics 
one finds that there is precious little material about the 
ideological variances Of the two Parties. Bolingbroke was 
the only maJor politician who mused extensively on 
politics and he did so not from any intellectual or 
philosophical compulsion but rather in the hope of helping 
to oust his enemy Walpole. 
'Personal issues were the political ideological 
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characteristics which gave the two parties their separate 
and distinctive identities. 
19 It is a fully viable 
argument that in large part these issues followed on from 
attitudes taken with respect to the court and to the 
conduct of government. Plumb overlooked this in his 
eagerness to counter Walcott. 
20 He was led to do this 
because the stances that the whigs and the tories took 
could be in part traced back to pre-Revolution attitudes 
on contemporary issues. He was just looking back when he 
should also have been looking for contemporary 
motivations. 
The 'personal issues can be seen essentially 
court/country in nature. Occasional conformity illustrates 
that it was this axis which principally fuelled 
post-Revolution politics, doing so often in the form of 
inter-party conflict. The Low Church identification with 
the whiss and the High Church one with the tories were 
real. However, this has tended to rather overshadow the 
fact that both parties were firmly and decidedly anglican. 
Occasional conformity was in large part a court/country 
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issue because it arose in part from William being 
unwilling to grant the whigs more than nominal access to 
the governmentts potential electoral strength to help them 
overcome their position as the minority party. Therefore, 
the whics had to clutch at whatever means they could find 
to improve their position; thus there followed a broad 
alliance with the dissentine interests. The most recent 
example of a similar pact with the dissenting interest had 
been that of James II in his attempt to remodel 
parliament. Therefore, the tories' attitude towards 
dissent was in large part a response to the stance which 
was being taken by their historical enemies the whigs, who 
had been forced into it by the crown. The hostility was 
Pre-Revolution but the issue was essentially 
post-Revolution and had a strong court/country context. 
In the early sessions of Anne's reign the occasional 
conformity issue had a strong party context. As Dennis 
Rubini perceptively pointed out this stemmed from the 
recent passage of the Act of Settlement which incorporated 
most of the platform that had led many country whigs to 
.4 
work in cooperation with the tories over the last few 
years. 21 erefore, the country programme no longer acted 
as a binding agent. The war meant a return to active 
covernment. The whits, with their proportionately lower 
content of former members of the Caroline country party# 
were more willing to accept the necessity of such. 
Occasional conformity divided the parties into their 
respective camps but in doing so it created stresses in 
both of them. The measure was not welcomed by those tories 
who believed in the war's necessity since they viewed it 
as wasteful and distractive. They perceived it as an 
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attempt to deprive the court of a prop that they 
themselves might wish to avail themselves of in their own 
future dealings with their own party. Sturdy anglican, 
country whits found occasional conformity distasteful but 
they appreciated that the issue was not being sought as an 
object in itself but rather that it was being exploited 
for partisan ends. The principal objects of the attack 
were the court whigs who might not be everything that 
country whims could wish for but whose presence in office 
was preferable to that of the court tories. therefore, 
they put aside their support for the Measure and expressed 
solidarit. v with their party colleacues. (The same is true 
of the later stages of the War of the Spanish Succession. 
There is no reason for believing that in the late 1710s 
the whiz gentry positively liked Paying heavy rates of 
land tax. ) 
At her accession and prior to the emergence of 
occasional conformity as a major issue, Anne sought to 
create a court party, consisting primarily of tories. 
Occasional conformity proved that the tories as a whole 
were incapable of serving as her court party. Her chosen 
ministers increasingly had to rely on the whigs, who as a 
party were able to serve the court with greater ease than 
the tories were able to. The queents attitude to the 
tories in 1702 is a factor which has hindered a truer 
appreciation of how the whigs were identifyinz themselves 
as the court party. That she particularly disliked the 
Junto. the most influential group within the party, has 
aided the lack of comprehension as to the nature, of the 
political situation and of how the factors present in it 
pulled the whigs and the crown towards one another. There 
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was a structural attraction; the queen wanted to have a 
court party, while the whizs were better able to act as 
one than the tories were, Anne's attitude was a result of 
her desire for an active crown policy. The factor which 
cave their mutual attraction a gravity, putting into 
motion their structural sympathy, was her desire for the 
war to be fought. 
Anne has been misunderstood, she has been made into 
tAnne the tory queen. ' It is a reasonable contention that 
much of her initial favourinx of the tories stemmed not so 
much from who they were as from whom they were not. They 
were not the whigs. Her dislike of the whics was not from 
their party nature. Rather, it seems to have been from the 
way they had become her late brother-in-law's servants, a 
role that the tories had for the most part failed in. Over 
1702-1705 the tories should have been working to secure 
their Position rather than assuming that they were safe in 
it and going on the attack against the whigs. However, in 
the wake of the Act of Settlement the rank and file tories 
were too bloody-minded In their attitudes to allow 
themselves to be reharnessed by their leadership. While it 
would be wrong to wholly discount genuine religious 
concerns, there is a deficienev in our knowledge regarding 
the immediate political calculations that weighed with 
those tory leaders who sponsored the scheme. 
In 1705 the High Church party were dismissed from 
office. Godolphin came increasinzly to'rely on the whigs 
for political support for the duumvir ministry- Anne 
became disenchanted with British participation in the War 
of the Spanish Succession, whereas her ministers did not. 
Therefore. there came the opportunity for Harley to become 
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her first minister in 1710. 
There was considerable scope for Brian Hill and Anaus 
McInnes to revive Harleyts reputation because Feiling saw 
the man's ministry as having a party character rather than 
a court one. The two principal reasons for his doing so 
were that the inter-party conflict was at a new height at 
the time of the ministry and because he did not appreciate 
that there had arisen a generation of moderate court 
tories who were different from both the Caroline 
leadership, that had by then in larce part disappeared, 
and from the rank and file tories who did not have their 
pro-court attitude. This arose from Feiling beinz both too 
literal and not analytical enough in his handling of 
primary sources. He failed to understand that 1710 was 
essentially a return to 1702 but then he had not 
appreciated the nature of 1702, when Anne had sought to 
have a court party serve her rather than the tory one. 
Feilinz perceived Ormond as standing with Rochester 
"for the pure Tory creed" while he repeats that Jersey was 
rumoured to be a Jacobite and that he kept out for another 
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year. This omits that both Ormond and Jersey were hearty 
Williamite courtiers during the years of the country 
party's height after Ryswick; Ormond was Rochester's 
son-in-law but he was also Williamts blood relative, while 
Jersey was brother to the countess of Orkney that king*s 
mistress. Feilingts errors were repeated by Plumb. The 
last was so receptive to Feiling's. work that he was even 
prepared to go to the length of applauding Walcott for 
regurgitating it. 
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On the Hanoverian Succession, George I opted to give 
the whigs the lionts share of office. In the wake of the 
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1715 Rising they acquired a monopoly; the first that had 
occurred for a quarter of a century. The whits were able 
to take advantage of this situation because their 
leadership and the majority of their rank and file were 
positively willing to serve the crown as a court party, 
firstly because they were generally more predisposed 
towards it and secondly because the crown, in the wake of 
the Act of Settlement coming into force, had a limited 
prerogative. 
The Supremacy followed and then worked for over four 
decades. However, however'large the degree of overlap 
between the court party and the whiz party was during it 
they were always separate entities, the terms should never 
be used synonymously. The party's position was 
conditional- court power could only be used for court 
measures, these were limited to routine crown business 
rather than trying to recapture the lost parts of the 
prerogative. The conditional nature of the relationship 
worked both ways- if the crown sought to try to enlarge 
the prerogative whigs would rapidly fall away from 
supporting the court; such incidents as did occur were the 
result of misjudgements on the part of the crown's 
ministers rather than of any monarch seking to enlarge the 
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crown's prerogative . Both George I and George II 
delegated most of the detailed and burdensome aspects of 
managing British domestic politics to native politicians. 
The level of the crown's influence on the whic party 
-both ministerial and opposition- has been underestimated. 
The assumption that ministries were homogeneous 
oligarchies is an error; therefore, to map out the 
elements that went to make them heterogeneous is to 
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advance the literature. There has been little real 
systematic investization of either aspect of the party. 
Foord's 1964 book is the best that the secondary 
literature has to offer. Its coverage of the Lords is 
small and its appreciation of the peerage's politics is 
minimal, although as a work in its own parameters it is 
both useful and well executed. 
In Feiling*s wake the tories were viewed as an 
exhausted topic until Colley showed that there were 
considerable riches still to be uncovered. As her interest 
was to prove that the party continued to exist as a 
political entity over 1714-1760 it followed that she did 
not investigate the pattern of tergiversation away from 
the party. This thesis uses a study of that pattern as an 
engine by which to see if there are any proclivities to be 
detected in such and whether these, if they existed, bore 
any relation to the party's internal state. 
After the 1715 Rising the tory party continued to 
contain a substantial court element. However, this was 
made up of those people who had been prepared to serve in 
the Oxford ministry and who therefore had a rather limited 
identification with the mass of the party. The Caroline 
leadership at least had had a strong mutual identity with 
the tory rank and file in the early and middle 1680s. 
Historians have unduly subordinated the Harleyites' 
courtness to their toryness. The career of Harlev has been 
re-interpreted, such demands that his followers' fate 
after his fall also deserves to be reconsidered. 
Post-1715 the Harlevites expressed solidarity with 
their party collearues because they felt it to be in their 
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own best interests. Stanhope and Sunderland and then 
Townshend and Walpole knew it was easier to control a 
court party which drew exclusively on whig support than it 
was to control one which drew on the tories as well. The 
Harle. vites were initially placed beyond the Pale because 
the treaty of Utrecht had deeplv offended George 1. The 
king chose to maintain such an attitude; therefore, he did 
not create a transparty court party which his ministers 
would have had to accept. The Harleyites aside, the other 
sections of the tory party were not likely to promote 
themselves as ministerial servants through holding either 
too Jacobite or too country attitudes. 
The HarleVites' unity in opposition through George 
I'B reien was impressive in view of their court 
inclinations. George II was content to retain the smooth 
ministerial machine that his father had left him. The 
frustration that the Harlevites felt led to a spate of 
defections from their section of the tory party. These 
defections only stopped because of a new use of the 
country axenda by cynical courtiers who had reached 
political maturity in an age when the Revolution 
Settlement had become political wallpaper. This occurred 
because Walpole, the court's chosen political manager, had 
realized that politics would be easier to manage if he 
lowered the occurrence of genuine inter-party 
confrontation. This had the effect of lowering the overall 
political temperature, such made transpartv cooperation 
possible on a non-party platform. 
After Walpole's fall the court soon re-asserted its 
control of politics. Neither had the relations between the 
various court groups been resolved nor had the question 
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been answered of who was going to be in the ministry when 
the the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion broke out. In its wake the 
surviving court-inclined Harleyites drew into the 
ministerial fold, followed for the first time by a 
significant number of mainstream tories. The political 
quiet of the early 1750s arose from the remaining tories 
being unwilling to be exploited again as they had been in 
the 1730s by careerist courtiers. 
The recontroversialization of politics in the late 
17508 is directly comparable to the 1620s. The expense of 
going to war made the political nation feel it had the 
right to criticize the conducting of that war. Excitement 
grew in part from the court having to reshuffle its 
ministerial line-up a couple of times before it had an 
appropriate team for the circumstances. There was an 
incorporation of a few tories as tories into the 
ministerial fold although other still stayed outside of it 
as did some whigs. 
It would be in error. to, discuss a disappeared state 
of affairs without touching on the factor or factors that 
caused that state to pass on. This is done briefly and is 
restricted to where pertinent. Discussions of the Excise 
Crisis. the popularity of admiral Vernon and the repeal of 
the Jewish Naturalization Act all help to give a context 
for the narrative that precedes it. 
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2.1. Introduction. 
The power to make commoners peers and promote peers 
from one rank to another lay within the royal prerogative. 
The best known incident of recruitment Policy in these 
years is the mass creation of the winter of 1711-1712. 
Cannon, through the broad nature of his canvas, chose only 
to look at whether peers were related to other peers, 
while Beckett chose to look at entry into the aristocracy 
rather than the more limited subJect of entry into the 
peerage. 
There were basic and universal assumptions about the 
peerage. What forms these ideas took is uncertain. This 
may have stemmed from their so generally being held that 
there was felt to be no need ever to refer to them. On the 
other hand, with the Dissolution being the foundation of 
many fortunes and the corruption of the early Stuart court 
the means by which those courtiers gained social 
distinction, it is unlikely that any lofty conceptions 
would have survived against a background of pragmatic 
realism. 
The best hunting ground for views on the nature of 
the peerage should be found around about the Peerage bill 
of 1719.1 However, despite the work of John Naylor, such 
material proves, rather elusive. In part this may come from 
the fact that the bill never became an Act, such would 
have probably brouzht forth suitable bepamphleted tirades. 
In the sections below recruitments and promotions are 
treated in an intertwined manner. This is because they 
were influenced by the same factors as one another. Were 
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they treated separately promotions would be dealt with at 
a disproportionate length since direct evidence on them is 
rarer than that on recruitments. Therefore, the two are 
treated together. 
The first section deals with the material worth of 
the peerage. The second is a consideration of the question 
of rank within the peerage. It lookB both at the rank at 
which peers were recruited and promotions from one rank to 
another. The third is a study of the size of the peerage 
and the way in which recruitment was not the only factor 
which added to it. The fourth section is where the meat of 
this chapter lies. It deals with the factors which 
promoted individual recuitments and Promotions. Those with 
their own subsection are- the law, state service, 
continuity, corruption, the Scots and politics. The last 
is somethinz of a coverall for all those instances that 
can not be neatly catecorized under one of the other 
headincB. 
In both the early 1690s and the early 1750S the best 
means of being recruited was to be the friend or kinsman 
of someone important; therefore, on one level matters were 
fairly static over the period. However, in themselves 
descriptions of the operation of the factors show that it 
is possible to delineate the operation of political forces 
and thus advance our current understanding of the politics 
of the period 1689-1760. This is true in terms both of 
understanding the period as a whole and of allowing such 
an overview to give insight into particular incidents. 
Lists of the recruitments and promotions can be found in 
appendix A. 
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2.2. Estate. 
Of Oxford's mass creation Peter Wentworth commented 
that 11... som take offence, others laugh, thol noe body can 
deny their being well chosen, at least most of them, for 
their estates and families. " 
2 There was a contemporary 
belief that if someone was seeking a peerage they should 
have the wealth to be able to support the dignity they 
aspired to; William III cave Somers the manor of Reizate 
to ensure that his title was properly supported. 
3 Not only 
was it thought that a peer should be an individual of a 
particular economic level but it was also thought that 
differentiations of economic levels between peers should 
be expressed where appropriate. Just as William III 
granted Somers Reigate so he gave the first earl of 
Warrington a 92000 p. a. pension out of the Post Office upon 
the man's promotion so that the dignity might be supported 
appropriately. 
4 
The practice of adding a pension or giving 
a grant of lands had been widely used by Charles II but 
after the Revolution Settlement came into operation it was 
used sparingly. 
With William's acceptance of the civil list, monarchs 
were no longer able to alienate crown lands at will. 
Rather, parliament's concurrence had to be sought. This 
discouraged alienations since parliament was disinclined 
to rid itself of a source of revenue which helped to keep 
down the need for taxes. William was made aware of this 
disinclination when he tried to grant some of the duchy of 
Cornwall's lands in North Wales to the earl of Portland. 
The opposition to this, which was led by the Denbighshire 
gentry, was such that he backed down .5 
William's next attempt was estates that had been 
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confiscated in Ireland in the wake of the rebellion there. 
Although this was in his role as king of Ireland and 
therefore was not technically English business, this 
attempt also met with failure since the English parliament 
was happy to view Ireland as a source of revenue to be 
exploited whenever possible. 
6 Consequently, Albemarle and 
the Villierses were not territorially established in the 
way servants of the the Stuarts. such as the first earls 
of Clarendon and of Bristol (1622). had been earlier in 
the century. 
Anne met with the most substantial success in this 
area. At the reign's opening the duke of Marlborough's 
spouse had been against his being promoted to a dukedom 
because their Hertfordshire estate was not capable of 
properly supporting such an honour. Consequently, they had 
been granted a limited pension from the Post Office 
Revenue. 7 In 1705 the queen Persuaded parliament to agree 
to the grant of the royal manor of Woodstock in 
Oxfordshire to the first duke in view of his spectacular 
military victory at Blenheim. 
Baron Bincley is the last individual whom it is 
possible to identify as receiving some form of grant of 
alienated land- Bramham Moor in Yorkshire. He did not come 
from a great territorial background, his father having 
practised as a provincial lawyer. At the time of his 
recruitment there was some difficulty at the Heralds' 
office in finding the family's arms, which implies that 
they had-only recently economically achieved armorial 
rank. 
8 
Torrington is the only identifiable instance of an 
individual receiving estat under the Hanoverians. This 
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was as a commoner in the wake of his naval victory at Cape 
Passaro in 1718. His being raised to the peerage was the 
result of politics rather than of honouring his victorw. 
Therefore, the grant was divorced from his title. The 
lands were in Ireland and the grant was for only thirty 
years at the end of which time the lands reverted to the 
crown despite the pleadings of the third viscount. 
9 
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2.3. Rank. 
There are a number of points to be drawn about rank 
at recruitment. Barons always made up at least half of 
those summoned within any of the reians. The proportion of 
barons to non-barons rose through the period, while there 
ceased to be any creations above the rank of earl after 
1711. Just as there was a variance from one reign to 
another in how people were created, so there was variance 
from reign to reign as to which ranks of the peerage they 
were created at. In William's reign the non-barons were 
English and Dutch favourites and naval and military 
victors. In Anne's they were leading Scottish peers and 
her two final first ministers. In George Its they were a 
senior Irish peer, a user of corruption, two Scottish 
minors who were the prospective heirs to dukedoms, a 
first-rank politician and'three second-rank ones of whom 
one was a naval hero of sorts. In George II's reign the 
first two of the previous set were repeated and joined by 
two first-rank politicians. 
Factors from one reign to another could continue, 
change, appear or disappear. The broad trend that emerges 
is that the wealthy English gentry who were reaching the 
peerage were not doing so above the level of baron, unless 
they were politicians of the first calibre or ones in' 
highly opportune circumstances. Those who were entering at 
the-level of viscount-or above, with the possible 
exception of Lonsdale, were Scots, Irish, naval, military, 
court favourites or users of bribery. From this it can be 
stated. in correlation with the growth in the share of the 
baronies, that the wealthy English gentry were 
increasingly successful in entering the peerage as a 
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proportion of the recruits. 
Just as both the rank at which peers were summoned 
and the size of the peerage changed, so did the 
proportions of the five ranks to one another in the 
overall group of recruits and inheritors. The three most 
numerically occurrent were the dukes, the earls and the 
barons. Over 1690-1735 the number of dukes more than 
doubled and then went on to contract slightly. Because of 
Charles II9s bastards and the careers of Schombers, 
Marlborough and Leeds, the ratio of inheritors to recruits 
was not overwhelmingly in the former's favour for the 
first two reigns. However, with the 1743 death of 
Greenwich the rank came to be held exclusively by 
inheritors. But for Newcastle (1715) and Dorset outliving 
George II, dukedOMB would have been held exclusively by 
people who had inherited the rank, rather than by people 
who had inherited peerage status and who had then been 
promoted to the rank. 
The number of earldoms grew by nearly a quarter over 
the period, which, as with the dukedoms, meant that they 
comfortably outstripped the growth of the peerage 
proportionately. One in five of these occurrences happened 
to a recruit. The overall proportion of inheritors amongst 
the individuals to whom it occurred was over eichty-five 
per cent. The ratio of inheritors of earldoms to recruited 
ones and promoted inheritors was fairly stable. The most 
important period in this balance was again George I's 
reign. Before it occurrence was less than one in five and 
after more than one in five. The inheritors were 
increasing their share of the promotions at the recruits' 
expense. 
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Over the period the number of barons decreased by 
nearly ten per cent. In conjunction with the expansion of 
the peerage, this meant a decrease of nearly a fifth in 
their relative share of the peerage. A comparison of 1690 
to 1760 reveals a BiMilar ratio to the earls of inheritors 
to recruits, slightlv over the eighty mark in the former's 
favour. The effect of the large creations of the 1710S was 
to maintain that share at approximately two-thirds until 
George II's active recruiting in the 1740s. The two lowest 
ranks came to largely be the preserve of the poor, the 
catholic, the recruited and the torv. Therefore, good 
whigs and courtiers positively desired to achieve the rank 
of earl or above. This continued to be even more the case 
in the 1740s and 17508'since George II had a policy of 
keeping recruitment and diminutions in a rough balance. 
The number of promotions was in key with the overall 
number of the losses to the peerage rather than being in 
parallel with the character of those losses. 
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2.11. Number of Peers. 
To assess the change in the number of peers it is 
necessary to impose a scale on the period. This is done 
(arbitrarily so) with trans-sections at five year 
intervals. These are taken as of midnight on January Ist 
of each year and start in 1690 so as to fit the maximum 
number in the period. The results are displayed in 
appendix B. The 1690 figure is 160, which gives a point 
from which to draw a baseline through the fourteen other 
trans-sections. Comparison with it allows detection of 
whether there has been any growth or shrinkage in the 
number of peers. The 1760 figure was 171. which means that 
there was a numerical growth through the scale of eleven. 
However, the two figures are not a true reflection of the 
number of peerages at their given times and therefore 
their difference is not the true numerical change in the 
peerage. The figures include those peers who were sitting 
in the right of their fathers' baronies and 
10 
whose 
peerages were additional to the true core of the peerages. 
Therefore, if the four such 1690 peers are subtracted and 
the none from the 1760 figure, the true numerical growth 
within the scale emerges as fifteen (9.6%) 
The growth of fifteen from 1690 to 1760 was not an 
upwards progression. There were fourteen five year periods 
which could have seen growth (5), decline (6) or 
stagnation (3). Neither growth nor decline had a 
predominant occurrence among the periods. There was growth 
in only just over a third of all the periods. Growth 
occurred in spurts. The three periods 1695-1700.1710-1715 
and 1720-1725 were responsible for the growth of the 
peerage. It may be stated that growth occurred in the 
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first half, the pre-1725 period, of the framework. 
There were a variety of factors which influenced the 
number of peerages besides title extinction and creations. 
These were baronies by writs, incorrect title recognition, 
attainders and reversals of attainders. 
There were two types of title- those which were by 
writ and those which were by letters patent. The former 
created an individual In a title and then left it to 
descend according to English Common law. Therefore, Just 
as a piece of property could pass to a female so could one 
of these titles. If there was not a single heir but rather 
a number of coheirs the title was the property of them all 
and fell, into abeyance either until such time as there was 
only a single heir, not necessarily one of the original 
coheirs, or until the coheirs came to a voluntary 
agreement amongst themselves that one of them should 
receive it. Titles became extinct when all the possible 
coheirs were dead or they could effectively fall'into 
permanent abeyance if there too many coheirs for it ever 
to possible for any agreement to be reached amongst them. 
Although used earlier in the seventeenth-century, 
e. c. Clifton, baronies by writ had stopped being used prior 
to the opening of the period. Letters patent were Used 
exclusively for titles during the period both for 
recruitments and for promotions. In these the possible 
passages of inheritance which the patents laid out were 
not necessarily from father-to-son or even from one blood 
relative to another. 
The two types could be held by a single individual. 
During the course of the period the earldoms of Derby, 
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Lincoln, Northamptom, FerrerB and Peterborough and the 
barony of Ward, all of which titles were by letters 
patent, became respectively separated from the baronies by 
writ of Strange, Clinton, Compton, Ferrers, Mordaunt and 
Dudley. Other baronies by writ which were recognized 
during the course of the period were those of Wentworth, 
Berners, Dacre, Clifton and Willoughby de Broke. Not all 
attempts to be recognized were necessarily successful, the 
eleventh baron Willoughby de Broke only being recognized 
at his second attempt. 
11 The complexities of inheritance 
were such that a couple of baronies were recognized when 
they were technically extinct- the seventh duke of 
Somerset was recognized as baron Percy on his mother's 
death, the title having previously become extinguished and 
baroness Cromwell had been recognized erroneously before 
the period opened. 4 
A number of people were deprived of their peerages. 
This was a response either to treason or to what was held 
to be treasonous activity. The barony of Widdrington, the 
earldom of Derwentwater and the dukedom of Ormond were all 
permanently attainted in the wake of the Hanoverian 
Succession and the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion. The viscounty 
of Bolingbroke was attainted at the same juncture but its 
attainder was reversed in 1725 and the first viscount was 
restored in blood. Prior to the period's opening the first 
duke of Monmouth had lost that title along with the 
earldom of Doncaster and the barony of Scott in the wake 
of his unsuccessful rebellion. His patrilineal grandson 
the Scottish peer the second duke of Buccleuch was 
restored to the two junior titles in 1743. 
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The dukedom of Marlborough had had its letters patent 
changed by Act of parliament in 1706. This was to allow it 
to be transferred to the duke's daughters and their heirs 
because his eldest son had died and because a new title 
would have meant that his heirs would have a lower 
precedence than the two peers who had been promoted to 
dukedoms after he had. 
A number of peers circumvented such lengths by having 
themselves recruited in titles in addition to those they 
already held. These would be remaindered on their chosen 
heir-general, who would otherwise have been a commoner 
without the transferable additional title. George 11 Cave 
out most of these in the second half of his reign. This 
was in parallel with his greater liberality than with 
recruitments and promotions. This was appropriate since he 
was particularly partial to 'continuity' promotions and 
recruitments. 
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2.5. Factors Effecting Promotion and Recruitment. 
2.5.1. Introduction. 
There were a variety of factors which influenced both 
recruitment and promotion: politics, state service, 
corruption, Scottish politics, legal eminence. the 
pleasing of a third party, court favour and the continuing 
of an extinct title. For ease of handling, individuals are 
dealt with under these broad headings but it would be 
simplistic to say that an individual necessarily owed his 
title exclusively to that feature with which it is most 
easy to identify him. It is not the case that commoners 
could achieve titles through a single means at once, just 
as it can be hard to identify them with one means rather 
than another while others appear in more than one section. 
The selection is arbitrary in nature. Individuals are 
sometimes mentioned in more than one category. 
'State service' is for those people who gained their 
titles through serving the state in one of the branches of 
the executive- the army, the navy and the diplomatic corps 
such as it was. 'Corruption' is the use of financial 
inducements to individuals such as royal mistresses in 
order to gain titles from the crown. Tpe term is not meant 
to convey the idea of corrupting what was innocent before 
but rather that of operating a pre-extant aspect of court 
society. 'The Scots' refers to any peer who was Scottish 
but held a British title (and Greenwich whose initial 
earldom was English). 'The Law' are those who reached one 
or more of a specific group of senior legal positions. 
Some were recruited upon their appointment to one of the 
specific offices. 'Continuity* describes those who came 
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from a family that had had a title or who had inherited an 
estate which had previously supported one. Each of the 
five occurred in a political context. 'Politics' is the 
coverall for whatever does not fit into them neatly. 
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2.5.2. The Law. 
The law provided several entrants during the period. 
There was a long stream of tradition that went back into 
the the Tudor era, the Ecertons and the Montacus beinz 
only two of the many families that owed much of their 
wealth and prominence to having had a judicial ancestor. 
There were eleven recruits who held at least one of the 
offices of the two lord chief Justices (Common Pleas and 
King's Bench) or the lord keepership or its alternative, 
and the height of any legal career, the lord 
chancellorshiP. 
12 There was a series of reasons why 
lawyers were recruited. Junior lawyers were encouraged to 
aspire, thereby sharpening the standard of practice, the 
House of Lords was provisioned with additional expertise 
and the forensic skills provided the government with able 
debaters. 
There was no set pattern by which a lawyer rose to be 
a candidate for elevation. It is clear that the entry of 
senior lawyers into ennoblement was not a smooth 
clockwork-like process but rather was something that was 
susceptible to contemporary political pressures including 
monarchical prejudice. All of them sat as M. P. s, although 
they could not be such if they became a judge. The offices 
of attorney general and solicitor general had to be held 
by M. P. s but not all of them served in either, dust as 
others served in one rather than both. Achievina one of 
the three uppermost offices did not guarantee receipt of a 
title. There was variation between the senior legal 
offices. Of the two lord chief justiceships, that of 
King's Bench was a better base for gaining one than that 
of the Common Pleas was. 
13 
only Trevor and King made it 
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from the latter. 
All the legal recruits of the period died as court 
whiss. A predominance could be expected but a monopoly is 
indicative of there being some uniting operative factor. 
This was that senior lawyers were susceptible to making 
themselves amenable to the prevailing political trend. 
Somers and Cowper were recruited as court whigs, the party 
being generally more pro-court than the tories. Trevor, 
Harcourt and Macclesfield (1721) were draftees sucked in 
during the 1710s. King and Raymond appear to have been 
fairly innocuous professionals drawn in by vacancies. The 
next four Judicial recruits were whigs, however, they 
reflected the latest trend. George II disliked recruiting 
lawyers unless there were pressing circumstances for him 
to do so. In itself professional eminence was never enough 
and the four had to force their way to their respective 
titles. 
In 1733 lord chief Justice Raymond died and lord 
chancellor King retired. Hardwicke was capable of filling 
either post, whereas Talbot was only suited for the 
chancellorship through his expertise being as a Chancery 
lawyer, therefore, both were able to extract titles. That 
the demise of one's senior colleagues was the best means 
of elevation was also borne out by Mansfield's succession 
to Ryder's lord chief justiceship in 1756.14 Peerazes 
could be given as carrots to reward good behaviour just as 
they could be withheld as sticks to induce better 
behaviour. As ever, circumstance was an important factor. 
In 1756 Sir John Willes was one of those who was 
seeking to exploit the political situation in order to 
gain a peerage. 
15 The following year he was offered the 
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Great Seal but made his acceptance of it conditional on 
his becoming a peer. George 11 refused this and gave the 
post to Henley, who was prepared to hold it as a commoner 
even though he also desired to be recruited. The need for 
a lord high steward for the trial of the fourth earl 
Ferrers forced the king's hand in relation to Henley. 
The dual entrv of 1733 can cive the impression that 
lawyers were able to enter with creater ease than before 
and that the general clamp down on new creations did not 
affect them. Such a view would be erroneous. if anything 
the opposite is true. The Post-1741 difficulty that Willes 
and Henley faced was in part a product of that incident. 
In general, lawyers had to extort their peerages from 
George 11 and never received them in a vacuum. 
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2.5.3. State Service. 
The diplomatic service and the army had an overlap 
from the latter to the former. In times of war it was 
often the case that a military commander was given scope 
for related diplomatic action. The experience of foreign 
politics that soldiers garnered in war-time could be 
efficiently exploited by it being applied to diplomatic 
uses in peace-time. There was no diplomatic corps per se, 
therefore, the penetration of the diplomatic service by 
outsiders was a prerequisite for its existence. Domestic 
politicians provided a number of the diplomats. The 
opportunities were curtailed because many ambassadors were 
drawn from the existing peerage. 
Recruitments connected solely with with diplomatic 
service were rare. The lack of opportunities accounts for 
this in large part. Openings did not really come until 
after Utrecht. William had the Dutch diplomatic service. 
which he was long used to using, to undertake many of the 
tasks that he could have entrusted to Englishmen. During 
Anne's reign the alliances of William's reign were 
automatically revived. Spain was the only new area for 
intense diplomatic activity and there the postings were 
conferred on military commanders. The treaty of Utrecht 
was an important Juncture for the conduct of British 
foreign affairs. The two wars had made the nation a far 
more powerful international entity. In 1714 Britain had 
the sort of international presence which it had not had 
since the Interrexnum. It was necessary to have diplomatic 
relations throuch-out western and northern Europe in order 
to follow the flow of international relations and to 
counter any possible moves by foreign powers to try to 
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embarrass the nation through the sponsorship of Jacobite 
activity. 
The period 1713-1716 saw two definite and one 
arguable service creations. The ending of the War of the 
Spanish Succession necessitated the sending of an 
ambassador to Madrid. Bingley was a close ally of the 
first earl of Dartmouth, who was Oxford's southern 
secretary. Therefore, Bincley was a good candidate and he 
was willing to give up the chancellorship of the Exchequer 
in order to hold the position. To reward him and to pay a 
courtesy to the Spanish the man was ennobled. 
16 By 1714 
Cobham's European service had seen him reach the rank of 
lieutenant general. As such he was a good candidate to be 
sent to Austria, Britain's war-time ally. 
17 In addition, 
he was a whiz and a substantial landowner in 
Buckinghamshire. He too was made a peer before departing 
on his mission. 
Cadogan is the debatable instance. Like Cobham he was 
an experienced officer being sent to a country which had 
been a war-time ally but he was not made a peer, although 
he was made master of the Robes in 1714. While he was at 
The Hague the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion broke out in 
Scotland. He successfully negotiated for the loan of a 
body of Dutch troops to help suppress the revolt and 
returned to Britain in command of them. From February to 
May 1716 he was commander-in-chief in Scotland. For this 
service he was made a peer. 
18 It is arguable that had he 
not been serving as a diplomat he would not have been able 
to serve militarily with such distinction and so earn his 
title. 
Harrington was another soldier who served as a 
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diplomat. The expertise he had acquired during his war 
service in Spain was channelled into various missions on 
behalf of the southern secretaryship. Despite being a 
Younger son of a gentleman, he was aspirant to entering 
the peerage, because he had married the heiress-general of 
the Gerard earls of Macclesfield (1679). Finally, his 
accrued diplomatic experience made him central to the 
negotiation of the treaty of Seville, "His merits in that 
delicate negotiation, extorted the peerage from the king. " 
The extorting being promoted by Newcastle (1715), who, as 
southern secretary, supervized the affair. 
19 
In 1754 before the final deterioration in 
Franco-British relations Hyde was one of the candidates 
for the prospective posting as ambassador at Versailles. 
He would have received a title then had he been 
selected. 
20 Like Harrington, he was a younger son of an 
aristocrat, executive service Proving attractive to people 
in such a Position. Hyde owed his title to politics and 
continuity. 
Peers tended to be given important diplomatic work. 
Bestowing promotions on them was a means both of rewarding 
them for their willingness to serve the state and 
flattering those with whom they were going to treat. 
Jersey was made an earl before going to The Hague in 
1697.21 Strafford (1711) had been working in Europe since 
1701 but was given the earldom of Strafford before going 
to Utrecht. Cadogan had been ambassador at The Hague 
before being recruited. He was held in high regard by the 
Dutch and therefore was continued in his office after he 
had helped suppress the 1715 Jacobite Rebellion. That he 
was raised to an earldom in 1718 while still there can 
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only have pleased them. Waldecrave was ambassador at 
22 
Vienna when he received his promotion in 1729 . 
The senior ranks of both the army and navy were to a 
large extent filled by aristocrats and their kinsmen, yet 
the army produced only a fraction of the number of 
recruits that the navy did. This divergence stemmed from 
the crown's attitudes towards its armed forces. War 
dominated the first two reigns. James II's Journey to 
raise Ireland into revolt cave William a further exCUBe to 
expand the sizable army that his predecessor had left 
behind and which he had initially enlarged in the wake of 
England's May 1689 declaration of war on France. As soon 
as the rebellion was broken William was able to start 
deploying the army in Europe. He used the navy in a 
auxiliary role. William was happy to allow a level of 
Parliamentary involvement in both forces in terms of 
personnel. However, he was careful to keep the two forces 
as part of the executive rather than allowing parliament 
to obtain a de Jure right to be involved in them. Anne 
accepted the necessity of Britain contributing fully to 
the land war effort on the continent. Therefore, she 
continued her predecessor's respective treatment of the 
two services. 
The Hanoverians were militarily experienced in Europe 
but had only minimal association with maritime affairs. 
The army which they inherited was had a strong character 
of its own and it took considerable efforts on their parts 
to stamp their authoritv-on it by means of individually 
overseeing the distribution of regiments and the awarding 
of the rank of colonel. The Hanoverians' insistence on 
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keeping politicians out of army decisions stemmed from a 
determination to establish and then maintain control of it 
as an institution. 23 
Schomberg and the earl of Torrington gained their 
titles as rewards for major contributions in the military 
aspects of the Revolution. The duke was William's military 
right-hand man during the course of it while the earl was 
one of the seven signatories of the Invitation and 
commanded the invasion fleet in 1688. The earl of Orford 
(1697) was commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet during 
1696 and as such kept a potential invasion fleet penned in 
in Dunkirk and Calais. In addition, he was a member of the 
Junto, the whig parliamentarw group which played an 
important part in enabling William to conduct his war 
policy. The second factor was the one that led to his 
being created. 
Mountjoy, Boyle. the second earl of Cholmondley 24 and 
Cobham were all soldiers. However, they entered the 
peerage as political draftees of the 1710s rather than as 
victorious conquistadors. As the discussion of diplomatic 
peerages shows Cadogan's case is debatable. If it is 
appreciated that Cadogan was born an Irishman, it can be 
stated, if with a hint of perversity, that no Englishman 
achieved a peerage through army service. 
Anson secured his title principally because of a 
naval victory at Cape Finisterre in 1747-25 The nearest 
army equivalent in the War of the Austrian Succession was 
the 1743 battle of Dettingen, where George II had 
commanded in person, perhaps thus denying some soldier of 
a parallel title to the sailorts. In sharp comparison with 
Anson, Vere and viscount Torrington were clearly garnering 
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the fruits of the navy's comparative openness to outside 
political interference. The first viscount Torrington 
exacted his peerage as the price for his quitting the 
Admiralty peaceably and thereby yielding in his quarrel 
there with its first lord- the third earl of Berkeley. The 
first earl of Bristol recollected an the viscount's 1733 
death that the man was "generally looked upon as kicked 
,, 26 - upstairs; ... Vere rose to be an admiral of the Blue. He 
was recruited because his expertise had led him to become 
a lord of the Admiralty. There he quarrelled with a land 
lubber first lord, the fourth earl of Sandwich, and 
therefore resigned in anger in July 1749. In spring 1750 
relations between Sandwich and the Pelhams were 
antagonistic and the latter solicited a peerage on Vere's 
behalf in order to slight the former. 
The divide between the two branches of the executive 
was clearly reflected in how one remained directly 
associated with the crown while the other drifted into 
being subject to ministerial games, the one came to have 
no senior members recruited while the other did. 
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2.5.4. Continuity. 
The previous existence of a title played a part in a 
number of recruitments. Both the 1694 recruitment of the 
first baron Herbert and the one of baron Lansdowne in the 
winter of 1711-1712 were in the wake of a patrilineal 
first cousin once removed having died. Both recruits were 
left as the senior male members Of their branches of their 
respective families. Had the patents of the extinct titles 
been drawn wider then they would have inherited them: this 
was particularly true of Lansdowne because the earldom of 
Bath had been given to his uncle, the first earl, in order 
to commemorate the civil war victory of Sir Bevil 
Granville. Sir Bevil was the earl's father but he was also 
Lansdowne's grandfather. 
Neither baron inherited the patrimonial estates of 
the person whose title they were continuing. over the 
period there was a shift in emphasis as to the criterion 
for forwarding an individual for a continuity creation. 
This shift was from patrilineage towards possession. The 
period's final two recipients of continuity creations 
-Hyde and Sondes- were not patrilineally related to their 
tpredecessors, l but each acquired two sets of estates that 
had supported earldoms. Hyde married the heiress to the 
lands of the earls of Rochester and of Clarendon, while 
Sondes inherited those of the earls of Rockingham and of 
Feversham. 28 This shift can be seen as a reflection of the 
way in which the crown was no longer able to alienate 
royal lands in order to create an estate which 
territorially established an individual. 
Among George II's accession recruits the first earl 
of Buckinghamshire was the heir to the second earl of 
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Stamford's (Maynard derived) west country estates and the 
first marquis of Rockingham inherited the Yorkshire ones 
of the earl of Strafford (1641). Conway inherited his 
lands from an elder brother who had in turn inherited them 
from a matrilineal relative. 
29 
Hyde was an example of the importance in some 
instances of recruitment of marriage to heiresses. 
MountJoy married the heiress to the Glamorgan section of 
the 1683 split of the Pembroke Herberts' South Wales 
lands. Harrington married the heiress Of the Macclesfield 
Gerards, however, she was not a blood relative of her 
benefactors but rather came to the lands by means of the 
peculiarities of inheritance which estate settlements were 
30 set up to avoid. Sandys married the great-niece and 
coheiress of the earl of Orford (1697) and so became 
possessed of that peer*s seat of Chippenham in 
Cambridgeshire. This may have eased Bath's (1742) 
procurement of a title for him. 
Continuity promotions were being given out with a 
degree of liberality in times such as 1689.1694 and 
1714-1715 and after Walpole's fall. The most outstanding 
example in the period is the dukedom of Newcastle. In 
fresh creations, the title passed through the families of 
Cavendish (1665). Holles (1694). Pelham (1715) and in 1756 
the last was created in the title again so that it might 
be inherited by the Clintons . 
31 The 1694 duke extracted 
some variety of promise from William very early in that 
king's reign. In 1691 with the death of the second 1665 
duke, he felt he had the right to remind the monarch of It 
and was upset by the king's non-responsiveness to the 
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point where he resigned his lordship of the Bedchamber and 
32 his lord lieutenancies. He was included in the 1694 
promotions and died in 1711. Thomas second baron Pelham 
did not have to agitate in the same manner, in 1714 he was 
made earl of Clare and in 1715 duke of Newcastle. 
33 
In 1714 the second baron Ossulston became the first 
earl of Tankerville. In 1706 he had inherited some of the 
estates of the barons Grey of Wark on the death of the 
fourth baron. The third baron'had been his father-in-law 
and earl of Tankerville (1695). The first earl of Halifax 
(1715) was to become a Privy Councillor but he owed his 
promotion to the fact that his uncle's earldom, which had 
created in 1714, had become extinct an the man's death 
whereas his barony had passed an as intended. The 1715 
promotion was a correction of the 1714 one's defect. 
The first marquis of Rockingham gained his second 
promotion in 1746. He was already earl of Malton, when he 
inherited the patrilineal barony of Rockingham in 1745. He 
sought a Garter and was fobbed off with a promotion to 
mark his recent inheritance. 34 In 1748 Herbert was raised 
to the earldom of Powis. Rockingham had inherited no lands 
with his title, whereas Powis had inherited no title but 
received the Welsh and Northamptonshire estates of the 
last Herbert marquis of Powis. The marquis was a distant 
patrilineal kinsman of the earl and a close one of his 
wife. The earl acquired his promotion by means of 
soliciting the support of Henry Pelham. 
35 
The earl of Hertford's 1750 title marked his 
connection with the family whose Irish and Warwickshire 
estates he held while his new one was associated with 
his 
patrilineal orizins- the Seymours. The 1559 creation of 
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the earldom of Hertford became extinct on the death of the 
seventh duke of Somerset in 1750. The dukedom had 
thereupon passed to the eighth duke, who was the elder 
brother of Conway's father. Conway received nothing but, 
with his uncle's blessing, he was raised to a fresh 
creation of the family title. 
36 George II had a good 
opinion of him and was aware of his having a good 
estate. 
37 
The second viscount Fauconberg was made an earl by 
that title in 1689. The earldom became extinct on his 
death in 1700 and the Belasyse viscounty passed on to his 
great-nephew. The fourth viscount was raised to an earldom 
in 1756 along with Ilchester. This lack of a positive link 
with one of the competing groups of politicians may 
indicate that Fauconberg was promoted at the behest of 
George II, as a reminder of who Possessed the prerogative 
to Promote within the peerage; he was promoted in 
precedence to Ilchester. It was in character with the 
king's peerage policy to restore the family to the rank of 
earl rather than to promote some other one virgin to the 
station to it. 
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2.5.5. Corruption. 
Corruption is a subjective matter. It is a word that 
is a broad title rather than a precise entity. Here it 
will be used to describe gratuities that were used in 
trying to obtain services in a manner that was accepted by 
high political circles in the early eighteenth-century. 
These gratuities had no legal base. They were tolerated 
because they were endemic rather than original depravities 
of the body politic. There is no acid-test by which it is 
possible to discern whether they had been of any effect. 
William III and George II both became widowers during the 
course of their reigns, as did George 1, except that he 
had imprisoned his divorced wife in 1694. All three kings 
had mistresses and would have been able to have subsidized 
their financial calls by means of making them into 
clearinz-houses for honours. 
That an individual was summoned by corrupt means did 
not mean that he was not of sufficient social status to be 
a peer; on the contrary, it inferred that he was. A 
favourite or mistress would not nominate a candidate for 
such an honour unless that person were capable of carrying 
it properly. otherwise he or she would be exposing the 
crown to attack and by extension himself or herself too. 
The capacity to be able to use corruption at court carried 
a clear label - good connections and wealth, two of the 
hallmarks of peerage. Corruption tended to break out in 
short bouts, rather than having a continuous perceptible 
presence. 
It is slightly surprizinz that William should allow 
the practice to have occurred when one considers that he 
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engaged in strong attempts to try to root out from the 
British army the practice of regimental Purchase. 
38 That 
he should allow it was probably in large part the 
acceptance of an extant, aboriginal, social system. 
Initially, he tolerated the custom until he had raised a 
force of the size that he wanted before trying to move 
against it. The only clear example of a 'corrupt' peerage 
in the reign is that of Barnard. 
39 The date is 1698 the 
time at which the limitations of the financial settlement 
would have begun to display their peace-time workings. 
This, in combination with the pressure for grant 
resumptions, may account for why it is so hard to 
delineate probable factors behind the promotions and 
recruitments of the mid- and late 1690s. 
George I came to the throne with firmly entrenched 
mistresses and female favourites. who quickly established 
themselves in the full Potential that their positions had 
to offer. In 1714 the first duke of Chandos sought to 
procure a promotion for his father, the eighth baron; 
however, the old man died and he himself became the 
recipient of the promotion. 
40 The 1716 recruits Romney and 
viscount St. John can be identified as owing their 
creations to this system of brokerage. 
41 The subsequent 
recruitments and promotions in the late 1710B probably owe 
something to the Germans. That the likes of Harborough and 
Coningsby should first be recruited and then go on to 
achieve earldoms in the space of only a few years can 
probably in part be attributed to the use of corruption. 
The failure of the peerage bill politicized the 
question of the peerage and after the ending of the Whig 
Split George I was sparing in his use of this branch of 
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the prerogative, although a good case can be made for 
Pomfret's earldom in 1721. He was a Northamptonshire 
landowner, therefore, it is possible that he may have been 
a connection of Sunderland. However, in 1727 he was quite 
happy to use corrupt means to become master of the Horse 
to queen Caroline. it is reasonable to think that he may 
have used such means six years earlier. 
42 
George 11 broadly followed his father's (middle and 
late) restraint until the 1740s. Queen Caroline had been 
the principal contemporary influence on George 11 until 
her death in 1737. It is probable that her death left him 
in an emotional vacuum which in turn made him prey to the 
rapacity of the duchess of Kendal and the countess of 
Yarmouth, which could not be met otherwise because of the 
financial limitations imposed by the civil list. Montfort 
and Ilchester gained their titles by putting in the 
highest bids for the two creations, which George II gave 
the countess of Yarmouth rather than make her a gift of 
430 000. Chronologically significant is that Ilchester had 
been clearly seeking a title since 1737, the year of queen 
Caroline's death . 
43 Of the 1747 six it is possible to 
identify Folkestone as paying C12 000 to the duchess of 
Kendal for his honour. 
44 
There may well be an element of 
truth in such a line of conjecture. He was also 
demonstrating the crown's strength at a time of political 
agitation . 
45 
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2.5.6. The Scots. 
Prior to the Union the English and the Scots were 
able to hold titles-in one another's peerages- both the 
earls of Ailesbury and the dukes of Leeds held 
pre-Revolution titles in both peerages. The July 1700 
death of the duke of Gloucester opened up the possibility 
of the two kingdoms being ruled by separate monarchs. This 
was not acceptable to the English because of the strategic 
implications it would have on the nation'B international 
position, while the Scots sought the economic benefits 
that a single market would bring. Therefore, the Union 
came into being. 
Greenwich received his 1705 title as a reward for the 
efforts that he had been making towards that end. However, 
until the mid-1720s he was only one of a number of-leading 
Scottish peers. The second duke of Queensberry and the 
fourth duke of Hamilton, both of the Scottish peerage, 
were respectively made duke of Dover in 1708 and duke of 
Brandon in 1711. While. in the first flush of post-Union 
harmony, Dover was allowed to occupy his seat in 1708 
without any trouble, three years later Anglo-Scottish 
relations had soured somewhat. The House of Lords decided 
that any Scottish peer who held a British title (as 
opposed to an English one) did so in an honorary manner: 
otherwise the whole purpose of the sixteen peers would be 
undermined and the Scots receive disproportionate weight 
in the Upper House. 
Oxford circumvented this state of affairs by 
recruiting Hay the heir-apparent to the Scottish earldom 
of Kinnoull. The House was unable to object to a Scottish 
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commoner being made a British peer. In 1719, when Hay 
inherited the earldom the House was unable to object to 
his remaining a member since it had already admitted his 
right to sit. This was taken note of and in 1722 the 
heirs-apparent of the Scottish peers the first dukes of 
Montrose and Roxburghe were summoned by George I in the 
respective British earldoms of Graham and of Ker. The 
earls were minors at the time but the ruse was conceded 
although it was not tried again and the three families 
were allowed to be exceptions. The 1711 decision was 
reversed in 1782. 
However, the career opportunities that the Union had 
opened were beginning to be exploited within the period. 
Scottish peers and their kinsmen were eager to supplement 
their landed income by going south. Mansfield was a 
younger son of the fifth viscount Stormont. He trained in 
the English legal system and rose to become lord chief 
Justice of the Kinz's Bench. 
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2.5.7. Politics. 
William's accession recruits were a mixture of 
favourites and minor politicians. Portland was made both 
groom of the Stole and first lord of the Bedchamber. 
Romney had been a Caroline courtier who had cravitated 
into William's orbit prior to the Revolution. He was made 
a Bedchamber lord as well as being recruited. He never 
sought to vie with Portland as to who should be foremost 
in the kinals affections. 
According to G. E. C., Ashburnham was a tory and 
Cholmondley a whiz. William's 1689 promotions Were more 
cross-party in character. The uniting factor being that 
the recipients had played a part in either opposition to 
James II or the Revolution. Scarbrough was promoted a 
second time the following Year along with a couple of 
minor figures. Warrington was like Romney in being a whiz 
courtier who had joined William prior to the Revolution. 
He was to fall in the king's estimation as the reign 
progressed. The promotion may well have been the 
fulfilment of an old promise since 1690 saw William call a 
general election in order to lessen the pressure that the 
whiss could brinz to bear on him in parliament. 
Longueville waB even leBB diBtinguished. He waB probablV 
included as a balance to show that William wished to work 
more with the tories. 
47 
The Villiers were an archetypal court family. 
Jersey's connection with William was initially through his 
sister Anne being Portland's wife. She died in 1688 but 
the family soon proved able to promote itself, another 
sister, the countess of Orkney, becoming William's 
mistress. Jersey's 1691 recruitment was a testament as to 
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and Newcastle (1694)- while Buckinzham was generally seen 
as being in her orbit. 
Lonsdale and Haversham were recruited in 1696. The 
former was a magnate but again had a close and principal 
attachment to William-49 The latter was not in the same 
material class as the viscount but was to prove an active 
member of the House. The creation of these two helped 
William maintain an interest of his own within the whis 
party. This was at a time when he was admitting the Junto 
to an increasing amount of power and influence. In 1695 
Tankerville (1695) was promoted to an earldom. This was 
almost certainly the result of the Personal opportunism 
that he harnessed for his political advancement. This 
trait had led Dryden to nickname him 'Cold Caleb. t50 It 
was to take him to the very heights- he was first lord of 
the Treasury for a year. even if it was largely by 
default. 
As the reign progressed the Villierses had grown away 
from their initial closeness to Portland to the point 
where they sought to oust him as an influence over the 
king. They successfully raised Arnold Joost van Keppel as 
a rival to the earl for the monarch's affections so that 
the young Dutchman was recruited as the earl of Albemarle 
in 1697. Two years later Portland acknowledged that he had 
been bettered by resigning his Bedchamber offices. 
Albemarle became its first lord but Romney became the 
groom. The earl of Grantham was another Dutchman. His 
father -Nassau d'Auverquerque- was still alive in 1698. 
However# like Jersey, Grantham went on to hold office 
during the reign so it is possible that he may have had 
some standing in William's eyes in his own right. 
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Both the Villiers and Albemarle aspired to grants of 
lands from the estates confiscated from rebel Irish 
landowners. However, as the Nine Years' War came to an end 
so the Country Reaction gathered the momentum and the 
pertinent grants had to be cancelled. The whig section of 
the country party was centred around the Harley-Foley 
croup, who hailed from Worcestershire and Herefordshire. 
Coventry's 1697 earldom may have had aa place in 
contemporary politics. it may have been a shot across the 
group's bows since he was a prominent landowner in the 
lower Severn valley. Either way. William seems to have 
ceased distributing new titles as a result of the Country 
Reaction. The earl of Halifax (1714) was the only other 
recipient during the rest of the reign. In 1700 he 
accepted recruitment in order to avoid further harrassment 
in the Commons. 51 In doing so he was allowinc Robert 
Harley in large part to re-arrange the existing political 
order. This pliability was to lead Harley to have hopes of 
retaining him in office in 1710. 
The first beneficiary of Anne's accession was 
Marlborough who was promoted to a dukedom. The followins 
year she recruited five accession peers. Aylesford was the 
younger brother of the eighth earl of Winchilsea, Conway 
was a younger son of Sir Edward Seymour 5th. Bt., while 
baron Granville was a younger son of the late first earl 
of Bath (1661). Winchilsea. Seymour and Bath were all 
torieB. All three peers had fallen foul of William which 
may have additionally promoted them in the queents eyes. 
To what extent Anne's accession changes were indebted to 
her dislike of Williamts servants and to what extent they 
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were the result of a positive likinz of the tories is 
uncertain; the relationship of the two factors at this 
Juncture has not yet been appreciated, the latter having 
been presumed to operating in isolation. 
However, Anne paradoxically felt bound to honour her 
late brother-in-lawts commitments as titles. The fifth 
recruit was a tory- Gower. The duke of Rutland obtained 
his 1703 promotion also via some form of undertaking from 
the late king. His candidature was helped by Gower, who 
was his son-in-law. 52 The inclusion of the first earl of 
Bristol in the accession batch, derived not from the 
earl's efforts but rather those of his father-in-law, Sir 
Thomas Felton 4th. Bt., the former comptroller of the late 
queen's household. Felton had obtained some variety of 
promise from William. 53 It was no accident that Bristol 
was a country whig and therefore it is unlikely that 
William had been enamoured of him. 
Buckincham, or so at least he claimed, had been a 
beau of the queen. While she was prepared to promote him 
in 1703 she was equally prepared to dismiss him in 1705 
for being obstinately High Church. Montazu's 1705 
promotion was the consequence of his son and heir-apparent 
having married the Churchills' youngest daughter Mary. 54 
The tories on the whole, throuch their espousal of 
the cause of occasional conformity, proved unwillinx to 
place the necessity or financing the war before their own 
partisan goals. Therefore, the duumvirs began to look for 
alternative means of providinc their ministry with a 
parliamentary support base. Therefore. they looked to the 
whigs. Those of William's aSBOCiateB who had not been 
accepted by Anne were not reallv viable because the queen 
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would object to them. Therefore, those court whizs, such 
as Newcastle (1694). who had been only loosely associated 
with the late king came to the fore. The 1705 recruitment 
of Pelham was almost certainlv a sian of this shift. 55 The 
new baron's standing in his own right should not be 
underestimated since he had served as a lord of the 
Treasury. 
The 1706 promotions illustrated how the whigs had 
advanced. Wharton was one of the lord lieutenants whom 
Anne had dismissed at her accession; she now promoted him 
to an earldom. Kingston was a Junto associate for whom the 
queen appears to have a fondness. 
56 The other recruits 
were by no means ardent rank and file whics. Cholmondley, 
Kent and Ancaster were all from the party's court wine and 
they all had tory backgrounds. a brother of Ancaster, 
Peresrine Bertie, having considerable influence at court 
through being vice-chamberlain. 57 Godolphin was a 
courtier through and through, his tory associations having 
melted away as his commitment to the necessity of the land 
war crew. He had refused offers of promotion in the 
previous reizns. 58 Poulett was another tory who had 
moderated his earlier ardency. The balance of the zrouP 
was whig but its character was court. 
As the war progressed Godolphin continued to believe 
in the necessity of the conflict whereas Anne chanced her 
mind as to the worth of continuina British participation 
in it. Harley offered to construct an alternative 
Godolphin-less ministry for her. One of the first signs of 
Harley's work was to re-introduce the distincuished court 
whiz the duke of Shrewsbury to senior office. In 1710 the 
lard chamberlaincy was made available to him by the far 
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less distinguished court whig Kent resigning it. Kent 
received a, Garter and a dukedom as a reward for his 
Plianc. v. 59 Subsequently, Godolphin was ousted and Harley 
became the queen's first minister with the intention of 
fulfilling her desire that the war be ended. 
Strafford (1711), Dartmouth and Poulett were promoted 
in 1711. They were all Harlevites who held or were to hold 
senior offices. The possibility of Harley being recruited 
had been discussed as early as 1700, when he first came to 
the fore as a power-broker. The factor that Beemed to 
stimulate him to become a lord in 1711 was the death of 
Rochester which meant that his principal tory rival would 
not be present in the Upper House. He was careful to 
ensure that the session's money bills were through the 
Commons before taking out his titlets patent. 
60 
The 1711-1712 batch of recruits had a number of 
connections to leading members of Oxford's ministry: 
Bathurst was Straffordts (1711) first COUBin ; 
61 Boyle was 
an associate of both Greenwich and Henry St. John (later 
first viscount Bolinebroke); 62 Mansell and Lansdowne were 
old political allies of Oxford ; 
63 
Hay was Oxford's 
son-in-law; Uxbridge was a kinsman of Foley who was 
himself a kinsman and old ally of Oxford; Middleton was a 
kinsman of the future first duke of Chandos who was a whiz 
who was sympathetic to Oxford, the earl and future duke 
both being Herefordshire landowners. The inclusion of 
Masham was the nearest that Anne came to recruiting a 
favourite, he being the husband of the former Abigail 
Hill. He was a last moment inclusion, although in April 
1711 there had been talk of his peerage aspirations being 
revived. 
64 
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Only MountJoy and Trevor do not have easily 
identifiable links. Indeed, Trevor had been a whig but 
then he was a lawyer. MountJoy was someone whom it would 
be expected that Oxford would not promote. This was 
because in the course of promoting Mrs. Masham he 
orchestrated the removal of Mountjoyls regiment from him, 
so that it could be conferred upon the future baron 
Masham. This he did by making it seem to Godolphin that 
lord Dixie Windsor, MountJoy's younCer brother, had been 
working against the election of the future second earl of 
Godolphin as a M. P. for Cambridze. Mountjoy appears to have 
let bygones be bygones and had been seeking a title since 
the previous summer. 
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In 1710 Oxford had tried to make the whit Carleton a 
peer but the commoner had refused the offer. At the 
Hanoverian Succession Carleton was offered a secretaryship 
but turned it down and was recruited at his own request. 
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Carleton'was the uncle of the third earl of Burlington. He 
did not owe his recruitment to his nephew's influence. It 
is virtually certain that Pierrepont did his title to his 
nephew- the first duke of Kingston. Pierrepont had not sat 
in the House of Commons since 1705 so it is improbable 
that he advanced himself towards the elevation. Kingston 
is one of those whiCs who was a magnate in the second rank 
of the party leadership. it is probable that his 
importance has been underestimated. The contemporarY 
influence of both the first and second earls of Scarbrough 
has been quite unappreciated. The latter was not deemed 
worthy of an entry of his own in the D. N. B.. The 
recruitment of their kinsman Castleton was an instance of 
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their contemporary influence. Tadcaster was the son-in-law 
of the seventh duke of Somerset who has lonx been 
acknowledzed as a sleepina leviathan of the period. Over 
thirty years later, having only broken his retirement to 
break the kinc'B ministers, the sixth duke was able to 
have two earldoms created at his behest. 
66b 
The recruits were all whics. George I's 1714 
promotions were clearly balanced in the party's favour 
rather than being given to it exclusively. Uxbridge was a 
tor, v: he had been one of the 1711-1712 recruits but had 
subsequently been denied the lord lieutenancv of 
Staffordshire on his father's death. In June 1714 there 
was speculation as to why he was not taking up his 
diplomatic mission to Hanover, it being seen in the 
context of the BolinCbroke/Oxford power struggle. 67 
Avlesford was the youncer brother of the the eiChth earl 
or Winchilsea, who had been a constant opponent of Oxford, 
even if the new earl had not always been . 
68 The promotion 
was a sign that the king was happy to work with Hanoverian 
tories. 
Newcastle (1715) was the agets greatest heir. Bristol 
was promoted because his eldest son was to have a place as 
a lord of the Bedchamber to the prince of Wales (the 
future Georce II). It was thoucht fit that the commoner 
Bedchamber lords should be the sons of peers with at least 
the rank of earl hence the promotion. Bristol, despite his 
close court connections, was still essentially a countrY 
Whig. 
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The first earl of Rockincham was an impeccable 
party man. In 1712 there had been talk of Tankerville 
I 
(171LL) receiving an earldom. therefore, he had HarleWite 
leanings. 70 Chandos had been a member of the rather tor. V 
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council of the lord high admiral and had been retained as 
paymaster-zeneral by Oxford as late as 1713. Halifax was a 
member of the Junto but was quite prepared to work with 
tories. 71 
1715 saw the Junto lord Wharton given a marquisate. 
The promotions of Ancaster and Kingston may have been 
connected to this in some way since, like him, they too 
had been promoted in 1706; the crown was signalling that 
it could promote court whics as well as those ficures who 
owed their prominence to their leadership of the party. 
The 1711L zrantins of the earldom of Halifax had been only 
to that earl and any descendants he Might have had whereas 
his baronY had been created so as to pass on to his 
brothers' descendants. The 1714 earl died in 1715. His 
nephew the second baron was promoted the same wear. 
Newcastle's (1715) earldom having only ever been intended 
as an interim measure, he was made a duke. 
The following year Wharton's son and successor was 
promoted to a dukedom. The patent's preamble made it clear 
that the the award was for the services of the father. 72 
Portland's promotion may have been procured by corrupt 
means. Prior to the Bubble he was possessed of a large 
Paper fortune, 73 therefore, he may have availed himself of 
the channels of corruption In order to achieve a dukedom. 
The summer of 1716 saw the dismissal of the duke of 
Greenwich from the future George IVs household. 
Therefore, Castleton's viscountcy may have been linked 
with the Lumleys and the future second earl of 
Scarbrough's presence in that household. 
The 1716 recruits included a number of brothers of 
peers. The future second earl of Cholmondley was recruited 
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as baron Newburgh. He was the younger brother of the first 
earl of Cholmondley. The baron Torrington was the youngest 
brother of the second earl of Bradford. Both new barons 
were in large part recruited in their own right since theY 
were prominent in their respective fields- Newburch as a 
soldier while Torrincton was a lord of the Treasury. 
Torrington's promotion complemented his brother the second 
earl of Bradford, who was an associate of the Marlborough 
connection. which had in larze part metamorphosed into the 
Stanhope-Sunderland connection. Stanhope's 1717 
recruitment was done as a sixn of the ascendant position 
that the man and his supporters had achieved. The earl of 
Sussex's (1717) promotion may well have been an indicator 
of the influence of the third earl of Sunderland, who like 
the new earl was a Northamptonshire landowner. 74 
In 1718 Stanhope was promoted to an earldom. Cadogan 
and Cobham, who were like him in being soldiers. were also 
promoted that year. Cowper's receipt of an earldom was a 
sign of the ministry wishinc to demonstrate that his 
resignation from the lord chancellorship was not the 
result of ill-feeling. Despite taking the honour Cowper 
joined the opposition. This behaviour may be why he was 
not readmitted in 1720 and therefore continued in 
opposition. Some of the 1719 promotions may have been 
induced by bribery, however, the ministry was in political 
trouble. Sunderland needed to improve its support base 
otherwise the Townshend-Walpole croup would have to be 
taken back in. Chandos was not only very wealthy, he was 
also well connected across the political spectrum. 
Greenwich was taken back into the political fold and both 
made lord steward and zranted a British dukedom. 
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The re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole croup in 
1720 sparked off a round of titular bestowals. The group 
needed to be civen a number of offices in order to mark 
its return to favour. Portsmouth, Falmouth and Ducie all 
resigned their places and were recruited as a result. 
Dorset was associated with the returned elements. However, 
he was a hanzer-on of the prince rather than a member of 
the Townshend-Walpole group. He was distrusted by them 
because of his political conduct in Anne's final years. 
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Castleton was associated with the Lumleys and therefore 
with the prince and not the Townshend-Walpole group. The 
duke of Bridawater was an associate of Sunderland, they 
both having married daughters of the first duke of 
Marlborough. These chances underline how the 
Townshend-Walpole group had been re-admitted as a dunior 
partner to the ministry. 
The followinx year Lechmere was recruited. This was 
as a result of a question-mark hanging over the propriety 
of his conduct as attorney seneral. 
76 He was an associate 
of the Sunderland group, he being a brother-in-law of the 
third earl of Carlisle. The same year saw Macclesfield 
(1721) made an earl and Harcourt made a viscount. Neither 
man was a positive friend of the Townshend-Walpole group. 
However, the gesture may have been aimed in part as a snub 
to Cowper who was still in opposition# it being rare for a 
Judicial recruit to pass the rank of baron. 
The second earl of Orford was made a baron in 1723 as 
a mark of the trust that Georse I was now willina to put 
on the Walpole group, in the wake of the deaths of both 
Stanhope and Sunderland and then of the groupts handlinx 
of the Layer plot. George I granted this positive sign and 
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then ceased to confer any further such honours 
(Townshend's eldest son being suramoned to the Lords in a 
family barony at the same time). 
George II's reign started with five accession 
recruits. Having failed to procure an adequate civil list 
Wilmington was kicked upstairs in order to ease Walpolets 
management of the Commons. 
77 Both Buckinghamshire and the 
first earl of Leicester were fellow Norfolk landowners of 
Townshend and Walpole. Monson seems to have been their 
ally too, he being a neighbour in the regional senBe being 
seated in Lincolnshire. His appointment as first lord of 
Trade in 1737 seems to have been a conCeSBion to Walpole. 
His lethargic exercize of the office shows that he is 
unlikely to have had it conferred on him through his own 
merits. 
7 a The first marquis of Rockincham was alicned with 
the group. This display of royal favour in relation to the 
two ministers and then to Walpole was never to be 
repeated. Indeed, the royal attitude in this area was to 
be like that of George I- rather frozen, a tool denied. 
Townshend's 1730 resignation was marked by 
Wilmington, Ashburnham and Fitzwalter beinx promoted to 
earldoms. None of them had a strong connection with 
Walpole. Fitzwalter, with his European/courtier wife (the 
Schombergs' heiress), and Wilmington were the king's men. 
Ashburnham had been a Hanoverian tory. In 1730 he was a 
member of the prince of Wales's Bedchamber which he was to 
leave the following year to go to become captain of the 
Yeomen of the Guard. He was a Sussex landowner as was 
wilmincton. 79 
The first marquis of Rockingham gained his first 
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promotion by claiming, erroneously if not falsely, that he 
could not accept the lord lieutenancy of the West Ridinc 
without beins promoted to an earldom since all the 
previous recipients of the office had had the rank or 
above, otherwise he would lose face. 
80 The king gave way 
in the matter because 1734 was the year of a general 
election and the marquis was central to the government's 
electoral interest in Yorkshire. George II, having Just 
supported Walpole through the Excise Crisis. had no wish 
to lose his first minister. 
Walpole was recruited after he fell from power. This 
was probably the result of a lonz-standinc understandinz 
between the kinx and his minister. It was also in Georce 
Il's best interests, since the Commons would not be able 
to interrogate Walpole as to how he had maintained himself 
in power, which in turn meant that the system that he had 
run could be continued by his successors in the kincls 
service. Mountedgcumbe, whose particular task had been to 
look after the government interest in the over-represented 
counties of Devon and Cornwall was recruited for the same 
reasons. Fitzwilliam had become very attached to Sir 
Robert prior to the prime minister's fall and Howe too was 
an associate of Walpole, one who had come in from earlier 
vociferous opposition to the Great Man to become his 
ardent supporter. 
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William Pulteney turned down the offer of a title in 
1730.82 He did this because he felt it would inhibit him 
in hiB gUeSt to OUBt Walpole, a venture which he carried 
to success even though it took him another twelve years. 
With the minister's fall he felt able to take a place in 
the Upper Chamber, thus continuing to share the same forum 
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as his old adversary. Having accepted his patent for a 
title, Bath was careful not to take it out until the tory 
Gower. his old colleacue in opposition, was safely 
installed as lord privy seal . 
83 However, despite this 
tactical astuteness Bath had made a maJor, and 
irreversible, stratexic error. His influence in parliament 
came from beinz able to place the covernment under 
pressure by influencing the opinions of those whig squires 
who sat in the Commons and who were politically 
independent of the ministry. Bath was no longer able to do 
this in the more staid and meditative atmosphere of the 
Lords. Walpole had lonc appreciated the difference between 
the two Houses and for this reason had remained in the 
Commons as lonx as he had in order to be able to act as 
the kincls minister. 
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Bath's influence did not evaporate immediately upon 
his elevation although it did wane fast. In 1743 he was 
able to secure a title for Sandys as a 1720-style price 
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for the man resigning as chancellor of the Exchequer. 
The parallel recruitment of the solidly Old Corps Powis 
was probably a balance so that the limits of Bath's 
influence might be illustrated. Namier described the 
rivalry between Bath and Powis in "Structure" as a means 
of illustrating rivalries among the various factions of 
court whigs in 1760.86 This incident may have been one of 
the causes of that rivalry or it may have been Just one in 
a lonx line of its symptoms. 
Harrington and Portsmouth both received compensatory 
promotions as the result of having to vacate offices In 
order that others might be accommodated in them as part of 
the re-arrangement of affairs. Neither man was a close 
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associate of the fallen minister. In 174U Leicester was 
promoted to an earldom. He had been recruited as a result 
of Townshend and Walpole's influence and had long looked 
to the latter to have him raised from a barony but had not 
met with success. Discontent arisinx from this may have 
accounted for Leicester's flirtation with the opposition 
prior to Walpole's fall. The reason for his promotion is 
not clear it may have been the now Orford (1742) 
fulfillins an old promise that mizht not have been met 
from any other source amidst the uncertainty. 
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In 1746, in the wake of the suppression of the 
Jacobite Rebellion, Georze II conferred a number of 
promotions. Rockingham. Fitzwilliam and Buckinghamshire 
were all Old Corps whics who had been associated with 
Walpole. Their promotion was a sign of George II's general 
approval for the Old Corps although there mav have been a 
Bubtext in the choice of particular beneficiaries. This 
was because earlier in the year he had been forced to part 
with the second earl Granville as his 'behind the curtain' 
adviser. Brooke was far more the kingts man, while Gower 
had tergiversated from torydom. 
In 17LL7 there was a recruitment of a zroup of six. 
Ravensworth was a independently minded whig whose 
recruitment was xreeted with apprehension by some within 
the ministry . 
88 He was wealthy since there were highly 
productive mines on his county Durham estate. Feversham 
and Folkestone both had 'new moneyt backgrounds. The Old 
Corps hack Archer came from a family that had been 
established in Warwickshire for centuries. 
Leinster, as the twentieth earl of Kildare, was 
Irelandts premier peer. In 1744 the second duke of 
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Richmond's oldest daughter lady Georgiana Caroline Lennox 
eloped with and married Henry Fox. Richmond was the 
grandson of Charles II whereas Fox was the son of Sir 
Stephen Fox, who had served as a clerk in that monarch's 
Household. Subsequently, Sir Stephen had gone on to create 
an immense fortune. Richmond's objections were to do with 
the ethos of nobility. Here he was on common ground with 
the prejudices of George II who Provided a British peerage 
which LeinBter was happy to accept in lieu of a dowry for 
Richmond's second dauchter, thus Baving the duke 
considerable expense. 
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However, the incident Was not 
sparked off by the elopement or the Leinster marriage, but 
rather by the conferral of an additional barony on 
Ilchester which was remaindered to Henry Fox. 
Another example of George II expressing good will 
followed two years later. In 1749 for family reasons it 
became necessary for the third duke of Devonshire to 
resign as lord steward. As a parting gesture the king 
created the Irish peer the second viscount Ponsonby, as a 
British baron. Pon8onby was the father-in-law of 
Devonshire's eldest dauzhter. 
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In 1749 Granville successfully manoeuvred into 
securing an earldom for Clinton. This meant that Granville 
had the new earlts thanks while the duke of Newcastle 
(1715) was put into the king's debt for the favour. The 
Foxes ascribed the authorship of the title not to 
Granville but rather to Chesterfield. 
91 Harcourt was 
promoted the same year and appears to have been the king's 
man. Hertford in 1750 and Cornwallis in 1752 appear to 
have fallen into the same category. whereas Guildford may 
have been the Pelham's. However, this is the result of 
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impressions. Contemporaries, varying with viewpoint, might 
well have described them in different terms at different 
Junctures. 
With respect to titles, the Pelhams' influence 
reached its zenith with the 1754 granting of earldoms both 
to their close ally Hardwicke and to their own kinsman 
Darlington. 92 In the wake of Henry PelhamOs death, as war 
became increasincly likely, it became clear that the 
ministry would have to take in one of the leading Commons 
men. William Murray chose to opt for a peeraze and a place 
as a lord chief justice, leavina the runnina to Henry Fox 
and William Pitt. Fox was taken in because George II found 
him more acceptable than Pitt. 
In 1756 there were a number of recruitments which 
reflected the various competinx elements. Harwich was a 
client of Fox. Lyttleton of Pitt (althouzh aB with 
Clinton's 1749 promotion there was more than one 
perspective), Hyde of Granville93 and Walpole of Wolterton 
of the fourth duke of Devonshire. 
94 Ilchester was promoted 
to an earldom as a result of his brother Henryts 
prominence. The kinx was able to promote Fauconberg at the 
same time, giving him precedence over Ilchester. 
In the 1760 the trial of the fourth earl Ferrers 
necessitated that lord keeper Henley be made a peer so 
that he might be able to act as lord high steward. This 
recruitment was used for Sondes, who was a relative by 
marriage of Newcastle (1715). and for Wycombe, who was a 
Wiltshire neizhbour of the Foxes. 
95 
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2.6. Conclusion. 
Lawyers were susceptible to contemporary political 
currents. The resistance that the final four lezal 
recruits faced in entering the peerage arose from that 
susceptibility. George II imposed restraints on the 
peerace as a whole- its size and the importance of 
continuity as a factor. In large part, the four had to 
exploit the political machine in order to extort their 
entries. It was not surprIzing that when the Ferrers trial 
necessitated Henleyts recruitment, the connection turned 
out to be a symbiosis and two political draftees were 
sucked into the peerage along with him. 
State service was a Poor route into the peerage. 
Changes of dynasty were the points at which it most 
advanced an individual. Otherwise, in all three services 
it was political circumstances which advanced an 
individual rather than the service that he rendered the 
state. Generally the army was an exceptionally poor means 
to achieving recruitment. After the Hanoverian Succession 
this was because it was virtually insulated from political 
interference. The navy and the diPlomatic service were 
both more susceptible to such meddling and therefore 
proved better conduits. 
Structural analysis points towards the Hanoverians 
having a high regard for the ethos of nobility even if it 
is hard to substantiate it with literary evidence. 
However, this did not mean that an individual's claim to 
nobilit. v could be advanced in a vacuum in view of their 
family connection with an extinct title or inheritance of 
an estate which had previously supported a title. Rather. 
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nobility was a secondary feature which helped to advance a 
candidate who was principally forwarded on other grounds. 
Both Fauconbercls (1756) promotion and Leinster's 
recruitment were afterthoughts rather than titular events 
that would have happened of their own without there beinc 
correspondina political pressures for them to occur. 
Somewhat paradoxically, in view of the ethos of 
nobility, corruption was another sign of court strength. 
It is no coincidence that George II should create both 
LeinBter and Folkestone as Viscounts when it was his usual 
practice to summon people at only the rank of baron. Under 
the Hanoverians corruption illustrated that there were 
channels other than the leading ministers to achieving 
court favour. -This helped underscore to the ministers 
their limitations. However, the crown was careful to use 
it sparingly since otherwise its ministers' management of 
political affairs might mave been irreparably damaged. 
The political context of most recruitments and 
Promotions is reasonably easy to identify. However, direct 
literary evidence is not always available, therefore, many 
have been ascribed circumstantially. Those incidents which 
involved several peers or involve historically well known 
figures are usually the most accessible. However, caution 
is advisable. 1694 shows that there was often a court 
subtext that has not been appreciated properly; i. e., the 
proportion of the whigs who were to prove acceptable to 
Anne at her accession. even thouch most members of their 
party were not. 
The decypherings of those occurrences where the 
recipents were less distinguished politically are not 
always sure. It is not always possible to delineate what 
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the cause of the conferral was. It micht be that the 
beneficiary was having an old promise to him fulfilled or 
it might be the result of a contemporary shift in high 
politics. The two could fUBe SO that to which the event 
was ascribed varied with an individual's perspective. It 
is clear that informed contemporaries did not always know 
who was responsible. 
As said in the introduction, entry into the peerage 
did not chance greatly from one end of the period to 
other- Pomfret was a kinsman by marriage of the first duke 
of Leeds and Sondes was one of the duke of Newcastle 
(1715). The only substantive chance from one end of the 
period to the other was that William recruited European 
favourites whereas George 11 did not. The two kings 
differed in style too. William was fairly free with 
titles; however, this was only in the early and middle 
sections of his reign; the final one saw him exercise this 
aspect of the prerozative in a very limited manner. In 
contrast George II was restrained for most of Walpole's 
ascendancy; thereafter he became far freer. He tended to 
give out several honours in contrast to William's general 
style of dribs and drabs. 
The principal differentiating factor between the two 
kings was the Act of Settlement. It BtriCtl. V prohibited 
the recruitment of foreign nationals. One is hard pressed 
to think of any non-royal male Hanoverian whom he would 
have wished to recruit, certainly none of them had a zood 
continuity claim. This lack of Hanoverian recruits was not 
necessarily the product of cowering under the Act of 
Settlement, which it should be remembered was not 
immutable. George 11 seems to have had a different style 
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of kingship than William and enjoyed and precisely 
modelled the nature of that style. 
George II used titles as a far finer tool in domestic 
politics than did William. George, by withholding titles 
from Walpole as part of the minister's political arsenal, 
underscored whose power it was that the Great Man was 
directing rather than controlling. With Sir Robert's fall 
the king loosened up, perhaps never feeling that he had to 
hold this particular whip hand over Walpole's successors 
in quite the same manner. George used titles to show that 
there was more than one faction that soucht to serve him. 
William did not use his broader titular powers in this 
manner. indeed, he virtually did not use them in the final 
years of his reign. This was because of the domestic 
political pressure he was under in the wake of the sicninx 
of the peace of Ryswick. In contrast, George's low usage 
in the Walpolean era had not been a sign of the king 
seeking to avoid causing offence but rather a sign of the 
crownts continuing strength. 
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3. Central Office. 
3. I. Introduction. 
In terms of the interaction of the peerage and 
politics, office is held to be important in terms of the 
ability of the zovernment to control the House of Lords 
throuch the distribution, continuation and deprivation of 
places which it could bestow. These places varied in 
decrees and amounts of profit, honour, influence and 
power. The relationship of the peeraze to office was 
different from that of M. P. S. As the monarchts supposed 
tnatural counsellors' they had a significant share of the 
better paid court positions. In addition, there were 
numerically far fewer peers than there were M. P. B. No 
office was technically in the exclusive preserve of the 
peerage, 
I 
although some offices were exclusively held by 
peers throughout the Period. Other offices were held by 
both peers and commoners while still others existed for 
only part of the period rather than throughout its course 
and therefore were not necessarily held by either type 
exclusively throughout it. 
Defined arbitrarily there were four broad categories 
of central office that the peerage held- senior, lesser, 
Bedchamber and service. This section will only look at the 
first and third of these. The first and second are rather 
multitudinous in character. The former will take priority 
because its holders were the more central to the exercise 
of power. The service categories will not be dealt with 
here because the peerage were always in a distinct 
minority in each of the services and such goes against the 
broad grain of this thesists approach. The Bedchamber can 
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be seen as a part of the lesser central offices. However, 
the large number of peers involved makes it by the largest 
single type of the central offices that peers served in in 
this period, seventy-seven were members of it. Therefore, 
it deserves to be treated as an entity in its own right 
being obviously a suitable candidate for study in terms of 
the adopted criterion. 
Senior office consists of three broad categories; the 
officers that headed the Household (the aroom of the 
stole, the master of the horse, the lord steward, the lord 
chamberlain), the great executive officers (the northern 
and southern secretaries of state, the first lord of the 
Admiralty, the first lord of the Treasury and the first 
lord of Trade) and the basic central machinery (the lord 
privy seal, the lord chancellor and the lord president). 
The lord lieutenancy of Ireland is an additional member of 
the group. The Bedchamber was headed by the groom of the 
stole, therefore, the lords of the Bedchamber were 
technically members of the Household. 
2 The two are grouped 
together with the lesser ones in order to see if there 
were any broad trends in the patterns of multiple holding 
of central office. 
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3.2.1. Senior Office. 
John Cannon saw the influence of the peerage on 
parliament as paling "in comparison with the power they 
wielded directly as office-holders, in day-to-day charge 
of the country,... O Jonathan Clark has reached a similar 
conclusion. However, it is a sign of development that the 
author of "the ministry rather than the House of Lords was 
and remained the political arm of the peerage" has gone on 
to write of the effects of the Revolution that "the real 
power of the executive (and therefore of the Crown) 
steadily grew" and that "almost all the institutions of 
government ... were... strengthening: the institution of 
monarchy. and the individual monarch... retained their 
centrality in the daily bUBiness of government from , 
William III to Georce II and beyond. 91 
4 His latter 
statement needs to be reconciled to his former, i. e. whose 
@armt was it. The contention of this part of the section 
is that the 'arm' distinctly belonged to the crown and 
that although individual members of the peerage were able 
to exert considerable influence through their official 
positions, they did so under the clear auspices of the 
crown. A study of the senior offices reveals that the 
crownts prejudices were what counted rather than an 
independent oligarchy acting as it chose to. 
The cabinet, although well established by George II's 
reign, was in its infancy during this period and therefore 
was subject to chances in the size of its membership, the 
frequency with which it met and the nature of the business 
it handled. Therefore, a group of fourteen offices has 
been selected to provide a framework through which it is 
possible to study the interaction of the monarchy with 
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those politicians who staffed the senior offices of state. 
The offices that make up this group were not of a 
consistent importance with one another throughout the 
period. Notable exceptions to the group are the archbishop 
of Canterbury, the secretaryship of state for Scotland, 
the secretary at war and the lord chief justiceships. Nor 
are those people who were in the cabinet at times without 
Portfolio included, such as the earl of Bath (1742) and 
baron Somers. The office of first lord of Trade was not 
created until 1696 and only in the time of the second earl 
of Halifax's possession of it did become a cabinet place. 
The senior offices were not of equal importance; a 
transfer from one to another could be a promotion. a 
sideward shift or a demotion. They were the two 
secretaries of state, the lord chancellor (or lord 
keeper). the lord chamberlain, the lord steward, the lord 
president of the Council, the lord privy seal, the first 
lord of the Treasury, the first lord of Trade, the first 
lord of the Admiralty, the lord lieutenant of Ireland, the 
master of the horse, the groom of the stole and the 
master-general of the Ordnance. The offices were not 
always of the same nature, the first lords include both 
the lord high treasurers and the lord high admirals. This 
section will deal with the nature of the offices in terms 
of their political context. The Political ramifications of 
a number of entrances into, shifts between and departures 
from office are dealt with in the political narrative 
section below. 
Cannon chose to look at the senior offices of state 
in terms of whether they were held by a peer or not. A 
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more detailed aPproach gives a better level of 
understandinz. Ninety-nine peers executed one or more of 
these offices durinz the period. althouzh some of these 
were filled by commoners at times. A list of the peers is 
to be found in appendix C. Of the twenty-two privy seals 
John Robinson bishop of Bristol was not a lay peer, of 
fifteen treasurers Henry Pelham died a commoner, as did 
Henry de Nassau d'Auverquerque of the seven masters. Of 
the seven masters-general John Louis Ligonier was an Irish 
peer. 
5 Of the sixteen admirals neither the Scottish peer 
the fifth viscount Falkland nor Sir Charles Wager was ever 
either an English peer or a British one. Of the thirty 
secretaries eleven were either never peers or were not 
peers until after the period. At the Admiralty both the 
earl of Orford (1697) and the earl of Torrington were 
first lords prior to being made peers. In Torrincton9s 
case the brief difference occurred prior to the period9s 
opening while in Orford's 'there was a zap of three years. 
There were five treasurers who held the office prior to 
creation- the first viscount Lowther and the first earls 
of Halifax (1714), Oxford, Stanhope and Orford (1742). 
None of the other offices had such a high proportion of 
commoners upon their entrance into it. 
The peers who held these offices can be subdivided 
into recruits and inheritors. Sixty-three of them held 
inherited titles durinc the period and thirty-six were 
recruited to the peerage during it. At the Admiralty Anson 
and the first viscount Torrincton became first lords after 
their creations while there were nine inheritors. Of the 
eleven stewards only Greenwich did not inherit an English 
title although he did inherit a Scottish dukedom. Of the 
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nine chamberlains the first earl of Jersey was the sole 
example of a recruit; of the privy seals the first marquis 
of Halifax, the first viscount Lonsdale, the first baron 
Trevor and the first earl Cowper were non-inheritors. 
Among the masters-general the fourth earl Rivers, the 
second duke of Montamu and the third duke of Marlborouzh 
were in a minority as inheritors compared to BiX 
recruits. 
6 
Of the secretaries the first earls of Romney, 
Jersey, Stanhope and Harrington were all made peers prior 
to their receipt of one of the two offices compared to 
there being eleven inheritors. The first earl of Godolphin 
and the earl of Wilmington became treasurers in the period 
having already been made peers, while eight other 
treasurers were inheritors. There were twelve peers who 
were first lords of Trade but only the first viscount 
Weymouth and the first baron Monson were recruits. Of the 
eighteen presidents seven were recruits. The earls Of 
Portland and of Romnev were recruit grooms while their six 
male successors were all inheritors. The only non-peer to 
be master was in William's reicn, his six successors were 
all inheritors. The earl of Romney and the-first earl of 
Rochester were the only recruits to have Ireland. 
At none of the fifteen cross-sections were more than 
twelve of the offices occupied by peers. For the first two 
cross-sections there was no first lord of Trade, the 
office was normally to be held by inheritors. In addition, 
for the first four cross-sections the number of offices 
averaged at 9.5 whereas for the other eleven it was over 
11-5. The proportion of inheritors to recruitB in 
possession of these offices did not remain constant. At 
the becinning of 1690 ten of them were occupied by peers, 
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five of each type. At the becinnine of 1760 eleven were 
occupied, ten bv inheritors and one by a recruit. Anson at 
the Admiralty made 9.1X of the total. The change was not 
one of steady decline; as early as 1715 the recruits' 
share was as low as 27.89 and as late as 1740 it was still 
as high as 41.7%. The recruitst high proportion in the 
first five cross-sections stemmed both from many of the 
Stuarts' creations still beinC alive and politically 
active -Leeds, Rochester, Marlborouzh, Godolphin and the 
marquis of Halifax- and from the recruitment of a number 
of William's own favouriteB- Portland, Schomberc and the 
earl of Romney. The final 9.1% was half of the size it 
could be expected to be because George II kept Henley as a 
commoner lord keeper until his hand was forced by the 
Ferrers trial during 1760. 
The ninety-nine did not all hold their offices in the 
same manner- some held Just one, others more, some held 
the same office more than once, and various combinations 
thereof. The duke of Dorset and the third earl of 
Sunderland held five separate offices each and the fourth 
duke of Devonshire, the eighth earl of Pembroke and the 
earl of Romney four apiece. Twelve held three, thirty-two 
two and fiftv a single one. There were only three among 
the top seventeen who were recruits- Romney, Harrinaton 
and Wilmington. Twenty-three of the remaining thirty-three 
recruits were among the bottom fifty. 
Inheritors were distinctlv, more likely than recruits 
to hold more than one of the offices under consideration 
in this'section. The seventeen and the fifty were more 
likely to be found in some offices than in others. to the 
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disadvantage of one another. The former were far more 
likely to be lieutenants, stewards. secretaries. 
presidents and chamberlains, whereas the latter had a 
greater proclivity to be admirals, trade, masters-general 
and chancellors. The offices of the croom, the privy seal, 
the treasurer and the master all lean towards the 
seventeen proportionately. 
There is a strong bias for those offices that called 
on a strong background of professional knowledge -the 
navy, the army and the law- to be poor platforms for 
holding more than one office. A few lawyers did transcend 
their professional origins to become the holders of 
non-legal senior offices, although these were like the 
chancellorship in beine in the central machinery of 
covernment. Cowper and Somers both served as presidents 
and Macclesfield as privy seal. Holders of the Household 
and executive offices were more likely to hold more than 
one office. Recruits to the peerage occur more often in 
the 'PrOfeBSionall group. 
Peers who were new to the rank of office under 
consideration were more likely to hold some offices than 
others. If one excludes the changes at accessions- there 
were seven virgins in William III's reign, five in Anne's, 
six in George Its and eleven in George II's. All of the 
chancellors and all of the first lords of Trade were 
virgin to the senior level. The next highest 
proportionately were the first lords of the Admiralty, the 
secretaries, the grooms and then the master-generals. The 
last were two-thirds new. At or just above the fifty per 
cent mark are the chamberlains, the privy seals, the 
stewards, the treasurers and the masters. Because of the 
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executive nature of their office it would be reasonable to 
expect there to be more recruit treasurers. This stems 
largely from the obvious candidate in William's reign, the 
first earl of Godolphin, not continuously holding it. 
Therefore, at the end of the reign there were three 
holders of the office in four years. 
No such concentration accountB for the 
masters-general. The office of privy seal was used pretty 
liberally in the early thirties and early forties. Less 
than a quarter of the lord lieutenants and less than an 
eighth of the presidents had not held one of the other 
offices in the group. Of the lieutenants, the second dukes 
of Ormond and Grafton and the marquis of Wharton had Irish 
possessions, while the last, the second earl Granville and 
the earl of Rochester (if they did not) were front rank 
politicians who were probably purposefully diverted from 
the other senior office. 
The ninety-nine left office a total of two hundred 
and two times during the period and at its end. Eleven of 
the two hundred and two can be accounted for through their 
being in possession of office at the end of the period; a 
further twenty-nine died while in possession. Therefore, 
one hundred and sixty-two left or changed office either 
voluntarily or against their will. If there were 
proclivities in the particular occurrence of the vacatinz 
of office, these would be indicative of the interaction of 
crown and peerage and any change in that relationship be 
reflected therein. 
People both left the offices under consideration and 
transferred from one to another. In William's reign there 
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were four transfers, in Anne's four, in George I's ten 
and in George I19s twenty-six. People left office in a 
variety of ways, an initial subdivision is of those who 
did so on the death of a monarch and those who did so 
between such deaths. There were three changes of reign 
during the period. Nine people ceased to hold offices 
under consideration- two on Anne's accession (Romney held 
two offices), six on George I's and one on George II's. 
Fourteen people left office during William's reign. twenty 
during Anne's, seventeen during George Its and 
twenty-three during George II's. 
By studying the distribution of this use of office it 
is possible to to discover how patronage was used on the 
peerage. A first approach is to examine to what extent 
peers held other offices before they were raised to senior 
office and the second is to see to what extent they were 
continued, given additional ones either on receipt or 
subsequently office honours. In William's reign 37X of 
senior office-holders had held office previously 
(irrespective of whether they were continued in the office 
or not), in Anne's 45.2%, in George I's 47.1% and in 
George II's 51.2%. Senior officers were increasingly 
recruited from other offices. In William's reign the 
figure would be higher since the likes of the first duke 
of Leeds and the first marquis of Halifax had held senior 
office underýthe Stuarts but are excluded as being 
ex-period. In Anne and George I's reigns the tendency to 
recruit from the politically excluded led to there being 
fewer recruits from the other offices, although in 
George's later years this was not so much the case. In 
George II's reign the near monopoly by the whigs on royal 
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favour allowed a system to flourish in which internal 
recruitment to high office was from existing 
office-holders. 
Indeed, once in senior office a peer was likely to be 
continued in it. The second earl of Godolphin disliked 
carryinx out his duties as zroom. Therefore, he asked to 
resign and was allowed to do so on a pension. However, 
shortly afterwards the privY seal became vacant. George 
II. ever mindful of the the financial limitations stemmins 
from the size of the civil list, was persuaded to kill two 
birds with one stone. He saved himself the cost of 
Godolphints pension by giving him the salaried post, the 
dutieB of which were larcely honorific. Godolphin accepted 
this arrangement because his son had predeceased him and 
he wished to have a title to continue in the Godolphin 
family. The earl was created in an additional barony. 
Penny pinchinx was one of the roots of the growinz 
inheritor share of the senior offices during the reign. 
Amonx those who entered senior office who were 
officeless prior to the bestowal in each reign are a 
Proportion of lawyers and sailors who rose through their 
professions rather than through court office. If those who 
were holding other offices prior to the receipt of senior 
office are divided into creations and into inheritors and 
then made a percentage of the whole- the break-down is 
18-59 each in Williamts reign, 12.9% creations and 32-39 
inheritors in Annets, 8.8% and 38.29 in George I's and 
9.39 and 41.99 in George Ills. If the first and last 
reigns are compared, over the period the number of 
recruits who held office prior to their receipt of senior 
office effectively halved whereas the number of inheritors 
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more than doubled. The two had started from an equality. 
Therefore, the growth in the number of Bedchamber lords 
and lesser office-holders who went on to become senior 
office-holders came exclusively from the inheritors, who 
not only did this but also made up for the shrinkage of 
the recruits' share. Although the share of the total held 
by previous office-holders increased minimally from Anne's 
reign to George I's, the difference, in terms of the 
inheritors-to-recruits did occur between those two reigns. 
Honours, e. c. the Garter, and offices, e. C. Bedchamber 
places, could be held in addition to senior office. These 
varied with the reigns. In William's reign 59.3% were so 
favoured. in Anne's 51.6%. in George I's 35.3% and in 
George II's 37.2%. There was a decline from the first 
reign to the second, a steeper one from the second to the 
third and a slight recovery from the third to the fourth. 
If the figures are broken down into recruits and 
inheritors they are- 25.9% and 33.3%. 16.1% and 35-59, 
11.8% and 23.59 and 9.3% and 27.9%. When William and 
George II's are compared the recruits had shrunk to just 
over a third while the inheritors had only contracted by 
one-sixth. The recruits dropped successively as each reign 
progressed into the next, by far the steepest drop being 
between William and Anne's reigns. Then and between the 
two Georgest there were slight rises there being a 
distinct drop between those of Anne and George 1. 
Patronage was being spread more widely as the period 
progressed. Those who held senior office in William's 
reign were nearly two-thirds more likely to receive 
additional marks in terms of office and honours or to be 
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allowed to retain offices they held already than those who 
did BO in George Ills. 
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3.2.2. Conclusion. 
The recruits made up more than a third of those who 
held senior office during the period. However, the 
proportion of offices that they held changed very markedly 
if one compares the two terminal trans-sections. Entry 
into senior office improved for the inheritors at the 
expense of the recruits. If entry from offices outside of 
the group to ones inside of it are measured bv comparinC 
the reigns of William III and Georze 11. the inheritors 
improved their likelihood of entry by half as much again 
over the recruits from the former reian to the latter one. 
If one looks at entry into the group from a position of 
officelessneBS, comparing the same two reigns, the 
inheritors' chances improved four times over the 
recruits'. Once in senior office the recruits tended to 
enter positions which required considerable technical 
knowledge and which were not good springboards to other 
offices in the croup. George Il's reign saw the highest 
number of transfers from one senior office to another, by 
which time the inheritors' position had been considerably 
advanced over that of the recruits. 
By itself this shift from recruits to inheritors in 
terms of the possession of senior office does not mean 
much. However, if one inserts it in a broader context it 
does. The other sections show it to have a correlation 
with other movements in terms of the peerage tenure of 
office and receipt of honours; it is part of a broad shift 
that the crown came to exercise in favour of inheritors. 
The period BaW conditions change from a small personal 
monarchy with a broad range of prerogative powers to a 
large executive one with a narrower prerogative. A manner 
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in which the crown was able to retain control of the 
covernment was to ensure that its PreJudices were clearly 
followed where it chose that they should be. The two 
Hanoverian kings possessed an ideal about nobility which 
favoured inheritors over recruits. This ethos was given 
vent throuch the allocation of senior offices. Once the 
guide-lines had been lain down by the crown there was the 
need for it to be active at every opportunity in domestic 
politics since it had defined the circumstances. The 
peerage might exercise power through their possession of 
senior office but it was the crown which controlled access 
to such power and thus ultimately the power itself. 
A large amount of research has been centred on the 
most novel aspect in the politics of these years- the 
emergence of the office of prime minister. That office did 
bezin to become a clear entity in these years but, it can 
not be understood unless its proper background is 
appreciated. The management of the Commons did require the 
presence there of one or more of the crown's leading 
ministers. Of the officers that could be there the first 
lord of the Treasury was the most appropriate in view of 
the House's power over money bills: hence Walpole, Pelham 
and Pitt all sat as M. P. s while in possession of that 
office. But these three all occupied such a position in 
George Il's reign. They did so because his particular 
style for manazinx domestic politics leant towards a very 
high level of delegation; there was nothing either that 
had been pre-ordained or that was to be irreversible about 
the emercence or state of the office by the end of Georze 
Ills reign. It was as much a symptom of the king's 
attitude to British politics as the heavy use of 
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inheritors was. It is clear that prime ministers did have 
a level of influence over who their senior colleagues were 
but it was not the uppermost one and it would have been at 
its most effective if operating firmly within their king's 
prejudices. 
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3-3.1. The Lords of the Bedchamber. 
Within the basic structure of the Bedchamber, there 
were thirteen lords of the Bedchamber. The office could be 
held by Scots peers and commoners. Four times a year they 
would be in attendance for a week. It-is clear that durina 
the period that the number was exceeded. The additional 
lords would probably have been supernumerary and therefore 
would probably have received a lesser salary. However, 
since the office was used frequently as a means for 
rewarding ambassadors and since a number of lords were 
somewhat lax in performing their duties under the 
Hanoverians, it is probable that a larser Bedchamber 
emerged in part to ensure that were actually lords to 
exercize such functions as they were left. 
The Bedchamber transcended the kings' role as kings 
of Encland, therefore, it included members of the Scottish 
peerage and commoners too. This section looks exclusiMely 
at those Bedchamber lords who were the holders of English 
or British peerages. The number of lords of the Bedchamber 
was subject to change. 
There is a list of the Anglo-British Bedchamber peers 
in appendix D. Of the seventy-seven, nine were recruits. 
In the cases of the first dukes of St. Albans and of 
Richmond this was because they were royal bastards. The 
first earl of Scarbrouch, the first baron Boyle and the 
first earl Fitzwilliam all inherited Irish titles before 
being given English or British ones. and became Bedchamber 
lords subsequentlY. The baron Weston and the earl of 
Romney were both younger sons of holders of English 
peerages. Only the earl of Portland and the first duke of 
Marlborough were not closely connected to an existing 
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patrilineal title before becoming peers themselves. Of the 
nine, four were in William III'B 1689 batch. St. Albans and 
Weston were members in the same reign, while George I went 
on to employ Boyle and Richmond. Georce II employed only 
Fitzwilliam. This is probably indicative of there beinx an 
ethos operative which meant that inheritors came to have a 
far better candidature for the place. It is the contention 
of this section that this is in line with the Hanoverianst 
attitudes to recruitment and senior office. 
It was practicable to have a degree of continuity of 
personnel of the Bedchamber from one reign to another. If 
nothing else they could proffer information concerning 
particular matters had been dealt with previously. -The 
twentieth earl of Oxford had served as a Bedchamber lord 
to Charles 11 before doing the same for William III. The 
seventh earl of Lincoln, the sixth earl of Westmorland and 
the first duke of Bridgwater served as Bedchamber lords to 
the royal consort prince George of Denmark and then went 
on to serve George I. George II continued from his 
father's Bedchamber the lords the second dukes of Richmond 
and of Manchester and the groom the second earl of 
Godolphin. Under the two Hanoverians any lords who were 
not continued were deemed to have a zood claim on any 
vacancies at court. Such continuation from William's reizn 
to Anne's did not occur principally because in 1702 for a 
peer to have been aBBociated with her late brother-in-law 
was a mark against the man rather than in his favour. 
What makes Richmond and Manchester stand out from 
their fellow lords in Georze I's Bedchamber is that they 
both 'succeeded' de facto their respective fathers in 
their places. There seems not only to have been a 
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Hanoverian prejudice in favourinx inheritors but 
preferably inheritors whose fathers who had held places in 
the Bedchamber. In George II's reign there are five 
further instances. Four of these occurred in the four year 
period of 1739-1741: the third duke of Manchester, the 
fourth earl of Holdernesse, the second earl Waldegrave and 
the ninth earl of Lincoln. The third duke of St. Albans was 
another one in 1751.9 The links can be extended even 
further If one choseB to. For example, the third duke of 
Marlborough was the matrilineal grandson of the first duke 
of Marlborouzh. 
Another element that seems to have been 
disproportionately favoured in the distribution of 
Bedchamber places were peers who had converted from 
catholicism to anglicanism. Scarbrough served William. The 
duke of Shrewsbury, the eighth baron Teynham and the first 
earl Waldegrave all served George I and the earl of 
Fauconberg (1756) George II. This may well have been "pour 
encourazer les autres. " 
The first earl of Scarbrouzh, the twentieth earl of 
Oxford, the second duke of Ormond, the first duke of 
Marlborough, the third earl of Peterborough and the earls 
of Romney and of Portland were WiýliaM'B initial 
Bedchamber lords. This selection showed the kinx both to 
be grateful to those who had abetted him in the Revolution 
and to be a king in the Stuart style in both having people 
around him who had served his predecessors and others who 
were personally liked by himself. Those who joined 
subsequently were a mixture of courtiers-and whizs. In the 
second earl of Essex and the second duke of Bedford he 
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acknowledged the strong link between the whig leadership 
and that party'B court origins. The whiZB did well for a 
number of reasons. Prior to their exclusion they had been 
engrained in court society. A number of them were young 
second generation members of the party who had only 
experienced political consciousness during the party*s 
existence and therefore were susceptible to beinz pulled 
into the Bedchamber throuzh their youthfulness since the 
t 
post-1688 entrants into the Bedchamber tended to be in 
their twenties or thirties. 
Many of the leading tories were in opposition or in 
office outside the Household. Most of the leadership were 
Caroline recruits and therefore were a zeneration too old 
to be potential members of the Bedchamber, while. their 
heirs were stll commoners and therefore less likely to 
secure places. The second earl of Bath and the second 
baron Lexincton were tories who were admitted as responses 
to immediate situations, whereas none of the whigs entered 
in such tspontaneous' fashion. 
10 
The Bedchamber lords were not continuously in the 
physical presence of any of the three kings. None of the 
three had their lords sleep in the same chamber as them. 
When queen Mary died, William III shut out his Bedchamber 
lords from beinx with him during the first stages of his 
mourning, their re-admission being a sign of his beginning 
to return to public life. 
11 In 1740 the countess of 
Portland remarked on the subject of sleep-walking that the 
second earl of Albemarle "is always lockt into his room to 
hinder any bad accident. , 
12 The earl had been a Bedchamber 
lord to George II since 1722 and was to go on to become 
croom in 1751. 
120 
In 1683 Charles II laid down orders as to the right 
of entry to the Bedchamber. This sharpened, the definition 
of what were its public and private aspects. In 1689 
William further resticted the right of entrv. George I 
took the situation a logical step further by continuing to 
have the same Bedchamber as he had had in Germany but 
grafting on to it as an outer formal shell a British one. 
George II enjoyed using his British Bedchamber for formal 
services such as dressing. 
13 
Jonathan Clark felt able to write that the groom was 
the "most politically powerful Court office of the 
century... "'LL A look at George I19s four grooms disproves 
Clarkts contention. The second earl of Godolphin was seen 
as a Jacobite, the ninth earl of Pembroke became an 
eccentric who ended his days "living upon vegetables", the 
second earl of Albemarle was notorious for his financial 
rapacity, while the fourth earl of Rochford was an 
exception to prove the rule, he could only mount to 
personal extravacance. 
15 Beattie was careful to point out 
how the third earl of Sunderland was an important ficure 
in his own right rather than because he held the office. 
16 
Bute was to be important not becaUBe Of the office he held 
but rather because of his personal relationship he had 
with George III. The two early Hanoverians allowed their 
Bedchambers to develop institutional characters, crooms 
under Georce II rose to their position by means of 
'Buzzin's turn' rather than throuch the expression of 
personal preference. This was indicative of the earlY 
Hanoverians' remote style of kingship rather than because 
of disinterest. 
The initial character of George Vs Bedchamber was 
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different from what it was to become. In its first couple 
of years it included a number of senior politicians -the 
dukes of Shrewsbury and Kent and the first duke of 
Manchester- and also a few torieB and former tories -the 
first baron Boyle and the second earl Granville. 
Subsequently, both the political calibre of those in it 
dropped and the partial heterozeneity turned into 
whiz/court homogeneity. Although it is possible to detect 
a level of continuity from the previous reign, it would 
have soon become evident that the new king had a different 
monarchical style from William. The Bedchamber became a 
shell to the inner, private court. 
As the character of the outer laver had little 
bearing on the-kernel beneath. George was not immutable on 
its being used for political purposes. There is virtuallY 
no evidence on how the change was wrought but the 1719 
date and the third earl of Sunderlandts becoming &room 
then points to his probably playing an important part in 
the process. It is a reasonable conJecture that the kinz 
retained a controlling say in the matter, which may have 
been expressed in part through having an 'inheritor' 
inheritor and former catholics. If the king possessed 
preferences-then his ministers' scope would have been 
limited by them and therefore their actions would have 
been more controlled. Georgets chance of attitude allowed 
a new seam of peers to be brought into place or the hope 
of place- the undistinguished inheritor. 
In the high Walpolean era George Il maintained the 
peerace element in the Bedchamber at a fairly static size. 
In 1738 it was expanded from nine to thirteen. This may 
have been to help Walpole or it may have been to prod him 
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along in a direction that the king wanted. There then 
ensued frequent changes but as soon as the Pelhams tried 
to establish a new ministry these stopped. This may have 
been to stress whose sphere of influence it was and 
therefore it may be significant that in 1748 the Pelhamst 
kinsman the fourth duke of Leeds and the neizhbour the 
second earl of Ashburnham can both be perceived as being 
connected with the brothers. If so, that was the high 
watermark of their influence on the Bedchamber. Had Pares 
browsed more thoroughly through "The Life of Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke" he would have seen that George II 
felt that the duke of Newcastle (1715) should not try to 
interfere in Bedchamber appointments, which in turn 
implies that the duke felt that he could do so upon 
occasion. 
17 Georce may not have'felt the same need to keep 
the brothers out-of Bedchamber matters as he had with 
Walpole. Newcastle and Henry Pelham being capable of 
breakinx off direct communication with one another at 
points when their mutual antipathy was out of hand. 
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3.3.2. Honours and Office. 
Possession of a place as a lord of the Bedchamber did 
not exclude a peer from receivinz honours or other 
offices. These will be defined here as any other than 
local offices. All of William's initial seven had a 
military aspect to their careers, as also did the second 
earl of Essex and baron Weston. The earl of Romney, the 
third earl of Peterborough, the third earl of Carlisle and 
the earl of Portland all held senior office. Portland, 
Carlisle, Romney, Burlington, St. Albans and Lexington all 
held lesser central offices in conJunction with their 
Bedchamber places. 
Lexington, Portland and the first duke of St. Albans 
all served as ambassadors. Scarbrough was the sole person 
to be promoted titularly within the reign while only 
grooms were given Garters. Only Bath and Bedford were 
without honour and office. 
18 thý! y being the lords who 
saved for the shortest while. William's Bedchamber was in 
character with his style of monarchy. The activities of 
its members reflected his interests. The people who were 
about his person were often the instruments of his will, 
their offices reflecting this. Brevity of service was the 
only reason why individuals were not broucht into a role 
that exceeded the strict functions of beine a Bedchamber 
lord. 
George Vs Bedchamber had a proportionately less 
martial character than William III's: the first baron 
Bo. vle, the first duke of Richmond, the first duke of 
Portland, the seventh baron Delawarr and the second duke 
of Richmond. This largely stemmed from the reign as a 
whole havinC a far less warlike character than william's. 
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The third earl of Berkeley and the third earl of 
Sunderland held senior office. The second duke of Grafton, 
the seventh earl of Lincoln, the duke of Kent, the second 
earl of Godolphin, the first duke of Portland, the third 
viscount LonBdale, the sixth earl of Leicester and the 
first earl of Sussex (1717) all held lesser offices in 
conJunction. The Becond earl Granville and the first earl 
Waldegrave both served as diplomats. 
A number of them became knishts of the Garter- 
Dorset, Berkeley, Sunderland, Lincoln, the third duke of 
Rutland and the second duke of Richmond. In 1725 the Order 
of the Bath was revived and was bestowed upon Leicester, 
the second duke of Manchester, Sussex and Delawarr. The 
first dukes of Manchester, Portland and Bridgwater were 
promoted in the peerage while Bedchamber lords. The sixth 
earl of Westmorland, baron Lucas, the seventh earl of 
Warwick, the eighth baron Teynham and the third viscount 
Townshend had no additional marks of favour while lords of 
the Bedchamber. 
There was a chance in character from William's reign 
to that of George I. Those Bedchamber lords who held 
additional offices of influence mostly did so in the first 
half of the reign. More people went into it and through it 
during the course of the reign than had been the case with 
Williamts. The Bedchamber also became less high-powered 
because it did not offer the same potential for intimacy 
with the sovereign that William's had. However, its 
members were given more honours proportionately than 
William's men had received. This was aided by there being 
no participation in a continental war which freed a number 
of Garters, the whiz infighting meant that the competing 
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factions were prepared to distribute them more freely and 
the king was tolerant of a level of corruption among his 
German favourites which the Bedchamber would have had 
excellent access to. 
There were seven soldiers in George II's Bedchamber: 
the future ninth earl of Pembroke, the second earl of 
Albemarle and the second duke of Richmond all in 1727. and 
the earl Harcourt, the third duke of Marlborough, the 
second duke of Kingston and the third duke of Ancaster 
subsequently. None of George II's Bedchamber lords held a 
major office of state while members of the Bedchamber. The 
third earl of Essex, the second duke of Manchester, the 
second earl of Albemarle, the second duke of St. Albans, 
the ninth earl of Lincoln, the second earl Waldegrave and 
the second earl of Ashburnham all held lesser office in 
conjunction. Fewer peers held minor court office 
proportionately in comparison with the previous reign. 
The third earl of Essex, the third earl of Albemarle, 
the fourth earl of Chesterfield, the first earl 
Waldegrave, the fourth earl of Rochford and the fourth 
earl of Holdernesse all undertook diplomatic missions. In 
1730 Chesterfield was the reign's first knight of the 
Garter. the third earl of Essex and the first earl 
Waldezrave did not follow until 1738. in 1741 the second 
duke of St. Albans, the third duke of Marlborough and the 
second duke of Kingston followed suit. The second earl of 
Albemarle was given his in 1749 and the ninth earl of 
Lincoln his in 1752. In 1756 the earl of Hertford, the 
second earl of Northumberland and the second earl of 
Buckinghamshire formed a second triumvirate, while in 1760 
the second marquis of Rockingham brought up the end of the 
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reign. None of George II's Bedchamber lords was made a 
knight of the Bath. The earl Fauconberg (1756) was the 
only person to be promoted while servinz in the 
Bedchamber. There were fourteen who ostensibly received no 
additional marks of royal favour. 
19 
There was a shift away from Bedchamber lords beinx 
men of influence. This occurred between the reigns of 
William and Georce 1, and it was continued further under 
George II. The key variance was that Bedchamber lords 
ceased to hold senior offices in conJunction with their 
Bedchamber POBtB. In addition, the number of honours that 
were bestowed upon them also decreased slightly. The 
Bedchamber had become a less important place because the 
intimacy it had afforded with the monarch had decreased. 
Georce 11's revival of the monarch's public dressinx was a 
display of Political theatre and can not be seen as 
affordine his Bedchamber lords any Particular intimacy; 
the obverse is more likely to be true. 
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3.3.3. Departures. 
There were four ways in which a peer could cease to 
be a lord of the Bedchamber: the monarch could die, the 
peer could die, the peer could be given an alternative 
employment or the peer could leave office without 
receiving such. The last of these could be either through 
dismissal or resignation. Of William III's- eight were 
still of the Bedchamber at the kinz's death and six had 
moved on without alternative employment. Of George Its- 
fourteen were of the Bedchamber at the monarch's death, 
eicht had died, four had moved on to alternative 
employment and three had moved on without such. Of George 
II's- fifteen were still in service at his death, nine had 
died, seven had moved on to alternative employment and 
five had resigned or been sacked. The political character 
of the Bedchamber changed between the reign of William and 
those of the two Georces. In the former period people left 
without going on to another employment, whereaB in that of 
the latter two, more people left to go into another 
employment than left not to do so. 
The departures in William's reign were indicative of 
his style of monarchy. The moths were attracted to the 
flame of power but there was no institutional screen to 
stop them straying too near it. The first duke of 
Marlborough, the second earl of Bath, the third earl of 
Peterborough and the earl of Portland were either 
dismissed or departed on bad terms. Ormond did not co on 
positively good ones, his decision stemming from a 
question of military seniority in relation to his and the 
first earl of Albemarle's respective guards, colonelcies. 
20 
Oxford is the only instance for whom there is no positive 
128 
suggestion that he may not have been disaffected. He was 
already exceptional in being an old man when he initially 
joined although it is quite possible that he may not have 
wanted to leave. 
Under the Hanoverians there was effectively a screen, 
in the entity of the private German Bedchamber, that 
separated the crown from its Bedchamber. The reign of 
George I was approximately the same length as William 
III's, yet only three people left the Bedchamber during 
it. Boyle's dismissal for corresponding with the court of 
St. Germains was not so different Marlborough's in 1692 
except in the matter of scale, there being an invading 
Jacobite force in 1715. The establIshment of the Supremacy 
saw politics cool a few degrees. The two dukes committed a 
far lesser sin than Boyle, of being members of the wrong 
faction. After them there were to be no more departures 
for over fifteen years. 
George II's reign was well over twice as long as 
George I's, yet it saw only five exits to non-employment. 
In 1733 the last departure having been in 1717, this may 
have given Clinton something of an air of confidence that 
he could act and enjoy reasonable immunity, both Essex and 
Lonsdale having been granted a fair degree of toleration. 
He discovered that for himself it was otherwise. 
Tankerville almost certainly left without ill-feeling in 
1738 since two years later he was made lord lieutenant of 
Northumberland. Marlborough's behaviour is rather 
equivocal. The resignation of Poulett can be seen as 
indicative of how the Bedchamber had changed. He was 
frustrated at his long service as Bedchamber lord not 
having led either to additional or to alternative 
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employment; a very different state of affairs from 
William's day. He was not the only instance in George II's 
reign. The second earl Cowper was similarly disenchanted 
before severe gout made him incapable of serving in the 
Bedchamber and therefore forced him to resign. The earl 
Harcourt was distinctly in want of a mark of recognition 
before he waB promoted to being a major general in 1755.21 
The Bedchamber was used as a platform to further 
office during the reigns of George I and George II. There 
were four instances in the former's reign: the duke of 
Shrewsbury became groom, the duke of Kent steward in 1716, 
the sixth earl of Westmorland a chief Justice in evre in 
1716 and the second earl Granville a secretary of state in 
1721. George Ijts pattern of moving his Bedchamber lords 
to other employments was different from his father's. 
The first of George II's was the fourth earl of 
Chesterfield. in 1730 he was made lord steward. In 1735 
the second duke of Richmond left to become master of the 
Horse and the second earl of Godolphin to become lord 
privy seal. The 1740 departure of the third earl of Jersey 
became a chief Justice in eyre. The fourth of Leeds 
emulated him in this pattern to the extent of also 
becominz a chief justice in eyre. The fourth earl of 
Holdernesse left to become the southern secretary. 
The two final instances of the reien involved the 
office of governor to the prince of Wales (and prince 
Edward). The office's importance lay in its supposed 
potential for shaping the future king. It was fit that the 
man selected to execute it should be one who had witnessed 
the current monarch's exercise of power at close hand, 
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therefore, the Bedchamber offered some candidate, the earl 
Harcourt in 1751 to 1752. and the second earl Waldegrave 
from 1752. 
Many of the senior offices of state were held by 
William's Bedchamber lords. Therefore, the place did not 
act as a staging Post for the great offices. George I did 
not have the same degree of integration of offices as the 
Dutchman had had, while Georce II did not have that kind 
of overlap. It is unwise to make anv direct comparison 
between the father and son since the first three people to 
leave Georze I's Bedchamber seem to have looked on their 
places there as an interim mark of favour. That kinz's 
habit of sivinz additional offices to some of his 
Bedchamber lords may explain why more did not leave. 
George 11 with his non-bestowal of additional places 
to Bedchamber lords had one which was far more of a route 
to other destinations. Some of those who tried to use it 
as a means to other ends succeeded while others did not. 
It is noteworthy that of the three who went through it to 
senior offices other than croom (Chesterfield, Richmond 
and Holdernesse), two were subsequently viewed by George 
disparagingly and the other formed an attachment to 
Walpole even though the minister had always viewed him as 
the king's man. 
22 George II did not have William's 
volatile relationship with his Bedchamber but then those 
whom he forwarded from it to high office did not have any 
close personal relationship with him. 
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3.3.4. Conclusion. 
The Bedchamber was a flexible area of patronage 
distribution. The number of English peers in each reign 
always increased from its initial size at the accession. 
To some extent this was in response to ministerial needs. 
It is a reasonable proposition that if William III had had 
a reicn as lone as that of Georce 11, his Bedchamber micht 
have increased comparably to the size of the Hanoveriants. 
It is probable that George I's would have been larger than 
his son's because his rate of expansion was faster. 
Clear signs of the ethos were both the establishment 
and the growth of *inheritor' inheritors and the way in 
which the recruits contracted into non-existence. 
Bedchamber posts came to be inherited increasingly in a 
near de facto manner. Althouch William's reign was too 
short for this trait to emerge, its occurrence is in line 
with the Hanoverians' peeraze policy in terMB Of 
maintaining a steady number. Even when the Bedchamber was 
expanded this factor was still allowed to occur, indeed, 
the expansions may have facilitated it to a degree. 
The Act of Settlement had an important effect in 
chancinz the Bedchamber*s nature from Williamts day to 
that of the HanoverianB. Unlike the Dutchman, the two 
Germans were unable to intearate their European courts by 
means of the offices of their British one. Therefore, from 
171LL on there existed both an inner, private court and 
Beparately an outer, formal one; a diBtinct deCree of 
structural homogeneity had been lost. Therefore, the 
Hanoverians may not have had the same immediate interest 
in the appointment of Bedchamber lords that William had 
had and therefore they may have been more susceptible to 
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outside politically determined candidates. To them the 
Bedchamber was a political tool that allowed them to 
impose the ethos of nobility on their ministers. Because 
of its size and association with the crown the Bedchamber 
was a necessary engine for the crown's ministers in 
managing the House of Lords. In either allowinc ministers 
a say or depriving them of one the crown was able to 
express its importance to the runninX of domestic 
politics. 
William III was a king who opened his reign in 
preparation for war and eneaced in such for the majority 
of it. Therefore, it was senBible that a high proportion 
of his Bedchamber lords were officers in the rapidly 
expanding army. The variance of the martial element in 
1714 from William's day was caused by the army having 
assumed an institutional character. It had been contracted 
Partially since George I was not deSirOUB of engaging in a 
prolonzed international struzzle. Therefore, the same 
circumstances were not in operation as had been in 1689. 
This was to an extent the situation through George II's 
reiCn too. 
In 171LL patronage was being used on the English 
peerage more broadly than it had been before. Therefore, 
Bedchamber lords were more likely to serve solely as 
Bedchamber lords at a time when the office had lost some 
of its earlier intimacy. Additionally, they were less 
likely to receive other markB of hanour. For a large 
proportion of Bedchamber lords the Bedchamber was an end 
in itself. However, for a minoritv it was a staging post 
to offices which had previously been more integrated into 
it. One feature that did remain steady was continuity of 
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some personnel from one reign to the next; to have been a 
Bedchamber lord in the previous reign forwarded a person 
to have a claim on royal favour. 
134 
3.1L. The Number and the Pattern of Office-Holders. 
It was possible for peers to hold more than one 
office at a time- holders of senior office, lesser office 
and Bedchamber lards all did so. The pattern of occurrence 
of peers holdinx more than one of the offices under 
consideration is a loose indicator as to the political 
tension; the more thinly office was distributed the more 
peers were being placated, the higher the occurrence of 
individuals holding more than one office the more relaxed 
political matters were liable to be. There were only two 
periods when there were no such double holdings- the early 
1710s and the early and mid-1730s. 
William III had never less than three such men. With 
the onset of the Country Reaction his response was not to 
redistribute the offices that various Politicians resianed 
from but rather to retain them in the hands of sure men 
drawn mostly from both senior office and the Bedchamber, 
two groups that already overlapped. This involved a 
mixture of courtiers and non-Junto whigs. 
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Anne redistributed the held offices because of the 
lack of a monarchical Bedchamber. Her husbandts was 
decidedly smaller than William's had come to be. Most of 
the double-holding was by whigs in senior offices prior to 
1710- the first and second dukes of Devonshire beint 
particularly successful. The Oxford ministry's need for 
places meant that double-holding, disappeared until the 
ministry's final internecine arguments during which the 
duke of Shrewsbury held more than one senior office. This 
stemmed from his being a whiz, therefore, he was not 
perceived as a contender in the ministry9s leadership 
struZZle which was being waged with increasing bitterness. 
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However, when he was finally made lord treasurer it was 
clear that Bolingbroke's bid had failed. 
George I always had a persistently high level of 
double-holding. He rooted it in the Bedchamber. The 
ability to do so stemmed from the continuation in peerage 
tenure of those offices that Oxford has opened up for 
such. George II did not continue this policy choosing 
rather to have initially a smaller Bedchamber than his 
father had ended up with and to have those lords who would 
have been in the Bedchamber and in POBBeBBion of an office 
outside of it just occupy the latter. From 1730 until 1738 
there was no double-holdine. This ceased because by the 
late 1730B the ministry had re-established its full grasp 
on the Lords. Thereafter, the numbers fluctuated but the 
ceiling never surpassed George I's floor. 
Five vearly intersections in appendix E show that 
William III's reign was essentiallY static. There was a 
distinct drop to the first one in Anne's and then a 
further one. There was a very clear watershed between the 
1710 and . 1715 figures. The whole of George I's reign and 
the first figure in George IIts are very much of a par. 
The final six show a moderate degree of volatility, the 
average of which was slightly higher than their four 
predecessors'. 
Anne's reign is the only exceptional one. In it 
Harley's need to reaffirm his interest within the tory 
party, while not wishing to alienate by means of dismissal 
any whics that he need not, led him to extend the very 
vocabulary of patronage- so that offices such as the 
tellerships of the Exchequer, the mastership of the 
Bloodhounds and joint vice-treasurerships of Ireland came 
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to be regularly held by peers, whereas before they had not 
been. The subsequent whig domination of the House was in 
larze part fathered by a lapsed country whiz. 
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4. The Lord Lieutenant and the Custos Rotulorum. 
4. I. Introduction. 
The two offices were only part of a whole array of 
offices that the central covernment had in the localities 
ranzinz from land tax commissioners, throuch to surveyors 
of the window tax and out on to the likes of filacers. 
I 
The custosts relationship to the other justices had 
originally been one along the lines of primus inter pares 
but it had a supervisory character in relation to them. In 
their turn the Justices, in the various sessions, oversaw 
the implementation of a wide variety of social 
lexislation: they monitored and where necessary controlled 
price levels for staple items such as wheat; they 
implemented the measures as to social conduct in matters 
such as gambling. Occasionally, they would also see that 
particular political matters were enforced in the 
localities, e. a. the Association of 1696., The duties of 
lieutenancy per se were restricted to the militia. 
2 
The importance of the two offices lay beyond the 
nature of their immediate functions. The dustices and 
deput. v lieutenants were technically appointed bv either 
the lord keeper or the lord chancellor (the chancellor of 
the duchy of Lancaster did the appointinx for Lancashire), 
the custos and lieutenant only havinx the richt of 
trecommendation. 1 The two were weighty principally because 
of the way in which they usually gave their holders a 
special relationship with the central government which 
allowed them to steer much of the patronage available in a 
county even though many of the places involved had no 
direct connection with either of them. 
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The power to influence the distribution of patronage 
in the localities was not of a continuous nature during 
the period. In order to allow both the administerine of 
and the financing of two warB there waB a period of rapid 
crowth in the executive, which in turn led to an expansion 
in the volume of patronage under William and Anne. 
Thereafter matters were fairly static, because it would 
have both engendered resistance and there was less 
positive need for such than there had been previously. The 
Excise Crisis grew in large part from fears of the 
political repercussions of the crown being able to expand 
its executive influence over both the political nation and 
parliament. William and to a lesser extent, Anne were 
careful to to try to avoid partiBan use of zovernment 
patronage whereas the Georges were prepared to allow the 
whiz party to use it in a partisan manner. Therefore, the 
political sway that a lieutenant-custos could conunand in 
this respect grew more marked from one end of the period 
to its other. 
That there were changes in the monarchv and the 
broader central covernment over the period is evident. 
Therefore, it is probable that such chance may have in 
some degree been reflected in the OffiCeB' patterns of 
tenure. That lieutenants were dismissed is well known- the 
High Church resignations of 1705. the Oxford ministrY's 
remodelling which was followed by that of the Hanoverian 
Succession and the Excise Crisis sackincs. These incidents 
have been viewed too simplistically. The last one has been 
looked at in a context of the whiz OPPOBition and the 
whics in zovernment beinc clearly delineated from one 
another. The other instances have suffered from beinz 
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looked, at in too party-orientated a manner. There is fruit 
to be garnered from examining the overall pattern of 
departures from lieutenancies, not all of which were 
dismissals. 
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4.2.1. The Number of Lieutenants and Manner of Tenure. 
Lieutenancies were not held in a sinzular fashion. 
There was no dictate that a countv's lieutenancy could 
only be held by a peer or that it could not be held in 
conjunction with other lieutenancies. Counties could be 
divided just as they could be coagulated into pairs and 
larger groupings. That there should be chronological 
shifts in the pattern of how lieutenancies were held may 
well be indicative of shifts in politics. The peerage did 
not have a monopoly on the tenure of them, the office 
could be conferred on commoners or peers who had Just 
Irish or Scottish titles. 
There was no need for a peer to own estates in a 
county whose office they held. Often his property might be 
predominantly in an adJacent county, e. g. the marquis of 
Wharton and Oxfordshire. A peer could be seated in a 
count. y without havinx inherited his seat there, there was 
always the POSBibility of marrying an heiress to one, as 
was the case with the second earls of Godolphin, Orford 
and Stamford. A lieutenant could even be a Purchaser of an 
estate: - Surrey was exceptional in having two successive 
purchaser-lieutenantB In the mid-17108- the earl of 
Halifax (1714) and the duke of GreenwiAZhe flexibilitw 
that allowed commoners and peers whose territorial 
interests lay elsewhere to have a lieutenancy also allowed 
individuals to act as 'caretaker' lieutenants, occupying 
the office until a minor was of age and able to assume the 
office himself. Sometimes these caretakers would be seated 
in the county and on other occasions they would not. The 
duke of Shrewsbury, Carleton, Rochester and the fourth 
earl of Clarendon all acted as non-resident caretakers. 
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From the work of J. C. Sainty it is possible to see 
that two hundred and ten individuals held one or more 
lieutenancies durinc the period. 
4 Of the two hundred and 
ten, one hundred and seventy-five held an Enzlish peeraze 
during the period. Of the one hundred and seventy-five 
fifteen were commoners when thev first held a lieutenancy. 
Nearly eighty-five per cent of the people who held a 
lieutenancy in the period were either English peers, 
created peers within one of the four reigns or were the 
heirs-apparent to a title. The other fifteen per cent were 
drawn from the upper strata of the landed elite in their 
I 
own localities. Seventy per cent of the lieutenancy 
holders in the period were at least second generation 
Enclish peers. 5 
The lieutenancy existed in each of the forty English 
counties and the twelve Welsh ones. 
6 Some counties had 
strong sub-divisions within them; the most obvious example 
or this is Yorkshire with its three Ridincs. In the 1670s 
Northamptonshire had been divided into two separate 
lieutenancies. Before acceptinx Kent in 1705 the first 
earl of Rockincham suggested that the shire also be 
divided into separate eastern and western portions, which 
were acknowledzed already, and that he should have only 
one of these. 
7 The idea was not carried through and he 
received the county aB a whole. 
Both Kent and the pairing of Devon and Cornwall had 
two lieutenants at once in the earlv 1690s. The second 
lieutenants were the fourth earl of Westmorland and the 
second earl of Bath respectivelv. This was because, at a 
time when an invasion was a verv real possibility, the 
former county was held by the earl of Romney, who had 
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pressing official duties in Ireland (as a lord justice of 
that kingdom), and the latter were held bv the first earl 
of Bath (1661). who was well into his sixties and had an 
experienced and dynamic heir-apparent. 
Of the one hundred and seventy-five, one hundred and 
thirty-six (nearly 809) were only ever lieutenants of a 
sinzle county. The other thirty-nine were lieutenants of 
two or more counties durine the period. The twenty-nine 
'doubles' and ten 'multiples' include North and South 
Wales as sincle lieutenancies. 
Of the 'multiples' the most extraordinary was that of 
the first earl-of Macclesfield (1679). His association 
with the duke of Monmouth had impelled him to flee the 
country durinx James II's reicn. By the time of the 
Glorious Revolution he had become sufficiently close to 
William to be in charge of the prince's bodyguard. In 
March 1689 he was given a bloc of five lieutenancies. It 
was a unique grant in the period, a de facto revival of 
the lord presidency of the council of Wales. 
8 He was not a 
landowner in Wales beinc possessed of estates in only 
Cheshire and Lancashire. The earl did not zain any further 
marks of being regarded highlv in royal favour after 1689. 
This was because William became disillusioned with him 
along with most of the other more radical and 
opportunistic whits. 
The earl's 1694 death led to his bloc being split 
three ways. Gloucestershire went to viscount Dursley. the 
future second earl of Berkeley. Herefordshire and North 
Wales9 went to the duke of Shrewsbury. He subsequently 
reBigned the former to the duke of Kent in 1704 (the duke 
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had been prepared to resign the county to the eighth baron 
Chandos, in 1700) and the latter to the second earl of 
Macclesfield (1679) in 1696. Shrewsbury owned land in many 
of the West Midlands counties but tried to be rid of North 
Wales since he owned no estates there. He forwarded the 
third baron Vaughan as an appropriate candidate in both 
respects. However, subsequently-he learnt of the second 
earl's desire to be given it. He felt able to give 
Macclesfield priority in the matter because he had not 
informed Vaughan of his intention. The king complied with 
the duke's wish. 
10 The only lieutenancy he held 
continuously was Worcestershire from 1689 to 1718.11 South 
Wales12 and Monmouthshire went the eighth earl of Pembroke, 
who relinquished them to local landowners in 1715. 
Pembroke held Wiltshire without interruption from 1689 to 
1733. 
In terms of chronological distribution the occurrence 
of 'multiples' and tdoubleB9 as a Pattern of lieutenancy 
tenure were distinctly weighted towards the first half of 
the period. Those which occurred in the second half were 
all repetitions of what had existed before. An exception 
to this was the fourth duke of BedfOrd. 
13 He came to enJoy 
both Devon and Bedfordshire, two counties which had not 
been held in conJunction prior to 1714 and which were 
physically separate whereas the other Ipairst had come to 
be immediate neighbours. 
There was a distinct shift towards the number of 
individual holders of lieutenancies being maximized-14 The 
office was more widely held in 1760 than in 1689. This is 
because of the breakdown in the occurrence of 'multiples' 
and the lessening of the frequency of occurrence of 
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'doubles. ' The number of peers who held the offices would 
not have grown particularly since the Prime beneficiaries 
of the process were the Welsh gentrY. Such growth as there 
may have been amongst the peerage would probably have been 
in line with the expansion of the peerace. The expansion 
in the overall number of lieutenants led to their being 
territorially more closely associated with the counties 
they held. Caretakers would have been fairly constant 
although it is probable that as lieutenancies came to be 
more widely held so there was more likely to be a need for 
caretakers. The shifts are not of balance but rather of 
emphasis towards a numerical broadenina of tenure and 
increased identification with the localities. 
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it. 2.2. Custodes Rotulorum. 
In 1689 approximately two-thirds of English counties 
had their offices of custos and lieutenant held by the 
same person. 
15 By the end of the period the onlw 
identifiable surviving separation was that of the North 
Ridinc of Yorkshire; its lieutenant was the fourth earl of 
Holdernesse and its custos was the second marquis of 
Rockingham. 16 That the other counties should have combined 
was because of the factors above which can be reduced to 
individuals preferring their power to be unchallenged. 
Once the two were given to someone jointly it was unlikely 
that either of them would be accepted sinclely by another 
person since such a bestowal would mark the new recipient 
was of a lesser stature than his predecessor or was less 
trusted than him. The process by which the tseparatel 
counties had their offices joined was piece-meal. to 
describe it would give detail without giving any 
particular insight into the working of politics in these 
wears. 
One particular incident can give illumination as to 
why lieutenants should wish to be custodes of their 
counties too. The first concerns the second duke of 
Montacu. He was made lord lieutenant of both Warwickshire 
and Northamptonshire in 1715 but not custos of either 
county. The former ended up eventually in the poBsession 
of the second earl of Macclesfield (1721) and the latter 
came to be held by the sixth earl of Westmorland. Both 
were deprived of them in the mid-1730s because of their 
association with the opposition. 
17 Therefore, Montagu had 
to deal with two commisssions of the peace which had been 
largely appointed by people who were hostile to the 
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ministry which he supported. The possibility for tension 
had been shown in 1732. Chief constables for a hundred 
were elected at leet courts summoned by the lord of the 
hundred. In this instance the hundred was the duke's and 
for his own purposes he did not wish a chief constable to 
be elected. The Northamptonshire commission took into its 
collective mind to appoint one against the wishes of its 
own lieutenant. 
18 
The Welsh counties fall into a different pattern of 
tenure from the English ones. This is because of the 
Macclesfield (1679) conglomeration of lieutenancies. He 
did not hold all of the posts of custodes that were within 
his lieutenancies. The pattern has to be surmized but it 
seems that they were more likely to be held by local 
landowners in the south than in the north. This Probably 
continued to be the case as the conglomeration thawed away 
since the Macclesfield Gerards and the Cholmondleys, who 
held North Wales after 1714. were both Cheshire landowners 
and therefore were more likely to have land and interests 
in the north. The lieutenancies fell to the local gentry 
(some of whom had Irish titles) whereas the offices of 
custos fell to landowners. The groups overlap but they are 
not identical. A number of those landowners were peers who 
principally resided in England. English peers continued to 
exercize direct power through much of Wales through the 
possession of local office. 
19 
The expansion in the number of lieutenants over the 
period was roughly matched by the contraction in the 
number of custodes durinc the same. Therefore, the number 
of people who held the two offices in toto was fairly 
static. Where a chance did occur was in the way in which 
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these officer-holders became both more powerful. through 
the expansion of the executive and the lessening of other 
individuals holding the other office, and more identified 
with the counties where they executed the offices. 
Proportionately. there was probably a slicht contraction 
of peers who were custodes and lieutenants when 1760 is 
contrasted to 1689. 
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4.3. Resignations and Removals from Lieutenancies. 
Crown favour was the principal factor in the six 
departures from the office durina William's reian. The 
departures occurred in an internal court context rather 
than in either an overt whiz versus tory one or a court 
versus country struggle. The party element was a subtext 
to the matter. In numerical terms the whizs zained and the 
tories lost although the overall chance was slight. 
Members from both parties left the offices but the whigs 
did better in terms of fillinx the subsequent vacancies. 
In addition, two of the whics were subsequently 
re-appointed to their lieutenancies. 
The Bath Granvilles had had considerable political 
weicht prior to the Revolution and therefore felt that 
their past experience gave them the standing to be taken 
on their own terms. Therefore, they were prone to clashing 
with William. The second earl resiened in 1693 and the 
first earl (1661) was dismissed in 1696. The second earl 
of Abincdon was replaced in 1697, his kinsman and patron, 
the first duke of Leeds, havinc lonz fallen from the 
political pre-eminence he had possessed in the early 
1690s. The duke himself was dismissed on the report of his 
death and was not re-instated when it emerced that he was 
both alive and wished to retain the offices. 
20 
The whigs were more adaptable because they had lost 
most of their original leadership. They had come into the 
political warmth after a number of years out in the cold 
and they were whole-heartedly in favour of the war. With 
James's departure for exile in 1688 the whics had achieved 
their principal political objective whereas the tories 
after the Glorious Revolution felt that the values and 
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institutions which they cherished seemed subjectively to 
be under continuous assault. Within the context of court 
politics it was easier for the whics to expand their 
position than it was for the tories to defend theirs. 
In 1691 Newcastle (1694) resigned as the result of 
pique when William III refused to promote him from his 
earldom to a dukedom. Restoration to Nottinchamshire and 
Middlesex and the promotion were both secured in 1694. The 
third earl of Peterborough was opportunistic in his 
political stances. In 1694 he fell under WilliamOs 
suspicion as the result of a report that he had reconciled 
himself in the favours of the exiled James II. In 1697 the 
earl was diSMiBsed when it was discovered that he was 
tr. ving to exploit the Fenwick plot in a manner which the 
extant evidence could not validate. No one else was 
appointed to the office. There was no pressing need since 
the war was ending and the county had a separate custos in 
the person of the first viscount Hatton. 
During Anne's reign party was nearer the surface than 
it had been in William's reign, but it is clear that these 
departures can not be understood solely in a party 
context. The accession alterations were not a 
straight-forward instance of pro-tory and anti-whiz. There 
was an impairment of the whiz position but this was small 
compared with what there would have been had the crown 
soucht to use these alterations for the optimum partisan 
capital in favour of the tories. The chanzes were still 
occurrina principally in a court context. 
In 1702 Peterborough was restored. This was a result 
of having taken care to foster good relations with Sarah 
duchess of Marlborough. in addition, to have been held in 
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bad light by William was not necessarily a nezative 
feature in the new queen's eves, even thouch her relations 
with late brother-in-law were not bad in his final 
21 
yearB . 
Buckinghamshire was given to the tory Irish peer the 
second viscount Newhaven who soon after resigned it to the 
whiz first duke of Bridgwater on the latter achieving his 
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maJority . The whig ninth earl of Derby was restored to 
Lancashire. He had resiCned the county in 1689 because 
William would not confirm it in tandem with Cheshire. as 
the earl had held it until 1687. Anne diBMiSBed Wharton, 
the second earls of Stamford and of Radnor from their 
lieutenancies. What she disliked about them was not their 
being whics per se but that theY had been prepared to act 
as William's men, a tendencv which was more common amont 
whigs than tories. 
The 1705 High Church resignations from the North 
Riding, Kent and Cornwall were a distilled instance of why 
the whits had improved their share of the lieutenancies 
during William's reign: tories tended to behave as tories 
whereas the whigs tended to behave as courtiers. The 
acquisition of lieutenancies by Godolphin in 1705 and 
Marlborough in 1706 were not positive advances for the 
tory interest since both men were far more court 
orientated than thev were partv inclined. 
By 1710 the whics had gained a high number of the 
lieutenancies in proportion to their presence in the House 
of Lords. At the beginning of the Period they had secured 
a zood share and since then had capitalized by showinc 
themselves as beine willinz to serve the crown, hence thew 
reaped its benefits. Operating under this sentiment it was 
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not they who indulged in the crand gesture of the 1705 
resicnations. 
The Oxford ministry of 1710-1714 was the time durinz 
which inter-partv strife was at its most intense. It is 
clear that overall the remodellinz of the lieutenancies 
durinz those four years benefitted the tories and did 
considerable damaze to the whics. The two statements are 
closely connected but it is wrone to say that the latter 
automatically followed on from the former. This is because 
to do so is simplistic; it looks at the disease and it 
looks at the symptom but it does not take any account of 
the body in which the condition is takinz place. If the 
nature of the changes is to be comprehended the role of 
the court can not be omitted. If Oxford is seen as a court 
manager, which is where the body of recent historical 
opinion has come to rest, 
23 it becomes clear that it was 
not in his interests to have a direct link between whiz 
diminution and tory advancement. Had he allowed such it 
would have undermined his position as a power-broker. That 
there should be chances in the lieutenancies was to be 
expected in view of the ministrvls intention to use the 
tory party as its principal support in parliament. 
However, the ministry also intended to use what whiz 
support it could zather in the two Houses, therefore, 
there was unlikely to be any automatic whiz proscription. 
The degree of the changes in September 1711 stemmed 
from the deaths of the duke of Newcastle (1694). the 
second duke of Bedford and the first duke of Rutland. who 
held seven lieutenancies between them. In 1712 Marlborouch 
and his associates. the second duke of Devonshire and the 
second earl of Bradford, were dismissed. 
24 Neither 
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adJustment was as overtly anti-whic as it could have been 
had Oxford wished to exploit them for the maximum benefit 
of the tories. It is evident that overall the ministry's 
remodellinz was not as pro-tory as it was anti-whiz. The 
difference is explained by there still being the court as 
an active element in politics. After 1712 there were few 
chanzes and there remained a distinct number of whics in 
25 of f ice. 
The cause of this is obscure. It probably lies in a 
balance of two explanantions, either one of which is 
capable of accountina for the chance. The first is that 
the ministry became too divided for either Bolingbroke or 
Oxford to be prepared to allow the other to make 
alterations In the lieutenancies and thereby carner an 
advantage over the other; the former was almost certainly 
the keener to do so, he having an equally ardent ally in 
the lord keeper viscount Harcourt. The second is that Anne 
was not prepared to give general backing to either party. 
Thus the general lack of changes'showed how limited the 
ministers' scope for action was if the crown was not 
prepared to back their line of action. In 1713 the first 
earl of Cholmondley opposed the the treaty of Utrecht in 
the Privy Council. Anne desired the Peace, therefore, the 
earl was dismissed from the lieutenancy of Cheshire. 
26 
The 1713 treaty of Utrecht took Britain out of the 
war but did not bring a stop to the wars so that the 
country's former allies, who included Hanover, had to make 
the best terms that they could in a circumstance that was 
disadvantageous when compared to that which had existed 
prior to the treaty's conclusion. A full reversal of the 
Oxford ministry's changes was the least that was expected. 
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Before the Hanoverian Succession, from Anne's perspective 
(she desiring the peace ardently), the whigs' opposition 
to the treaty was distinctly anti-court. After the 
Succession, from George I's view. all good courtiers 
should have been against it. 
The lieutenancy adjustments that followed the 
Hanoverian Succession were not a straizht-forward instance 
of Itories out and whizs in. t It has to be appreciated 
that nine whiz peers had retained office through the 
Oxford ministry. The changes that took place were either 
restorations of individuals or fresh bestowals. The 
counties affected had not necessarily been taken away from 
other people, counties such as Nottinghamshire and 
Staffordshire having been maintained vacant. 
The first two years of George I's reign saw the whi9B 
secure every lieutenancy with the arguable exception of 
Wiltshire, Pembroke is best seen as a courtier rather than 
a tory. However, it was a triumph created through the 
crown. The king made the positive decision that the whigs 
should enjoy a marked predominance among the 
lieutenancies. Initially, he was happy to have a tory 
minority. In the wake of the 1715 Jacobite Rising he made 
a second positive decision that such tories as remained 
should be removed. The whigs were advanced rather than 
advancing through their own efforts; they were advanced to 
act as the court party not as whics. Party members might 
occupy all the lieutenancies but they never controlled the 
distribution of them. 
After the two sets of alterations were made changes 
I 
among the lieutenancies became rare. The second earl 
Granville resigned Devon in 1721. It is unlikely that he 
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left the office becaUSe of the return of the 
Townshend-Walpole group to the ministry the previous year 
because the third earl of Sunderland was still alive and 
influential. Granville's connection with the county was 
through his mother the first countess Granville. She was a 
coheiress of the Granville earls of Bath. It is probable 
that she was regularizing her inheritance by selling off 
her interests in Devon and that it was this that was his 
reason for departinz the office. 
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The reign's other three departures were sackings. 
Greenwich's 1716 dismissal was the result of petty court 
machinations. The deprivation was the first clear instance 
of the part that the reversionary interest was to play in 
politics under the Hanoverians. The earl of Coningsby's 
1721 dismissal was for social misbehaviour in the 
expression of his views as to the lord chancellor in the 
wake of prolonzed litization. As an associate of the third 
earl of Sunderland his departure would have been welcomed 
by the recently re-admitted Townshend-Walpole group. The 
first earl Cowper was dismissed in 1722 and the third earl 
of Essex appointed in his stead in October. This was 
because of Cowper's ardent opposition to the ministry. 
28 
His opposition was not just to Townshend and Walpole but 
had also been to their ministerial colleazue third earl of 
Sunderland who had died in April that year. It is an open 
question as to whether Sunderland had guarded Cowper from 
being moved against as a means of antagonizing his fellow 
ministers. 
From the early 1720s to the mid-1750s the exchance in 
the tenure of lieutenancies was fairlY quiet. The age's 
essence was to allow affairs to continue as they were 
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unless there was an especially pressina reason for 
chancing them. In terms of the general governmental policy 
of 'letting sleeping dogs lie' it may have in large part 
originated with George Il. Lieutenancies were regarded as 
being in the crown's patronage sphere rather than 
ministers'. 
There were two exceptions to the general 
peacefulness. The 1733 dismissals of Clinton and the third 
duke of Bolton have come to rather obscure those of Cobham 
and the third viscount Townshend in the late 1730s. 
However, it was in the latter that the seeds of Walpole's 
downfall were sown. whereas he managed to weather the 
earlier episode. Three of the four people, Townshend being 
excluded, who were removed from office in the 1730S can be 
easily perceived as the king's men rather than as 
Walpolets- two soldiers and a Bedchamber lord. Georce 
felt able to dish out this form of punishment to the three 
becaUBe it was being received by people who were in his 
own spheres of interest. The viscount was master of the 
Jewels but his dismissal sprang from his fatherts death 
rather than his own conduct. The third viscount's brothers 
who occupied profitable offices, such as tellerships of 
the Exchequer in reversion, were left in their places 
undisturbed. 29 
Bolton in the wake of Excise Crisis dismissal drifted 
back into the court orbit and in 1740 was made captain of 
the Gentlemen Pensioners. He and Walpole came to enjoy a 
positively friendly relationship with one another. 30 The 
amicable nature of these relations may have led to 
Portsmouth's being granted an earldom in return for 
resigning the office, but not until after the 1741 general 
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election which had led to Walpole's fall. 
Lieutenants who were occasionally associated with the 
opposition retained their offices: viscount Tadcaster, the 
seventh duke of Somerset, the second earl of Scarbrouch 
and the fourth earl of Shaftesburv. The factor that 
allowed them to do so was because they did not necessarily 
transgress the king's direct interests. especially if 
those peers viewed themselves as courtiers who acted with 
the opposition to Walpole rather than with that. to the 
court. None of these people were of the hardened 
systematic opposition. 31 
With Walpole's fall the removals stopped and the 
departures came to be caused solely by resignations. The 
second duke of Chandos attached himself to prince 
Frederick, who spent periods in a state of mutual 
antipath. y with George II. The first duke of Chandos 
desired to be rid of his own lieutenancies at least as 
early as 1738. Therefore. the 1741 bestowal of 
Herefordshire on Sir Charles Hanbury Williams was not a 
slight to the first duke. 
32 
By the time of the 17,56 outbreak of the Seven Years' 
War the militia had long been in a state of growing decay. 
The militia's original purpose had been for national 
defense. The Nine Years' War and the War of the Spanish 
Succession had shown that national interests could be 
advanced in terms both of international relations and of 
colonial concerns throuch participation in European 
conflicts. More importantly. the army had proved to be an 
excellent tool for suppressing the 1715 Jacobite Rising. 
Thereafter, the army was guaranteed a sizable presence in 
the national life since the Jacobite card was one that 
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hostile powers could play at will asainst Britain. 
Therefore, the militia was no lonzer the principal means 
of national defence. 
In 1745 the militia failed to provide any military 
block to the Jacobite arnw that advanced out of Scotland 
and it was again the army that quelled the menace. The 
Militia had proven ineffective but at least it had tried 
to play a positive role and succeeded in doinz so in terms 
of auxiliary functions, such as keeping a watch on the 
highways. It is probable that much of the decay can be 
attributed to the central government appreciating that its 
interference in the localities would excite the sort of 
fears that had been excited by the Excise Crisis. 
It was not until the outbreak of the Seven Years' War 
that the militia issue was placed firmly on the political 
agenda. The conflict, with its tri-continental 
enzacements, needed new levels of manpower. This posed a 
dilemma that either Britain should meet hostility in every 
theatre that it found such or the nation should husband 
its resources and only counter it selectively. The former 
approach was chosen. Therefore, there was a need for BOMe 
form of adequate national defence to be provided in order 
to allow the army to be deployed abroad as extenBiVely as 
possible. An example of what could be done was the Norfolk 
militia garrisoning Portsmouth in summer 1759 in order to 
make good the absence of the fort's normal recular 
occupants. That this was seen as important to the war 
effort was demonstrated by the militia beinx reviewed en 
route at Kensington Palace. 33 This instance of cooperation 
was exceptional. In September 1759 the Devon one rioted 
when it believed its members thought they were going to be 
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shipped abroad. 
34 This attitude may well have been 
indicative of how the members of most militias felt about 
the effect of the war on their situation. 
The problem loomed even before war had broken out, 
Pitt made political capital from Fox's close official 
connections with the military as secretary at war. He 
pointed out that onlv five of the proposed thirteen 
militia regiments had been raised. TwO BUccessive Acts 
were passed but neither was by any means popular and the 
militia issue was to remain contentious into the early 
years of George III's reign. All this led to a 
politicization of an office that had come to be regarded 
as a sinecure. This in turn led to resicnations in the 
late 17508 by earl Brooke. the ninth earl of Lincoln, the 
second earl of Ashburnham, the second baron Ducie, the 
sixteenth baron Abergavenny, the second earl of Egremont 
the third earl of Cholmondley. This was a radical state of 
affairs in comparison with the lack of diBMiBsals since 
the late 1730s. 
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4.4. Conclusion. 
The functions of the two offices were specific. There 
was a range of other offices through which the centre also 
conducted its relations with the localities. Therefore, 
the prestige and the lack of burdensome duties that the 
two offices commanded made them attractive to the 
aristocracy and particularly to the peerage. The nature of 
political power shifted from the politico-militarv towards 
the politico-administrative. The immediate sub-patronage 
that each office commanded was useful in supportinz an 
interest within a county. Additional influence was 
acquired throuch the offices havinx considerable, if not 
outricht, influence on the distribution of many of the 
other centrally appointed offices. 
The way in which the offices were held changed 
throuch the period. The number of 'double' and 'multiple' 
tenures decreased so that lieutenancies were beinxýheld by 
more people. Through the same span, there was a distinct 
decrease in the number of lieutenancies that were beinz 
held separately from the office of custos. While more 
people were holding the one office they were more likely 
to hold it in condunction with the other. Therefore, the 
number of holders of these offices was rouzhly static. The 
exercize was not a straicht-forward instance of maximizine 
patronage. Rather what happened was that the offices were 
made more efficient and makina recipients became more 
influential. In view of the expansion of the peerage over 
the period, from 1689 to 2760 there may have been a 
contraction in the proportion of peers who were in 
possession of one or more of the two offiCes. 
In the first two reigns and in the early years of 
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Georze I's reign there were some removals from office and 
a number of resignations. In William's reign these changes 
were rooted in the court. The whiss benefitted under him 
and Anne because they were prepared to behave as courtiers 
whereas the the tories tended to behave as party men. 
Initially, Anne was not as anti-whiz as she could have 
been, her actions being court orientated rather than party 
geared. The remodelling by Oxford's ministry was 
distinctly less pro-tory than it was anti-whiz, thereby 
restressing the earl's position as a court manager rather 
than as a party leader. Because of the retention of a 
large number of whigs it is clear that it was not a 
straight-forward partisan purge, indeed, it seems to have 
initially been aimed at a very specific court group. The 
deprivation of the lieutenancies of 1733 and 1739 was 
exceptional. After 1739 departures from lieutenancies 
stemmed from resignations rather than dismissals. Those 
who subsequently left lieutenancies did so because they 
chose to. The 17508 particularly witnessed a number of 
instances because of the Militia issue. 
For the most part those whies who had been given 
office in the localities and who engaged subsequently in 
opposition were allowed to retain those offices. This was 
because the ministry was able to by-pass them when it 
chose to. The whizs in power retained an party 
identification with the independent court whizs. This led 
to the former not wishing to undermine the Party interests 
in the county along with those of the latter. 
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5. The Crown, the Executive, the Peerage and High Politics, 
1689-1760. 
5.1. Introduction. 
Prior to the Exclusion Crisis, the post-Restoration 
high politics of Charles IIts reign were conducted along a 
court/country axis. The former pole was identified with 
the crown and its prerogative and the latter with the 
broader political nation and resistance to assertive 
interpretation and outright abuse of the prerogative. From 
the Crisis until the middle of James II's reign politics 
was dominated by a whiz/tory axis. The former pole sought 
to prevent the accession of a practisint catholic to the 
throne and the latter one to maintain both the Stuart 
family an the throne and the broader socio-political order 
that had been re-established after 1660. These two axes 
both existed throughout the period 1689-1760. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the 
inter-party conflict has been stressed unduly in the 
secondary literature. This had two roots- a general 
underestimation of the continuint strenxth of the crown 
and a concentration of research upon the Commons and 
especially the election of its members. This thesis does 
not seek either to downplay the importance of the 
inter-party conflict or to say that there was a previously 
ignored high level of court/country conflict. What it does 
seek to do is to add to the general appreciation of 
politics by examining the crown through the medium of its 
interaction with the peerage. Such an approach reveals 
that through trying to understand the period's politics 
solely by means of inter-party conflict. one does not gain 
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a full comprehension of the events of the four reiens. If 
one does BO, but also StreSBeB the due place of the crown 
during the period, a better understanding can be gained. 
The 'personal issues. which separated the two parties from 
one another, did not emerge from thin air. Some of those 
issues had clear court/country roots. The. V became hardened 
away from these with the passage of time so that they 
came, only with time, to assume a life quite separate from 
their orizins. 
Politics existed on a number of different broad 
levels- court, ministerial, parliamentary and popular. 
These were not mutually exclusive but what happened in the 
court was not in direct parallel to what happened at the 
popular level. This thesis will concentrate an hich 
politics at the centre. Therefore, it deals the first 
three areas, although the fourth will be touched upon 
briefl. v. The politics in which the peerage participated 
had a different character from that in which M. P. s ' 
engazed. It was not a case of each havinz a Predominant 
axis to the otherts exclusion from it. The Lords was more 
BUsceptible to court influence than the Commons, while the 
Junior House in its turn was more susceptible to both 
party conflict and the country interest. 
The difference can be substantiated by a comparison 
of the factors that worked on the membership of 
parliament's two Houses. At any civen point the Lords had 
numerically approximately a quarter of the sitting members 
that the Commons had. 1 Its membership turned over at a 
slower rate than the Lower House's BO that patronage could 
be dealt out in a more carefully considered manner than it 
could with the Commons where a larze proportion of the 
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membership changed with each general election. Although 
many M. P. s were returned at their own behest or that of a 
patron. a majority had to face re-election where they were 
exposed to the prejudices of the the political nation in 
all but the very rottenest of boroughs. Peers, in 
contrast, either inherited their titles or received them 
from the crown. 
Party politics is not to be ignored in the Lords but 
it was nearly always subordinate to ministerial needs. It 
is hard to identify instanceB when a party was effective 
purely as a party in the Lords. During the first two 
reigns as soon as either party tried to manipulate the 
ministerial interest in the House it was forced to rely on 
the strict support of its members only, and those members 
whose principal loyalty was to the court could prove 
distinctly ambivalent. The parties were too near to one 
another in size and the courtts influence was too strong 
in its presence to allow easy partisan exploitation of the 
House. During the second two reigns there were very few 
instances where the whics tried to behave as whigs. Much 
of their activity was essentially zovernmental and has 
come to seem whiz because the government consisted of 
virtually no one but whiza. However, Just as overt party 
activity was hard to conduct through to fruition so were 
overtly court measures. The politics of noise, where party 
labels are easily attached, has long been mistaken with 
the politics of achievement, where true party labels are 
very rare. 
Over 1702-1760 itAS Possible to consider politics by 
means of narratives constructed to describe the factors 
which accounted for particular ministerial chances, 
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e. g. 1710,1720 and 1746. The three reigns are dealt with 
by means of narratives which are designed to illustrate 
the forces underlying politics in the period. Each reign 
has a basic introduction to it. The Politics of William's 
reign has a different character from that of the three 
reigns which followed it. There were no such incidents; 
Leeds was dismissed lonx after his power had waned, while 
the Junto left office in a piece-meal manner. There were 
two fundamental reasons for this. The first was that 
during Williamts reign the interaction of the crown and 
the political nation led to the size of the executive 
being expanded at the price of the scope-of the 
prerozative being contracted. The framework in which 
politics was conducted was thus fundamentally reshaped. 
The Revolution Settlement was achieved and other matters 
were allowed to riBe to the head of the political agenda. 
The second reason was that William was qualitatively more 
involved with day-to-day politics than the other three 
were. He had the prerogative to defend whereas the 
constitutional state of affairs was essentially agreed 
upon in their reigns. 
2 
Anne showed marked decisiveness in her long-term 
goals- the fighting of the war and then its termination. 
However, she was susceptible to being bullied and could be 
manipulated by a series of short-term manoeuvres which 
could add up to make a considerable alteration, e. c. the 
admi8sion of the Junto to office in the late 17008. The 
two Georges were happy to delegate most of the menial 
business of runninx domestic British politics. All three 
of the monarchs at times positioned'themselves so that 
their political managers could force them into certain 
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limited actions which thew themselves had no positive wish 
to undertake- the 1708 dismissal of Harlew. the 1744 and 
1746 ones of Granville and to a lesser extent the 1720 
re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole group. 
William used managers but his participation in 
politics was such that he was never placed so that he had 
to undertake such an action. Leeds, Sunderland and Jersey 
were each aware that that they were always politically 
expendable, whereas Godolphin came to have quite a 
different perception of his situation by 1710. William was 
a highlv determined individual who had distinct goals in 
changing circumstances, therefore, he engaged in politics 
in a decidedly purposeful manner. An important point of 
difference between him and the other three. which 
underlines the difference in mentality, is that he was the 
only one of the four who did not acquire the throne by 
inheritance but rather did so throuch personal assertion, 
in the politics that followed the Revolution. The 1694 
passace of the Triennial Act and the 1701 one of the Act 
of Settlement could be used as axiomatic incidents around 
which narratives could be constructed but such would 
overstress the court/country conflict at the expense of 
the whig/tory one. Therefore. in order to try to 
incorporate the two themes, a broadly linear approach has 
been adopted. 
Proxies, divisions and protests are mentioned 
frequently. This is done not so much as to provide an 
overall statistical framework throuch which the period can 
be discussed but rather to give flavour to the immediate 
point of discussion by allowinx it to be compared with 
those before and after. A high number of diViBions or 
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highly attended diViBions is usually a sign of politics 
being heated at that particular point. If the size of the 
majorities was small in a full House then the ministry or 
a party was having trouble controlling the House and if 
they were small on a smaller diViBion or large on a big 
one then the ministry/party was not havinc difficulty. 
Proxies were a means by which an individual could still 
make his vote effective in the House without necessarily 
beinx present. There were a number of technicalities 
restricting their use. Protests were a means by which a 
peer could register his dissension in a matter. As with 
divisions their frequent occurrences was usually 
indicative of a keen political temperature. Copies of 
these appear to have been circulated to interested parties 
outside of the House. 
3 
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5.2. William 111,1689-1702. 
William and Anne's reigns are the years which saw the 
establishment of the Revolution Settlement. This was made 
up initially of the Bill of Rights and then a series of 
legislatory Acts which included legislation such as the 
Triennial Act of 1694 and the Regency Act of 1709. The 
Settlement's effect. which was not fully operative until 
after the accession of George 1. was to limit the scope of 
the prerogative in a number of fields and to make the 
crown dependent upon a parliamentarily granted financial 
settlement at the commencement of each reign and 
thereafter annually with army and navy estimates. 
The four most important items of the Settlement were 
the civil list, the Triennial Act. the Act of Settlement 
and the practice of annually passing the Mutiny Act. The 
first and last became established in William's reign while 
the middle two were enacted in it. Therefore, however 
unwilling he may have been in the process. William was 
very much the father of the Settlement. For a man who was 
a Stuart both by descent and by marriage this was rather 
extraordinary. William may not have liked paying the price 
but, in order to gain an extended executive, he paid it 
voluntarily. 
The king's willingness to contract the crown's 
prerogative stemmed from his being allowed to expand its 
executive to a degree that parliament would have 
positively feared with either Charles II or James II. The 
expansion was what enabled him to fight the Nine Years* 
War with English resources and to start the preparations 
for what became the War of the Spanish Succession. He 
subordinated high regard of the prerogative to his mission 
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to resist the expansion of French influence in Western 
Europe. Through parliament, the political nation was 
willing to support this military effort because Louis XIV 
positively identified himself with the cause Of the 
restoration of James II to the throne and if such occurred 
it would return the nation to the avenue of political 
development that it had sought to avoid with the Glorious 
Revolution. Although parliament had a similarity of 
interest with William it was a parallel one rather than an 
identical one. Therefore, while granting the king the 
means with which to fight wars which both they and he 
wanted, they built in safeguards which were designed to 
prevent any further Stuart attempts at aggrandizement of 
the crown through the prerogative. 
The process by which the Settlement came into being 
was not a foregone conclusion in 1689. What has been 
described above is the overriding logic of the situation. 
To contemporaries this would have been evident in 
retrospect but not so beforehand. The degree to which the 
monarchy should be restrained ran a wide gamut of opinion. 
This range meant that although it was probably expected 
that some form of chance would occur it was not certain 
how far this would co or even what areas of the 
prerogative and the executive it would effect. 
The situation was complicated by the tories having a 
variety of attitudes towards the monarchy because of who 
was on the throne. At the same time the whics, who had 
been proscribed by the last two monarchs, were now broucht 
back into many of the places of political power, by the 
&race of another Stuart thus undermininz the opposition to 
the prerocative that they had come to enjoy. There were to 
169 
be further complications throuch the mutable nature of 
political stances, the whics beine particularly 
BUSceptible to this. 
There is a debate as to which was the dominant axis 
for the politics of the reian. Dennis Rubini used his 1968 
book to argue for a court/country predominance. His 
efforts broucht upon him hostile commentary. 
4 
The majority 
of political historians who have considered the reign seem 
to have felt that a party axis dominated. The principal 
arena for contention was the interpretation of a series of 
Commons division lists. However, the arcuments presented 
have not led Rubini to retract his views nor have they 
made him seem obtuse for not doine so. This thesis's 
attitude is that he struck upon a broad truth as to the 
character of the reign's politics but that he is over 
extendinx it with respect to the lists themselves. 
Rubini's detractors have made two mistakes with the 
reign's most volatile elements, the general elections 
which dominated its second half. The first was to read 
them far too retrospectively and thus save the 1690s too 
much of a party interpretation, to the exclusion of the 
rival axis. This is not to say that party did not exist in 
the early 1690s but rather that it should not be turned 
into a homogeneOUB factor in politics when its nature 
varied during the reign. The second error is to assume 
that politics in the Lords was in an immediate parallel 
with that in the Commons. 
The prime example of these faults is Henry Horwitz's 
1977 book. At a level of primary scholarship on almost any 
given topic the work is more informative than Rubinils. 
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However, it is limited in itself; firstly, by its 
essentially being a reaction to Rubini and secondly by its 
beinz principally a study of the politics of the Commons. 
Its concentration on part of the political elite to the 
exclusion of the localities and the preSB was noted. The 
court, the ministry and and especially the Lords were 
given only the roles of supporting players. It was hardly 
Burprizina that the tome was duly criticized in its turn. 5 
The belief in the necessity of restraining the 
executive crossed the party confines. The whias might 
contain the more enthusiaBtiC Bupporters of the programme 
but the measures were not party legislation. Whigs were 
involved in opposition activitY in the Upper House. This 
was mounted in large part by the first duke of Bolton and 
the second earl of Stamford. They were sometimes joined by 
various members of the tory party and acted not so much as 
a country party as an anti-court one. It is noteworthy 
that the duke was not among those who shared in the fruits 
of the partwts later good fortune. The earl did come into 
zovernment but not as the Junto's client, rather he did so 
as his own man in an operation to cover the Juntots 
departure. 6 They were not to be ionored lichtly since both 
were landowners in the far south-west of Encland, where 
there were a large number of parliamentary seats. 
7 
The tories had enJoyed a monopoly of office from the 
end of the Exclusion Crisis until James II set about his 
remodelling. In 1689 the tories had a numerical advantace 
over the whiCs in the Lords. However, a number qf their 
more extreme members excluded themselves from sitting by 
refusing to swear the oaths, e. g. the second earl of 
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Clarendon, whereas many of the more extreme whics were 
still in parliament. The tories found that although they 
were the larger party they had to share office with-the 
whics, who gained a disproportionate number of places 
through William having initially believed that the two 
parties were of a comparable size. The whigs were most 
strongly represented in the Household, although there were 
tories there too. 8 
At the opening of the period the tories were keenly 
divided by rivalries that had their roots in the previous 
two reigns. The success of the tories in supporting the 
Stuart monarchy, until the middle of James II's reign, had 
sown the seeds of a number of internecine quarrels. These 
the kinzs had exploited in order to retain their influence 
over the party, Charles II doing so especially since he 
was temperamentally inclined towards such behaviour. 
9 In 
addition, although some tories did suffer under James they 
had not had the prolonged persecution that the whics had 
undergone, therefore, they had not come to have the same 
sense of solidarity that the experience had engendered in 
the other party. The whics, with their electoral expertise 
learned from the first earl of Shaftesbury, were far more 
of a party in the organizational sense of the word than 
the tories, who were more of one in the less sophisticated 
basis of having shared attitudes. 
At the reign's start the three most prominent tories 
in office were the northern secretary the second earl of 
Nottingham (the seventh earl of Winchilsea), the lord 
president (the first duke of Leeds) and the lord, privy 
seal, (the first marquis of Halifax). The last two were 
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bitter enemies. 
10 Nottingham was considerably younXer than 
them and did not have their experience althouch it was he 
who was put into the burdensome office whereas theirs were 
fairly honorific. He was inexperienced in high office and 
therefore, in theory, was more likely to prove pliant than 
his two companions. who were available to the kine's 
counsels. The three were dominant in the ministry but they 
certainly did not have a stranglehold on the offices of 
power nor on the tory party itself. Outside this group the 
most influential tory in the Lords, and possibly in the 
party, was the earl of Rochester. 
William Boon realized that the whiz party was smaller 
than he had at-first thought and that he had therefore 
given it a disproportionate amount of interest in relation 
to its size. Also, many of the party's leaders were more 
interested in resolving old political conflicts than in 
coping with the new problems of government. He called a 
general election in order to lessen the party's strength 
in the Commons. The election was succeBBfUl in enzineerinE 
its intended result. This led to an increased tory 
presence. Consequently, Leeds found himself propelled to 
the political forefront. His importance was initially 
promoted by his being by far the most skilled, and for it 
notorious. parliamentary manager. The essential 
pre-condition for his earlier achievement had been that a 
civen parliament did not have a set time-limit on its 
life. Although he had been in the Lords since 1673 there 
were additional tools for Use on the Commons throuzh the 
wartime expansion of the executive. 
11 However, laCk of a 
time-limit acted to promote internal disharmony since it 
Played down the place of party, there not being frequent 
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zeneral elections to re-insert a zrass roots element into 
the rarified atmosphere of St. StePhen's. 
Additionally, the duke came to prominence through a 
number of possible rivals to himself optinx not to serve 
at that time but rather to wait on events. William's 
favour was shown in his allowinx the Treasury commission 
to be remodelled to make it more tory. 
12 However, there 
was one notable exception to the new commission- the first 
earl of Godolphin, who disliked Leeds. 
13 Halifax decided 
that his own career would best be advanced by zoine into 
opposition'and seekinc to exploit any mistakes or any 
failures made by Leeds. 
14 
With the commencement of the 1690 session it quickly 
became apparent that parliament was not prepared to risk a 
financially independent crown and that therefore it was 
not prepared to make a lifetime grant of the customs. The 
session as a whole was business-like. This was because the 
crown was willinx to make some concessions in order to 
secure various measures that it soucht. In this, the 
session was a condensed version of the constitutional 
developments of the reian. The purpose of the 
Rezularization of Proceedings bill was to give the force 
of law to the proceedings and legislation of the 
Convention. The crown saw this as limiting its potential 
scope for political manoeuvre. Therefore, it opposed this 
development. However, it swiftly became evident that the 
support for the bill was too broad for it not to be 
accepted in some form or other. This was because there Was 
an underlyinx threat that if it were not enacted the crown 
would not obtain its desires over other items such as 
financing the war. 
17LL 
During the seSBion it became fullw evident that the 
king did not wish to accept an Act which would guarantee 
the frequent elections of parliament. The court whiz the 
duke of Shrewsbury resigned an April 28th as southern 
secretary. For him the achievement of further 
constitutional safeguards took priority over serving the 
crown and he had no desire for his wish to do the latter 
to lead to his being compromised in obtaining the 
former. 15 
The session saw the court tories and-whigs cooperate 
with one another for the most part. The only possible, 
rather than clear, exception was a modification to an 
amendment to the Abjuration bill. The bill saw Halifax 
working with Leeds but towards the end of the session he 
was backed by some whiZB in trying to exclude Leeds from 
the Act of Grace. 
16 
During the summer of 1690 there was an engagement off 
Beachy Head in which Dutch ships bore the brunt of the 
losses. In order to assuage political opinion in the 
United Provinces, William attempted to make a scapegoat 
out of the English commanding officer, the earl of 
Torrington. 17 A look at the protests reveals that the 
matter was actually fouzht alonx the lines of court and 
opposition, the whiss beinc far more heavily represented 
in the opposition at that time than the torieB were. 
18 The 
acquittal of the earl by a court-martial (made up of 
officers whom he had mostly appointed in his official 
capacity) put Leeds under pressure and made him generally 
more susceptible to attack. 
The duke's Position was eased through the timely 
uncovering of the Preston Plot by his son the second duke. 
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This unsettled Halifax, Rochester and even some whigs. 
Therefore, Leeds survived the attack. The danger of a 
simplistic party analysis in these years is beautifully 
illustrated by this instance of a tory usinx the taint of 
Jacobitism as a defensive weapon azainst fellow tories who 
had recently been his miniBterial colleagues. 
19 
Leeds was careful to never allow himself to be 
tainted with Jacobitism. In May 1692, three months after 
the session had finished, the first duke of Marlborough 
was found to be in correspondence with James II. Whether 
Marlborough can be classified as a torv after the 
Revolution is questionable. He and the first duke of 
Buckingham were prominent in the group which eXiBted 
around Anne, Godolphin being a strong sympathizer. The 
princess disliked the way Marlborough had been treated; 
although she did not raise a serious reversionary Interest 
herself during the reigns there was always the possibility 
that she might do so. For the next two years she was 
disaffected rather than overtly hostile. Marlborough went 
into opposition while Buckinzham's continued support of 
the ministry was decidedly equivocal. 
20 The session was 
like its predecessor in not being innovative. The 
expanding tory opposition in the Lords was largely hostile 
to Leeds. 21 
During the summer of 1693 Nottingham became exposed 
politically through the lOBSeB the Turkey Fleet sustained 
from enemy action. He was clearly the patron of the 
admirals involved in the debacle, therefore in November he 
chose to resign rather than face the full wrath of 
parliament. 
22 The tory opposition in the Lords had grown 
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still larger and now contained a clear majoritv of the 
party's leading members in that House. The 1694 promotions 
indicated both the partyts weakeninx position and the 
dividedness that had aided that weakening. 
The tories had begun to slip badly by the middle 
1690s, especially in comparison with the advances that the 
whigs had begun to make. The emergence of a single 
predominant group or individual within the tory party was 
restrained by the high number of self-regarding 
politicians who already existed in its courtier reaches. 
William was careful never to favour anyone or any Croup to 
the extent where they could establish such a predominance. 
Leeds was always kept on a ticht rein. Like Sunderland 
later in the reign, the duke, even though he had not 
associated with James, had too odious a past of 
manipulating-parliament for Charles II for him to dare to 
seek to become pre-eminent (in spring 1692 William was not 
yet heedinx Sunderland's proffered advice that he should 
take the Junto into the ministry). 
23 The duke was by no 
means able to dictate the character of the ministry in the 
early 1690s, even when the beneficiaries of appointments 
were often tories. 
The whiz party had the good luck to have its 
misfortune early in the reign. Had William continued to 
support them throuchout the early 1690s their subsequent 
rise might not have occurred. As it was, a number of 
opportune deaths among the older generation of survivinx 
First Whigs and the catharsis, that they underwent in the 
wakeýof the 1690 general election, without there being 
another one in sight, left the party leadership both free 
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to adapt and with a reason for doinx so, if it were to 
have a realistic prospect or power. 
24 In the Commons a 
ceneration of youna whics were able to develop a line of 
constructive whiggery. They decided that 
non-confrontational methods were the best means of 
advancement. 
There were a number of whiz peers who were not 
adversely affected by William's dislike of the more 
radical whigs in the earlier years, men who made up the 
whig party but also whose retained presence guarded the 
king from being subject to the tories. The first duke of 
Devonshire was the most noticeable of them but other 
leading ones were the sixth earl of Dorset, who was lord 
chamberlain, and the first earl of Bradford, who was both 
comptroller and treasurer of the Household. Men like these 
were great territorial magnates. The duke of Newcastle 
(1694) can be loosely appended to this group although he 
spent most of the early 1690s in a Bulk over not being 
cranted a dukedom. The first duke of Ancaster had been 
part of the Osborne-Bertie clan but with the political 
eclipse of Leeds the association faltered and he began to 
driftýtowards whiggery. The first viscount Lonsdale was a 
territorial magnate but he became particularly attached to 
the king. In comparison the earl of Tankerville (1695) was 
a maxnate who became so attached for his own careerist 
motives. 
There were other varieties of court whiz. The first 
earls of Warrington and Macclesfield (1679) along with the 
third earl of Peterborough were radical whiss of the 
variety with whom William had become disenchanted. The 
last was successful in continuing as a personage at court 
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throuzh the reign and right through to that of George II. 
The first baron Haversham, whom William expressly 
recruited, was probably the king's man rather than a 
member of any faction within the whig party. He was 
associated with Peterborouzh at dunctures during the reian 
but failed to emulate the earl's subsequent success. The 
earl of Romney, who was the scion of a magnate family, 
fits loosely into this category but was ultimately in 
quite a separate group since he both held senior office 
and was a royal favourite. He was brother to the whig 
martyr lord Algernon Sydney. 
These different elements within the whiz party all 
went to play a part in Williamts use of the Junto (the 
marquis of Wharton, baron Somers, the earl of Orford 
(1697) and the earl, of Halifax (1714)), illustrating that 
that group was not his only point of contact with the 
party. Prior to 1695 the court whics did not perform quite 
the same role in the king's relations with the tories. 
William had been careful to construct a whizzish court 
party for himself in order to avoid becoming too dependent 
on the tories in the Upper House and to counter tory 
strength in the Commons. However, it was principally a 
court party. He did not recruit it exclusively from the 
whigs. the first earl of Jersey was a courtier of a tory 
hue. Indeed, William did not recruit them exclusively from 
English parties, he also had his continental creations, 
e. z. the first earls of Portland and Albemarle 
A more homogeneous strand of the court party were 
inheritors of titles who were probably courtiers even if 
they never obtained a high profile- the eighteenth baron 
Fitzwalter, the twentieth earl of Oxford, the sixth earl 
I 
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of Warwick, the sixth baron of Delawarr and the first earl 
of Strafford (1711). oxford was poor but for his various 
court incomes, Warwick was considerably poorer than his 
predecessors but better off than his Successor, Delawarr 
was certainly poorer than his Tudor predecessors had been# 
while Strafford was a careerist of the weakest tory hue. 
For such people party was very much a secondary feature, 
there b. einz little overt party warfare in the Lords 
On balance in the wake of the Triennial Act, these 
people tended to act more in common with the whigs than 
with the tories and many of the Whigs in their turn 
behaved in a far more court manner. For those who were 
either ambitious or temperamentally inclined to serve the 
court, which was natural for peers as the crownts 'natural 
counsellors', the whigs had shown themselves to be capable 
of acting as the crownts servants. A prime illustration of 
this was the way in which the second viscount Townshend 
became a whig even though he had initially been 
principally associated with the tories. 
It became clear that the whigs were more 
whole-heartedly in favour of the war than the tories and 
that the mass Of their party had a stance where they were 
willing to participate in constructive government. The 
Million Loan bill of December 1692 was the child of 
Charles Montagu. 25 It met with no opposition in the Lords. 
It had been the whics who had been principally responsible 
for the early Revolution Settlementts enactment. Some 
tories shared this conviction while still others saw the 
potential for resisting the growth of whics in office bY 
underlining for the crown the inconcruitv of whigs being 
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in government. The Loan bill was followed in the session 
by a Place one. The purpose of this item was to prohibit 
certain categories of crown officer from sitting in the 
Commons, thereby making it harder for the crown to 
recreate the conditions of Charles II's high Danby era 
which would have been perfectlv possible in view of the 
expansion of the executive. The bill passed the Commons. 
The crown was able to use the House of Lords as a fail 
safe, a means of preventins the enactment a measure which 
it did not-want. 
26 
The politics of the 1693-1694 session revolved around 
the Triennial Act and the Place bill. Both items passed 
both Houses, the divisions in the Lords passed the one 
hundred mark for the first time in the period, an 
indication of the fierceneBS with which the court foucht 
its rearguard action. On January 25th William finally 
accepted an amended Triennial bill. With the Place bill he 
acted as his own fail safe, using the royal veto to stop 
the bill. Alona with the Place bill William lost two 
supply bills. However, later in the session the Tonnage 
bill was passed. This was intended to raise a loan of 41.2 
million. 
27 The threat that underpinned the concerted drive 
for limiting the prerogative came into operation, even if 
it was only partial. 
The 1694-1695 session contained the first State of 
the nation debate of the period that ended in a division 
in the Lords. The Caroline tories Nottingham, Rochester 
and Halifax were joined by Torrington in venting their 
spleen at the king. 
28 The session ended with attacks for 
corrupt practices against both Buckingham and Leeds, the 
latter being saved by William proroguing parliament. After 
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this Leeds was very much a spent force since he could no 
longer manipulate the Commons in the way that he had been 
able to do earlier. Shrewsbury and Sunderland were given 
the dissolution that they had been seeking from William 
and which would produce a more whizzish Commons. 
29 
However, William was temperamentally disinclined to have a 
minister forced out unless he wished that the man go, -so 
Leeds remained in office. WilliamtB aversion to being 
dominated by either party seems to have been slippinc in 
parallel with the whigs slipping towards becoming a court 
party. The tories who remained were either dead wood or 
were politically peripheral to the ministry. 
In the wake of queen Mary's death in December 1694 
4 
William's relations with Anne improved. Despite this, 
William preferred to appoint lord Justices rather than 
leave her as regent: the reconciliation had been rather 
recent and she was close to Marlboroush, who was still in 
disgrace. Whereas previously the council appointed to 
advise queen Mary during William period's overseas had 
been markedly tory the lords recent were all whigs with 
the exception of Godolphin. He had the experience of beinz 
summoned only occasionally to their regular meetincs. In 
addition, the previous year Sunderland had allowed him to 
be subjected by the Junto to questions on his use of 
Customs and Excise patronaze. This mizht have been a 
matter on which he could have defended himself reasonably 
as his abuse of office was remarkable In its moderation 
but he was unable to appeal to either the broader partY or 
the Carolihes since he was no longer closely identified 
with either. Much of Godolphin's political standing in 
William's reign came not from himself but rather his being 
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Sunderlandts pawn. That he was no loncer a mainstream 
court tory was to have repercussions after 1702.30 
The First Whigs had initially been a court party that 
had gone on to take much of its strencth from the country 
party that had preceded it. 
31 Therefore, there were always 
internal tensions inherent in the party's post-1689 
composition. There was a paradox In that success brought 
out dissent within the party. The less party orientated 
the party leadership had appeared, the more power they had 
been admitted to; the group were happy with the Revolution 
Settlement, but that did not mean that those whose support 
they exploited were necessarily also satisfied with the 
subsequent state of affairs. The 1695 general election did 
not make the Commons become a whiz House but rather the 
partyts proportion of the seats there increaBed. 
32 
A group, centrinz on the Marcher families of Harley 
and Foley, appeared disillusioned with the increasingly 
court character of the party, after its firm country 
stance during its proscription less than a decade 
before. 33 To what extent the croup was articulatinc 
genuine country sentiments and to what extent they were 
usinx it as the time-honoured ploy for self-advancement is 
not delineable. It is quite possible that the group's 
politics were not of a homozeneous character and that 
attitudes towards the court varied within it at different 
points in time. 
The Junto and their allies found it increasingly hard 
to control the mass of their colleacues in the Commons. 
The war was beginning to wind down, therefore, many in the 
Lower House felt that there was no longer quite the same 
imperative to maintain party discipline so that many of 
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the beliefs that had been put into suspension in the early 
1690s re-emerged. 
Country values were not the exclusive preserve of the 
whigs. Therefore, there was a country wing to the tory 
party. In addition, court tories found the stance a useful 
enzine for OPPOBition. The coalition between the 
disconsolate country whiCs and a large proportion of the 
tory party was felt primarily in the Commons. Its presence 
in the Lords was disproportionately through the tories 
there, the whigs there not seeing it to be to their 
advantage. 
In the 1695-1696 session Rochester found political 
capital through cooperation with those whigs who were 
dissatisfied with the chances in their own party, there 
being as yet but a nascent country party and a long-term 
whiz opposition-in the Lords which had not tasted the 
fruits of its own Party's recent success. 
34 Somethinc was 
needed that would re-emphaBize shared common 
characteristics and thus persuade the party to follow 
collectively the leadership's line. As with Leeds and the 
Preston Plot, a very timely conspiracy turned up- 
Fenwick's. The Plot was discovered on February 14th 1696. 
The Northumbrian, kniCht had been making plans for an 
assassination attempt on kinz William. The Junto seized 
upon it as a device, using it both to attack the tories 
and to maintain whig party discipline. 
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The Junto and the whics soucht to exploit it by 
creating the Association which was a document to be signed 
as an indication that an individual abhorred the plot. It 
held up to William the dangers of Jacobitism in terms of 
the English domestic threat more clearly than he had 
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hitherto had instance of. Howevero despite this, on the 
December 18th vote there was a defection by many of the 
whiz party's court members. These were accompanied by the 
amenable court tories such as the second duke of Ormond, 
the eighth earl of Pembroke and Godolphin. It was seen as 
noteworthy that the IiXes of Bradford, the third earl of 
Peterborough and prince George of Denmark did not go over 
with them. 36 The effect of the switch was to show that 
there were clear limits on the croup in that there were 
points beyond which the court element within their support 
would assert itself. 37 
The forces of country opposition that the plot's 
discovery had ameliorated did not go into decline and 
broke out anew the followint session. The Qualifications, 
bill waB principallv a product of a tory reaction to the 
election. The party rank and file in the Commons felt that 
many of those who had been elected were not of, sufficient 
means to be independent in their voting because the 
beBtowal of a place or a pension would make a very 
considerable alteration to their income. The item had its 
roots in old suspicions as to the whics but was probably 
in larce part a child of the crowth of the executive and 
the riches that were to be made from it; it echoed 
pre-Exclusion Crisis suspicions of the court. 
38 That it 
was not altogether a party measure and the recentness of 
the whiX admission to power probably accounts for its 
successful passage through the Lords. William had to use 
his veto to stop the measure. 
39 
The limited ability of the whigs in ministry to 
secure Office Was illustrated by the nature of those that 
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they did secure in these years. The lord lieutenancy of 
Devon which was given to Stamford was one of two taken 
from the first earl of Bath (1661). the Granville group 
having been peripheralized from the body of the torY 
party. 
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Leeds was now in a similarly outlyinc position. 
His being allowed to drift on as lord president was in 
part to allay tory arguments as to the king being 
surrounded by whics, however, his lack of influence was 
illustrated by the humiliation of his kinsman the first 
earl of Abinedon, whose offices both as lord lieutenant of 
Oxfordshire and as a chief jusice in eyre were taken from 
him and given to the Junto member Wharton; it waB hardly 
the secretaryship that he had lonx aspired to. 
As high political predators, the whigs were able to 
pick off the stragElers from the tory party but they were 
not allowed to make anv serious inroads that micht have 
threatened the body mass of the herd. William made a clear 
statement that it was with the crown that power lay by 
selecting from the peerage the toryish courtiers -Pembroke 
and the first earl of Jersey- as two of the Joint 
plenipotentiaries-to treat at Rvswick. 
The factor that the Junto saw as imperilling their 
own political survival was the second earl of Sunderland. 
The earl had come ýo act as a political advizer to William 
and as such was not possessed of a personal party bias. He 
had been instrumental in the the croupts ascent, however, 
just as he was prepared to help the Junto so he was ready 
to help any group that could provide control of the 
Commons for the king. By such behaviour he prolonged his 
own political usefulness to the crown and therefore his 
own political survival. This was not to say that he was 
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positively working for their dismissal but rather that he 
had the worrying habit of keeping his options open. 
41 
William's attitude towards the country party had been 
ambivalent, he had no particular cause to have a high 
opinion of his English courtiers. Sunderland inVeBtizated 
the potential of the crown having a cooperative 
relationship with the alliance and came back with some 
positive responses. This is demonstrated by the way in 
which the kinx was happy to acquiesce to the land bank 
scheme in the hope of unlockinx further capital to finance 
the executive. 
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In October 1696 Sunderland had secured the place of 
first commissioner of the Treasury for Charles Montagu by 
using the Fenwick Plot as a means of tricking Godolphin 
out of the office. This he did by sayinx that a voluntary 
resignation would be a means for the king to show his 
confidence in the man by reconferring the post upon him; 
the king did not do so. While the Junto had been glad that 
one of their members now had the office, the incident had 
underlined just how dangerous Sunderland could be. 
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Fortunately for the group's needs the earl was also a 
bocey fieure for the tories. However, as events were to 
show, he was not the only royal servant to possess such a 
place in the tory/country demonology. Early in the 
1697-1698 session an attack was mounted by the tories on 
Sunderland as the supposed author of the King's Speech. 
The Junto made it clear to William that they were not 
prepared to make any effort to defend the man. This 
refUBal meant that the earl's Position was hopeless, 
therefore, he resigned as lord chamberlain and withdrew 
into political retirement (for the time being). 
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However, the attack was only part of a campaicn which 
included the Junto as its next targets. It is probable 
that Sunderland then helped steer the onslaught on towards 
Montacu. Whatever the exact circumstances, the Junto man 
responded to the development by attacking Charles Duncombe 
on similar grounds to the charges against Montagu. 
Duncombe being an associate of Sunderland. In this Montagu 
was backed by the mass of the party and by Anne's 
associates, while Nottingham, Leeds, Rochester and 
Peterborough successfully defended Duncombe. Again there 
were defections which indicate that the Junto's assault 
was not court-sanctioned. Bolton and Dorset were both with 
the tories. The question of fining those French merchants 
who had remained in London was a further instance of court 
whizs breakinc off from the body of the party when its 
behaviour became too partisan. Devonshire, Stamford and 
Haversham all felt driven to sign a subsequent protest. 
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The Junto seem to have decided that there was no 
advantage to be had from their trying to raise a political 
controversy. Thereafter, there was quiet until the summer 
of 1699 when William refused to dismiss the tory admiral 
Sir George Rooke at Orford's (1697) request, so the earl 
resigned. The rest of the Junto remained in office not 
wishing to provoke the king further. Romney, as first lord 
of the Bedchamber, accompanied William to the continent, 
rather than Portland who had been becominz increasingly 
withdrawn from the court; Jersey was made a secretary, he 
was the ally of the new principal royal favourite 
Albemarle; Leeds was ousted in order that his place might 
be given to Pembroke, whose own was given to Lonsdale. 
Stamford and the second baron Lexington were brought into 
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Junior positions. William was not faced with a straight 
choice of either the Junto or the tories. He was able to 
construct a less party-orientated ministry than that which 
had come to exist. The changes made the ministry more 
court and less party in character. 
The government did not seek to engage in a positive 
line of policy. During the 1699-1700 session the 
country-/tory alliance attacked Somers over the questions 
of his fee-farms and the privateer William Kidd. The 
pre-court whizs defended the baron; 
LL5 
solidarity in 
defence was the norm, whereas there was no guarantee of it 
in attack. In the Commons, the opposition sought to 
exploit the need for supply in order to further its desire 
for grant resumptions. The Resumption bill was tacked to 
the Land Tax. Even Charles Montaeu voted for the 
measure. 
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The Commons showed how determined its members 
were over the matter by killing a bill designed to 
facilitate a Union of England and Scotland. an item which 
William desired. The court then reversed its stance which 
it had defended by having the Lords stand on their 
privileges in the matter. Albemarle, Jersey and Romney 
were Prominent in executing the re-addustment. 47 In early 
1700 Albemarle. Sunderland and the Villiers concurred with 
the tories to try to influence the king towards changing 
the character of the ministry. In May Somers was dismissed 
and Shrewsbury decided to resign. 
48 
It was noticed that Robert Harley and Rochester were 
crowing friendly and the commoner was shortly to continue 
in the time-honoured careerist metamorphosis from country 
to court. 
49 While there were points of difference between 
him and the Junto there were also strong similarities. He 
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Bhared their whia background, once the Revolution 
Settlement was established the group became positive crown 
servants, whereas he had clung to the country position 
coming in when they were underzoine attack for having done 
the same. These parallel paths went through the same 
terrain rather than through different landscapes. Robert 
Harley turned into a full courtier only after the Act of 
Settlement whereas they had been prepared to come in 
earlier. For the time being politics was drifting. Neither 
the court not the whigs sought to engage in any line of 
action unless goaded into it. 
Two deaths changed this state of affairs. On July 
30th 1700 the duke of Gloucester died. He was Annets last 
surviving child and it was generally agreed that she was 
not going to bear any more; therefore, the Succession 
question was opened up. If the Old Pretender was excluded 
the next claimants were catholic members , of the French 
royal House of Bourbon. Therefore, the succession needed 
to be settled for when both William and Anne were dead, 
catholics havinz been excluded by the Bill of Rights. 
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The autumn zeneral election saw substantial tory 
gains. However, international events soon undermined the 
reBUlt. On October 21st Carlos II of Spain also died. He 
willed his crown to Louis XIVIs grandson the duke of 
Anjou. William was soon convinced that it would be 
necessary to go to war. However, the duke's acceptance of 
the crown in itself did not precipitate the War of the 
Spanish Succession. It took a series of incidents to 
convince English domestic political opinion as to the 
conflict's necessity. Louis provided these, for reasons 
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that are not clear. The duke9s potential claim to the 
French throne was underlined in the parlement of Paris; 
the Barrier fortresses between the Spanish Netherlands and 
the United Provinces were surprised and occupied by French 
troops; it became apparent that French would enjoy a 
privileged status in relation to trade with Spain and the 
Spanish colonies which the Enzlish would not be 
accorded. 
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In November and December 1700 a ministerial reshuffle 
took place. Harley was in larze part responsible for these 
appointments, exacting it as the price for his cooperating 
in securing the Succession for the Lutheran House of 
Hanover. who had the next best claim and were seasoned 
memberB Of the anti-French alliance. The more ardent 
tories did not profit from the Juntots decline. rather the 
court continued with a set of ministers who drew only 
partially on the pool of possible talent, although the set 
did have a tory bent. 
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On February 12th 1701 the Kine's Speech was delivered 
to the Lords. Peterborough and Haversham were maverick 
Williamite whics, they used. the Speech as an opportunity 
to draw notice to the recent actions by France. The 
Carolines RocheBter, Buckingham and Nottingham were 
pacific in their sentimentB, however, the following day a 
bellicose Address was passed by the House. The torieB, in 
an act of decidedly bad judgement in view of William's 
attitudes on the matter, undermined this by having the 
House seek the Commons's concurrence on the matter, which 
was not obtained in view of the character of the Lower 
House. 53 The court was divided and it was improbable that 
William's sympathies were with either the tories or the 
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country party. 
Public opinion had yet to be convinced of the 
necessity of war, therefore, it was possible for 
anti-court sentiment to be expressed in the actions of the 
Commons. The tories and the countrv whics sought to 
exercise their resentment of the government's policies 
over the previous years by tryinx to impeach those whom it 
held to be responsible. Portland was clearly out of favour 
with William and therefore vulnerable. On March 29th 1701 
the Commons found him guilty of a high crime and 
misdemeanour for his part in the negotiation of the Second 
Partition treaty. AB the result of the earl's evidence 
Orford (1697), Halifax (1714) and Somers were impeached 
for knowledze of the same item on April JILth. 51L 
It was improbable that William would tolerate the 
impeachments succeeding; Just as the Junto had lost bv his 
hich view of the crown so they now benefitted by it. 
However, there were grounds for worry perhaps caused by , 
William takinz his time to come out in their favour. 
Peterborough, Ancaster, Lexington, the first earl of 
Cholmondley, the duke of Kent, the second earl of 
Warrington and the ninth Derby all signed one or more of 
the protests relating to the treaty and the Impeachments 
between March 15th and June 17th (although it should be 
appreciated that none of them participated in systematic 
signing in the way that the tory protestors did). They 
were courtiers but all but the last can be classed as 
whics. 
55 The Junto might not be disliked as much as the 
country party but that did not mean that their court 
colleagues, even if whig, had to have a positive liking of 
the Croup. 
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The Junto's cause was backed in the Lords because the 
zroup were of use to William. The House postponed 
consideration of the Land Tax and Haversham infuriated the 
Lower House by clearly remarking on the partisan nature of 
the impeachmentB. The impeachmentB did not BUrViVe the 
cross-fire. 
56 The supply bills were subsequently passed by 
the Upper House. The Lords were still capable of 
challenging the Commons' supremacy in financial matters if 
BUfficiently antagonized into doing BO. 
The Act of Settlement was backed in the Commons by 
the country party because it contained further 
restrictions on the prerozative and in the Lords by the 
court party because it determined the matter as the crown 
wished. The bill passed the Lords without amendment. Had 
the duke of Gloucester not died then then this extension 
of the Settlement would not have occurred at thiB 
juncture, if at all. The Junto had felt no desire to push 
it further. Whether the court/countrv conflict would have 
died down as much as it was to do without the Act of 
Settlement passing into law is both an open and 
unanswerable question. 
Two decisions affectins senior positions show that 
William was seeking to keep his own options open as to its 
disposal in view of what he decided to do with the 
ministry. In June 1701 the court whig Tankerville (1695) 
died and his office of lord privy seal was put into 
commission. During the same summer Marlborouch was 
appointed general of the forces beina sent to the Low 
Countries. The duke was neither the Junto's man or 
associated with the country opposition. 57 
William felt that a parliament that had tried to 
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impeach former ministers of his for executing his foreign 
policy was not the best one that he could have for 
financing English involvement in another major European 
war. He ordered a dissolution, althouch the matter was 
only carried by three'votes in the Privy Council. Among 
those who voted amainst it were the court tories Jersey, 
Godolphin and Pembroke, who had all been antagonized by 
the realization that it was the whits who would benefit 
from these chanzeB. 
58 This does not mean that it was tory 
party solidarity that was beinc expressed. It is more 
likely to have signified their dislike of the 
re-advancement of the whics that would follow. 
The 1701 general election saw the tory gains reversed 
without there being a reaction in the whigs' favour-59 
Before the parliament met the ministry was aZain 
re-organized. The tories Rochester and Sir Charles Hedges 
were both dismissed from senior office. To make matters 
worse for the tories, Jersey and Albemarle had fallen out, 
so that the former's position was precarious. 
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In 
September 1701 Louis XIV recognized the Old Pretender as 
James Ill. The court was determined and the necessity of 
war was generally accepted, therefore, there was little 
domestic political activity in Encland. On March 8th 
William III died from a chill caught while recuperating 
from a bad fall from a horse. 
Politics during the reign of William was fluid with 
the existence of a natural majority for the court in the 
Lords. It is a reasonable assumption that party was the 
primary political identification with parliament. However, 
it was not the principal framework through which politics 
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was conducted in the Lords. Rather, in the Upper House, 
politics took place alonz a court/country axis, the latter 
consisting principally of displaced courtiers. The 
politics of party flowed over the static presence of a 
determined and self-aware court. The day-to-day practice 
of politics could be acrimonious because of the endemic 
internecine rivalrieB that senior Politicians were prone 
to. 
The cutting back in the size of the army after 
Ryswick was very much azainst William's wishes. However, 
after nearly a decade of personal involvement in Enclish 
politics he must have been fully aware that such would 
happen with the arrival of'peace. Realism at the prospect 
of frustration must have underlain Williamts fury at its 
advent. William III found his will Positively contravened 
over the crown grants in parliament. However, this 
opposition stemmed from the Commons. When the matter was 
in the House it was not a clear party matter. The Upper 
Chamber was as a whole prepared to do as William wished 
even if it could act cantankerously in the short-term. 
The concessions that William made as to the 
Prerogative meant that the crown was able to engage in 
prolonced land warfare on the continent on a scale that 
none of his Stuart predecessors had been able to seriouslv 
contemplate. William might lose the occasional minor 
political battle but he was able to wage real war. The 
political conflicts were lost on territory that he knew he 
had already ceded and they were lost in the Commons not in 
the Lords. 
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5.3. Anne, 1702-1714. 
The analysis of this reizn opens with a consideration 
of the way in which it has been treated by political 
historians. Its narrative splits in two portions- the 
duumvir years of 1702-1710 and the Oxford ministry of 
1710-1714. The former consists of a series of interrelated 
treatments of various aspects of high politics. The first 
deals with the issue of Occasional Conformity and its 
effect on both the tories and the stronx position that 
party members initially had in the ministry. This thesis 
believes that the issue was not Just one that divided 
Marlborouzh and Godolphin from the body of the party but 
was one which demonstrated that its courtier sections were 
only connected with its rank and file for purposes of 
political manoeuvre. The Hich Church party's actions may 
have had an ideolosical aspect to their conduct but they 
were principally seekinx the measurets enactment for its 
political consequences. This divercence has been 
underpla-ved PreviouslY. 
The next section deals with the other issues where 
there was ministry/opposition confrontation durinx the 
duumvir years. These are familiar to political historians 
but they can bear retelling. This is first because of the 
section's overall structural solidarity and because the 
behaviour of a number of individuals can be fitted into 
Patterns which occurred on a broader canvas. The third 
section is a description of the nature of the ministry's 
support base and of how it changed in character prior to 
Harley's 1708 dismissal. This shows that Anne's supposed 
initial pro-toryness was not just a partisan preference. 
It was tempered by a dislike of associates of her late 
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brother-in-law, a group which included a number of tories. 
Those Williamites who were excluded by her were largely 
associates of Marlborough, a sub-group which consisted 
mostly of whits. The fourth group discusses the internal 
state of the whiz party and shows that, as in William's 
reign, there were other parts of the party besides the 
Junto who were capable of providing the crown with 
servants. 
The final section of the duumvir years builds on the 
previous ones to show how Harley was able to offer Anne 
the prospect of an alternative ministry and then put the 
blue-print into execution. This coup has been painted as 
the ousting of a. by then, predominantly whiz ministry and 
it being replaced by a tory. Such is wrong. The duumvirs 
always remained the ministers who controlled both 
government policy and government actions, and they were 
courtiers. Their use of the whiss was as a support, not as 
partners. Oxford cathered tozether those whigs who either 
had not been drawn into the ministry or who had been but 
had subsequently become disenchanted with it. The tories 
were happy to comply with his plans since they meant both 
the oustinc of the duumvir ministry and the endina of the 
war. The new ministry was like its predecessor in being 
court in character. Its nature was underlined both by the 
Junto being prepared to adjust to the situation and seeing 
what they micht be able to salvace from it and by the 
duuvirs being its principal enemies for the first two 
wears of its existence. 
The four years of the Oxford ministry are dealt with 
in straight chronological order. The ministry had a 
dilenuna in havinx to be court in character in order to 
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retain Anne's approval but having a Commons support base 
which was heartily country/torw- The ministry was an 
escape option for the queen, allowing her to slip the 
grasp of its predecessor. However, once at liberty it 
proved not to be an end in itself. She tolerated it for 
four years first because it provided her with a service 
and then because she could see no prospect of any new 
ministry that would suit her any better. 
This reign has a well developed historiography. -The 
most prominent of the monographs upon it is Geoffrey 
Holmes's "British Politics in the Ace of Anne. 19 This 
tome's high standing among political historians of the 
period tends to rather shade other works written on the 
reign; Edward Gregg's "Queen Anne" deserves appreciation 
as a solid book in its own right, even if the chapters on 
William's reign are somewhat shaky. However, despite 
Holmes's 1987 revision "British Political' is very much a 
piece of work rooted in the scholarship of the 1960s. Both 
his initial research on electoral influence in the reign 
of Anne and his association with Bill Speck have left a 
legacy which revision did little to alter. The reign is 
too cut off from its predecessor and therefore certain 
forces are not given their due weight. 
Two examples of this concern peers. The first earl of 
Jersey emerges as an "independent" and "undeviating" tory. 
This rather ignores the fact that in the previous reign he 
was principally a Williamite courtier. Such is not 
incompatible with his stance in Anne's reign, however, to 
fail to mention that the earl had previously had a 
different political character from the one which Holmes 
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seeks to project, one which does not allow him to be 
viewed properly. To say that Jersey was independent may be 
technically correct but it is rather misleadinz. His 
branch of the Villiers owned land in Kent but they were 
hardly in the class of the Sackvilles or the Sydneys in 
terms of estates in the county. The family's principal 
income was court derived, it was this factor which was to 
lead the second earl to become a supporter of the 
Supremacy. 
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The second earl of Stamford is a figure whose 
career gives insight into the reign's politics but whom 
Holmes feels fit to give only two limited mentions. 
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When Holmes deals with the peerage in chapter twelve 
his treatment is somewhat Junto-centric, drawing on the 
influential but unpublished D. Phil. of Edward Ellis on the 
croup. The importance of that croup is not to be denied 
but there were other political forces operative within the 
whiz party, the most notable of which will be discussed 
below. Holmes's interest in organization and in conflict, 
the foreground of politics, prevents him from takinx full 
notice of the framework in which it occurred. This thesis 
seeks to make a case both for additional rather than 
alternative emphases and that it is omissions that have 
been made rather than outright errors. The 1967 work could 
have best been revisited by a series of complementary 
essays rather than by a revision. "British Politics" 
should not be belittled but it could still be improved. 
Party's place is not to be lessened but it can not be 
understood in isolation. 
The story of the High Church partyts fall and the 
Junto's rise during the Marlborough-Godolphin ministry is 
well known to the political historians. However, the tale 
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can bear retelling without much new material having come 
to light. This is because the previous perspective has 
always been from a position where inter-party conflict was 
what gave the matter its principal interest. This thesis 
hopes to insert further insight into the politics of the 
reign by showing the limitations of the inter-party 
conflict. These limitations have not been duly appreciated 
since there has previously been a general underplaying of 
the continued strength of the crown. 
At her accession Anne favoured the tories markedly. 
Political historians have not previouslY considered either 
the displaced courtiers or contemplated whether they left 
a mark on the reisn's politics. They have larzely been 
categorized as Junto fodder yet the croup only ever 
enjoyed fully harmonious relations with the court whics 
over 1708-1710. The court whits played an important part 
in Oxford's initial calculations as to the viability of a 
transparty ministry. The other side of William's court 
legacy was that a number of whigs were continued. Their 
survival has a bearinc on the reign; Oxford's initial 
dismissal or whiz lord lieutenants, Bradford and 
Devonshire, was not to do with their party allegiance but 
rather with their association with the duumvirs. 
During William's reign Anne had, for the most Part, 
remained on the political sidelines. On her accession it 
soon became evident that those who had been close to her 
were going to receive the highest offices, Marlborough 
being continued as captain-ceneral. In terms of the 
distribution of office Anne opted Primarily to follow her 
Stuart liking for the tories. However. the queen committed 
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herself to the necessity of engaging in a European war. 
Her desire that it be waged was stronger than that of many 
tories. Therefore, Anne found herself in a situation of 
potential conflict with the party. 
At Anne's accession Rochester had enzaged in a short 
power struzzle with Marlborouch which the former lost. His 
acceptance of the lord lieutenancy of Ireland was a rather 
dubious consolation prize . 
63 He and Sir Edward Seymour 
5th. Bt. were the figures with the most influence over the 
mass of the party. 
64 Both had spent the madority of 
William's reign if not in outright opposition then in a 
non-supportive attitude. Therefore, they were not 
temperamentally well equipped to lead the party into 
constructive support of the government and of the war. The 
tories had the misfortune of not havina been throuch a 
metamorphosis like that of the whics in the early and 
mid-1690s. 
It was not a good sign for the party in their 
relations with Anne when a number of its more prominent 
members began to look for engines to attack the whigs with 
as a means of making political capital in high politics in 
the hopes of caining benefits at the zrass roots level 
which in turn could used on the upper plane. The Commons 
party was susceptible as a result of the recent spate of 
general elections and the passage of the Act of 
Settlement. An Occasional Conformity bill was promoted in 
the 1702-1703 session. 
65 The campaixn was aimed at the 
whigs' SUPPOBed electoral prop- the votes garnered from 
protestant dissenters. It became verv much a party issue 
although It was not without its court subtext in that 
James II had tried to use Protestant dissent for Political 
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ends and he was no whic. 
66 Because the accession general 
election's result had seen a distinct swing to the tories 
the bill passed easily through the Commons. 
Anne was initially prepared to support the measure. 
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In the House of Lords, at least, the whics had an 
advantage in that it was the tories who had adopted a 
party stance and not themselves. Through death, 
tergiversation and creation the whics had drawn close to a 
numerical equality with the tory party in the Lords since 
1689. The difficulties of a number of tory Williamite 
peers are illustrated by the way in which Strafford (1711) 
chanced sides on December 4th. 
68 Even though he changed in 
favour of the bill his initial uncertainty points towards 
a factor that was occurrent in the the early 1700s. People 
who regarded themselves principally as courtiers did not 
wish to act as partisan party men. This addition to the 
whics and the non-gain to the tories through abstentions 
were enough to defeat Occasional Conformity in the 
Lords. 69 
The Occasional Conformity bill re-appeared at the 
start of the next session. The queen indicated her 
displeasure at the measure by having her husband prince 
George of Denmark absent himself from the proceedings on 
it. Court tories such as Pembroke and the first earl 
FerrerB felt able to speak out against the measure. 
70 In 
the session after that Occasional Conformity was again 
re-introduced. The lack of court sympathizers led the 
tories to try to force the measure through by tacking it 
to the Land Tax. The Tack was defeated in the Commons 
after vigorous canvassing by Harley. 71 The bill did not 
make a fourth appearance in the succeeding session. 
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The Hich Church party had created conditions in which 
the whigs could progress politicallw. The whigs advanced 
because they were prepared to do what the crown wanted- 
they behaved Principally as crown servants and acted as 
party men only when goaded into doing so by tory attacks. 
By the time the tories had desisted from the issue the 
whics had developed a momentum which they were able to 
maintain throuch a mixture of luck. skill and discipline. 
In the 1702-1703 session the Prince of Denmark bill 
was to provide a fitting financial settlement for the 
possible circumstance of prince Georce outliving the 
queen. Initially, the bill included a clause to exempt him 
from a xenophobic provision of the Act of Settlement. The 
provision barred any naturalized foreigner from sitting in 
either the Privy Council or parliament after Anne's death. 
This could have been taken to include the continental 
favourites whom William III had created. 
72 The whiz third 
earl of Sunderland led an opposition to this and the 
measure was passed only after the judges had given their 
opinion that those peers would not be barred by the Act of 
73 Settlement. The Qualifications bill provided some 
contention (althouCh not to the same decree) since it too 
strayed on to the subject of M. P. s who were born 
foreisners. 
On these measures the main body of the whics had 
their way. However, the last induced a Protest signed by 
tories and courtiers of the Cholmondley-Ancaster variety, 
Townshend being among the signatories. 
V' 
These people were 
to become more whiz with the reignts progression. In 
December 1703, in the following sessions the Lords 
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committee ror investizatinz a Scottish Conspiracy was 
selected by ballot. It was composed almost exclusively of 
whics, Townshend's membership of it was one of the first 
clear indicators of his alignment to the party. 
75 
In the 1704-1705 session the tories appeared to have 
a legislative success in passing the Alien Act. This was a 
response to the Scottish parliament's Security Act. The 
two parties' behaviour over this issue convinced Godolphin 
as to the necessity of securing the whiCB1 support for the 
ministry so that its war efforts might be properly backed. 
However. the Junto had engineered the item both to bring 
this response and to try to promote a Union of the 
kingdoms. The latter held the Prospects for the group both 
of allowine weater political stability to come into beinz 
and of manipulatinx the susceptible Scottish political 
s. vstem for their own ends. 
76 
The Protestant Succession dominated the 1705-1706 
session, although not with the same intensity as 
Occasional Conformity had the previous ones. The Act of 
Settlement arranged for the passage of the crown from one 
descendant of James I to another without providing any 
machinery for a provisional covernment in the event of the 
recipient beinx out of the country since Anne would not 
tolerate her heir-apparent being in the country while she 
herself was still alive. Any hopes that the Carolines 
Nottingham, Rochester and Buckingham may have had of 
making political capital out of the situation were stymied 
by Wharton and Somers bringing in a thoroughly prepared 
Rezency bill which passed into law. 
77 
The whics repealed the previous session's Alien Act, 
which in turn enabled the Scots to repeal their Securitv 
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Act without losinx face. Godolphin was re-affirmed in his 
belief that further bestowalB of office on the whizs were 
necessary if the war was to be properly manazed. His 
attitude was reflected by the composition of the Union 
commissioners. Only tories in senior office were included 
whereas all the Junto were, although none of them had yet 
held a senior office in the reicn. 
78 
The Union bill dominated the 1706-1707 session, 
becoming law on March 8th, the Union coming into being 
during the Bubsequent prorogation. The opening of the 
followinx session found clauses in the Rezency and Union 
Acts being used bv the whics. in conjunction with the help 
of many of the Scots, to expel a number of tory 
office-holders. 
79 The Junto then tried to embarrass the 
duumvirs and thereby make them more tractable to their own 
wishes by making an issue out of shipping losses. In this 
they received the cooperation of Rochester and Nottingham 
who, for their own ends, were also intent on embarrassinx 
the ministry. When it became clear that the tories were 
seeking to exploit the matter as far as they could, the 
Junto allowed Godolphin to call for an investizatinz 
committee to be appointed. 
80 
Those whies who had resisted 
the measure bound themselves to help the ministry in 
resistinx any further unreasonable demands by the Junto. 
In December 1707 the tory opposition soucht to make 
capital out of Peterboroughts removal from the Spanish 
theatre. 81 The attack developed its own momentum so that 
the tactical error of assaulting Marlborough's conduct of 
the war in the Low Countries was made. Since the situation 
in the Low Countries was by no means comparable to the 
disorder that Peterborouch had left in Spain, this allowed 
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the whics to turn the situation over on itself and to have 
passed a motion that there should be 'No Peace without 
Spain. t82 
The Junto continued its general alliance with the 
tory opposition. The leadinx ministerialists found 
themselves in a minority on the unimportant technical 
issue of the timing of the dissolution of the Scottish 
Privy Council. The overall character of politics was quiet 
in these years, at least in comparison with Occasional 
Conformity and what was to follow. Therefore, the Junto 
felt able to toy with the ministry, which probablv would 
not have happened in more stressed times. 
SCOttiBh matters were still contentiOUB in the 
followinz session. The Scots had been expected to be 
receptive to the March 1709 Union Improvement bill since 
it was designed to strengthen the, state of the Scottish 
law in that field by bringing it into line with current 
English treason law. It was thought this would act to 
disincline people to Jacobite activity. However. the Scots 
decided to take a nationalistic reverence for the separate 
character of their lexal system (as xuaranteed by the Act 
of Union) and to view the bill as an attempted intrusion 
upon it. However, the turn-outs were not hich, therefore, 
the matter was not closely fouzht. A protest followed 
which was sizned by Scots, tories and Williamite whiss of 
the like of Peterborough, Warrington and the first earl of 
Scarbrouch. 83 
The session's other hich division was on the bill for 
the Naturalization of Foreign Protestants. The principal 
cause of the contentiousness was the use of the sacrament 
in the naturalization process. This cave the parties an 
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opportunity to vary on their relicious fronts. Whartonts 
attempt to use the measure in order to benefit Enclish 
dissenters found only limited support from his own 
party .84 The whigs were an anclican Party who were on the 
whole more tolerant of protestant dissent than the tories. 
but they had no party desire for such dissent to be 
encouraged. William had found the same to be true in March 
1690, as was the first earl Stanhope to do so 
subsequent lv. 
85 
Scottish Treason and Naturalization had shown that 
the white had a limited ability to secure original 
legislation for which there was no pressing governmental 
need. If they displayed excessive zeal so as to go beyond 
their brief or soucht to work outside of it, then, they 
could not expect to be as effective as when they were 
acting as the government's servants. This was because they 
could then only expect the support of those whose 
allegiance was primarily to the party rather than to the 
court. These two matters and the general tone of the 
politics at the time were not sufficiently crave for the 
more courtish whits to adhere to the party in matters 
which were non-governmental. By the same score the 
government was exposed to the croup's manoeuverings 
because they were performed on matters which were not of 
central importance to the government. 
At Anne's accession most of the kingts late servants 
were put to one side. Devonshire owed his continuation as 
lord steward in large part to his having supported 
Marlborouch when that duke was imprisoned in William's 
reicn. The same factor meant that Bradford was continued 
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as treasurer of the Household althouch his cofferership 
was civen to Seymour. 
86 The sixth duke of Somerset was 
transferred from beint lord President to become master of 
the Horse after Shrewsbury had refused it. Somerset stood 
on his own merits rather than through his connection with 
Marlborough: relations between the dukes were not bad 
prior to 1708. Peterborough was another Williamite with a 
Marlborough connection. However, his appears to have been 
Principally with the duchess rather than her husband. 
87 
The problems that other associates of William could 
face are illustrated by the fate of the tory second baron 
Lexincton. He had resianed as Annets master of the Horse 
to become a Bedchamber lord to the king in 1692. In 1702, 
despite his being a tory. he was deprived of his place as 
a lord of Trade and had to wait until 1712 when azain he 
served in office. He was then forwarded bv his being one 
of the few tories who was a seasoned diplomat and there 
beina the need for such for the nezotiations at Utrecht. 
Lexington*s problems were accentuated by his conduct in 
1692 but they seem to have had a similarity with those of 
other tories who had been closely associated with 
88 William . To be favoured by one monarch cave no guarantee 
of being favoured by the next. 
It is to be considered that the Williamite Jersey was 
not promoted to be lord chamberlain at Anne's accession 
but rather was continued in the orfice. William havinx 
conferred the place on him in 1700. Additionally, in 1702 
the earl underwent a diminution in his standing by his 
heir-apparent's tellership of the Exchequer beinz taken 
away In order that it might be bestowed upon Sir 
Christopher Musgrave 4th. Bt.. Even though compensation was 
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made the alteration showed that the earl's standinc had 
been lessened. It can even be arcued whether Jersey would 
have been continued in 1702 had he not quarrelled with 
Albemarle durinx the winter of 1701-1702. The quarrel must 
have damazed his standinc with William and therefore it 
may well have raised Anne's estimation of him. It is 
noteworthy that Ormond, who became lord lieutenant'of 
Ireland in 1703. had quarrelled with Albemarle in 1699.89 
Godolphin and Marlborough were courtiers first and 
tories second. They and Harley soucht to retain the 
crownts independence by relying on neither party. By 
February 1703 Marlborough and Godolphin felt that 
Rochester's use of Occasional Conformity and his hostile 
criticism of the war's management were intolerable in view 
of his membership of the ministry. They chose to make an 
issue of his neclect of his official duties in Ireland and 
insisted that the queen make an ultimatum to her uncle 
that either he should fulfil his official responsibilities 
or resign the office. The earl chose the latter option (he 
was succeeded by his son-in-law Ormond). 
90 
As it became clear that Occasional Conformity was 
zoinx to fail a second time Nottincham, tried to bully the 
queen into dismissing the remaining whiz office-holders as 
a sign of her preference for the tories. However, she 
asserted herself by responding with the dismissals of 
Jersey and Seymour, which in turn promPted Nottinchamts 
April 1704 resiCnation. 91 
The first person to feel the effect of Godolphin's 
post-Alien Act anti-High Church conviction as to party was 
Buckingham, who was dismissed in March 1705. The duke of 
Newcastle (1694) replaced him as lord privv seal. 
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Newcastle was a courtish whiz, who had not previously 
attained hizh office. This may have stemmed from his 
quarrellinx with William in the early 1690s, which may 
also have improved his candidature in Anne's eyes. 
In September, she made Cowper lord keeper. He was 
always to be independently inclined. He was a legal 
counsel in the case of Ashby V. White where the Lords 
clashed with the Commons over the adjudication of 
electoral matters. However, rather than beina ardently 
whiz and standing up for the Lords position his stance was 
equivocal and confused. Cowper's appointment was not 
altogether a straight-rorward cain ror the whiss. 92 
In December 1706 HedgeBtS secretaryship was 
transferred to the third earl of Sunderland. There was a 
distinct difference between the temperaments of William 
and Anne which meant that such a sambit would never have 
been tried on him. He was determined both in the lonz-term 
and in the short whereas she appears to have only been 
firm in the former and was in the latter rather 
susceptible to being edged piece-by-piece towards a stance 
she would never have taken outricht. Sunderland had been a 
commoner durinx William's reian and had not served that 
monarch in any office. 93 
There was to be a subtle shift in these chances of 
office from their beins primarily means of dismisBinx 
tories to their being principally means of placing whics. 
This thesis does not see these chances as beina simplY 
whiz. Instead they reflect the court influence of Sarah 
duchess of Marlborouch rather than that of the whiz party; 
she was a whiz but one on her own idiosyncratic terms. 
Newcastle's period of disfavour in the early 1690s had in 
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part coincided with that of her husband; her own 
background was Hertfordshire Just as was Cowper's; 
Sunderland was her son-in-law. Sunderlandts appointment 
seems to be the point at which the Junto began to seek to 
advance themselVeB althoush they refrained from actively 
doinx so until after the benefits of the Union and the 
1708 general election (it followed a Jacobite invasion 
scare) improved their strength in parliament. 
94 
As the whics' position improved, so they became 
increasingly susceptible to internal divisions. In June 
1706 Stamford staged a brief one-man rebellion on not 
having been chosen to take the Acts over to Hanover: 95 in 
November 1707 Stamford mounted a defense on behalf of the 
duumvirs durine the State of the nation debate; 96 in 
February 1708 the Scottish Privy Council issue saw Cowper, 
Townshend and the first duke of Kincston with Godolphin 
and Buckingham on one side, while the Junto, Rochester, 
the first duke of Richmond, the second duke of Grafton, 
the second earl of Essex, the first duke of Dorset and the 
fourth baron Cornwallis were on the other. 
97 Most of the 
royal bastards were with the majority, they had been part 
of William's court partv, and like much of it came down 
firmly on the whiz side in Anne's reign since the whics 
were behaving in a more 'court* fashion than the tories. 
However, this did not mean that they were Junto 
supporters. 
Party solidarity seems to have been established in 
the months that followed the vote but it was a solidarity 
that could easily disintegrate. In December 1708 the 
reason for Kentts continuance as lord chamberlain was 
ascribed only to the dancer of giving it to someone else. 
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which would disoblize the multitude who felt able to fill 
it. 98 The Williamite Haversham was almost certainly one of 
that 'multitude. ' The earlw fruits of the party's advance 
within the ministry stimulated his desire for a mark of 
recognition for his services to the party but it could not 
confer places at will, especially as he had a distinct 
Williamite past but, unlike Peterborouch, had not been 
associated with Marlborouzh. Therefore, Haversham did not 
receive one. His response to this was to go into 
opposition and there to act in alliance with the High 
Church tories. However, in 1709 the Junto still saw him as 
someone whom they could call in if they wished. 
99 (It 
would be interesting to know what his conduct under Oxford 
would have been. However, he died in November 1710. ) 
Harley was provina sympathetic to the queen in her 
desire to retain a ministry that was free of beinz 
dominated by either party. This probably became clearer 
after December 1706. In April 1707 he backed the queen in 
her proposal to use two vacant bishoprics to benefit the 
tory presence on the episcopal bench. Durinz a summer 
conference the Junto decided on the necessity of removing 
Harley. 100 He did this not necessarily as a pro-tory 
gesture but rather as one to try to mitigate the growth of 
whiz/Junto influence, since such would lessen the crown's 
political independence and therefore effect his own 
continuation in office. He had a motivation for doinz such 
since the addition of the Scottish M. P. s and 
representative peers was perceived by contemporaries as 
benefittinx the whics more than the tories. 
By the start of the 1707-1708 session Marlborough and 
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Godolphin were becoming convinced of the necessity of 
Harley's dismissal. It seemed probable to the duumvirs 
that in any reconstruction of the ministrvts support base 
he might well try to exploit the fluidity of the situation 
in order to tr. V to Oust them. Anne was unwilling to 
withdraw from her support of the secretary. However, in 
December 1707 Harley was severely compromised when it 
emerged that a clerk in his office, William Greg, was in 
French pay. Then, in January his close associate Henrv 
St. John admitted to the Commons that he himself had misled 
them as to strencth of the forces in Spain and the numbers 
present at the battle of Almanza. On February 8th 1708 
both Godolphin and Marlborough tendered their 
resionations. On the 9th Wharton set in motion the 
becinnines of a committee to zather information to see 
whether an impeachment was viable. On the 11th Harley 
resizned. 
In the wake of the 1708 general election Townshend, 
the second duke of Devonshire and the M. P. Robert Walpole 
were won over by the Junto so as to further isolate 
Godolphin. 101 With backing of this type the Junto then 
felt able to engage in a partial re-organization of the 
senior offices, Anne set herself against this. However. 
circumstances chanced around her. On October 28th 1708 her 
husband prince George of Denmark died. The offices went as 
the whigs had WiBhed- Pembroke became lord high admiral, 
Somers lord president and Wharton lord lieutenant of 
Ireland. It had been an exercize in brinkmanship that had 
succeeded through the occurrence of a factor of which 
there was no guarantee. 
102 
The late 1700B were the hich-water mark of Junto 
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influence in Anne's reign. The likes of Townshend and 
Stamford, rather than fendinx off the Junto for the 
duumvirs' sake, had changed to being prepared to act with 
the group. However, this thesis feels that an 
overestimation of whiz unity in the Lords should be 
avoided. The party had recently been divided in its 
attitudes; success gave it solidity but otherwise its 
members' loyalties could be fluid in character. The Junto 
never became the ministry and in the dav-to-daw business 
of government the duumvirs' influence remained 
predominant. There was always the dancer of chance which 
might undermine the Junto's support in the Upper House. 
The September 1709 battle of Malplaquet had been a 
technical victorv for the Allies but it showed that a 
thorouth victory could only be achieved by means of 
attrition and neither monarch wanted to win at such a 
Price. 
103 The French were susceptible to entering 
negotiations. The financial and social strains of the war 
in the wake of the severe winter of 1708-1709 made their 
domestic situation one that was best handled with care. 
The seventy-one years old Louis XIV could only be expected 
to live for a few more years and there would then almost 
certainly ensue a long minority. 
104 The actions that had 
caused the war to break out had stemmed from the kinals 
personality and BrItain could have stayed out of the 
conflict had he not insisted an inserting a Jacobite 
dimension into it. 
Anne was content to have a peace without any mador 
zains. Britain had suffered from the same winter. The 
duumvirs soucht to continue a royal policy to its logical 
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end, even thouch it was defunct in terms of the crown's 
contemporary attitude. Therefore, they forfeited their 
role of acting as the crown's servants and effectively 
filled their offices for their own ends. They and the 
Junto were confident that thew could continue because 
previously they had been so successful in gaining what 
they wanted from Anne in the past acainst her wishes there 
was no apparent reason whv thev should not continue to do 
so. The war made the crown, with its need to finance the 
executive, very exposed politically and therefore it might 
have to comply with their wishes. 
In the wake of 1708 Harley found rich pickings among 
the disconsolate whits, who were unhappy with the duumvirs 
and who were not enamoured with the Junto. Somerset had 
positively bad relations with the Junto, while those he 
had with Marlborouzh had distinctly deteriorated after 
Harlev's dismissal. The duke felt that Kingston was being 
raised by the Junto as a rival to him. His isolation from 
the body of the whits is indicated by a remark that had 
not the queen valued him then no one else would have. By 
September 1709 that duke was on a political limb as far as 
his fellow whics were concerned. The soldier, the fourth 
earl Rivers, was antagonized by Marlborough's February 
1710 decision to forward the court tory (and Annets first 
cousin) the duke of Northumberland for the vacant 
Tower. 105 Therefore, the earl Joined Somerset in beinc 
susceptible to Harley's advances, while Shrewsbury was not 
hostile to them. Harley himself was wary lest Somerset be 
too individualistic or too forward. The duke tried to 
obtain a pension for Rivers, althouch this was probably in 
concurrence with Harley. In 1710 Somerset was not the most 
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effective of allies. He compromised a wish to resizn by 
deciding not to attend any further Privy Council 
meetings. 106 
Peterborouch had conducted himself Poorly in Spain. 
The Junto duly took him to task upon his return. The 
tories had backed him as a means of attacking the duumvirs 
who had subsequently moderated their handling of him. 
Therefore, the earl was not well disposed to his former 
associates even if it was his own poor conduct that was 
the principal root of their attitude towards him. Yet 
Harley had proposed his arrest in cabinet in Auzust 1707. 
In 1710 the two were against a common object rather than 
of a shared outlook . 
87 
The Junto were not the party and had only limited 
support upon which thev could depend in all circumstances. 
Harley envisated securinx other non-Junto whics- the likes 
of Cowper. Haversham, the eighteenth baron Fitzwalter, the 
duke of Greenwich (a soldier whose dislike of Marlborouch 
was of long standing), the fourth baron Mohun and the 
commoner Walpole. 
107 There were already a number who would 
automatically follow through being courtiers. Those court 
tories (such as Northumberland, Lexington, Pembroke, the 
sixth earl of Suffolk and the third baron Berkeley of 
Stratton) who were pro-Sacheverell (when as courtiers 
close to Anne thew might have been expected to have voted 
against him), were all potential supporters of a 
cross-part. v non-Junto ministry. 
108 
In November 1710 Swift was to feel able to write of a 
celebration at court that there were no whigs near the 
caueents person when there were supporters of the previous 
ministry present such as Berkeley of Stratton and Pembroke 
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while Shrewsbury was clearly a whic. 
109 
Strafford (1711) had spent most of the reign in the 
undistinguished diplomatic posting at Berlin. He had had a 
decidedly court background under William and therefore was 
used to havinx worked with many of those who were being 
supplanted. The same month he was advised that if he 
replaced Townshend at The Hague he would become "a 
declared enemy to the juncto, and ruin*d with the Whigs 
for ever, and the Tories are not noted to stick so fast to 
their friends as th' others. " 
110 
Harley offered Anne an alternative- a mixed ministry 
which relied Principally on tory suPport but which would 
try to manage from a stance whose first loyalty was to the 
crown. He held out the prospect of a form of return to 
1702. The situation in which Harley sought to put his 
plans into operation was different from that of 1702 in 
two key ways. First. the crown was disengaging from a line 
of active policv. whereas in 1702 it had been enzacing in 
one. The sicninx of a peace did not hold out the prospect 
of Prolonged crown activity which the opening of the war 
had offered. The ministry would be Principally serving the 
crown for a short-term purpose and therefore the crown 
would not have the same need of it as it would have had if 
it had been engazinx in a lonz-term project, just what the 
Junto had been trying to avoid for themselves. And 
secondly, inter-partv conflict had come to be far more 
central to politics than it had been in 1702. The 
Triennial Act had been one part of the country procramme 
that had been implemented via the Revolution Settlement 
and the Act of Settlement. As Rubini has astutely pointed 
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out, this meant that the court/country axis became 
distinctlV less important and therefore there had not been 
the same need for the crown to maintain or to develop a 
distinct court interest. "' By 1710 the prolonzed 
operation of the Triennial Act had come to aggravate party 
conflict. This was felt more in the Commons, however, the 
Lords would have been affected by the raising of the 
zeneral political temperature. 
The strains of war were becinning to tell upon the 
nation. One of the media throuch which this discontent was 
being expressed was the Pulpits of high church clergymen. 
The Junto, relt compelled to show whiz strencth which would 
illustrate the danger of antagonizing them and decided to 
make an example of Sacheverell. It was to prove as bad a 
political error for the Junto as Occasional Conformity had 
for the Hich Church party. A difference in 1710 was that 
success was achieved with the matter, but this was to 
prove hollow. 
In early 1710 the Sacheverell impeachment passed 
through the whizzish Commons without difficulty. However, 
in the Lords it was foucht. The likes of Scarbrouch and 
Shrewsbury voted for the doctorts innocence. while 
Somerset and Greenwich helped soften his sentence. In 
terms of-the overall party these people were numerically a 
small minority. 
The impressive display of solidarity was being 
expended on the spoutings of an over-opinionated, minor 
cleric. It is quite improbable that such a display would 
have been possible had Anne ever positively disapproved of 
the prosecution. It was an expression of party solidarity 
which the Junto were manipulatinx rather than an 
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expression of solidarity with the Junto per se. 
112 
On April 14th 1710 court whiz Kent resigned as lord 
chamberlain. He was replaced by court whiz Shrewsbury. The 
following month the peace negotiations that had been being 
conducted with the French broke down and a fresh season's 
campaigning began. On June 14th Sunderland was replaced in 
his secretaryship by the Harlevite tory Dartmouth. 
The Junto had been forewarned of this. They thoucht 
that there was the potential for negotiating their way to 
an acreement. a belief Harley was happy to foster for his 
own ends. This possibility stopped any immediate cohesive 
response on their part. Wharton was tendina to his 
official duties in Ireland and therefore was not able to 
inJect his own particular-brand of decisiveness into his 
colleagues' meditations: Halifax was restive since he had 
not been restored as first lord of the Treasurv; he had 
had to paSB up a diplomatic MiBsion that Townshend had 
been ziven so that the viscount micht be wooed away from 
Godolphin; he was trying to prepare for the oncoming 
session so that it would not be too fractious. his 
consequential susceptibilitv to accommodative arrangement 
made him a possible tarcet for Harley. 
113 
The Junto's members appreciated that, because of the 
Sacheverell trial and the zeneral war-weariness, the new 
ministry would gain control of the Commons if a general 
election were called. Harley was not an avowed tory and 
was unlikely to want to be dependent on the tories for 
support in parliament. The Junto knew well that the mould 
of politics was beinz used for another cast and they 
assumed they would play a part in the new product. This 
would mean that they would have a position from which they 
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could exploit anY opportunities for political leveraze and 
so re-advance themselves. A single-party ministry was not 
in their world-view; they themselves had souzht to work 
within the existing framework rather than to supplant it. 
On Autust 8th 1710 Godolphin was dismissed. He was 
unable to offer any resistance because the crown could 
outmanoeuvre him by calling an election which would lead 
to a parliament which would not support him. He was 
replaced by a Treasury commission which was headed by 
Harley, and which contained the likes of the first earl 
Poulett and the future first baron Mansell. Marlborouch 
was continued for the time beint because his presence was 
necessary but not to the point where he could use it for 
political leverage against the queen as he had in February 
1708. 
It remained to be seen whether Harley could Play his 
own financial card. Anne dissolved parliament in order to 
break the whiz control of the Commons otherwise the House 
would probably not arant Harley supply in the forthcominx 
session. The ministry found itself with a tory-controlled 
Commons and not the balanced one that it would probably 
have preferred. The whigs had proven generally 
unresponsive to Harley's overtures and it was not a cood 
sign that Somerset aimed to cooperate in electoral matters 
with his fellow party members even if he had not recently 
been doing so in in either court or parliamentary ones. 
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In October 1710 Shrewsbury felt that Harley's whiz 
adherents in the Lords would not necessarily be easy to 
handle. The centre-piece for the session was the State of 
the War in Spain. This was to allow the ministry to Put 
the whizs on the defensive. Scarbrouch botched an Address 
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of thanks to Marlborough through lack of preparation thus 
forcing his fellow whics into a tactical retreat in order 
to avoid an outright defeat. 
115 An investization into the 
defeat at Almanza came out in favour of the contemporary 
ministerialist Peterborough rather than James Stanhope 
(the future first earl Stanhope), who remained allied to 
the main body of the whig party. 
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The former ministerial whics supported the 
re-introduced Place bill in its passage throuch the 
Commons. This was to show the country members of both 
parties that Harley was not coinx to warm to country 
measures. They did not continue their support in the Lords 
since they thoUcht it would not be in their own best 
long-term interest for it to be enacted. 
117 The Scottish 
Judicial case of Greenshields v. the Edinburch Maxistrates 
caused a large turn-out. The matter revolved about the 
issue of the place of episcopal clergy in Scottish law and 
therefore broucht to bear on the interests of both the 
representative peers and the bishops. Understandably, 
Harley found the matter a nuisance. 
118 
It had yet to be seen whether Harley was capable of 
providinz finance for the executive, if he could not he 
would have to resign or come to terms with the whics. On 
May 2nd Harley unveiled his proposed South Sea Company. 
The company's supposed purpose was to benefit from the 
tradina advantazes that it was assumed that the nation 
would extract from Spain with relation to South and 
Central America. However. what it was principally designed 
for was to help service the National Debt, i. e. continue 
the sustenance of the government financially and therefore 
of the ministry politically. He now had an institutional 
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rramework through which he could borrow against the 
security of the supplies voted bw that Commons. 119 The 
previously whiz-orientated financial institutions had 
either to fall into line or to lose their covernment 
business. 
In the new parliament tory sentiments had been 
catered for by the PaSBaze of the Fifty Churches and 
Property Qualifications Acts. 120 However, as the session 
had progressed the Commons became increasingly difficult 
to manage. The rank and file tories did not make Harley's 
manazement of themselves any easier, the tory bill for the 
repeal of the 1709 General Naturalization Repeal Act in 
February was not a ministerial initiative. As often 
before, it was an event outside of parliament that enabled 
ministerial control to be re-asserted over the Lower 
Chamber. On March 8th 1711 while interrozatinx the marquis 
de Guiscard, Harley was wounded by the Frenchman. 
According to Dickinson, the incapacity of Harley did not 
work to sharpen the distinction between him and his 
associate the secretary of state Henry St. John. The 
latter'B ambition MUBt have been additionally whetted by 
the incident. 121 In cabinet St. John had used Harleyts 
absence to force succeBSfUll. V through a proposal to Bend 
an expensive summer 1711 expedition to Quebec. He had been 
careful to make sure of Mrs. Masham's support first by 
havina her brother John Hill as-its commander. 
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In April 1711 the emperor Joseph I died. His heir was 
his younger brother Charles, who was the person whom the 
Allies were trying to make king of Spain. Durinz the 
summer It became evident that Charles was unwilling to 
pass up on the Austrian inheritance. 123 The war became 
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somewhat purposeless from the British strategic viewpoint. 
Anne had no wish to be responsible for the emergence of a 
second emperor Charles V, a fizure who would indubitably 
have the resources to dominate Europe in a way that Louis 
had only ever aspired to. Therefore, both her desire to 
end the war became stronger and the potential for domestic 
opposition to her wish was zreatlv decreased. 
In M" 1711 Rochester died. Harley opted to be 
elevated to the peerage, perhaps feeling that his 
presentation of himself as the queen's first minister 
would be less cramped in the Lords than it would have been 
were the earl still alive. In addition, the ministry was 
in need of able speakers there. This would make it easier 
to control the House and so counterbalance the Commons, 
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which he could not hope to dominate. However, in terms 
of control of the Commons this was not a politic move. 
St. John was active and becominx ever more independent, 
bezinning to try to manipulate the tory party. Oxford 
sought to moderate St. John's influence in the Lower House 
by tryinc to appoint as its speaker the influential 
Hanoverian tory, Sir Thomas Hanmer 4th. Bt.; Hanmer 
refused. St. John's direct influence on the Commons was 
lessened by his own elevation to the peerage in July 1712 
(Hanmer only became speaker when the Commons was more in 
sympathy with his own pro-Hanoverian views in the wake of 
the 1713 general election). 125 
To conclude a peace was the Principal raison dletre 
of the ministry. The negotiations with the French caused 
the simmering rivalry between Oxford and Bolingbroke to 
break out more nakedly. Shrewsbury was to start drawing 
away from his colleagues on the question of deserting the 
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Allies. In this he was reverting to the whiz aspect of his 
political make-up rather than continuinx to obey the court 
one. Oxford had some sympathy for the dukets view. 
126 
In the early part of the 1711-1712 session the 
behaviour of individual peers, e. c. Delawarr, 
ýomerset 
and 
the fourth duke of Hamilton, became very important in the 
control of the House. As late as December 10th neither the 
second duke of Leeds nor the eichth baron Hunsdon had been 
secured for sure by the ministry. 
127 The court's strenath 
in the House was such that it did not feel it wise to push 
the point of Hamilton's British patent. Marlborough and 
Godolphin's ambivalence was displayed by their withdrawal 
from the House, they having not yet entered upon an 
opposition attitude. 
128 
The tory Nottingham had Joined the opposition because 
he appreciated that Anne was unlikely to prove amenable to 
his influence if she had Oxford as first minster. He was 
careful to preserve his High Church image. This, in 
conJunction with the whigs' desire to cooperate with him, 
made it possible for Occasional Conformity to reach the 
Statute Book. 129 The control of business in the House was 
brief and it was not one of takinc the mantle of 
government, it had been the torles' thunder that had been 
stolen rather than the ministry's; however, the move had 
succeeded in reflectinz badly on Oxford. The last 
opposition triumph was over the Instructions to the 
Plenipotentiaries at Utrecht. 
130 These votes put into 
doubt Oxford's ability to control parliament snd therefore 
the practicality of his continuing in office. 
The ministry used a mass creation in order to 
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re-assert control of the House. The politics that preceded 
the mass creation of winter 1711-1712 may Possibly have 
been enzineered expressly to give Oxford the excuse for 
it-131 Even this manoeuvre did not brinc an end to dissent 
there. The opposition astutelv moved acainst the earl with 
a Place bill. This move's effectiveness was shown by the 
way in which some of the summoned twelve defected 
temporarily over it. 
132 This was because the recruits 
mostly had some political sympathy with either the earl or 
his backcround, the latter type would still have had 
traces of country attitudes in their outlooks. The 
spoilinc amendment that killed the measure was not a 
frontal assault on its contents but rather a proposal to 
Postpone its activation until after the queen's death. 
133 
In April 1712 prince Eugene's perception was that 
Sunderland and the duumvirs made up the more violent 
section of the opposition while Somers, Halifax (1714) and 
Cowper were more pacific. 
134 Godolphin died in September. 
The ministry then siznified that they would proceed 
acainst Marlborouch over the matter of a perquisite he 
received in relation to the Low Countries arnw bread 
contract. In November 1712 the duke went into voluntary 
exile thus abBentinz himself for the reien's final two 
sessions. 
135 Therefore, the Junto became the opposition's 
front line whereas before it is POSBible that they had 
contemplated some level of cooperation with Oxford. 
The difference between Oxford and Bolingbroke became 
more marked with the end of the session. Oxford joined 
Shrewsbury in being concerned as to the interests of the 
United Provinces. In September there was an open argument 
over the terms of peace in cabinet between the two with 
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the earl prevailing. 136 The ministrv's internal frictions 
remained unresolved and as the war was erfectively at an 
end there was no pressing need that they should be. 
In March 1713 a series of treaties were concluded. 
These brought the war between France and Britain to an 
official end. This left the allies to do the best that 
they could for themselves in the new circumstances. This 
included the elector of Hanover (the future Georce I). The 
French commercial treaty was very much Bolingbrokets 
child. On April 7th 1713 Cholmondley and lord chief 
Justice Parker (later first earl of Macclesfield (1721)) 
spoke azainst the scheme in the Privy Council. 137 
Subsequently. they were both dismissed from office. 
The ministry found its solidarity easier to maintain 
if it were not beina frequently tested. The opposition 
appreciated that an end to the war was overwhelmintly 
popular and that they should not worsen their prOBPeCts at 
the polls additionally by opposing the peace, or by being 
a more general nuisance. Therefore, the 1713 session in 
the Lords was quieter than its two predecessors. However, 
it was by no means silent. Political urgency was 
distinctly present even if its form was predominantly 
latent. 
It had not been in Oxford's best interest for control 
of the Lords to pack the representative peers with ardent 
tories, otherwise he would not have been able to play one 
House off azainBt the other. The Scots at Westminster 
thoucht the French commercial treaty would undo the 
positive economic benefits which the Scots believed that 
the Union gave their nation. 138 Therefore, on June Ist 
there was a vote on the Dissolution of the Union. The 
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whigs again showed themselves to be willing to Bacrifice a 
cherished stance for an immediate tactical cain. On the 
5th one hundred and fifty votes were cast on the Malt 
bill. The majority was two. 
139 
It was not just the Scots who disliked the treaty. On 
June 18th the bill was lost in the Commons by nine votes. 
In June and July Hanmer and Anclesey led the opposition in 
their respective Houses to the eichth and ninth articles 
of the treaty of commerce. 
140 The opposition's success was 
marked further by Wharton's astute June 30th move for an 
Address requesting that the queen ask Lorraine to remove 
the Pretender from its soil; the motion passed with only 
the sixth baron North beinz so bold as to dissent. 
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The ministry's internal situation was no more 
resolved than it had been a year before. The continuance 
of this conflict was to be a key reason of why it took so 
long for parliament to meet after the 1713 general 
election. 
ILL2 The election improved the whicst position 
qualitatively. Not on their part but rather on that of the 
Hanoverian element amonx the tories, which crew- 
proportionately stronger within that party. 
143 
Swift's Pamphlet 'The Public Spirit of the the WhigsO 
offended the representative peers. 
144 While only 
eizht. v-eicht votes were cast in the consequent division, 
it was noted that the pliable court whizs Kent and the 
first earl of Sussex (1717) voted with the main body of 
the party. 
J-45 The votes on the Protestant Succession 
reached one hundred and forty-two. Despite the mass 
creation. the ministry's room for manoeuvre was minimal in 
the Upper House. 
In early April the Hanoverian tories the fifth earl 
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of Anglesey, the first earl of Ashburnham, the second earl 
of Abingdon and the second baron Carteret either voted 
against the ministry or stayed out'of the House. 
146 This 
added an additional note of uncertainty and further 
destabilized the political situation. Anglesey was one of 
the people, like Bolingbroke and Oxford, who felt able to 
court Mrs. Masham in the hope of her furthering their 
political interests with the queen. 
147 
On April 14th the Hanoverian envoy in London applied 
to lord chancellor Harcourt for a writ so that the 
elector's son the future George II might take his seat in 
the House of Lords in his title as duke of Cambridge. This 
showed that the reversionarv interest was watching the 
state of British politics with interest and was prepared 
If necessary to participate actively by some means or 
other, although the Hanoverlans appreciated that Anne 
would not tolerate the elector's presence in Britain. 
148 
The re-introduced Place bill passed the Commons 
unopposed since it would have been useless and 
counter-productive ror the ministry to oppose it there. 
There were seven votes on the measure in the Lords berore 
the ministry killed it. On the 16th the peace was voted 
on- one hundred and rortw-rour votes and a majority or 
twenty. Its size was indicative or the mass creation 
having been designed to help end the war and the dislike 
or the conrlict by the tories. Anglesey was with the court 
but mute. 
149 
In May the Judicial case or Roper v. Hewet was 
Politicized because the latter was a catholic. the 
association being with the Old Pretender9s catholicism 
which In turn was supposed to be linked to the assumed 
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Jacobitism of the tories. 150 This stood in marked contrast 
with the previous session. 
Bolingbroke introduced the Schism bill. Its purpose 
was to remind the tories that it was he who shared their 
views and values. It was on territory on which the whigs 
had recently compromised themselves over the Occasional 
Conformity Act. The votes reached one hundred and 
forty-nine. A protest was signed not only by the likes of 
Torrington, Sussex (1717) and the third duke of Schomberg 
but also Oxford's kinsman and lonx-time associate. the 
first baron Foley. 151 In its immediate tactical purpose 
the bill was a fleeting success; the whies had had their 
party Identity re-affirmed, while the Hanoverian tories 
were still firm on the unrelated matter of the succession. 
The latter was logical in part since the Act of Settlement 
had been the child of the tory/country alliance. 
The opposition targeted Bolinzbroke for attack on the 
Spanish Commercial treaty. The reign's final divisions 
took place on July 8th. Foley and the others were joined 
in the protest by the second earl of Rochford. 
152 Most of 
the Dutch favourites and their sons had followed most of 
the royal bastards and their sons in siding with the 
whigs. Oxford unable to provide a positive ministerial 
line in the Lords because by doing so he might antagonize 
the tory dominated Commons. Therefore, $natural' courtiers 
such as royal bastards and foreign recruits could either 
side with the tories, who were not acting in a court 
fashion, or with the whigs, with whom they were long used 
to working in the court's interests. 
153 
On July 27th Oxford was dismissed. On August Ist the 
queen died having made Shrewsbury lord high treasurer. 
154 
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Therefore, at Anne's death three of the senior offices of 
state were in whiz hands, even if they were the same pair 
of hands. By then all of the ministerial whigs had adhered 
to their party. As Oxford's late dismissal indicates. the 
queeh vacillated. Therefore, the person of the monarch and 
the positive influence of the crown were mostly withdrawn. 
Even in these circumstances the two parties were not in 
outricht opposItion to one another. 
Oxford fell principally because his ministry was a 
means of Anne being able to escape the duumvirs' grip. It 
had not come into being as an end in itself. What was 
remarkable about it was the length of its survival. The 
reason for this was that Anne was unable to find any 
alternative that looked like being viable. Almost 
certainly she had been open to one presenting itself since 
late 1711 when it had emerged that Oxford was unable to 
engage In any constructive government which ran against 
the wishes of the tory rank and file. These wishes were 
country orientated and therefore were not amenable to 
being manipulated outside of their set prejudices. 
The situation was not solely the result of Anne's 
handling of it. The passage of the Act of Settlement had 
seen the two parties become more defined in their 
Post-Revolution personas. Anne had harder materials to 
handle than her predecessor. However. one cannot but come 
back to the fact that she had the scope to handle her 
Political concerns in a far more active manner than she 
did. Anne had in large part failed herself by taking such 
a Passive attitude to politics. She had been prepared to 
be satisfied with the duumvir ministry because it worked. 
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When its members had started behaving in a manner that was 
against her wishes she had failed to assert herself, as 
William would have done. and thus control the situation. 
Rather, she let matters drift and turn sour on her. Her 
1710 use of Oxford was an option that was presented to her 
rather than one which she had originated; she did not have 
either the political imagination or the perspective that 
had allowed her predecessor to toy with the Land Bank 
scheme. 
She was of a rather singular political variety. In 
general she preferred torieB to whigs because the former 
had supported the continuation of her family on the throne 
and were generally more in sympathy with her views on the 
Church of England. However. she also had a distinct. and 
previously underestimated. dislike of her predecessor's 
servants who were not connected to her or Marlborough 
prior to her own accession. Therefore, she automatically 
denied herself a ready running court party. it was through 
the prospect of largely reactivating that party that 
Oxford was able realistically to float the idea. A lack of 
basic pragmatism was a principal reason for her failing to 
handle what was a fairly strong crown position. Had she 
sought to play her situation for maximum effect she would 
have continued William9s post-Triennial Act handling of 
the whics- general cooperation tempered by the fostering a 
court party as a brake. Anne worked with whigs only when 
forced to and did nothing Positive to foster a court 
party, relying an her managers to use whatever they could 
find rather than giving them the proper resources and 
Support. Godolphin was a fine financier but he was limited 
as a Politician; Oxford was an able Politician but he was 
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not someone she would have chosen through free choice. 
However, it must be said in Annets favour that she did 
have considerable tenacity in the lonz-term. She kept the 
war going until she believed that it was not in the 
nation's best interests and she then resisted the country 
ministry that would have occurred had she admitted 
Bolinzbroke to power. 
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5.4.1. Introduction, 1714-1760. 
What emerces from a study of the Lords over these 
years does not so much contradict what has become the view 
of the reign so much as to extend it in certain directions 
and to clarify certain broad assumptions which have led to 
erroneous conclusions. This thesis seeks to argue that the 
place of the crown has been underplayed because of the two 
Georces' remote style of dealina with domestic politics, 
that because of crown strencth the internal state of the 
whig party was more complicated than has previously been 
shown and that the tory party's decline was not finished 
as a subject by Colley: the crown was again an important 
factor. 
After minor alterations, such as removinx the 
necessity of the monarch having to ask parliaments's 
permission before Physically leavinx Britain, Georce I was 
happ. y to accept the broad Revolution Settlement. Under the 
Hanoverians the crown had a more limited prerogative than 
it had had under William and Anne. The prerogative did not 
have any further limitations placed upon it during the 
remainder of the period under discussion. In 1746 and 1757 
George II was persuaded into particular lines of action as 
a response to the mass resignations of the majority of his 
leadinz ministers. These incidents were viewed by whiz 
historians as stepping-stones on the road to 
constitutional monarchy, but they were not. 
There was no deterioration of either the crown9s 
Prerogative position or its political strength between 
1714 and 1760. The incidents were principally the result 
of the crown being made to realize that its current style 
of kingship had to be consistent with its usual style. 
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Georce I did not run into the troubles that his son did 
because he was far less active with the crown's executive 
than George II- no full-scale wars were fought by Britain 
between 1714 and 1727. The less excited the executive the 
less likely the prerogative was to encounter its own 
limits. 
Factionalism was to be a particular mark of the whiz 
Party after the accession of Georce III. It was somethina 
that had been present throughout the preceding four 
reigns. The whig party leadership was of a heterogeneous 
character in both 1689 and 1760. Factionalism was endemic 
because of pre-Exclusion Crisis diversity. It broke out 
with the Revolution's success and the disappearance from 
the domestic political scene of James II, their principal 
raison dletre. In addition, personal antagonisms and 
,. -career rivalries added fuel to party disunity. 
One of the principal factors which tended to divide 
one whig from another was attitude towards the court 
interest. Under both William and Anne the whits had only 
ever been permitted to hold a share of offices. When the 
size of that share was small then there would have been 
considerable competition among the whigs for such places 
as were available. In such circumstances to be 
unquestioningly obedient to the court was not necessarily 
the best means for a person to advance himself. The 
capacity to mitigate the hostility of those who were 
against the court Could additionally promote an 
individual, over someone or a group who could not lessen 
such. Influence in such quarters was not acquired throuch 
subservience to the crown, influence was to be had bY 
operating at the interface of the court and the potential 
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opposition to the court. The Junto were careful in the 
late 1700B to step over into opposition on occasion in 
order to stress their value. 
Prior to the Succession there was a variety of 
opinions towards the court ranzinx from the hostile to the 
subservient. The establishment of the Supremacy after the 
1715 Jacobite RebellionAdentified the court interest with 
the whig party but the two were never identical, they 
never merged to become the same entity. There remained 
whiz gentry whose attitude to the executive was such that 
they were not willing to be drawn into the courtts orbit 
by allowing place to be conferred upon them. 155 
It was the crown which led to the body of the whit 
party coalescing into a predominant consensus. Under the 
two Georges, it did this in part by allowing a single 
group or individual to steer most of the fruit of the 
cornucopia of domestic governmental patronage. Anne had 
allowed this more than William but not to the same extent 
as the Georges permitted it. She had not allowed it to 
happen within a sincle party context. However, Just as the 
whics never became the court party per se so the patronage 
always remained the government's and was never the 
party's. This was ensured by the crown always makine sure 
that its first ministers knew that they were playinx 
within limitations set by it. First, the ploy of, employing 
#non-friends' of their first ministers was used. Such 
reminded a first minister of how limited his personal sway 
would be if he were deprived of the fount of government 
patronace and the mass of his party remained pliant to the 
court. At the same time such divide and rule tactics were 
limited purposefully to the hicher political reaches in 
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order that a broad unity and harmony might be maintained 
below. 
In the upper reaches factionalism was extant but it 
was barred from being allowed to show itself too nakedlv, 
lest the responsible party run the risk of being expelled 
for endanzerinz the general political harmony. In the 
first half of George I's reign a fairly bitter faction war 
was waged. Through the 1720s and the 1730B factionalism 
was present but neither Georce used it as a tool to 
control Townshend and Walpole; it was the high period of 
the Hanoverian ethos of nobility. After the fall of 
Walpole in 1742 Georce II was more tolerant of 
factionalism, usinx it himself as a Political tool. He put 
it aside when Henry Pelham proved able to provide a second 
period of quiet. However. after Pelham's death no one 
filled the same role in the reitn's final wears, 
therefore, George used factionalism azain. It was 
continuously present, its symptoms beinx only mitizated at 
times by crown attitudes. - The close associati , on of the 
court with the whics means that the two are best treated 
broadly together during the early Hanoverian period. 
The torieB have proven somewhat problematical to 
historians of the two reigns, the principal reason being 
the scarcity Of source material. Keith Feilincls 1924 and 
1938 tomes were for a long time the principal works on the 
subJect. Archibald Foord's 1964 study of the opposition 
did little to break new ground. Therefore, it was not 
surprizing that research in the area veered towards the 
stud. v of Jacobitism in the hope of finding enlizhtenment. 
A conclusion which particularly stimulated work in the 
side pasture was Eveline Cruickshank's 1970 remark in the 
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1715-175LL volumes of 'The History of Parliament' that UP 
to 1745 the tory party was predominantly a Jacobite 
one. 
156 However, Linda Colley had the perception to 
appreciate that much of Feilinz's work could do with 
revisitina and that there were considerable areas related 
to the subJect which he had not included within the 
boundaries of his work since he was principally interested 
in high politics and had little appreciation of the 
party's rank and file. Her 1982 book made a convincing 
argument for the continuation after the Hanoverian 
Succession of a cohesive and organized tory party. This 
thesis broadly agrees with her findings. 
Colley dealt with the tory peerage of the early 
Hanoverian period in an incidental manner rather than a 
systematic one. Probably through having her work cut out 
in trying to prove the continued existence of the tory 
party, she tended to sketch over the question of 
departures from it. This thesis Will try to determine 
whether it is possible to delineate any patterns in the 
way in which peers left the party and see if any such 
patterns can be implied to have a significance in 
interpreting the politics of these years. For the sake of 
clarity the field will be dealt with away from the 
interaction of the crown with the whiz party. 
There is a fourth theme which deserves to be included 
in this section. It does not add to understanding of the 
politics of the period through the interaction of the 
crown and the peerage. However, it does place that 
interaction in perspective and it did affect the 
interaction in the decades after the periodts Close. These 
two counts are reason enough for it being touched upon 
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briefly. The theme is what can be deemed 'low politics-' 
'High politics' took place principally in Westminster, 
Whitehall and the other royal palaces and their precincts. 
It could occur in other physical locations but was 
essentially about the court and the ministry. tLow 
politics' was what happened outside of this rarified 
atmosphere. It occurred at moments when the broader 
Political nation felt agitated by the course of affairs or 
at the prescribed eventualities of elections. Its 
principal encroachment on parliamentary politics was 
through general elections. Many of the peerage did involve 
themselves in low politics through electoral activity but 
such is outside of this studyts confines. 
The two principal incidents when contact was made 
with low politics were the Excise Crisis and the Jew bill. 
Both were very short-lived intrusions an the business of 
the House. The Excise bill was dropped in the Commons so 
that the crisis in the Lords was not over it but rather 
the South Sea Company Stock bill, while the Jew bill had 
an uneventful initial passage through the House and a 
fairly swift repeal. Neither occurrence made any impact on 
the way in which the peerage engaged in politics during 
the period. However, they were indices of the existence of 
low politics. 
Paul Langford's "The Excise Crisis" and T. W. Perry's 
"Public Opinion, Propaganda and Politics" will both be 
discussed in as far as they are relevant. There are a 
number of other works that could be drawn in, such as 
those of Gary De Krey, Nick Rogers and Bill Speck. 
However, with their concerns as to the City or to 
electoral matters none of these have quite the same 
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immediacy to this thesis as the two cited works. However, 
an article which is not boaxed down in the same 
territories as Messrs. De Krew etc. is a 1988 piece by 
Kathleen Wilson on admiral Edward Vernon and popular 
politics, which will be included. As with the torv theme 
it will treated separately from the court/whiz narrative. 
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5.4.2. The Establishment of the Supremacy, 1714-1716. 
The whig position in autumn 1714 was good but it was 
neither a monopoly nor guaranteed. Initially, there was 
extensive scope for political manoeuvre. Most of the 
Hanoverians tories were admitted to covernment. The main 
body of their partV had placed itself in a bad light by 
engineering an early peace and taking an ambivalent stance 
with respect to the SUCCeSBion but it had not shown itself 
to be positively Jacobite. There were marked internal 
divisions among the whiz partv's senior members. The rank 
and file of the whiz peers had had a natural stance of 
supportinC the court for the last twenty years. It was 
reasonable to assume they would revert to their court 
stance rather than engage in overt partisan party politics 
at every opportunity; the Sacheverell trial had proven a 
painful and fruitless victory. 
Nottinzham was made lord president and Aylesford 
chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster. Other members of the 
Finch clan were provided for. Halifax did not play the 
part of an obdurate whiz and was prepared to cooperate 
actively with tories. That tories other than the Finches 
were possible partners in future administrations led the 
whigs to care for some of their interests to a degree. 
Halifax gave some of the lesser Patronage at his disposal 
to tories. Townshend was careful to screen Dartmouth from 
impeachment and tried to retain a kinsman of baron 
Lansdowne in the Customs. 157 
Bolingbroke and Oxford agreed with, one another to 
cooperate on matters of broad mutual interest but ther 
were unwilling to form any Closer working relationship. 
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Each was prepared to leave the other to his fate in terms 
of their respective impeachments. 158 Throuch their 
association with Anne these two had provided the partY 
with much of its effective coherence over the last four 
years. therefore, there was something of a gulf of 
leadership. However, like other tory leaders before them 
they had emerced not from the ranks of the party but 
rather from the court. Therefore. the tories were badly 
hit when the two failed to give any lead and, even more 
so, by the court no longer sanctioning any new such 
individuals. 
In the 1715 general election the electorate swung 
generously in the whicst favour. The major contemporary 
political issue was what to do with Oxford and Bolincbroke 
and their lieutenants Ormond and Strafford (1711)-159 In 
late March Bolinabroke decided it was expedient to flee 
the country. In June the Commons decided at Walpolels 
instigation to impeach Oxford and Bolingbroke without a 
division, although there was only a good documentary case 
azainst the earl. On the question of Ormond there was not 
such and a sizable minority voted in his favour. However. 
in July he panicked and decided that it would be in his 
best interest to withdraw himself abroad. Strafford stayed 
and was charged with high crimes and misdemeanours. 
160 
In July there were divisions on Oxford's Impeachment. 
The votinz reached one hundred and thirty-eicht, while the 
smallest majority was twenty-five, having shrunk with each 
division. The earl had some non-torv support. Cowper and 
Greenwich joined Nottingham, viscount Harcourt and the 
first baron Trevor in backinx his cause; 
161 the first duke 
of Chandos could have exploited the impeachment with 
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respect to their both beinx Herefordshire men, instead he 
expressed solidarity with his neighbour and former 
patron; 162 On the 18th the Ormond Attainder bill passed on 
a vote of eichty-two. Bolinxbroke's did not cause a 
division. 
Also in July George I had announced to parliament 
that a Jacobite invasion was being prepared. In August 
1715 the Scottish peer the sixth earl of Mar raised the 
standard of revolt in Scotland. The Youne Pretender did 
not arrive in Scotland until December, by which time the 
Risinz had lost its momentum and was set to fail. The 
1715-1716 session was dominated by the matter. The tories 
were cooperative in securina the measures to help ficht 
the Rebellion, e. c. the hicher rate of Land Tax. The 
assembly of the machinery for suppressing the Rebellion 
was easily accomplished but the Judicial processina of the 
rebel lords was another matter. Nottincham was decisive in 
obtaininc moderate support for an Address askina, the king 
to be clement. The first earl of Uxbridze, the fourth earl 
of Clarendon, Anglesey, Nottingham and Aylesford were all 
deprived of their posts. 
163 
'The 1715' acted as a reason for both passing and 
implementing the legislation that became the engine for 
securing the Supremacy. In April 1716 the Septennial bill 
secured a total of one hundred and fifty-seven votes on 
one division. Shrewsbury, the architect of the Triennial 
Act, opposed the measure. Peterborough-maintained his 
tergiversancy while Nottingham was again operating firmly 
in the tory fold. 164 The tories and the Hanoverian tories 
were joined by some of the more independently minded whiza 
such as Somerset, Somerset0s son-in-law viscount Tadcaster 
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and the first earl of Bristol. 
The bill would have the effect of taking down the 
political temperature because there would no longer be the 
near-constant electoral campaitning that there was in 
William's final years and through-out Anne's reign. 
Patronage could be used more effectively on M. P. s and 
peers if recipients knew they were going to have several 
years, rather than just a couple, in which to enjoy the 
fruits of their positions. The Bedchamber, with its 
flexible size. had returned and during Oxford's ministry 
there had been an expansion in the types of other offices 
that could be given to the peerage: peers were now 
rezularly tellers of the Exchequer and masters of the 
Buckhounds. 
It became increasincly certain that the whics were 
going to retain royal favour for several years. What was 
immediately damaging for the tories was that the poor 
lords started to drift towards the whics who occupied the 
court position that Oxford had had. The poor lords were 
usually prepared to follow whoever governed their 
pensions. Their adherence to the crown had been of help to 
both Godolphin and Oxford. Their Post-1715 siding with the 
ministry meant that the tories became an even smaller 
minority in the Lords than they were after the mass 
creations of 1714 and 1716. The second earl of Yarmouth 
was clearly a poor lord. For several years he had sworn 
the oaths of Allegiance PerhaPs being driven into the 
political fold by poverty. 
165 The likes of Hunsdon and the 
fifth viscount Saye and Sele were near automatic court 
supporters through their penury. 
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5.1t. 3.1. The Whigs and the Court, 1716-1720. 
The problem which dominates the first half of George 
I's reign, after the establishment of the Supremacy is- 
Why was the Townshend-Walpole zroup taken back into the 
ministry in 1720, when it had taken a hostile stance 
towards the ministry durinc the Previous sessions? This 
principal question has a subordinate primary one of- Why 
did the Townshend-Walpole aroup leave in the first place? 
The Townshend-Walpole group's problems grew from the 
success of the whiz party. The whigs had been used to 
struggling for a share of Power. The party had not 
experienced ministerial domination on the scale that 
George I was willing to allow it in the wake of the 
Risinc. However, just at the point when the whigs were 
admitted to an unprecedented share of offices the majority 
of their front rank fizures disappeared from the political 
scene. By April 1716, of the original Junto only Orford 
(1697) was still alive. There were other senior 
politiicians but neither Somerset nor Shrewsbury was able 
to build a working relationship with George; 
166 the 
arch-courtier Marlborough, whom the king did hold in high 
regard, was permanently and severely disabled by two 
strokes during the course of 1716. Therefore, there was a 
power vacuum into which the second rank of the leadership 
was swept. There were no conditions of adverBitV for the 
party to unite in, therefore, internal tensions came to 
the surface. 
The incentive to win was accentuated by the political 
scene itself changing. Having accepted the mass of the 
Revolution Settlement.. George I was generally uninterested 
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in the detail of British domestic politics. This meant the 
prospect of the party being able to use the court 
interest, therefore, whoever predominated within the party 
would have an unprecedented sway in domestic politics. The 
passint of the Septennial Act in 1716 meant that, the 
victors would have an easier task than Anne's ministers in 
managing domestic politics. 
A number of the details of the party's power struggle 
are obscure. For example, Stanhope and Sunderland drew 
tozether but it is not clear when exactly they bezan to 
act as a unit. From an approximate equality with Townshend 
and Walpole, Stanhope and Sunderland pulled ahead. The two 
decisive factors were that Sunderland crew ever hicher in 
George I's esteem and that Stanhope had a series of 
advantages over Townshend. The principal cause of 
Sunderland's rise was probably the friendship that he 
developed with the royal mistress Madame Schulenberz. 
167 
Stanhope was the son of a diplomat; he had had a 
cosmopolitan upbrinzinx which allowed him to share much or 
the king's perspective; he was a distinguished soldier and 
therefore was able to relate to the sovereicnIs martial 
interests; and Townshend had the northern office which 
meant that he had to learn George's prejudices with 
reBpect to northern Europe from his own errors while 
executinx the office whereas Stanhope, in the less 
sensitive southern secretaryship, could watch and learn 
from the viscount's mistakes. 
168 
George I spent the summer of 1716 in Hanover, leavinx 
the future George II as lord regent in Britain. The 
prince's conduct, his association with Greenwich and the 
fact that Stanhope was with the king on the continent led 
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to Stanhope and Sunderland gaining an advantage at their 
rivals' expense. This advantage was marked by Townshend 
being made lord lieutenant of Ireland in December 1716. 
The office had immense political and financial clout but 
only within Ireland; in terms of domestic British politics 
it was a demotion, especially as he was not an Irish 
landowner. 169 The transfer allowed Stanhope to take over 
the now more important northern secretaryship. Townshend 
and Walpole had lost too much ground to their rivals to be 
able to achieve power within the ministry. They decided to 
go into opposition although there is no evidence as to 
precisely when they came to this conclusion. 
There were a number of Positive reasons as to why 
they should enter opposition. There was no guarantee that 
Stanhope's sophisticated and expensive foreign policy 
would be succeBSfUl. If it failed then the ministry would 
be embarrassed and therefore susceptible to attack in the 
Commons where an active foreign policy was not popular in 
the wake of the cost of the War of the Spanish Succession, 
which was still beinc paid for. The PolicY might well run 
azainst the wishes of the German interest at court which 
therefore might oppose the miniBterS. 
In 1716 the large majority of the whiZ party knew 
from recent experience what it was like to be positively 
excluded by the courts so the mass of the party was less 
likely to be subservient to the earl's wishes Prior to 
1722 than it would be afterwards. Prince George was 
clearly not happy with the way that he had been treated by 
either his father or Stanhope and Sunderland. He had 
considerable electoral strencth in Devon and Cornwall and 
could, if need be, undermine Sunderland's 
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efforts there. Greenwich was-similarly unhappy and he 
could make inroads into the zovernmentts efforts in 
Scotland. 170 
There was no guarantee that the association of 
Stanhope with Sunderland would survive under the strain of 
having to sustain themselves against a prolonged domestic 
attack. On the dismissal of the impeachment against 
Oxford, Sunderland was with the Marlborouch croup in 
withdrawins in a dissentient manner while Stanhope was 
not. In late 1717 the first earl Cadozan's military 
interests were in conflict with those of Stanhope (and 
those of the second earl of Scarbrough) and the former was 
clearly associated with Sunderland since he was 
Marlborough's client. In October 1718 it was regarded as 
newsworthy that Stanhope should be staying at Sunderland's 
apartments while his own were beint put in order, since 
there had been a rumour of rift between the two. 
171 
The Townshend-Walpole group waited through winter and 
spring to see who it could persuade to join it in 
opposition. By April it was ready. Townshend voted against 
the ministry on the Mutiny bill which led to his 
dismissal. 172 His allies resianed in support: in the Lords 
this meant Orford (1697) and Devonshire. Both had 
followings in the Commons and were additionally important 
in that they came from different strands of the party -the 
earl from the Junto and the duke more from the 
court/Marlborouzh side- therefore they had broad points of 
contact within the party. 
The identification of 'whiz' with 'court' was never 
to come into beina. There was a close correlation that had 
247 
only Just begun to exist. When the ministry did try to 
advance its interests it did so in what were not whiz 
ways. Therefore, it was only able to call on part of the 
support that it could have had had these matters been 
matters of party interest. 
Stanhope and Sunderland put far too much pressure on 
the correlation. The ministers were caught in a paradox- 
if they failed to act they would lose the ability to 
engage in positive government and if they acted they then 
ran the risk of being unable to govern. Only time could 
rescue them, the link of court with whiz growing stronger 
and therefore being able to bear more stress. Just as with 
Stanhope being able to benefit from Townshend's 
awkwardness as the king's first northern secretary so the 
Townshend-Walpole group were to benefit from the 
Stanhope-Sunderland croup's awkwardness in being the first 
court/whiz ministry to try to defend itself againBt a 
transparty opposition. Had the Townshend-Walpole Zroup met 
with no BUccess then their ability to oppose would have 
lessened since they would have lost political currency 
within the opposition. 
The 1718-1719 session of parliament saw the ministry 
first score a positive success over the repeals of the 
Occasional Conformity and'Schism Acts. However, they then 
became over-confident and failed to repeal partiallv the 
Test Acts. It was over four years since the Succession, so 
the former repeals were not of pressing urgency to the 
whics as a whole. The failures 1690 and 1709 were 
precedents for the failure of the attempt to repeal the 
Test Act. 
During the subsequent parliamentary break Stanhope 
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had a showdown with the kinz over the German courtiers and 
their influence over British foreign policy (while the 
Britons lost theirs over Hanoverian foreign affairs). 
173 
Then Greenwich was brought in from opposition. Both points 
improved the ministry's domestic position, so they felt 
confident enough to embark on a bold legislative programme 
in the 1719-1720 session, to show that they held the 
initiative in terms of the political azenda. 
For the 1719-1720 session it was decided to act 
firmly within whig persona prejudices and attack the tory 
domination or the two Enclish universities. This was 
coupled with two bills that were intended to alter the 
hardware of politics. The first was the Peerage bill. This 
was to allow the peerage to be expanded Blichtly174 and 
then make it into a limited body with replacements being 
allowed to be created only as then existina titles fell 
vacant. The second was to repeal the Septennial Act which 
would have meant that the parliament would continue as 
long as George I Wished it to exist or lived. The repeal 
was probably attractive to many whigs. The expense of 
elections had grown steadily and the ministry was a whig 
one. However, there must have also been other whics for 
whom it was quite unacceptable# it bearinx a strone 
parallel to the circumstances that had allowed Danbv to 
act so effectively as Charles Ilts parliamentary manazer. 
The bills were ministerial in character rather than whiz. 
Sunderland and Stanhope miscalculated badly in 
decidinx to promote the Peerace bill. The measure was 
unacceptable to the mass of the gentry and it was the 
zentry who made up the large majority of M. p. B. 
175 They 
were hostile to what was an overt court measure which 
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sought to markedly change the existing socio-political 
system. The bill's loss meant that there was no hope of 
passing the repeal. The ministrv had lost its control of 
the Commons. The only sure means of controlling the 
Commons was to bring the Townshend-Walpole group back into 
the ministerial fold. Bernstorff and Bothmer were keen to 
promote this. 
176 This was both because of the way they had 
been treated over foreign policy by Stanhope and because 
the Peerage bill would have effectively killed any 
lingering hopes that the Germans at court had of entering 
the British peerage. 
The peerage were important as individual players at 
court. The House of Lords itself was always firmly with 
the ministry. It was a theatre in which the OPPOBition was 
able to provide a shadow to complement its activities in 
the Commons and at court, which were where the principal 
struggles were being waged. The Townshend-Walpole group 
were careful in the Lords to show that they were capable 
of being selective in their opposition and that they 
believed in the continuation of sound governmental 
practice. 
In February 1718 the highest division on the Mutiny 
bill involved one hundred and sixty-eicht votes and 
although the smallest majoritv was eleven there was never 
any real danger of the ministry losing its control of the 
Upper House. Other high divisions followed but none 
reached the same intensitv. In opposing the bill Townshend 
was joined by Devonshire, Bristol, Greenwich, Tadcaster. 
the second duke of Rutland. the earl of Castleton, and the 
second earl of Scarbrough. 177 It was a broad cross-section 
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of whiggery rather than being a homogeneous representation 
of the Townshend-Walpole croup, althouzh Rutland had 
travitated towards it. Scarbrouch was a close associate of 
prince George, and Castleton a kinsman of Scarbrough. 
178 
The previous December relations between the prince and the 
king had deteriorated sufficiently for the former to be 
expelled from his apartments in St. James's palace. 
Townshend and Walpole were careful to try to keep the 
prince and the tories from becoming too friendly. Walpole 
advised the prince not to vote against the Mutiny bill. 
This lack of solidarity achieved its result of greatly 
upsetting the tories. 
179 
The attack in the 1718-1719 session opened with an 
assault on the AddreSB in Reply. The Bedchamber lord the 
third viscount Lonsdale showed that despite his place he 
was determined to conduct his own independent political 
line. 180 Townshend and Walpole decided to shelve their 
whiggishness and opposed the repeal of the Schism and 
Occasional Conformity Acts. 
181 In the Lards the highest 
diViBion on the matter involved one hundred and 
seventy-two votes while the smallest majority was sixteen. 
The Peerage bill criSiB occurred in December in the 
Commons, where the covernment found that it would not be 
able to pass the measure through that House. 
As the ministry lost the lecislative initiative so 
the 1719-1720 session became quieter in the Lords than its 
predecessor had been. Late in the session there was a 
majority of sixty-three from a vote of ninety-seven on the 
South Sea Company Annuities bill. This was not the 
Townshend-Walpole ZrOUP opposinz but rather an indication 
that the companv with its role in governmental finance 
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occupied a special place in the collective psyche of the 
Lords prior to the advent of the Bubble. It was less than 
a decade since the Company's establishment and it had had 
to metamorphose from its Harleyite origins into something 
that was more acceptable to the crown. 
The unhappiness of the duke of Newcastle (1715) with 
his colleagues' proposed legislative programme was 
important. During the session it looked as though 
Newcastle and others of the ministry's young magnate 
backers were waverinC in their support; 
182 the second duke 
of Bolton was happy to leave his proxy with the third earl 
of Burlington who was in turn involved with the proxies of 
the whig opposition. 
183 If people of this type fell away 
the ministry would not be viable in either House. 
Therefore, there was another pressing reason for the 
ministry to accommodate the Townshend-Walpole group. 
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5.4.3.2. The Whigs and the Court, 1720-1733. 
On May 24th 1733 the government was technically 
defeated on the South Sea Company Stock bill. This was the 
only occasion under the first two Georges that such 
occurred on a major governmental Piece of legislation. It 
happened for a variety of reasons: the Excise Crisis was 
in full flight, although the Excise bill itself had been 
dropped; the ministry made the mistake of allowing a 
controversial bill into the Upper House before tempers had 
cooled properly; and there was a sizable opposition in 
existence. The Crisis had been avoidable. 
The cause of ousting Sir Robert Walpole had come to 
be one behind which a sizable opposition had gathered. It 
was this that was the principal long-term reason for the 
defeat. In 1720 he had been one of a number of front rank 
politicians. He outlasted all of his colleagues so that in 
1730 he became the first prime minister, the sole leader 
of a one party ministry. He survived because he continued 
to provide the crown with what it wanted while his 
colleagues either died, retired or went into opposition. 
Walpole's positive achievement was remaining at the centre 
while his contemporaries departed from it by one means or 
another. 
Stanhope died In February 1721 and Sunderland in 
April 1722. Most of those who had supported them in the 
late 1710S were happy to sit back and collect the rewards 
of office, e. c. Cadozan. Many probably had onlY supported 
them as the crown's chosen ministers, rather than having 
any deeper commitment e. c. Bolton. 
184 The second earl of 
Godolphin had been associated with the Sunderland croup 
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but made a clean conversion into being a supporter of 
Townshend and Walpole but not until after Sunderland's 
I 
death. Godolphin's son-in-law, Newcastle, who was also 
Townshend's brother-in-law. had been an important figure 
in the overthrow of the previous ministry working from the 
inside. Therefore, he was admitted into the inner workings 
of government, but again it was after Sunderland's 
death. 18 5 The second earl of Yarmouth, and presumably the 
other poor lords, retained his loyalty to the earl. 
186 
People who were positively hostile were slowlY ousted 
as they provided opportunities through their own 
corruptness, incompetence or lack of Political judgement. 
However, just because many of those who disliked the 
ministers departed, it would be wrong to assume that their 
replacements were strongly pro-Townshend and Walpole. Many 
of those who came into office would have done so had the 
two not been taken back into office in 1720. Therefore, 
they would not have felt a compulsion to be 'Pro*, which 
was acceptable just so long as they were not too 
Positively 'anti. ' 
Under Georce I the third earl of Berkeley's 
continuation as first lord of the Admiralty was a sign of 
the pair's weakness. He was a leadinx member of the 
ministry, as his being consulted on the treaty of Hanover 
shows. 187 He was distinctly independent of the duumvirate. 
In 1727 he paid the price for that independence and was 
dismissed. George II was careful to retain the other 
ministers that Georze I used to control his principal 
ministers. 
Secretary Carteret overextended his diplomatic 
abilities in tryinz to procure a French dukedom for the 
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prospective son-in-law of the countess von Platen in 1723. 
Failure embarrassed him with George I and consequently the 
baron was demoted to the lord lieutenancy of Ireland, 
which he resigned in 1730 because of the level of protests 
there over Wood's Halfpence scheme. 188 It should be held 
in mind that Carteret chose to resign and was not 
dismissed. He may well have seen resignation as being in 
his own best interest in view of the internal state of the 
ministry at that juncture. 
William Pulteney (later earl of Bath (1742)) was 
another key member of the group who had zone into 
opposition in 1717 and returned with it in 1720. In early 
April 1725 he went into Opposition over the meeting of new 
civil list debts. However, this seems to have been an 
excuse rather than a cause in itself. He later regretted 
not having waited and done BO over the treaty of Hanover 
later in the year. 
189 
Walpole had learnt the lesson of the 
Stanhope-Sunderland ministry that it was dangerous to 
engage in a positive domestic political programme unless 
it was more dangerous not to. However, he did not Just Sit 
tight and have his colleagues and enemies disappear from 
the running. Rather he had to perform the duties that were 
required of him as first lord of the Treasury- The first 
of these was the South Sea Bubble Crisis. Largely through 
Walpole having the good Judgement to implement Robert 
Jacombets scheme the Bank of England was brought in to 
Is 0 
mount a rescue operation. so that a worsening of the 
situation was prevented and a retrenchment of the overall 
financial system was made possible. 
190 His behaviour was 
255 
essentially a response and this was to be the hallmark of 
his successful politics- letting sleepinz dogs lie. 
The prospect of the accession of Georce II was a 
problem that there was no cuarantee of the 
Townshend-Walpole ministry surmounting. The group 
weathered the event because the new kinx did not have any 
positive new views on how domestic Politics should be run. 
because the new queen felt that TownBhend and especiallv 
Walpole were the best men to do so and because Sir Spencer 
Compton (later the earl of Wilmincton) WaB unable to 
obtain a suitably generous civil list from the Commons. 191 
1725 saw Townshend embark on his ambitious foreign 
policy. This started because neither the peace of Utrecht 
nor Cape Passaro had resolved the problems of 
Austro-Spanish conflict. The French proved unhelpful to 
their Spanish allies, because they were preoccupied with 
their own internal affairs. These necessitated that Louis 
XV have a son and heir. His betrothed Spanish infanta was 
too young to provide one in the short-term future. 
Therefore, she was returned and the kinx married an 
appropriately aged Polish princess. This turned the 
Spaniards against France and motivated them to tr. V to set 
their own international affairs in order. The result was 
that the former enemies Austria and Spain signed the 
Alliance of Vienna in 1725. This development changed the 
whole nature of power relations in Europe. 192 
Townshend was forced to respond to these 
developments, otherwise Britain and the electorate might 
well be left isolated and therefore their interests 
unguarded. If he failed he would lose his interest with 
George and no longer be a viable minister. The viscount 
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was caucht out in his reaction because the causes of 
Austria and Spaints mutual antazonism were too deeply 
rooted to be overcome; their 'friendship' broke down and 
Europe started to move back to its pre-1725 state of 
affairs. The overall process took some five years and was 
brought to a conclusion bw WalPole and the southern 
secretary Newcastle when they concluded the treaty of 
Seville with Spain in 1730. This was designed to forestall 
their clashing interests from causing a war rather than to 
conclude an alliance. 
Relations between Walpole and Townshend had broken 
down for a number of reasons; by 1728 each was prepared to 
plot azainst the other. 
193 Seville made it clear that the 
viscount had been outmanoeuvred by his erstwhile 
colleague. For Walpole to have been able to conclude the 
treaty meant that he had the support of the king in the 
matter, ergo, Townshend did not possess as close a 
relationship with George II as he had formerly had. As 
with 1717, Townshend chose to resign rather than to play a 
subsidiary role. He had paid the price for the nature of 
the office which he occupied. Neither the viscount's 
departure nor his subsequent Political Passivity were 
pre-ordained. It was Townshend's misfortune that the 
international situation was the way it was and that the 
Alliance of Vienna was concluded. 
The opposition to Walpole in 1733 was made up of both 
whigs and tories and therefore could command larce numbers 
In both Houses. This was because pre-conditionB for such 
an opposition had come into beinx and then a vehicle for 
it to use had appeared. Cooperation was possible because 
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party differences had not been stressed for nearly a 
decade. Walpole wanted to make the management of domestic 
politics as untroublesome for himself as he could. A good 
means to bring down the political temperature was to 
immobilize the tory party as a legitimate medium for 
opposition. This in turn would make his chosen task 
easier. 
The Laver plot effectively disabled the tories for 
several years. Walpole had agents scour Europe in search 
of Jacobite activity. This was to provide him with 
material to re-awaken the domestic fears that the plot had 
raised. 194 To engage in parliamentary dialogue with the 
tories as a party would have zone against his obJect since 
it would have suggested that they were an organization for 
legitimate political expression. Therefore, not only did 
he attack them as supposed Jacobites but he also made sure 
that they were given few opportunities to appear as a 
party. Therefore, politics was practised in an 
increasingly less inter-party manner. Therefore, Walpole, 
in order to make his political task easier, actually laid 
the groundwork for a new trans-party opposition to emerge. 
Bolingbroke's past was too notorious to allow him to 
act other than as a consultant, but it was he who probably 
did the most to enliven the new opposition. He had used 
his skill at court manipulation in order to prepare the 
groundwork for his pardon and legal return to Britain. 
Walpole was presented with something of a fait accompli 
since the viscount had successfully bribed the duchess of 
Kendal, the royal mistress, into acting on his behalf, so 
there was a vested court interest working on his behalf. 
Harcourt and the third earl of Berkeley had also been 
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campaigning for his return. 
195 The Bedchamber lord Essex 
temporarily defected to the opposition on this matter, his 
ramily having a close association with Bolingbroke. 
Walpole did not feel it would be in his own best 
interests with the court to make a stand on the issue and 
therefore bent on the matter, althouch makinz it-clear he 
was not happy. In the Lords votes on the Bolingbroke 
estates bill both Devonshire and Orford (1697) were in the 
minorit, v. 
196 That they were doinc so was as a sicn that 
the group viewed the viscountts return with distaste. 
Among the whiz opponents to Bolingbroke's return were 
Coventry, Bristol and Warrincton. 
197 Initially it might 
seem rather ironic that these three should object to the 
viscountts return to the British political scene, since he 
was to advocate successfully that the opposition adopt a 
country programme. 
198 They saw him as what his past made 
career made him out to be- an arch-courtier. However, they 
themselves had solid court backgrounds. Bristol is the 
best candidate for a true country whiz in the Lords, but 
he had a large number of relatives, including his wife and 
eldest son (baron Hervey) who held court office. 
Warrington's father had received a pension from William 
III, the arrears of which enabled both Oxford and Walpole 
to exert a degree of influence over the son. Finally, 
Coventry as a commoner had no objections to using corrupt 
means to secure office but, felt that the rates that 
Walpole was charcinc were extortionate. 199 
Just as the overall character of the opposition was 
not homogeneous, neither was that of its whiz elements. 
There were three broad elements Prior to 1733: the first 
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were the relics of Cowper's party, the likes of Warrincton 
and Bristol; second the the Young men who began to gather 
after 1730. many of them were magnates with distinctly 
whiz backgrounds; and third Carteret who, alone with his 
associates, felt himself to be a courtier unduly ousted. 
These three categories are loose and were by no means 
mutually exclusive. The middle one was separated from the 
other two by ace while the other two were divided from one 
another by attitudes adopted in the mid 1720s. 
After the 1722 zeneral election the duke of Wharton 
summarized the situation as beina "that Lord Cowper is at 
the head of the Tories and Lord H(arcour)t at the a--- of 
the Whics. ##200 Cowper's ability, and therefore his 
importance to the opposition, is testified by there being 
thirty-seven divisions durinx the session. The basic 
relationship of divisions to protests in this Session was 
that the latter followed on from the former. He had the 
process snowball on itself so that there ended up being 
divisions about protests which in turn promoted still 
further protests. The body of the sianatories was made up 
of tories but its heart was made up of whics. 
201 This 
activit. v was engineered with respect to the approaching 
zeneral election which was due under the Septennial Act in 
1722. 
Cowper had success in exploiting individual issues to 
make some of the government's non-core supporters defect 
temporarily. In appreciation of how fluid the political 
situation could be, the ministry was careful to look after 
202 the likes or Somerset and the second duke or Montazu. 
In May 1722 Somerset and Cowper had been approached by 
Carleton and Carteret. However. a fUll-blown cooperation 
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was not to develop, the Layer Plot and Cowper's death 
ending that brief era of whiz opposition. 
In January 1725 the future second earl of Oxford 304 
copreBented a petition to parliament on behalf of 
deranged, doddering, double dowager duchess of Albemarle 
and Montacu (and empress of China to herself). This was 
manipulated by the ministry and turned into an 
investigation into the Practices in Chancerv, which in 
turn led to the impeachment of the first earl, of 
Macclesfield (1721), who had been a Stanhope-Sunderland 
supporter. Both Bridgwater and the second earl of 
Scarbrough voted on the earl's behalf in some of the 
divisions. 203 There were protests that were signed by 
opposition whics such as Lechmere and Wharton and 
government ones like Greenwich, Sussex (1717). the first 
earl of Halifax (1715). the fourth earl of Carlisle, the 
first earl of Pomfret, 
204 the first earl of Harborouch and 
the second duke of Manchester. 
205 The impeachment was a 
partisan action by the ministry: it was not a crown 
action. Therefore, there was no compulsion for zovernment 
supporters to act with the TownhBned-Walpole group. 
The opposition rumbled on, unable to make any 
advance, waitina upon either the crown or the ministry's 
internal condition to chance the overall state of 
Politics. Scottish affairs were occasionally sensitive: 
the Malt bill was contentious in 1725 and in January 1727 
there was a turn-out of one hundred and nineteen on the 
earl Grahamts case. The Malt bill had caused sizable 
divisions. Relations between Britain and Spain remained 
bad durIng the 1720s although Passaro acted as a deterrent 
to their deterioration into outright war. The conduct of 
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foreign affairs gave the prospect of opportunities for 
future agitation. In 1724 and 1726 there were divisions on 
Spain. 
In Februarw 1726 the prince's associate Scarbrouch 
complimented Strafford (1711) on the part he had Plaved in 
making the treaty of Utrecht. Whether this was a sign of 
how close Strafford was to the prince or the prince was to 
Strafford is unclear. 206 Bristol was the onlv whig who 
voted with the minority. 
207 The existence of a 
reversionary interest was always a destabilizing feature 
in Hanoverian politics (it would probably have been over 
1689-1714 but for Anne's determination choosing to prevent 
it from doing so). What degree it would be was 
indeterminable prior to the event and it thus hung as a 
sword of Damocles over the Political situation. 
When the sword dropped in 1727 its effect was to 
quieten politics as no one wished to antaxoni'ze the new 
. king. Therefore, the 1728 session was very quiet. The 1729 
session was livelier because those hopes were not met and 
because of the unsettled state of relations with Spain. 
The number of topics on which there were hich divisions 
grew. The following session was similar because there was 
the treaty of Seville to debate. In addition, there 
emerged the staples of the Lords Political divisions for 
the decade- the Passaxe of the Mutiny Act and the defeat 
of the Pension bill. 208 
During the 1730'session the whiz opposition regulars 
found themselves Joined on the Pension bill bw some 
younger whics- the fourth duke of Bedford, the ninth earl 
of Huntingdon, the third duke of Marlborough and the first 
earl Kerr. Bridgwater joined them. Their motives are 
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obscure, but they are unlikely to have been country 
inspired idealism. In March Lonsdale and the second baron 
Cadogan were against the ministrv on the question of the 
Pension bill, the two havinz usually acted previously as 
court supporters. In the 1731 session the Pension bill 
protest was sicned afresh by the fourth earl of 
Gainsborouch, the second duke of Ancaster and the 
sixteenth baron Abergavenny. In the 1732 session the 
Mutiny bill saw the fourth earl of Shaftesbury with the 
opposition. New protestors to the Mutinv bill were 
Carteret, his crony the eighth earl of Winchilsea and the 
seventh earl of Suffolk. 
209 A number of whics in 
opposition followed Carteret in regarding themselves as 
loyal courtiers who were in adverse circumstances. Despite 
its composite character the opposition waý expandina 
rapidly in the Lords. The Young peers were more prone to 
being systematic in their opposition. 
The 1732 session's one new measure to zenerate a 
large number of divisions was the Salt Duties bill. This 
was designed to improve the Excise revenue. It gave 
political capital to the Opposition because it left the 
ministry open to the suggestion that it was trying to 
expand the number of revenue men for its own ulterior 
motives; the addition of new Excise votes in certain key 
borouzhs would have helped the ministry in its Commons 
strencth. In itself the scheme was a sensible measure 
which allowed due money to be collected far more 
efficiently. there having been a number of minor 
Precursors relating to other goods. The bill passed into 
law and the ministry decided to try to extend the 
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system. 210 This played into the hands of the opposition. 
Christmas 1732 saw its leaders gather at Cassiobury, 
Essex's seat. The organizer of this meeting was almost 
certainly Bolingbroke, since he had close relations with 
the Capels. 211 
There were Mutinv and Pension divisions in the 1733 
session and opposition was expected on the Excise bill. 
Surprise came in the number and the calibre of the whiz 
defections on the measure. Scarbrough, Burlington, the 
first earl Clinton, the third duke of Bolton, the fourth 
earl of Chesterfield and viscount Cobham were all 
prominent court whics. 
212 There was a distinct dancer that 
other senior ones would follow and that then the rank and 
file would be drawn after them and a snowball effect 
acquired from which recovery might not be possible. 
Wilmington and Dorset were watched, although neither did 
defect in the event. 
213 The previous session Scarbrough 
had supported the Salt Duties bill and in this one he had 
been a warm advocate of the Mutiny bill. 
214 That he and 
the others should act in this way had probably been 
encourazed by the tolerance shown in the previous 
sessions. That thev felt able to act in this manner in the 
short-term probably derived from the measure appearinc to 
be Walpole's child and that George II was not seen as 
being connected with it. Whether the intention of these 
courtiers was to bring down the minister or not is 
unclear. There is no evidence as to their precise motives. 
It is probable that the crisis had roots in the conduct of 
foreizn policy and possibly in old whic suspicions as to 
the, power of the prerogative. There were no divisions on 
the issue in the Lards. On April 22nd Walpole withdrew the 
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measure from parliamentary consideration. 
The general state of political crisis continued in 
the Lords. This was because of the South Sea Company Stock 
bill. This affair has been obscured by the Excise bill 
when in fact they were two separate matters that happened 
to occur in close chronological proximity to one another. 
Paul Langford has written of their conjunction "when the 
excise was dropped without coming to the upper House, a 
new target had to be selected.,, 
21 5 This carries an air of 
an immediate swop being made and suggests that had the 
South Sea Company Stock bill not been handy a White 
Herrin& or Paving bill would have sufficed. Although there 
was almost without doubt a considerable transfer of 
'momentum of opposition, ' Langford's handling of the 
matter overlooks that the company touched a particular 
nerve in Westminster politics and especially so with the 
Lords; this had been so prior to the Bubble. The 
post-Bubble session had been the crisis that never broke. 
There had been no great divisions then, but this masked 
the very high attendance that occurred that session. 
Although Walpole had handled that affair well, this 
adeptness appeared only after the gravity of the matter 
was fully evident. Plumbts work on the Great Man's pattern 
of share purchasing has shown that he was by no means 
financially omniscient with respect to the c6mpany. 
216 In 
1733, when legislating with relation to it. Walpole may 
have allowed his blind spot to obscure the probable 
political repercussions. In addition, he did not run the 
day-to-day affairs of the House of Lords. this having been 
Townshend's preserve until 1730 and then Newcastle's. 
217 
The short-term mistakes were not necessarily Sir Robert's. 
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The crisis peaked on May 24th, when the two sides 
drew seventy-five apiece in the Lords and the government 
lost its only post-Succession division in the period on a 
218 technicality relating to drawn votes. Greenwich, 
Falmouth, Somerset, Kent, Fitzwalter. St. Albans. 
Manchester, Macclesfield (1721), Pomfret and Cornwallis 
all voted with the opposition, while Onslow spoke for it 
but did not divide. 219 The ministry soon re-asserted its 
control of the House. This may have been in part through 
material concessions on the item. The vote on June 5th was 
won by a majority of five. St. Albans, Manchester, 
Harborouch, Falmouth, Cornwallis and Onslow had all 
220 previously either voted against the court or abstained. 
This time they voted with it. while Greenwich withdrew. 
Cobham and Chesterfield were new protestors that session. 
On June 2nd they signed one relating to the company. 
By 1733 a fairly sizable opposition had come 
together. What made it so dangerous was that a band of 
courtiers suddenly started to cooperate with it. That 
Walpole was not liked by many of his colleagues was well 
known, but that they should actually act in outright 
opposition to him does not seem to have been expected by 
contemporaries. Foreign policy was a major factor in 
Walpole's relations with other senior office-holders 
there. 
The crisis had been predated by the February 1733 
death of king Augustus II of Poland. That event signalled 
the start of another Franco-Austrian conflict. Walpole 
disliked the idea of another European war because such 
would make the Commons harder to manage and in the event 
of either any setback or it having a prolonged length the 
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crown would be susceptible through its financial needs to 
a potentially hostile Commons and with such a state of 
affairs he himself would be in an exposed position. 
However, within the ministrv there were a number of 
elements that almost certainlv desired British involvement 
in the War of the Polish Succession. 221 It is to be noted 
that a number of the Excise defectors held military 
positions- Cobham. Bolton and Scarbrough, and of the 
defectors later in the 1730s Greenwich was an officer. 
In 1730 Townshend had isolated himself by veerinz 
away from what had come to be accepted as the whiz foreizn 
policy of supportinx Austria against France. in 1733 
Walpole was not keen on going to war as doing so would 
mean having to raise taxes and thereby make the Commons 
harder to handle. Therefore, Probably with the Alliance of 
Vienna still in mind, he decided to avoid having even a 
whiz foreign policy, evading the Austro-British alliance 
by means of the technicality that the relevant treaty 
termed itself a defensive one and that the Austrians had 
actually initiated the military phase of the conflict and 
therefore could be held to be the agaressors, so that the 
document had no bearinx in the circumstance. 
222 
The soldiers and their associates were probably aware 
of what drift Walpole's policy would take, if it was not 
then already clear. Therefore, they may have soucht to 
isolate, if not necessarily oust, him and force a return 
to a 'traditional' whiz policy. The ExciBe bill would have 
been seen as an extension of the prerogative by earlier 
whics. Therefore, Scarbrouch's espousal of the Mutiny bill 
and his opposition to the Excise one were facets of a 
consistent approach to politics. His and his associates' 
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miscalculation was that they underestimated the degree to 
which George II would back his minister if driven to it 
and that Walpole's non-interventionism at that time would 
provide the kinx with a foreicn policy which the kins 
found acceptable. 
In the Excise bill the ministrv made a bad choice of 
measure. For over a decade Walpole was careful not to 
engage in a programme of positive domestic legislation. 
The bill was a limited technical item which was intended 
to make the collection of revenue more efficient. It had 
been preceded by similar bills in previous sessions. His 
own previous success in this area of legislation was 
probably the factor which caused Walpole to introduce the 
measure. There was no necessity for introducing it. There 
was no way in which it could be viewed as a whiz piece of 
legislation. Therefore, it was a court measure. However, 
it was not one in which George II had any positive 
interest, erao, it appeared solely as a Walpolean bill 
devoid of redeemina feature. It was hichly susceptible to 
being manipulated for-propaganda purposes. Bolingbroke. 
with his long residence in France, was brilliantlY Placed 
to point out the parallels that could be made between the 
scheme and the hated gabelle across the Channel. 
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5.4.3.3. The Whigs and the Court, 1733-1742. 
Walpole fell in 1742. This was because of 
disaffection within the system that he had so long been 
manipulating in order to maintain himself on power. 
However, such disaffection would have been ineffective 
unless there had been considerable external pressure 
against the Great Man's continuation in power. Without the 
two working in collusion he might well have continued in 
office until death. The character of disaffection. both 
inside and outside the ministry, and their interaction, is 
the principal tale of the Lords in these years. 
The Crisis had a detrimental effect on the ministry's 
performance in the 1734 general election, however, it 
retained a working majority even if it was a smaller one 
than in the previous parliament. 
223 However, the 
opposition had its own problems. In 1735 Bolingbroke opted 
to go into voluntary retirement in France. By the 
mid-1730B Pulteney and the opposition whics had absorbed 
all that he seemed likely to produce and he had given no 
indication that he would engage in innovatory activity. 
The Great Man was aware that his enemy was now regarded as 
a peripheral figure by the OPPOBition. Therefore. he 
started a concerted campaign against his old enemy by 
means of the press and by working on the fears of the 
independents in the Commons. 224 The eight years that 
followed it lacked any innovative political conduct, which 
meant that Walpole was able to conduct his defense by 
drawing upon his past experience. 
Divisions centrina on Mutiny Acts and Pension bills 
were regular features of the opposition's activity against 
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Walpole. The Mutiny Act was one of the means by which 
parliament retained a check on the activities of the 
crown. It was the successful passaze of the Mutiny Act 
which enabled the crown to have a lezal basis for 
maintaining discipline within the armed forces, otherwise 
its actions to retain such would have been arbitrary and 
illegal. To have stopped one would have proven that the 
ministrv had lost the confidence of parliament. In 
contrast the Pension bill was a Positive action by the 
opposition which sought to curtail the crown's influence 
on the Commons by limiting the number of placemen who 
could sit in it. Again, for it to have passed parliament 
would have shown that the ministry was incapable of 
continuing. Both lines of attack fed off old country fears 
of the court- an extended executive perpetuating its own 
existence at cost to both British liberties and purses. 
The principal point of these attacks was to act as a focus 
for the opposition and to try to skim some support from 
the government bencheB. 
The confrontations took place principally in the 
CommonB where many whiXB Btill clunt on to BOMe country 
beliefs even if they saw support of Walpole as being 
normally the best means of aiding whizzery. The Excise 
Crisis aside, Walpole was prepared to act well within the 
Revolution Settlement. In the early 17308 Pension bills 
regularly appeared in the Upper House. This was because 
the ministry let them through the Commons since it felt 
that to quash them there would be detrimental to the 
lonz-term manacement of the Lower HoUBe. However, the 
Excise Crisis chanced Walpole's management style so that 
he had such bills halted there. Mutiny Acts had been 
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contested prior to the CriSiB and became the great regular 
rallyinx point of opposition in the Lords after Pension 
bills ceased to reach the House. 
Opposition rallying points did not necessarily have 
the same effectiveness in both the Houses due to the 
differences in the two Chambers' respective characters. 
There was a sizable element in the whiz opposition in the 
Upper House who regarded themselves as displaced 
courtiers. Such people, of whom a substantial further 
minority had held army commands, were loath to so directly 
oppose the court. 
The whig opposition's heterozeneous nature led it to 
have a tendency to splinter. Those who had the createst 
tendency not only not to vote with the opposition but 
actually change sides and do so with the ministry were the 
courtiers such as Carteret and Scarbrouzh. Althouzh 
Scarbrough was with the opposition on the question of the 
Augmentation of the Forces in March 1734. the previous 
month he had been careful to leave his proxy with the 
ministry for a vote on the OfficersO Commissions bill. 
225 
In February 1735 the OPPOBition tried to make political 
capital out of the government's manipulation of the 
elections for the sixteen representative peers frOM 
Scotland. Somerset came especially to, parliament in order 
to vote in the matter. However, Carteret voted with the 
zovernment. 
226 In 1736 Carteret, Cobham. Winchilsea and 
Chesterfield were all in the defeated Walpolean minority 
on the Mortmain bill. 
227 In 1737 Scarbrough voted with the 
zovernment on the civil list, while Yount whits of the 
likes of Shaftesbury and the eleventh baron Clifton 
abstained. 
228 
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The 1737 session was dominated by the Porteous Riots. 
The ministry was unsure as how to introduce the matter of 
an inquiry into the House. Although Carteret disapproved 
or the ministry's response to the event, his social 
sensibilities were such that he felt unable to make 
political capital out of the matter and therefore raised 
the matter in tones which condemned the riOtB, thereby 
defusing any opposition attack that might have been 
planned. 229 Being a courtier by nature he would have been 
well aware of how Georce II's social sensibilites would 
have been affected by the matter. In 1738 Scarbrouch 
helped the ministry squeeze its PrivIlezes bill throuch by 
a maJority of one. 
2 30 The same session saw Marlborough 
change over to the ministry. He accepted a regiment In 
March and a place in the Bedchamber in Auzust. 
The flirtation with the ministry that some of the 
courtier opposition had been engaging in largely ceased in 
the late 1730s. First, the adhesion of Greenwich, Falmouth 
and prince Frederick to the opposition lent it a new 
seriousness. 231 Many M. P. s would have followed them over 
the divide and it was probable that they would be Joined 
by many more at the next election. The other factor was 
the war. Walpole had been forced into it, clearly azainst 
his will, so he was now positively perceived as 
vulnerable. Also it was no loncer practical to oppose 
measures such as the Mutiny Act, so the opposition was 
quieter than it might otherwise have been. 
In the Lords the ministry did not run into trouble on 
the scale on the South Sea Company Stock bill azain. The 
principal factor that accounted for this was that the 
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crown's behaviour had spelt out the lesson that even if 
its support for its chosen minister was latent it was 
still support until an indication was given otherwise. 
This message was clear but it left the question- Was the 
private politician, who was the king's minister. to be 
supported when he was not acting as the king's minister? 
In the Excise Crisis retribution occurred before the 
session's end. The dismissals were partial rather than 
wholesale. Bolton and Cobham were removed from their 
regiments, while Clinton and Chesterfield were dismissed 
from the Household. The departures of Burlington and 
Scarbrough from office were both voluntary. The former had 
known aspirations to become lord privy seal. These were 
clearly ignored when the office was conferred upon 
Lonsdale, a person who had independently-inclined voting 
habits. Scarbrough resigned as master of the Horse in 
February 1734 because of the kinats sustained coldness 
towards him. Neither man could claim to have been 
dismissed. 232 Durint the summer Scarbrough had expressed 
gladness that Somerset was using the Petworth electoral' 
interest on behalf of the Pelham interest in Sussex. This 
echoed the way in which Somerset had remained resolutely 
whiz in electoral matters in 1710 so the earl was a 
ministerial whiz in the general election of 1734.233 
Departure from government and entry into full, 
outright hostility were frequently connected but are not 
directly comparable. These six were clearly associated 
with the Excise bill rather than the South Sea Company 
Stock one, an indication of there being layers to the 
crisis rather than it being of just one singular 
character. The limited number of actual dismissals was a 
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sign that the crown did not wish to push too many 
courtiers towards opposition. The choice of snubbing 
I 
Burlington via the likes of Lonsdale was indicative that 
the crown was still willinx to tolerate heterogeneity, 
even if the overridinc meSBaze was that it would not allow 
its overall runninx of affairs to be questioned. These 
gave the clear message that although the king might not 
appear to be actively interested in everything that his 
first minister did. Walpole was his chosen minister until 
matters were signified otherwise. 
Tolerance was to be shown in later distributions of 
office. After the 1735 session the sixth earl of 
Westmorland was dismissed as first lord of Trade, although 
he was allowed to retain his reximent. His replacement was 
Fitzwalter. who had voted with the opposition on the 
question of the Scottish Peers' Petition in the same 
session. 234 The bestowal may have been intended to keep 
Fitzwalter in line. Perhaps he had promoted himself 
throuzh displayinx his nuisance value. However, this 
should not rule out that the crown soucht to maintain a 
breadth of attitude amonz its senior office-holders. Even 
if he had allowed himself to be converted into a supporter 
of the ministry that did not necessarily mean that the man 
had become a Walpolite. The factor that was probably 
uppermost in his favour was that he was the husband of the 
dauzhter of the late third duke of Schombere, who was a 
considerable court favourite in her own richt. The ancient 
orizins of Fitzwalter's barony may have ziven him a lustre 
in George's eyes in the way the Norman ones of the 
twentieth earl of Oxford's helped promote him to 
successive royal Bedchambers. Fitzwalter is best seen as 
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the king's man. 235 
Another change among the senior offices in 1735 was 
caused by Lonsdale's resignation from the privy seal, 
Egmont, the opposition diarist, ascribes this to a dislike 
of the general management of public affairs, although he 
admitted there was no Particular incident that promoted 
the action, whereas Hervey the memoirist of the ministry 
saw it as beinz indicative of a zeneral inclination 
towards retirement. 236 The precise reason for the decision 
can not be ascertained. The differina contemporary 
perspectives of the two sources probably gave rise to the 
variance between their perceptions. Contemporaries did not 
always see political actions in a singular licht and 
indeed people could chance their Justification to suit the 
prejudice of their audience. 
The place went to Godolphin, who was to prove a loyal 
lieutenant to Walpole. However, Sir Robertts first choice 
was Scarbrough, to whose return he sought and obtained the 
queen's approval. The Proposal foundered on the man's 
refusal to be brouzht back in. It was only after this 
initiative had failed that Godolphin was selected as 
successor to the viscount. However, the king was 
suspicious of Godolphin because he had been a pace-boy to 
James II. Georce's prejudice was largely neutralized by 
the assurance that while the earl had had some personal 
attachment to that king it was not of a political variety 
and that he possessed neither sentiment for the person of 
the Old Pretender. The monarch overrode his own preJudices 
when it was pointed out that the appointment would save 
him the considerable pension that he granted the earl an 
his retiring as groom earlier that year. 
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That Pension bills were no longer reaching the. Lords 
can be seen as indicative of Walpole'B having become more 
intolerant of political divergence after the Crisis. 
However, it is clear from incidents of Lonsdale's receipt 
of the privy seal and Fitzwalterts becoming first lord of 
Trade that even after the Excise Crisis Walpole did not 
dominate the appointments to senior office with his 
nominees and that he was prepared to have as colleagues 
men who held distinctly ambivalent attitudes towards him 
if such helped in his overall management of political 
affairs. In the long run it was better that he have some 
dissentient colleagues and the crown be happy than he have 
congenial colleagues and the crown be dissatisfied. 
The key variable in this instance was queen Caroline. 
That she supported him politically is clear'91 but if she 
was capable of coming to a decision that he was good for 
the dynasty she was also probably capable of assessing 
what limitations should be placed upon his behaviour. The 
prime minister may have been seeking to defuse any 
objections she might have had as to his becoming too 
comfortable. There is no evidence to delineate her exact 
influence on senior ministerial appointments in these 
. years; it may well have been her influence that had kept 
Britain out of the War of the Polish Succession. She died 
in 1737 and Britain entered into the War of Jenkins's Ear 
in 1739. 
The South Sea Company had ostensibly been created for 
trading with the Spanish possessions in South America. In 
the wake of the Bubble, this aspect was able to emerge. In 
the late 17308 relations with Spain began to deteriorate 
markedly again, notably over the conduct of this colonial 
276 
commerce. For the same reasons that Walpole had sought to 
avoid involvement in the War of the Polish Succession, he 
was against any line of policy that would take the nation 
into open conflict. However, George was now willing to 
accept such and a number of the knight's close colleagues 
positively believed in its necessity. 
237 The behaviour of 
NewcaBtle with respect to the treaty of Seville had shown 
that the duke was capable of trying to pursue what he felt 
was the best line for the ministry even if his superior 
was not. The duke was Joined on this by his brother Henry 
Pelham, by his fellow secretary the first earl of 
Harrington and by the chancellor the first earl of 
Hardwicke. 238 The four, in conjunction with those senior 
office-holders who had no particular loyalty to Walpole, 
effectively isolated the minister. Rather than resign, as 
Townshend had, the Great Man stayed on, heading his 
ministry rather than leading it. The colonial War of 
Jenkins's Ear turned into the full-blown European conflict 
of the War of the Austrian Succession, which meant that 
both the crown and its first minister moved nearer-towards 
being placed in situations where they might have to be 
politically malleable against their wishes. 
Against such a background it was to be expected that 
the state of Walpole's relations with the Pelham group 
experienced considerable stress when Godolphin declared 
his desire to stand down from being lord privy seal. It 
was a long-standing wish which had been deferred through 
the man's loyalty to Walpole; this postponement had been 
reciprocated by an understanding not to question the 
earl's decision when he decided to go through with it. In 
1739 Godolphin stated that he wished to resign. This 
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raised the question- Who was going to succeed him? Both 
the king and the Pelham croup-were happy that it should be 
a Walpolite, but the latter found that this view of theirs 
was conditional when Sir Robert selected baron Hervey. The 
baron had a record of actinx as a loyal lieutenant to the 
prime minister; they had had a shared patroness in the 
late queen. However, Hervey had not found his position 
incompatible with regularly antagonizing some of their 
colleazues. One of his particular victims had been 
Newcastle. Therefore, it'ýwas the duke, in a state of near 
hysteria, who led the group's opposition to the 
appointment. The affair reached a'point where the four 
seriously contemplated a collective resicnation. Matters 
were eventually smoothed down so that Hervey's-receipt of 
the office was. accepted. 
239 If Walpole Cained any benefit 
from the episode, it was more than nullified by the 
resultant trauma that had been caused to the internal 
Btate of the miniBtrv. 
In his new position Hervey was not to prove the-most 
reliable-of lieutenants. InýJune 1739. iby which time it 
had become clear than Walpole was on the wane, ýhe combined 
successfully with Henry Fox in advocating that his 
0 intimate friend Stephen,,, Fox (the future earl of Ilchester) 
become the junior secretary to the Treasury even though 
the prime minister did not want the man in the office. The 
success of this manoeuvre, was another sign of Sir Robert's 
decline. 240 
When Georce II went to Hanover in the summer of 1740, 
the lord'Sustices quarrelled amoncst themselves. As John 
Owen noticed, Hardwicke remarked that when George was 
present he "was a kind of centre of unity, at least his 
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final opinion concluded everybody else... 11 The remark 
carries the air that Georce tended to influence 
ministerial discussions by ending them rather than by 
leadina them, that the then internal state of the ministry 
was decidedly fractious and that the fractiousness was not 
necessarily anythinx other than the standard state of 
relations between the senior office-holders. Walpole's 
disinclinaion, to have larze or frequent cabinets is 
understandable, as the cabinet, with its fractiousness, 
was a tool for the eorces. 
241 
The way in which Walpole's, cabinet colleatues did not 
necessarily owe their places in-it to him was illustrated 
by his surprise at the second duke of Richmondto offer 
after'his fall. This was to resign in solidarity even 
thouZh the duke had not come to the Position throuch the 
prime minister's influence. 242 
The fact that Walpole was not at one with his 
colleazues on the issue of entry into the War of Jenkins's 
Ear has lonx been known. 243 Through the means of printed 
sources it has lonz been possible to show that there a 
broader situation, of having colleagues who were 
independent--of him and that he was prepared not only to 
tolerate it but to positively encourace it upon occaBion. 
Through Plumb deciding to stop his monograph on Walpole in 
173LL modern historiocraphy has been denied a most 
interesting treatment of this matter. In the wake of the 
Excise Crisis it would, have been evident that havinz a 
cabinet packed full of Walpoleans was not in the 
minister's best long-term interests. Manipulation of the 
political situation rather than domination of it was the 
best means of prolonged survival. The toleration of 
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heterogeneity enabled the ministry to, appeal to those 
court whizs who did not feel a particular debt to the 
private politician. However, Walpole was not safe in 
perpetuity. He had to act as the king's minister and such 
necessitated at times going against the general tone of 
his political conductý He was caught out by the general 
desire for war (a desire which he may have created in 
larce part because he had had helped take war and its 
immediate economic consequences out of the recent 
experience of the political nation). This meant that he 
had to engage in activity and thus go against his policy 
of general inactivitv. which the Excise Crisis had 
underlined,, since war meant that he was exposing himself 
to political risk. The dancer of such a situation had 
always been inherent in-his Position. Had TownBhend been 
able-to boast a positive success, from his foreign policy 
in 1730 it would have been the viscount who would have 
been in the stronzer political position. 
- on 30 Maw 1738 Walpole spent a large amount of effort 
in defeating Pulteney's Commons motion on the searching of 
Spanish ships. only to see his victory made redundant by a 
stronger motion being easilv passed in the Lords the same 
day. 244 Although foreign affairs were not his principal 
concern, it was clear that the minister was out of step 
with both his colleagues and the king on that area of 
government. As the Treasury minister and overall manager 
of domestic political affairs he was secure in not havinz 
railed in either of his own principal areas or concern. In 
this way the situation was different from that of 
Townshend in 1730, therefore, he felt able to continue in 
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office. Townshend lived to see the discomfiture of Walpole 
before dyinx in June 1738. 
The 1739 session saw a number of recent inheritors 
Join the opposition- the second baron Raymond, the second 
earl Stanhope, the second baron Talbot, the seventh earl 
of Westmorland and the Scottish representative peer the 
245 
second duke of Buccleuch. Greenwich assumed a position 
as near-leadership as the whiz OPPOBition ever gathered 
behind. Chesterfield was happy to act as a lieutenant to 
the duke while Carteret preferred to stand apart. 
246 (The 
hardeninz of the political lines in the Lords may have 
weiched heavily on the likes of Carteret. It was possibly 
a contributory factor to Scarbrough's January 1740 
suicide. ) 
The session wasýdominated by relations with Spain, 
the Augmentation of the Forces, the South Sea Company and 
the Sugar Colonies bill. The four were connected with one 
another. There was some distinct waverinx. Such could be 
reasonably be exPected from the likes of Scarbrouch, 
Lonsdale, Essex and Greenwich, but these were Joined by 
usually passive courtiers such as the earl of Portsmouth 
and the first earl of Leicester (1744). Montagu gave some 
concern since he was seen as a fixure whose defection 
would be the sicnal for others to follow. 
247 Althouch very 
wealthy his danCer was nOt BO much rrom his standinx in 
the party but rather that he held attitudes that reflected 
those of many of his fellow court whizs. However. the 
potential effectiveness of the opposition had been rather 
undermined by the overall drift of the ministry, which led 
the actual debates on the Convention of Pardo to be 
somethinz of an anti-climax. Had Walpole's views 
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predominated'the session would have probably been far more 
confrontational. 2 
48 The 1739-1740 session did not see the 
opposition make any new advances. This was because the war 
was generally popular'and no serious gaffes had been made 
in its management. 
The 1740-1741 session opened in the late autumn as an 
indicator of the seriousness that was given to 
parliament's participation in its management, there being 
an imminent general election. Among the new waverers were 
the earl Brooke''and the fourth earl of Sandwich. The 
session's big turn-out came on a vote that the House 
should address Georce II that he remove'Walpole from his 
"Presence and Councils forever. " The covernment won with a 
majority of forty-nine from one hundred and sixty-seven 
votes beinx cast. 
249 Walpole, havinz acquiesced to the 
general, desire for war, was s-4ýcurelv backed'in the Lords. 
At Westminster the political temperature was higher. 
The information on hish society rather than on hizh 
politics is somewhat ambivalent. The collapse of the 
I scheme for'a weekly subscription ball shows this. The 
subscribers were to have the right to invite outsiders to 
the dances. However, the duchess of-Queensberry was 
vehement that an undertakinz be civen by all the 
subscriberB that-no one would invite Walpole whOM Bhe 
detested. This was felt, by manv of them to be unreasonable 
behaviour on her part and therefore the scheme 
disintegrated. It is clear that she had strong feelings on 
the matter but that they were extreme. 
250 That Walpole 
could have been invited shows that the opposition and the 
ministry were not riCidly separated in their social lives. 
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5.4.3.4. The Ministry, 1742-1746. 
The reason why George II had-to part with Granville 
in 1746 has two parts- Whv was the second earl Granville 
(Carteret) in power in the first place? and Why was he not 
acceptable to. his colleazues in 1746? Both have the same 
root answer which is that Georce wished it to be so. The 
whole matter was a case of the king made to face up to the 
paradox that he had created for himself. 
George found the earl acceptable because of the man's 
person and because of his general conduct. The earl was a 
German speaker; and was personable in character. 
251 HiEi 
behaviour durint the 1730s had shown-that he had always 
remained a courtier at heart., He was clearly in no manner 
beholden unto anv of the Old-Corps and therefore would act 
as a useful brake upon, them. The Old Corps and the other 
senior! office-holders were UBed to having to tolerate one 
another so that he was. not an anomalous ficure amonest 
them. Therefore, -when Granville became northern secretary 
in, Februar. v 1742 he was acceptable to his colleagues. 
- The reason why the earl had to be ousted in November 
1744 and February 1746 was that he was felt to be 
incompatible with effective government. He was seen as 
encouraging George to take, political attitudes which were 
not realistic. Had the nation been at peace then the 
politician would have had a better chance of surviving in 
office. It is to remembered that-there were members of the 
ministry who wished that Granville remain their colleague. 
e. g. Chesterfield. 
252 However, parliament had to be 
treated with particular care since Britain was at war. 
George II had allowed the country to become involved 
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in the European conflict. The principal fixures in the 
movement to banish Granville and his advice were the 
Pelham group. Their influence had increased with Henry 
Pelham being appointed first lord of the Treasury in the 
wake of Wilmington's July 1743 death. However, the king 
clearly wanted the group to be in the ministry. They had 
helped push the ministry towards war although it had been 
clear that Walpole did not want such. The Pelhams were in 
power because George II wanted them to be there. 
The two Georges, through their desire for political 
security, broadly aligned the court interest with the whiz 
one: the capacity for whiz ministers to be able to 
disagree with one another led the kings be able to do this 
with a fair degree of impunity. The form of political 
identification of interests was neither pre-ordained nor 
was it irreversible. That it was not reversed stemmed from 
the king's deBire that it should not be. JUBt as the 
Revolution Settlement and the Act of Settlement occurred 
at times of international tension, times when the crown 
was in need of a viable ministry, so both the mass 
resignation of 1746 and the threatened one of 1744 
occurred during the War of the Austrian Succession. 
That the king was unable to engage in a particular 
positive action did not mean the crown's overall position 
had not'deteriorated since the establishment of the 
Revolution Settlement. The Settlement had made the crown 
financially dependent on parliament, erzo, parliament 
could not be contravened in the practice of government, 
otherwise it might deprive the crown of its means of 
having an extended executive. William had brought about a 
fundamental political chance, as a result the crown was 
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more exposed in times of war than it was when the nation 
was at peace. 
Granville,, as the old chestnut goes, had not sat in 
the Commons. - havinx inherited his fatherts title as a 
minor. Therefore, he had a Proclivity to cive advice which 
encouraged George to engage in a foreign policy which did 
not take, into due consideration the preJudices-of the 
Commons and for the kinx to receive advice which did was a 
necessity for the smooth running of contemporary political 
life. It was not a question of Granville either 
oricinatinx or directine the policy. the principal 
objection was that the earVs advice had encouraged George 
II to think that policies which were, unrealistic in 
domestic political terms were otherwise. Initially, the 
kinx did not face up to the locic of the situation that he 
himself had created. Those who resigned did so as a means 
of having him realize the basic logic of that, situation 
when the earl of Bath (1742) and Granville were unable to 
form a ministry to replace them. 
253 The debacle underlined 
the point that was being Stressed. In the long-term he 
created-the Old Corps, if only passively, and in the 
short-term he chose to take advice from Granville. 
What the ministers were trying to do was to make it 
Possible for them to be able to conduct the busineBS Of 
sovernment, which was the task which he had apppointed 
them, to'do. -There was no question of, their tryinz to foist 
a first minister on the kinc: - Pelham was already the 
foremost figure in domestic politics. He emerged even more 
Prominently in'the 1746 incident's wake because the kinx 
now recognized the fuller character of what Pelham had 
been appointed to do. This was to manaze British domestic 
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politics on the day-to-day level. 
In 1746 the war still had over two years, to run and 
therefore the end would not have appeared to be in sight. 
It was clear that land war on the continent was not 
popular with the political nation. This was because it 
both committed resources that could be applied profitably 
elsewhere, e. a. in imperial activity in the West, Indies# 
and because it had a strong overtone of being engaged in 
on behalf of interests which were not British even if the 
expense was borne at home. Itýis probable that had it been 
peacetime there would-not have been the same imperative to 
oust Granville and, that other politicians might have been 
more willing to fill the-breach the resignations created. 
174LL and 1746 were'not trials of strength between the 
monarchy and the development of cabinet government, rather 
they were frictions in the relationship of Georze II and 
the group of politicians whom he himself had allowed to. 
assemble over the years. The croup can only be termed an 
oligarchy in a limited sense of the word-they were 
numerically few and they were involved in the governinz of 
the state. They were an appointed oligarchy, not a 
self-selectine one, and while they exercised government 
they did not control it. 
John Owen's essay "George II Reconsidered" is perhaps 
the most-important work in the current secondary 
literature on the place of that kine in relation to the 
politics of his reign. 
25 4 This thesis agrees with his 
conclusions. The only major criticism that it has is that 
he only compares the reign with that of George III, 
whereas it is also possible to draw a comparison between 
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the instances that he citeB in George IVB reign and two 
previous incidents which were like 1746 in there only 
being the threat to resign. In February 1708 the 
Marlboroughs and Godolphin persuaded/forced Anne to 
dismiss Harley and in 1739 the Pelham group threatened to 
resign if Hervey were made lord privy Beal. This failure 
presumably BteMS from the essay being in large part a 
response to Richard Pares's 1951-1952 Ford lectures an 
"George III and the Politicians. 0,255 
After the savaging that Walcott's 1956 book received 
it is to be half expected that an old Namierite should be 
wary of the far end of the eichteenth-century. 
256 
The 
1708 incident can be compared with those that Owen deals 
with. The duumvirs acted in such a manner because they 
knew that Anne was committed to the the war being waxed 
and that it had to be waxed with parliament's support. 
However, only the whigs were willing to Provide consistent 
active support for it in Parliament. Therefore, the whigs 
had to be placated to a degree and the means which the 
whics selected on was the sacrifice of Harley. Anne was to 
become disillusioned both with the necessity of waging the 
war and with Marlborough, but in 1708 such feelings were 
only beginning to form in the queen's mind and were 
certainly not known to the three, who consequently felt 
that they were acting in the queents beat interests, even 
if she was not immediately aware of such. A feature which 
historians have found particularly striking about 1746 is 
the large number of resignations tendered; initially it 
was Just an inner group but the process snowballed so that 
over forty offered to resign. It is a reasonable 
contention that had Marlborough and Godolphin resigned in 
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1708 they would have been, followed by a similar number. 257 
The 1739 incident varies from 1708 and 1744 in that 
it was never a formal proposal but rather just suggested 
as a possible line of conduct and that the matter that had 
allowed its possibility was carried through anyway. 
However. the incident has a continuity of personnel with 
1744. In 1739 there was clearly a deep animosity on the 
part of Newcastle, it was the same a few years later. In 
both cases the person who was obdected to was an able,, 
eloquent and personable courtier, who, had no positive,, 
reason to view the duke highlv., In 1739 the proposal was 
for a limited group to resign, in. 1746 that was what 
happened. In 1739 there was no constitutional question at 
stake. With so many points of comparison between it and 
1744 and 1746 one should be careful in firmly concluding 
that,, there were truly constitutional questions at stake on 
either of those occasions. Rhetoric can not be dismissed 
but it should not be allowed to obscure the structural 
reality of a period's politics. 
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5. LL. 3.5. The Ministry, 1746-1757. 
The problem of why George 11 admitted Pitt to power 
lies in part with the person of Pitt but principallv it 
was the result of the king's own conduct. George II wanted 
to take Britain into the Seven Years' War. The Pelham 
ministry had provided him with a perfectly sufficient 
ministry in the years of its existence, but Henry Pelham 
died in March 1754. Newcastle then stepped into his late 
brother's place as first lord of the Treasury. The'new 
secretarv was the seasoned diplomat Sir Thomas Robinson. 
For the war effort to be viable the ministry had to 
be capable of convincinz the independent M. P. s that it waB 
a worthwhile enterprise. As a reBUlt of his"long years 
abroad Robinson was inexperienced in terms of domestic, 
politics and was not up to the task of convincing the 
Lower House. 258 The number of politicians who had the 
oratorical powers needed to control the Commons, was 
therefore rather limited- William Murray, ' William Pitt and 
Henry Fox. 
,' Murray, who was a Scot, did not feel any desire to 
try. This was probably because of the Stone-Murray scandal 
of 1752, which had shown that he had not dissociated 
himself firmly enough from his Jacobite family background 
as a-younz man. 259 Therefore, Fox'and Pitt both sought to 
promote-themselves to some place in the ministry by 
exposinx the hapless Robinson's limitations as a 
parliamentarian. This they did via the'election petitions, 
which followed on from the 1754 general election. Robinson 
prepared-to stand, down. Georce II had no likinx for either 
man, Pitt having offended his sensibilities an both 
Hanover and the army whereas Fox had offended only those 
289 
on the nobility. It, should be remembered that George, did. 
not take a likinx to many Britons althouch he had a 
distinct capacitv for developinx workina relationships 
with them. The king chose Fox as the less objectionable of 
the pair. 
260 
The summer of 1756 saw the war go badly from the 
British perspective, notably with the loss of Minorca in 
June. Both7Fox and Newcastle panicked and resigned. 
261 
Devonshire was made first lord of'Treasury and Pitt-was 
drafted in as the-southern secretarv. Pitt was still not 
liked by the kinx, nor was Georce necessarily fond of the 
fourth duke of Devonshire who had initially opposed the 
Hessian and Russian treaties that George had had concluded 
in December 1755.262 
In April 1757, George II, having been egged on both 
by his son the duke of Cumberland and by Fox. dismissed 
the ministry and tried to form one around the-second earl 
Waldearave. The effort was even less realistic than trying 
to have Robinson as a wartime secretary of state. The 
attempt failed and the kint had to face the fact-that if 
he wanted to be able to finance the war now he had to come 
to terms with Pitt. 
263 Devonshire was happy to stand down 
in favour of Newcastle, who was a proven war minister. The 
new ministry was in a stronx position and was further 
improved by Cumberlandts September humiliation at 
Klosterseven. 
Paradoxically, the kinz caused the man's rise. Georce 
desired that domestic political affairs were run with his 
being minimally troubled. Therefore, he did not create 
alternative options for himself which more active 
participation in British politics would have made 
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possible. Instead, by the mid-17508 politics had concealed 
somewhat so as to present the king with a very limited 
number of candidates who were capable of controllinc the 
Commons. There had'come to be strong forces that induced 
such a state of affairs but they were neither inevitable 
nor necessarily irreversible. 
The king exposed himself politically by entering the 
Seven Years' War. Colonial rivalries and the problems of 
the'balance of power in Europe made British involvement 
probable but they did not make it pre-ordained. He had 
felt able to stay out of the War of the Polish Succession. 
At the same time, he had supported Walpole through the 
Excise Crisis. In 1746 George had been involved in the War 
of the Austrian Succession and had been forced to abandon 
Granville; therefore the king should have known that he 
would be politically exposed. 
Lastly, in the short-term the king was unfortunate. 
Boscawents St. Lawrence conduct and Minorca both eXPOBed 
the ministry to potential political assaults. Had the 
warts early events been more successful neither Newcastle 
nor Fox would have resigned, therefore, the opportunity 
for Pitt to rise would not have existed. It was also 
George's misfortune that Murray felt unable to take a 
position at the very forefront of politics. He was an able 
man whose very elevation to the Lords indicated the 
influence he was probably capable of exerting over the 
Commons. 
Therefore, if the crown sought to engage the 
executive in positive lines of conduct, i. e. go to war, it 
had to accept that it would therefore be vulnerable in 
terms of its domestic political position; George created 
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the pre-conditions for Pitt's rise. War made the crown 
susceptible to beinx politically vulnerable; it was 
failures and non-successes which made it positively 
vulnerable in politics. The executive's conduct had to be 
called into question for the people who Berved to be 
politically exposed. pitt's rise was not inevitable, 
rather it followed from events and factors over which he 
had no control and that were themselves possibilities 
rather than certainties in their occurrence. 
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5.4-3.6. The, Opposition, 1742-1757. 
The opposition presented a maJor force in the 
Politics of the House of Lords for the first couple of 
sessions after Walpolets fall but soon thereafter 
diminished into a rump. The principal causeof this was 
the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. After 1746 whenever the 
opposition began to look as though it might become 
dancerous-it could be neutralized by the practice of 
bringing into office a few of its leading members. This 
had the immediate effect of making the current-opposition 
less potenti and there was also an accumulative one of 
making opposition an activity which careerists could 
engage in in order to try to forward their claims to 
ministerial office in an almost cyclical manner. The death 
of prince Frederick accentuated the'Rebellionts effect. 
Newcastle was not the predominant voice in the final 
years of Walpole's administration, nor Was he during those 
of his brother's ascendancy. However, in both ministries, 
in the years between them and in those after 1754 he was 
continuously at the centre of power even if he was not 
always central to its exercise. The character of his 
relations with the other major politicians of the time was 
a continuous and important strand in the high politics of 
these years. Horace Walpole disliked the duke because he 
felt that he had betrayed his father. Walpole chose'to 
interpret, Neweastle's handling of his fellow secretaries 
as the central theme of "Memoirs of the Reign of George 
Il. " In them Granville was perceived as being betrayed by 
Chesterfield and Sandwich, the latter, who was ambassador 
to-The Hague, being introduced to Newcastle by the former. 
Harrington had played his part in this and was 
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consequently rewarded with the vacant office. He in turn 
resigned it when he appreciated that his position would be 
no better than his predecessor's in relation to the duke. 
Chesterfield was in his turn sacrificed to the fourth duke 
of Bedford. 
264 This could have been extended back to his 
treatment of Stanhope and Sunderland in 1720 and Townshend 
in 1730. 
There continued to be larce divisions in the Lords in 
the 1741-1742 session even after Walpole had resigned: a 
Pension bill, a Place bill, a Standing Order on Strangers 
in the House and the Orford Enquiry Indemnity bill. This 
was because there was still a sizable whiz opposition 
which was working in close alliance with the tories. The 
New Whigs, Bath (1742) and Granville's supporters had been 
taken into office but it was clear that they did not give 
the ministry a safe majoritv in parliament. During the 
prorogation some Hanoverian troops were taken into British 
pay. This caused an uproar in the subsecluent session since 
British taxes were perceived as being used to finance 
6 Hanoverian purpo3e2. Cobham did not feel confined by 
his re-acquisition of a regiment to keep to the 
ministerial line. 266 1 
In February 1743 the divisions on the Gin bill peaked 
at one hundred and thirty-seven. While the effects on the 
social order of cheap alcohol were felt to be in need of 
remedy, the proposed measure touched on the same nerve as 
the Excise bill, it being intended to tax spiritous 
liquors out of the common people's reach (and to raise 
some additional revenue). The officials needed to enforce 
the legislation would seem an intrusion of central 
government into the localities and the rights of these 
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officials as underminine the liberties of private 
citizens. This was perhaps why Sir Robert Walpole had not 
sought to deal with the problem. Hervev*s interests had 
naturally not been looked after by the Pelhams during the 
general political accommodation. This had led to his being 
expelled from office so that it might be conferred upon 
the first earl Gower, -therefore, the baron-was to be found 
deliverine a fine oration attacking the bill. 
267 
During the summer the efforts of the third duke of 
Devonshire and the Pelhams to try to bring the Cobham 
croup back into the miniBterial fold did not meet with 
success since the group were insistent an both the 
expulsion of Bath and his cohorts and the inclusion of 
some tories. 268 In Januarzvýý'1744 there was a further 
division on the Hanoverian troop issue, Among those who 
Put his name to the protest that followed the January vote 
on the matter was the second earl of Bristol (he had 
succeeded his father as-baron Hervey in August 1743). His 
behaviour two months later was to be important in allowing 
us to comprehend the end of large-'scale opposition in the 
Lords. In March 1744 the first earl of Bristol, as a rood 
whig,, ý applauded his grandson for not opposing the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus because of the serious 
worsening of the international situation. 
269 On April 27th 
there was another cross-party protest, on the'subject'of 
the Young Pretender. However, subsequently a message came 
from the king on his being in France "whereupon the House 
of Lords voted nem. contradicente to address his Majesty 
that they will stand by him, 'but'the earl of Chesterfield 
proposed to add thereto desire that his Majesty would 
enquire why our fleet under-Sir Jo. Norris was not more 
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opposition was denied the war as a means of encouraging 
parliamentary opposition to the ministrY. 
In the wake of the Rebellion there were no whiz 
opposition groups for the tories to engage in active 
opposition with since thev and the New Whigs had a strong 
mutual dislike. However, there was the prince of Wales. By 
January 1747 the basis of a working relationship had been 
formulated: he would not contradict them in domestic 
affairs, as they would not him on foreign ones. However, 
full discussions were postponed bv the general election 
and did not start until June. Finally, in February 1748, a 
formal relationship was publicly acreed upon. However, the 
prince was politically promiscuous and went on to 
entertain the attentions of Newcastle rather than follow 
the advice of Eamont. 
274 The prince's behaviour undermined 
the opposition's efforts which in turn encouraged him to 
flirt with the ministry. 
The cycle was broken by the prince's March 22nd 1751 
death. His widow opted to take an apolitical stance. She 
was rewarded for this by being named as regent-apparent in 
the subsequent Act, which was to cover the Possibility of 
George II dying while his heir was still a minor. The 
reversionary interest, but for a few rumblings in the late 
1750s, was to be silent for over three decades. 
On May 10th one hundred and eighteen peers divided on 
the Regency bill for the only vote of the 1751 session. 
The minority of twenty-four was made up of a mixture of 
tories and whics- Stanhope, Talbot, Shaftesbury, the 
seventh earl of Thanet, the third earl of Oxford, the 
third earl of Lichfield, the eleventh viscount Hereford, 
the third viscount Townshend, the sixth baron Ward, the 
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sixth baron Maynard, the second baron Foley and the second 
baron Romney. 275 They had an anti-court stance rather'than 
a positively country one. Their make-up was too diverse 
for them to be deemed a coherent party; this is true of 
opposition in the Lords in George Il's final years. - 
,, Newcastle started to press for the departure of 
Bedford and Sandwich. -This was because with the death of 
Frederick he was safe in the knowledge that they could not 
team up with the late prince in opp'osition. Newcastles 
change in attitude was an example of the potency of the 
reversionary factor in the politics of the period. Henry 
Pelham was less ardent than his brother in the matter. The 
deciding factor for him is meant to have been, that one of 
his own daughters had an affair with one of Bedfordts 
Leveson Gower brothers-in-law. At the end of May 1751 
Sandwich was dismissed, which induced Bedford's 
resignation. 
276 
Granville came in as lord president, disclaiming his 
connection with Bath. 
277 Thereýhad always been an inner 
tension in the New Whigs because of the way in which the 
two leaders had had different early Political careers- 
Granville-the tory turned Stanhope-Sunderland whiz and 
Bathýthe Walpolite who had,, followed'his master's lesson of 
opposition. -being a means for self-advancement. He was to 
exert definite, -if limited, influence on the conduct of 
foreign policy. The New Whigs had ceased to be a cohesive 
unit. 
Court politicians could use the Lords to delineate 
their personal variance from the government line. This 
behaviour, became Increasingly occurrent after Henry Pelham 
achieved his ascendancy. It was using the House both as a 
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means through which to define their particular variance to 
their fellow court whigs and as a means to broadcast, it to 
a wider audience. 
278 it probably acted as succour to their 
allies in the Commons where opposition may have been 
Practised more actively. On a number of occasions it is 
quite literally a single individual who is arguing a 
point. The isolation was not always voluntarily. In 
January 1752 almost all of the previously existing 
opposition absented themselves from supporting Bedford and 
the second earl of Halifax in the pertinent debate. 
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(The treaty was to keep the elector of Saxony from allying 
with France. ) 
The September 1755 formation of the Fox-Newcastle 
ministry spurred Pitt and his supporter the second earl 
Temple into parliamentary activity- Associated with them 
in this were the second earl of Pomfret and to a lesser 
extent Talbot. Stances were taken on the use of British 
resources in order to defend Hanover militarily, the 
employment of foreign protestants in America, and on the 
Russian and Hessian treaties. On the last, ninety-seven 
peers divided and there was a majority of seventy-three. 
It was the first pre-ChristmaB division since 1743-1744. A 
subsequent protest was signed only by Talbot. On November 
15th Temple and Halifax opposed an Address relating to the 
treaties (Halifax was then first lord of Trade). Talbot 
opted for neutrality upon this occasion, while Bedford was 
with the ministry. 
280 On March 31st Temple found himself 
backed by only Pomfret: - Winchilsea verbally lacerated the 
isolated earl. 
281 With Pitt's return to office in late 
1756, Temple ceased his Opposition activities, he himself 
having become first lord of the Admiralty. 
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Before the war opposition had, centred on a number of 
disparate bills. In March 1752 ninety-two peers divided on 
the Scottish Forfeitures bill. The majority was 
sixty-eizht'. Since William's reign estate forfeitures had 
been a continuous theme in politics, although its 
prominence varied somewhat. Then, it had been to do with 
Ireland and the prerogative. whereas after the 1715 Rising 
it grew to be about the presence of central government in 
the localities'and Scottish interests. In the minority 
were Bedford,, Bath (1742), Chesterfield, Sandwich, 
Macclesfield'(1721). Lichfield, Oxford, Ward, Maynard* the 
second duke, of Kingston, the fourth duke of Beaufort and 
the ninth baron Wentworth. The group was distinctly 
cross-party and now contained Bath, who as a New WhiZ had 
formerly held aloof. 
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On February 2nd 1753 sixty-seven voted on the Game 
bill., the majority was three. The issue was a social one 
that peers as solid country landowners could be expected 
to agree upon. However, the banning of fire-arms to the 
lower orders was a political question. The bearing of arms 
touched on the freedom of the common man, the Bill of 
Rights, the power of central-government and the role of 
the militiai 
283 On May'LLth'there was a predictable 
covernment victory on the Clandestine Marriazes bill with 
only fifty-five peers dividing. The kincts elevated view 
of nobility (especially that of the royal family), led him 
to be-interested in the bill. The opposition to it in the 
Lords was weak-and can not really be construed as beine of 
a concerted nature. 
The following session saw a division over the repeal 
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of the Jewish Naturalization Act. The repeal was caused by 
the popular outcry against the original Act. There was a 
majority of forty-six from sixty-six votes being cast. The 
minority were all whics. Naturalization had traditionally 
been an area of party conflict because of the place that 
the sacramental test played in the process Of 
naturalization, any attempt to make the process easier for 
foreigners to go through could be interpreted as 
undermining the place of the Church of England within 
English society. Even though the vote was on a persona 
issue it was not a party matter since the mass of the 
whigs were with the government; times had changed. It can 
be seen as a case of the tories and the court being 
against the purist whizs, except that the likes of Halifax 
and Temple were not exactly purists in their awareness of 
the advantages in forwarding their careers as court whigs 
by being seen by the party's rank and file to take such a 
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stance. 
With the general dropping of the intensity with which 
'Politics was fought a number of the higher divisions in 
the Lords had come to be over local legislation. High 
Politicians began to spar more frequently over low 
political issues. There had always been this sub-text 
(e. g. the Cornwall Assizes bill in 1738 which touched the 
Political interests of both prince Frederick and the 
second viscount Falmouth), but now it became far more 
prominent because the flesh of opposition activity in the 
Lords had largely withered away. With most of these 
Post-1747 instances it is fairly easy to connect them with 
the interests of a prominent politician. Presumably these 
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arguments were a means of trying to score points in 
various rivalries, sometimes the combatants being within 
the ministry, although some of them may have been 
Primarily the result of other tensions. 
In March and April 1748 the Buckingham Assize bill 
touched on the interests of Cobham who was seated in the 
county. In June 1749 there was a protest on the 
Worcestershire Roads. It was signed by Foley, who was a 
Worcestershire landowner. - Oxford, who was a landowner in 
the neighbourint county of Herefordshire, and Shaftesbury, 
, who was a tested political ally of Foley. During the- 
1749-1750 session it was clear that was tension within the 
ministry. The chief conflict was between the Pelhams and 
Bedford. Early in the session the duke was dissimulatively 
baited-via a Bedfordshire Roads bill, the county being the 
one with which he was principally associated. 'The Pelhams 
ostensibly sided with the duke but had their supporters 
gather in opposition behind the banner of the second duke 
of Grafton. 
In February 1755 the Bristol Watch bill may have 
touched on the interests of Beaufort or his allies in 
Gloucestershire. In April 1756 the earlier antagonism over 
the Bedford turnpike was revived with a vengeance on the 
Islington Roads bill, 285 whichýaffected their respective 
urban Middlesex estates to the south of the road. 
286 In 
March 1758 the Cirencester Road bill-caused a minor 
division. The interests of Bathurst were almost certainly 
touched upon as he was seated near the town. He had 
gravitated towards court politics in the wake of the 
deaths of Oxford and Beaufort. 287 ý 
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5. LL. 3.7. The Pitt. -Newcastle Ministry, 1757-1760. . 
The central question of the politics of these years 
is- Why did Pitt back contentious domestic legislation? 
The work of Richard Middleton giVes a picture of Pitt not 
as the great leader but rather as a member of a team; his 
role was to cater for particular needs of the ministry- 
keeping the domestic political scene as quiet as 
possible. 
288 What makes Pitt interesting in terms of the 
Btu - dy of domestic politics is the idiosyncracy of his 
previous political record and that he continued this 
behaviour in part into office: he represents in a single 
person the meeting of conflictino. courses. Pitt was on the 
periphery both of the court and of'the independents, so he 
was central to their interaction. That he moderated 
himself is clear- he accepted the kinZ's wish for 
commitment to land warfare on the continent. However. at 
the same time, he was associated with the promotion of 
Political interests that questioned the 6. rrinzement of 
affairs that had been allowed to stand since the 
mid-1710s. ' 'I 
- It is to be remembered that he'was a secretary of 
state and not the first lord of the Treasury as Walpole 
and Pelham had been. 
289 Also'his secretaryship'was the 
southern'one which had been the less prestizous of the two 
for over forty years. Therefore, he was not'as bound to 
work within the same political confines as'Pelham and 
Walpole had been. He was different from Walpole and Pelham 
in having circumstantially forced his way into senior 
office, whereas they had been more 9products of the 
system* who had risen to the premiership from within it. 
This in relation to the circumstantial large decline 
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in the party barrier-in the wake of 1745 and the deaths of 
Oxford and Beaufort in the mid-17508 meant that he was 
able to extract a broader degree of support than a more 
conventional court politician could have; had Fox been in 
his place it is probable that the Opposition would have 
been better defined. pitt's uniqueness, however, put him 
in a dual firinZ-line. Once the extraordinaryconditions 
of war ceased or if its course took a turn for the worse 
it was probable that he would be, isolated in a, way that 
neither Walpole or Pelham had ever had to face. 
On May 24th 1756 there was a division on the Militia 
bill introduced by the M. P. George Townshend, lord Lynn; 
Pitt was then in opposition and Fox in power. 
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Eighty-two peers voted and the majority was thirty-six. . \, 
The militia issue was placed in the limelight by'the war, 
national defence reassuminx a central place on the 
political agenda. The measure attracted country support 
and was an item which Pitt genuinely desired rather than 
sought to exploit for its nuisance value. Once it was in 
play he was prepared to lend the bill support not least 
because it. might-embarrass Fox. However. it is 
questionable-whether Pitt necessarily wanted the matter 
brought up in the first place. It is to be noted that it 
was not he who initially raised the issue. 
The Fox-Newcastle ministry had the Lords StOP the 
bill in the way-they had the country measures of the 17308 
OPPosition. Newcastle and Hardwicke were hostile to it for 
two reasons. Firstly, they were aware of the strong 
preference that George 11 and Cumberland had for 
conventional troops. A revitalized militia would almost 
certainly cut into the financial provision for these. And 
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secondly, the two ministers believed Townshend's-bill to 
be that only of a discruntled courtier and therefore to 
have only limited genuine support in the nation at 
large. 291 
The whiCB Stanhope, Talbot and Shaftesbury were for 
it along with the likes of Lichfield, Westmorland, 
viscount Folkestone and the second baron Mountjoy. The 
majority of the item's supporters were government 
regulars- some fifteen can be positively identified. For 
the most part they were not Old Corps regulars. Bedford, 
Temple, Halifax and Bath (1742) were all politicians" 
Independent of the group. The second baron Bruce, the 
seventeenth baron Dacre, the second duke of Chandos and 
the second earl Poulett all had elements in their 
background which meant that they then had an inclination 
towards oppo*sina the Old Corps. 
292 Romney was to be-one of 
the few peers who subsequently took a militia command. 
while the second baron Ducle was to resiEn a lord ' 
lieutenancy., As courtiers and soldiers Kineston and the 
earl Harcourt are surprising figures to find. However, 
some toleration had frequently been shown within'the royal 
circle. Kingston had, been with the opposition over 
Forfeitures in March 1752. A more surprisinz find, is 
Cadogan, who was Fox's uncle by marriaz? e? 
3 There is no 
strong linking-factor to unite these people. The 
opposition and government camps were even less clearly 
defined than they had been pre-1754. The character of 
politics appears new. 
With the November 1756 establishment of the 
Pitt-Devonshire ministry Pitt backed a, new Militia bill. 
The issue had been firmly re-inserted into political 
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debate and would not go away until something was done 
about it in one form another, so he could not ignore it. 
Being a senior member of an unproven ministry it is 
unlikely that he would have wanted the matter on the 
political agenda if it had not been there already. On 
April 27th 1757 there was a division, eighty-five peers 
voted and the majority was five. On May 9th there was a 
second diViBion on the subject. The majority was 
thirty-six. On the May 26th division dust fifty-two votes 
were cast. 
The composition of the opposition was indicative of 
how there had been a considerable chance in the possession 
of power. Newcastle and Hardwicke had not been banished 
from the exercize of it but rather they were no lonser the 
principal people who had a reasonable expectation of usina 
itý The effect of seeins the pair on the side which was 
bound to lose the vote would have been somethinc of a 
change for the political psychology of many peers, the two 
having almost become the House's stamp of ministerial 
business., On the 26th there was a third division on it. 
Fifty-two peers voted and the majority was two. There was 
a intercameral interchange on the matter and it was passed 
into law. The matter was not beinc fought over with great 
294 ardency. 
Durine the prorozation the Militia Act proved 
generally unpopular both with the gentry, who were 
expected to provide the officers, and with those who were 
expected to serve under them in the ranks. 
295 The issue 
needed to be dealt with. Therefore. in the 1757-1758 
session the now Pitt-Newcastle ministry responded even 
though its two leaders had been opposed to one another on 
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the previous bill. The, Corps as a whole recognized the 
need for something further to be done in relation to the 
Militia and while they did not like the new bill they felt 
unable to do anything other than add some amendments. The 
measure commanded considerable country support. 
296 The 
Corps had drawn considerable ire onto themselves through 
their disposal of a Habeas-Corpus related bill earlier In 
the session. The Corps's composition was ultimately ý 
heterogeneous, therefore, there was usually going to be 
some sympathy within the group towards a doomed measure. 
In killing a bill its internal discipline was put under 
stress. Therefore. it could only be used a limited number 
of times before its discipline would begin to be severely 
strained and disintegration be risked. 
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Pitt had a desire to extend the state of the Enalish 
Militia bill to Scotland. Newcastle opposed, this because 
it was contrary to Old Corps sentiments- the memory of 
armed Scotsmen crossing over the border was not yet 
fifteen years old,. -In March 1759 a Scottish militia bill 
was killed in the Commons by the Old Corps. This was not a 
direct test of, strenZth with Pitt since the pro-militia 
elements were divided amongst themselves. 
298 Those present 
at a meeting over the Militia bill in early April 1759 
included Temple, Chandos, Shaftesbury, Cholmondley, Bruce, 
Folkestone and the second earl Cowper. the second baron 
299 Romney and the tenth earl of Pembroke. Again, they were 
a diverse group. Despite these efforts the militia was not 
settled at the periodto end. In October 1760 Newcastle, 
Devonshire and Mansfield decided to oppose any further 
Pittite reform on the matter. - 
- In late April 1759 Pitt faced trouble on the Judges' 
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Salaries bill. This related to fears of the executive 
being able to influence the judiciary. In the Lords the 
eleventh earl of Derby opposed it. The earl had been a 
long time, member of the the opposition to Walpole, 
receiving the, -lord lieutenancy of Lancashire only on the 
Great-Man's fall. The earl's commoner'heir-apparent was 
the politically idiosyncratic whiz M. P. lord Strange. 
Stranee was one of those people who had been willing to 
have a lord lieutenancy in 1757 at a time when many peers 
were choosing to resign rather than face the contention of 
being-active in the office. Indeed, the earl had resigned 
in-hiB, favour. 300 This exposed Pittts rather ambicuous 
position as someone who had acted as a critic of 
government now being one of its chief servants. It showed 
that he-could not necessarily be counted on to bring in 
the, -support of all those whiCs who had stayed outside of 
the old Corps fold. 
Durine 1759 the annus mirabilis took place. It did 
not stem directly, from Pitt. It can be reasonably argued 
that his continuation in government Crew from achievements 
which he had little part in creating. This Cave Pitt the 
ministerial-security to act in a manner more attractive to 
the likes of lord Strange and perhaps in part lessen their 
crowing complaints as to the war's cost. He backed the 
wish for the 1711 Qualification Act to be strengthened. 
This was an attempt by the minister to assuage hostile 
criticisms of his conduct from those who might otherwise 
have been his supporters had he been in opposition. That 
the measure had country/tory overtones is true in 
retrospect but it is to remembered that there had been a 
Sizable whim opposition in the Commons for over quarter of 
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a century which had been usine such sticks with which to 
attack the court. ' 
The Elder Pitt duly occupies an important place in 
the development of British-politics but it is a disservice 
to both him and his achievement to make him into something 
he was not. Pitt is Important because he was a senior 
minister who wanted a 'country' Procramme whereas such was 
usually manipulated as a tool by the opposition, who when 
they attained office dropped it. He represents the 
re-awakening of the power of the political nation, 
something that had been latent since Anne's reign. He 
re-inserted an element to counter the osBification which 
Kenyon perceived, even so the politician did this in a 
political vocabulary that would have been fully 
comprehensible to the early eighteenth-century and most of 
the seventeenth-century: bills on judges' salaries. the 
militia and property qualifications for M. P. s. 
That he was the willinx father of such lexislation is 
not altogether true. The militia was inserted into 
politics by George TownBhend and Pitt's handling of it by 
no means resolved the issue. Pitt was to a large extent 
forced into acting upon it because had he failed to do so 
he would have alienated much of his own political 
constituency in the Commons. the independents, perhaps to 
the point where he would no longer have been of any 
political weight. When he did seek to advance a measure 
-Judges salaries- he was by no means able to secure full 
automatic support from that constituency. As Middleton has 
shown Pitt's input into the annus mirabilis was at a 
non-immediate political level, he was also in distinct 
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need of it. Had there been a situation akin to the fall of 
Minorca Pitt would have indubitably fallen himself. The 
year guaranteed him a place in the pantheon of Whig 
history but it did not materially alter his political 
Position, hence the, attempt to strenethen the 
Qualifications Act. 
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5.4.4-Tory Tergiversation, 1716-1760. - ýý 
The tory party came into, -beinx in order to protect 
the status quo in church and-societV, James 11's 
succession beinx seen as, indicative of the desired 
continuity, he beina the next lecitimate heir to the 
throne even, if a catholic. The party was not possessed of 
a homogeneous character. It was made up of people who had 
been members of the pre-existinx and mutually opposed 
court and country parties. They left a lezacy in one of 
the party's major divisions, between those tories who were 
Principally concerned with the advancement of the party's 
interests at the centre, at court and in parliament. and- 
those ones who were principally concerned with the 
implementation of vtoryt policies in the localities. For 
the sake of arCument these two arbitrary tvPes can be 
deemed 'central' and lerass roots., 
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At the period's end the Lords was more amenable to 
the crown-because Charles II and James 11 had specifically 
worked to create a monarchical interest in the House. 
There had been an initial susceptibility to thisý 
manipulation there becaUBe the peerage were seen, in the 
seventeenth-century world-view as crown's 'natural 
counsellors. ' However, James II ended up trying to use 
means other than the par, ý. y to advance-his political plans, 
while William's accession to the throne was not liked 
within the party. These two developments did not 
permanently alienate 'centrally' orientated tories from 
the crown. -Charles 11 had died in 1685 so that in 1689 the 
effect of his pearace policy was Still very extant within 
the House. A high proportion of the party there had either 
been recruited by him or had received promotions from him. 
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The Commons party had never had the same effort 
concentrated upon it: it being far larger than the Lords; 
it had been the principal home of the country party in the 
1660s and-, 1670s; it was influenced by, the way in which its 
M-P. s had to seek re-election. Ergo. in 1689 there was a 
basic difference in the character of the party in the two 
Houses. 
Charles II had left the party with two unfortunate 
characteristics- a rich crop of internaLrivalries and the 
comparative youth of much of its leadership. Charles II- 
had fostered-rivalries within the party in-order to allow 
him-, to possess a larger measure of control over it than he 
would otherwise have had- a-proCeBB of divide and rule: if 
one toryýpolitician was not pliant to a particular line of 
policy then another one might be. These rivalries were 
accentuated by the way in which some tories were prepared 
to cooperate with James IIýin-tryinz to attain toleration 
while others were not preparedýto. 
303 Many of the tory 
leaders had been, raised to prominence by, Charlesýfairly 
early-in their political careers; the king. -while alive, -. 
had been able to use his superior political experience in 
his dealin=s with them. 
A new, generation might have been able, to rise as 
I 
lieutenants hadýthe partybeen allowed to-dominate under 
either William or Anne but it was not civen the 
opportunity to do so. Admissions to power under these two 
sovereigns were alwaYs-partial, many senior places being 
retained by court managers or their clients. Therefore, 
those tories who-were prominent were often competing 
against one another for such vacancies as did occur, so 
they were unlikely to encourage any additional rivals from 
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within their own partY for those vacancies. It is to be 
noted that Oxford achieved his initial prominence from a 
whic, background not from a tory one. 
ý The fate of the central aspect of the tory party in 
the period's first twenty-five Years was not a slow 
continuous decline. In larze part this was because much of 
the leadership of Charles's reign was still alive 
throughout, the first two reigns of the Period. Rochester, 
Leeds and Godolphin did not die until the early 17108. 
Buckingham and Nottingham both survived the Succession and 
its ensuant decade comfortably, however, the first was a 
self-interested and idiosyncratic in his general political 
conduct while the latter was a haughty individualist. 
In the ranks below the leadership a new generation of 
tories appeared. They were people of a different hue from 
the Carolines. They were in character with William and 
Annets shared general desire to keep the crown out of the, 
clutches of either party. In their desire to serve the 
crown they were more willinz both to take only partial 
admissions to office than the Caroline central tories were 
and to work with whigs where it was desired that they 
should. The political careers of the new central tories 
reachedýmaturity in an ace of toleration whereas those of 
the Caroline ones had done so at a time of excluding and 
persecution. Before 1710 this new generation were not 
breaking through into the party's leadership. 
However, in 1710 Anne no longer wanted to continue 
British participation in the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Harley did not seek to fulfil the wants of the 
crass roots tories but rather to try to manipulate those 
desires in the service of the crown. Because of the long 
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association of the whics with constructive government that 
party had built up an operative majority in-the Lords. It 
was this which Oxford sought to circumvent with the mass 
creation of winter 1711-1712. It was not in the earl's 
interests to wrest power in the Lords from the whigs in 
order to hand it to the grass roots tories. Therefore, the 
new recruits mostly reflected his own attitudes, they were 
new central tories, people who sou&ht to serve the crown 
and who would not necessarily be averse to workine with 
whics. The new central torieB were not just confined to 
that batch of creations. Oxford had built up a group on 
the foundations of the existing new generation of central 
tories in the Lords. The group included people who had 
been recruited previously, inheritors and the eldest sons 
of, inheritors. Many of these people had been alienated 
first by the grass roots tactics early in the reign and 
then by the duumvirs' increasing use of whigs in 
Preference to tories such as themselves. 
Just-as Charles II had left a legacy that was present 
in the House long after he-was dead-$ soýthe influence of 
the earlts, actions was felt lona after his fall. Bathurst 
continued to be politically active into the reign of 
George: III and he had been one of the 1711-1712 recruits. 
Not all-new central tories were necessarily pro-Oxford. He 
filled a gap which others felt that-they could have done 
Just as'well and therefore. these people felt no compulsion 
to become his subordinates. Such people hune on the wines 
of the Harleyites waitinx for the earl's-eclipse to see 
what they could make of the-circumstances that would then 
come about. Most of these people were to, become Hanoverian 
tories. 
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The-new centrals were not the majority of the tory 
party in the Lords at the time of the Succession. However. 
they were a sufficiently substantial Proportion of it that 
if they were to defect en masse the party remaining there 
would very definitely be a rump, which would alter the 
whole character of politics in the'Upper House since the 
whiZ/court party would be able to pass business without 
the slightest worry. It was ominous for the party that 
most of the Hanoverian tories continued with the court and 
therefore went over into at least token whizzery early in 
George I's reign. 
Understanding of the nature of toryism has been 
slowed up by the Jacobitism debate. 
304 The two aspects of 
Jacobitism which need to be stressed more'are how in the 
early part of the period it was as much a court phenomenon 
as it was a party one and how in the later part, of the 
period it was often Iýrincipally a covert form of 
anti-central social protest rather than a genuine desire 
to place'a foreign Catholic on'the throne. The debate has 
been conducted in far too party-orientated a manner. 
'The first earl of Jersey can be used to illustrate 
this. He has been'seen as an ardent tory because, of his 
Jacobite connections. However, he was not the same as a 
Catholic Highland-, chieftain-'who supported the-cause during 
the 1715 Rising. ýObviouslyq Jacobites came in more than 
one form. -The earl's Jacobite tac'-stemmed not from his 
being a keen member of the tory party but rather from his 
family background being endemically court he being the 
great-nephew of the great early Stuart favourite the first 
duke of Buckingham and the son of the knight marshal-of ý 
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the Household. This example should not lead to the view 
that all former Stuart courtiers had a Jacobite element to 
them, it was just that some had a proclivity to have one 
and that if they were so it did not necessarily mean that 
they were ardent tories too. If the earl was the last it 
would almost certainly have been throuzh opportunism 
rather than through conviction. As has been seen above, 
the second earl of Godolphin, a whiz lord privy seal, can 
be classed as a Jacobite. Either way, Oxford wished to use 
Jersey. It is improbable that he. did so primarily In order 
to placate grass roots tories but rather becauselhe wished 
to make good use of an experienced and amenable courtier. 
There is a particular need for arbitrary means with a 
subject as elusive as toryism in these years. The 
methodology which will be used here is to investicate the 
way in which individuals chanced sides, principally using 
the receipt of pre-1714 honours and offices to identify 
probable central tories. With the increasing shrinkage in 
the number of tories who gained such, honours with the 
passace of time it can be argued that the method is , 
flawed. Therefore. the discussion.. while being centred on 
such, has been stretched to include anyone who is 
pertinent to it. The-hope is first to detect whether there 
was tergiversant activity among the peerage, and if so 
when it occurred, and then to see if that tergiversation 
was of a. consistent. or. a varying nature. 
A label for a certain type of tory will be used 
because it allows, a decree of distinction within the party 
and therefore the possibility of a decree of insight. The 
label will, be tHarleyite. 1 It is reasonable to assume that 
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these people were supporters of Harley rather than being 
fervent High Church tories. They were people who sought to 
have a court ministry with tory support rather than a tory 
ministry. It Is'to be assumed that Harleyites received 
some mark of favour such as being recruited, promoted or 
summoned in their father's barony. Harleyite is not a 
substitute for Hanoverian. Nor should it be assumed that 
all Harlevites held aloof from Jacobite activity. It is a 
reasonable surmise that people who had the ambition'to try 
one course for advancement, and who subsequently found that 
it did not work were as likely to try another avenue as to 
continue with the first. And lastly. because an individual 
chanced to supporting the court did not mean that he had 
metamorphosed into a fervent 1689-stvie whiz: many whigs 
of the 1750s were very different political creatures from 
their predecessors at the period's beginning. 
George I did not find'the idea of a mixed ministry a 
truly inimical one. If he had there would not have been 
much contemporary incentive for the tories to cooperate 
with the Townshend-Walpole group. When it became evident 
that the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry was in need of 
additional support in parliament, Sunderland was given 
leave to approach some of the more likely candidates for 
inclusion. The earl himself was not exclusively whiz in 
his associations; during the attempted impeachments he had 
commiserated with Strafford (1711) over the length of time 
his was taking. 
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There was little tergiversation in the reign. Of 
those who did go over viscount Harcourt and the first 
baron Trevor-were the most prominent. "For as these two 
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men were too knowing in their trade to swerve from the 
established principles of their profession, they acted 
like most lawyers, who generally look on princes like 
other clients. and, without regard to right-or wrong, the 
equity or injustice of the cause, think themselves obliged 
to maintain whoever fees them last and pays them best. 
006 
That both were 'feed' and held senior office under George 
I was, no mean achievement in view of their both having 
been raised to the peerage bv the hated Oxford. Because of 
this, their behaviour is worthy of particular monitoring 
prior to their defections. 
In February 1718 Harcourt was with the opposition an 
the Mutiny bill. 307 In December 1718 both the Occasional 
Conformity and the Schism Acts were repealed. Harcourt was 
noted to vote for repeal although he had helped enact the 
measures originally. 
308 In April 1719 Harcourt and Trevor 
signed a protest on the Common Council of London with 
their fellow tories. 309 During 1720 the former was taken 
into the ministry and made lord privy seal with a pension. 
Beyond convenience, it is uncertain how whole-hearted his 
conversion to whizdom was, but then it is unlikely that 
his torvness had ever been heartfelt. Neither Townshend 
nor Walpole can have warmed to his Presence in the 
ministry although both were aware how it was benefical in 
the government's overall management of politics'. In 1725 
he was to vote, for Macclesfield (1721) in some of the 
divisions during the earl's impeachment. 
310 While the 
negotiations on the re-admission of the Townshend-Walpole 
croup was being conducted, he was used as a channel by 
which the likes of William Bromley, the former secretary 
of state, were approached. However, there were no Positive 
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responses to these soundincs. 
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Colley has written "The extent of the torw party's 
decline by 1723 must have suprised even those who had 
worked to achieve it.,, 
312 The principal cause of this was 
the Layer plot which dominated the 1722-1723 session. In 
December 1721 North, Strafford (1711), baron Weston and 
Francis Atterbury bishop of Rochester had signed a letter 
to the Pretender. They soon lost any faith that they had 
had in the project. However, Christopher Layer, a Norfolk 
attorney, had been conducting his own fanciful 
correspondence. The two elements combined made a potent 
concoction which Walpole was able to force down the 
opposition's throat. 313 The plot was a severe blow to the 
tory party but it was only one of a number in the early 
1720s. The March 1723 death of Cowper was important to the 
tories. The earl had shown himself a superb political 
tactician in the House of Lords. He had appeal among the 
court and moderate whigs. 
Perhaps a more important death than Cowperts was that 
of Oxford in May 1724. A mould had been broken that may 
well have been holding a considerable portion of the tory 
party in the Lords. The Yoke of Harley was zone. Up until 
that point very few of his former associates had Zone over 
to the court. Trevor's defection seems to have followed on 
from it. Despite having been active with the opposition 
during the time of the plot the baron succeeded Kingston 
as lord privy seal in 1726. During the treaty debates of 
1726 the second earl of Aylesford expressly took Dartmouth 
to the House because of the expertise the latter had 
acquired in Annets reign. However, to Aylesford's 
consternation, the earl divided with the ministry. 
314 
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There is, minimal direct evidence on George 11's 
attitude towards the tory partv prior to his accession; 
during the late 1710B any hopes that the tories had banked 
on the prince of Wales were destroyed in February 1718 
when he followed Walpole's suggestion to abstain from 
votinz against the Mutiny bill. 
315 Upon the accession a 
number of tories who had avoided George I's court attended 
George Ills. This, in association with the new king's 
general political behaviour through his reign, suggests 
that he had probably been occasionally passively tolerant 
of their presence. in much the same way that Georce I had 
allowed catholics such as the eichth duke of Norfolk to 
come to court. 316 George 11 would only give positive 
encouragement to tories as individuals and not as 
representatives of their party. 
Some tories did seek to be accepted individually. 
Bathurst had hopes placed on the efforts of Mrs. Howard 
(later-the countess of Suffolk) and the duke of Dorset 
acting as his intermediaries. Neither proved fruitful as a 
conduit. He turned one of his brothers out of a seat at 
the general election in the hope of pleasing the king and 
in 1729 there was a report of his being given over by the 
tories. 317 During the treaty of Seville debates Bingley 
was prepared to speak on the ministrvts behalf, althouch 
he was'-distinctly less keen to vote for it. 
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The first baron Hay was appointed as ambassador to 
Constantinople in 1729. Because of his unsuitable conduct 
he was recalled in 1734. In order to be able to execute 
the office in, due state he had had to lay out considerable 
expenditure. At the time of his return he had not yet 
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recouped his outlay and therefore had lost money through 
the office rather than gained it. However, rather than 
return to opposition he tried to obtain a further 
governmental appointment in the hope of making good the 
deficit. As late as 1740 he was seeking to have himself 
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appointed as governor of Barbados. 
In '1731 the fifth earl of Denbigh aspired to be sent 
as ambassador to The Hague. The Feildings had undergone 
heavy financial losses both in the South Sea Bubble and 
subsequently. The family's overall poverty may have 
additanally driven the earl to trv to seek the post. 
However, the general stance which led him to sign a 
protest with the, opposition over Macclesfield (1721) in 
1725 may have contributed his failure to achieve the 
post. 
320 In the'early years of the reicn the Jacobite 
first baron Boyle lapsed into pen8ionerdom. 321 He was not 
a Jacobite of the ardent tory kind. 
After the Excise Crisis the second earl Poulett was 
summoned in his father's barony, the honour being paid for 
by the father's adherenceýto the ministry. In March 1734 
when the first earl joined, Scarbrough and Greenwich in 
voting against the ministry on the Augmentation of the 
Forces, it was a sign that he had become a court supporter 
rather than a Walpolean whiz. However, the elder Poulett 
was to return to his retirement in Somerset, sendina up 
his proxy to his courtier son. The first earl had been one 
of the hard line tories who had not been immediately 
receptive to William's accession. he had not take his seat 
in the period until the 1696-1697 session because of his 
322 continuing loyalty to the Stuart cause. He was showing 
a form of consistency beina pro-court both in the 1680s 
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and in the 1730s. 
In 1732 Lansdowne returned from the self-imposed 
exile that he had gone into after his 1717 release from 
the Tower. He chose not to sit in the House again but he 
did send up his proxY to the court whigs Wilmington and 
Dorset. 323 These tories had been all either recruited or 
promoted during OxfordtS ministrv. Denbigh was an 
exception in having been both a commoner and a minor in 
the early 1710S. Harlevite creations were to prove 
important in the control of the House after Anne's reicn 
as well as in it. Where Harcourt and Trevor had led others 
had now begun to follow. 
The tory party had orizinally come into existence for 
the purpose of supportinz the crown and the churcho. so it 
was reasonable that its latter-daY members should still 
zravitate towards the crown, especially those who had 
served it and profited from it under Anne. The ministrv 
was able to sell itself to potential terciversants as the 
court party, the attitude that many of the older tories 
had been brought up in. Insisting on full and utter 
apostasy to 1689-style whiggery would not have been the 
best means of persuading an individual to chance sides 
when he could have the easier option of retirinz from 
POlitiCB, therefore. many conversionB were a shiftina of 
emphases rather than revelations of 'the road to Damascus' 
variety. 
The tory tergiversations of the reign's early years 
larcely dried up in the early 1730s as the opposition 
became increasingly active. This was because a distinct 
prospect seemed to grow that Walpole might be overturned 
and the kinC be persuaded to accept a mixed ministry. 
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However. in the the wake of the Excise Crisis Walpole 
secured firm control of the House so that hopes of further 
returns did not bear fruit. Therefore. many tories must 
have asked themselves whether they would be able 
realistically to advance themselves in their party 
colours. This was probably especially so in the Harleyite 
section of-the party from which the past defections, full 
and temporary. had-mostly come. The chance was too recent 
and too marked for people to wish to go over for fear of 
accusations of opportunism from their former colleazues; 
it was easier to be inactive. 
The'first baron Chedworth was an M. P. when he 
tergIversated in 1735 from the tories to the ministry, 
althouzh subsequently he did act independently upon 
occasions. He was the son of Jack Howe, the author of a 
number of bills the purpose of which was to make 
parliament more independent of the crown. Jack, a. k. a. lord 
John Grubham Howe. had only embarked on this career of 
opposition after he had been denied a grant he sought, he 
feeling able to ask for one since he had, been queen Maryts 
vice-chamberlain. Beinc an angry courtier was the cause of 
his becoming Plumbts "blistering-tongued orator of the 
squirearchy ...... In 1702 Anne was happy to take him back 
into the court fold as paymaster-ceneral, -an office which 
he occupied throughout her reign. He and Harley had been 
natural associates durinc much of William's reign. If Howe 
was not a Harlewite in-Annels. since he did not resign in 
1708, then he was certainly a central tory. When his son 
terziversated it would not have been from the crass roots 
324 section of the tory party. Chedworth's rarity value in 
1735 may have given him much of the Prominence that was to 
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lead Walpole to forward for recruitment in 1741. In the 
early and middle 1730s other potential terziversants 
Preferred to wait on events rather than chanCe their 
active political stances. Ideally, tories would like to 
have been taken into government as tories and not by 
having to shift their political emphases so that they 
became court whics. 
In the 1737 session the Civil List vote showed both 
the fifth earl of Northampton and the second'earl of 
Oxford to be with the ministry on that issue, while 
Mountjoy abstained. On the Porteous Riots, Oxford and 
Northampton were joined in their positive support of the 
government by Strafford (1711) and Northampton, while 
Mountjoy abstained with the second baron Foley. 
325 In the 
short-term, the Riots improved the court's overall 
position by helping to promote what looked like becoming a 
Harlewite split from the rest of the tories. In January 
1738 Foley was noted to be not only attending Frederick's 
court but also George jj, s. 
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The danger to the tory party of a large-scale 
Harlevite defection in the Lords was probably averted by 
the worseninx of the international situation. This led the 
opposition's collective fortune to pick up in the 1738 
session: it was evident that Walpole had not wanted 
Britain to go to war, making his isolation within the 
ministry more evident than before; ministries were always 
politically more exposed in times of war than in times of 
peace; the parliament's life was over half-way throuch and 
there was the coming general election to be worked for. 
The presence of Greenwich (a long-term effect of the 
Porteous Riots). Falmouth and prince Frederick improved 
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the possibility of the Great Man being turned out. 
I Not all of the Harleyite section re-integrated back 
into the body of the partv. The 1741 death of the second 
earl of Oxford, the'son of Harley himself, was to be seen 
as a loss to the ministry. especially as he was succeeded 
by his stridently tory cousin. The second earl, was courted 
in a number of ways. These were particular to him ratheý 
than aimed at the tory party (as Hill has contended). 
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In December 1737. oxford was making a tour of EaBt Anglia. 
When the second earl of Orford, Walpolets eldest son, 
heard of his presence in the neighbourhood of Houghton, he 
not only bid him stay at the house that night but 
personally conducted Oxford around it and the estate the 
followinx daV. Such behaviour was in large part 
aristocratic courtesy, but it may also have reflected 'a 
&rowing political closeness. The earl had financial 
difficulties; since estates could'take several year IB to 
sell he was considerably helped by Hardwicke's 1739 
Purchase of Wimpole in Cambridgeshire. 'In a''reign in which 
the Garter'was increasingly given to undistinguished 
courtiers its most undistinzuished recipient was Oxford's 
whig'son-in-law the second duke of Portland'in 1741. And 
lastly. the earlts sister lady Kinnoul, the'wife of Hav, 
was provided'with a pension. 
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This case of tergiversation'has been rather Icnored 
because he has come to be seen as a person who can be 
overlooked easily. being in the shadow of his father. 
However, he was an instance of a trend that extended 
beyond himself, the effort beinx directed at convertinz 
not just the earl. In 1742 Sir Robert Walpole had offered 
dukedoms to both Northampton-and the'third earl of 
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Ailesbury but they had both turned them down on the 
arounds that they did not have sons to inherit them. Both 
men had been summoned to the Lords in their fathersO 
baronies by Oxford's father, the first earl. 
329 , 
Both Gower's becominc lord privy seal in 1742 and his 
later chance is well known, however* it has been 
overlooked that the earl was made a lord justice during 
the summer of 1740 (no mean achievement for a tory, 
however central, at the time. ) Both Colley and Hill bemoan 
the 1740 death of Sir William Wyndham 3rd. Bt. as a great 
loss to the tory party at a critical time; what neither 
appreciates is that he had only achieved his position 
because of his association with Prince Frederick; the 
tories were not used to producing their own leaders: they 
had to have them identified for them by the crown, or in 
this case its reversionary interest. The party CoUld only 
have leaders emerce if they were prepared to moderate 
their views into a form of Hanoverian centralism: the,, 
higher an individual rose he became both less ,- 
representative-of his support-base and more'likely to 
tergiversate. This paradox, which holds for both Gower and 
Wyndham# accounts for the lack of leaders for Feilina to 
study inýthe early-Hanoverian period. 
330 In October 1749 
the seventh duke of Somerset was given the additional 
earldom of Egremont which was remaindered on his nephew 
Sir'Charles Wyndham 4th. Bt., the eldest son of Sir , 
William. Young Wyndham consequently became the second earl 
of Egremont the following year. 
The fall of Walpole in 1742 did not brine the tory 
Party any lasting tangible gains. The whits remained 
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unsettled because George 11 chose not to recognize any of 
them as his first minister. Without there being a settled 
state of affairs there was little reason for any tory to 
tergiversate since he did not know what sort of a 
court/whiz party he was going over to: Gower did not go 
over until after the 145. As the Pelhams became 
established in the late 1740s there was a policy of crown 
favour to certain tories notably through titles. The 
ministry would have been grateful for the effect that this 
had in helping quieten the Lords. It is obscure to what 
extent this originated with, the king and to what extent 
with his ministers. 331 
Before the 1745 Rebellion a decline had been 
occurring in the party's numerical strength in the Lords. 
After the Rebellion's suppression the rate of that decline 
crew markedly. Gower may not have taken forty M. p. 8332 
into the ministry but there were other peers who went 
across at much the same time as he did for much the same 
reasons, some of whom may have been holding themselves 
back first because of the prospect of Walpole's fall and 
then because of the ministerial instabilityýthat had 
followed it, while still others would have gone into full 
or partial retirement. The last fourteen-. vears, of the 
period saw no large-scale opposition in the Upper House. 
OPPosition-mizhtýbe noisy and vehement there but it was 
always small. The tory party was finished as a major force 
in-the, contemporary Political set-UP. However, it did 
continue as a Croup. A number of tories were to be 
admitted to office as tories in the late 1750s as part of 
a drive to minimalize the friction in domestic politics. 
Colley has written "What was novel in high politics 
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in the late 1740B and 1750B was not BO much the emphases 
of parliamentary argument, as the number of up-and-coming 
politicians who were compelled into trumpeting whiggery 
because their own orizins were torm. it333 She is deicribint 
only one dimension of what was happenint and describing it 
only in terms of pariy attitudes. The'iikes of Fox, 'Le-exe, 
Pitt, Dupplin (the second baron Hay) and William Murray 
(Mansfield) were all in the Commons. It was'easier for 
them to disavow the politics of*their fathers' generation 
that it was for other members Of that generation. The 
peers were changing from the pro-court politics of one era 
to the pro-court politics of another: it was the same 
Journey but by a different vehicle. 
In 1747 Sir Francis Dashwood 2nd. Bt. compiled a list 
of the opposition in both the Commons and theýLords. ' The 
latter were*twenty-four in number. Usint the references 
zathered tomether by'Clyve Jones and David Hayton, 334 it 
is possible to differentiate between those'who stayed in 
persistent opposition until either the period's end or 
their own deaths and those who were prepared to cooperate 
witri the ministry. if only occasionally. The consistent 
tories were the'third earl of Abingdon. the third earl of 
Oxford, the fourth baron Craven, the eleventh baron 
St. John, Beaufort, Lichfield, Foley, Mountjoy, Maynard, 
Wentworth and Ward. -Peripheral to, the eleven were nine 
others who at one time orýanother were to vote with-the 
zovernment- the fifth earl of Denbich, the fifth earl of 
Northampton, the, eleventh earl of Suffolk, viscount 
Folkestone, the second baron Mashamo Avlesford,, Boyle, 
WeBtmorland-and Thanet. 335 One should not overstress the 
division, the Hayton/Jones material being largely derived 
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from Newcastle's (1715) lists for pre-sessional meetings. 
There were tories not in either group, e. z. Bathurst. Also 
there are clearly a number of sons of central tories among 
the consistents who are unlikely to have had the tory 
politics of the rank and file of the early 17108. However, 
the groups can be used in a rough manner to distinguish 
the core of the party in the Lords from those who were 
generally more willing to cooperate with the ministry. 
. 
In the Lords politics was engaged in in a different 
style from that of the Commons. With the passage of time a 
coaxing approach would have met with less, results as the 
tory party in the Upper Chamber was steadily reduced 
towards its, grass roots strand. The character of the tory, 
party there was, affected by members with experience of 
party warfare in the Commons inheriting family titles, who 
seem to have injected touches of dynamism and militancy 
which the Lords party would have lacked otherwise. Lord 
Noel Somerset had been elected to the House of Commons in 
1731. He had emerged-as a considerable force among the 
tories there. In February 1745 he inherited the, family 
dukedom of Beaufort. He was happy to act on his own 
account and take whoever would follow him from Gower's. 
banner. 336,. Chesterfield did not take this development-too 
seriously, although he viewed the-third earl of Oxford's 
involvement in it as being that of a man of weight. Oxford 
had also been a-leading mefter of the Commons torv party 
while an M. p.. 
337 The 1748-1749 session ended with Oxford, 
Beaufort and some other lords meeting at the St. Albans 
Tavern. 338 Who those 'other lords' were could tell us a 
treat deal about the state of, the tory party at that 
Juncture. 
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In the Lords, in the'period's final years there were 
still Harleyites tergiversating although, there were an 
increasing share who came from other strands of the party. 
Those who did not cross'over were increasingly people who 
had come to their political maturity in the wake of the 
establishment'of the'Supremacy. Those did come into the 
government ranks did not necessarily do so unconditionally 
and could stray, or threaten to do so, back into 
quasi-opposition. This may have been a sign of a chance in 
the political complexion of those who were tergiversating. 
Even though one must take into account that patronage is 
the principal tool of this section's methodology, it seems 
that it had to be used in order to brine people over. 
There was no scope for using local office as inducement 
since such would have offended whiz sensibilities at the- 
grass roots level. 
The third earl of Ailesbury was one of two to whom 
Walpole had offered dukedoms. The earl was wooed with a 
barony in 1746 which his nephew and intended heir, who was 
not a Patrilineal relative, could inherit. Otherwise, the 
second baron Bruce would have acquired the Wiltshire and 
Yorkshire estates as a commoner. The earl had both been 
summoned to the Lords in his father's barony by the first 
earl of Oxford and offered a dukedom by Walpole. The fifth 
earl of Northampton. having in 1743 inherited the 
Eastbourne estate of his uncle Wilmington, became a Sussex 
landowner. He was paid courtesies by the Pelhams over 
local county matters, such as road legislation. Like 
Ailesbury he had been summoned in 1711 and offered a 
dukedom in 1742.339 
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The Mansells were another family who drifted into 
whizzery. Marcam. Abbey, decayed severely durinc the 
seventeen-year minority of the second baron Mansell. The 
family metamorphosed from Welsh tories into Sussex whics. 
The fourth baron as an M. P. had been pliable to the 
ministry upon occasions. His fuller chance as a peer was 
aided by the acquaintance that he struck up with Newcastle 
(1715) after the duke's offer to help stock the park of 
his Sussex seat* Newick Places with deer. 34a 
Amona the 1747 recruits was the former tory 
M. P. Anthon. V Bouverie (Folkestone). 341 In Januarv'1748 
Henry Rolle, another former tory, was recruited. During 
the 1730s. ' as an M. P., he had frequentlv brought in 
Qualification bills. Neither appears to have been a 
Harle. vite. Folkestone, like Northampton, was one of the 
peripheral nine, as Rolle might well have proved to be had 
342 he not died in 1750. 
In July 1749 Bruce's brother, the fourth earl of 
Cardigan, was to feel able to forward himself for his late 
father-in-law's lord lieutenancy of Northamptonshire. He 
was unsuccessful but it was indicative or there being a 
chance since the man may have been seen previously as a 
tory. The tory element may be the reason whv the office 
went to the second earl or Halifax, who had the advantage 
of being a certain whiz, even'if he was a rather factious 
one who had a relatively unimportant territorial presence 
in the county in comparison with Cardican. 343 
In February 1747 the third earl of Ailesbury died. 
The barony and his estates passed to the now second baron 
Bruce. -Included among these was the valuable Wiltshire 
property of Savernake which the earl's mother had broucht 
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as dower'on her 1676 marriage. it having been previouslv 
the property of her family, the Somerset Seymours. In 
February 1750 the, eighth duke of Somerset inherited that 
ramily*s title. He was or a milder tory disposition than 
his father Sir Edward Seymour 5th. Bt.. In April 1751, in 
the post-Rebellion political climate, the duke felt able 
to ask for the lord lieutenancv of Devon, he havinc 
inherited the paternal estates of Berry Pomeroy there and 
of Maiden Bradley in Wiltshire. However, the fourth duke 
of Bedford was then in favour and was unimpeachably a whiz 
so that Somerset's wish was not met with. Prince Frederick 
had died only the previous month and therefore the Pelhams 
had not yet acreed between themselves on the removal of 
Bedford. 
In July 1752 Somerset let it be known that he was 
going to law against Bruce over the Savernake estate. How 
serious he was in this can not be ascertained. What is 
certain that Is that it demonstrated his nuisance value: 
two court tories whom the ministrv could have had 
reasonable expectations of accommodatinz would be 
implacably opposed to one another and that branch of 
political rapprochement WoUld have been destabilized in 
large part. 344 This is not proven positively bUt it is 
chronologically tidy. He was almost certainly bought off 
with an interim pension. In 1752 the duke was made chief 
Justice in evre north of the Trent. although the office 
was usually given to someone who had estates north of the 
river, which he did not have. 
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In January 1751 the tory heir-aPparent of the fourth 
earl of Clarendon had been summoned bv the ministrv in his 
father's barony, the man having long been seen as a member 
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of the party who might turn into a ministerialist. 346 
The'third earl of Oxford died, in April 1755 as did 
the fourth duke of Beaufort in October 1756. The two had 
had a major influence on the partY in the Lords since the 
early 17408. It is Possible that their'-weight can be 
illustrated by the wav in which Bathurst was prepared to 
accept employment in the same month that the duke died. 347 
However, even at this late juncture the depth of 
tergiversation should not be overestimated. Both the first 
baron Boyle and the fifth earl of Denbich had shown 
themselves to be clearly amenable'to the ministry at the 
beginning of George Ills reign., The-second, baron had 
opposition associations and was forwarding himself as 
someone who should be boucht off with a place. In December 
1757 he souzht to succeed Somerset, on the duke9s'death, 
as a chief justice in eyre, while'in May 1758 he was 
civina his proxy to the ministerial Devonshire. 348 He may 
well have been-already in receipt of a pension. 
The is ixth earl of Denbigh was'involved in protracted 
necotiations in the late 1750s over pensions for himself 
and his sisters. During these negotiations his financial 
affairs improved and, as he was already involved in 
talking to the ministry, he felt himself'tO have the right 
to extract something and therefore sought a mark of 
honour. As late as-February 1760 he was able to extract a 
place of the Privy Council by audibly mutterinz the words 
"cocoa tree.,, 349 'The Cocoa Treet had lone been one of the 
coffee houses where tories in the Hanoverian ace had 
cathered'in order to consult with one another on 
parliamentary tactics. 350 This incident proves that, 
despite both the marked decline in'the tory party's 
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strength in parliament and the way in which a number of 
the remaining tories had been brought intooffice, there 
was still a tory opposition extant at Westminster. It was 
not active in the Lords but it did exist and the earl's 
remark, even if was made in a calculated manner, was 
considered to be worth taking seriously in order to 
preserve as high a level of political harmony as possible 
at a time of marked political stress caused by the heavy 
burden of war taxation. 351 
In 1759 the second earl ofýEzremont resigned the lord 
lieutenancy of Cumberland to Sir John Lowther 
5th. Bt. (N. S. ). Sir John was the heir-ceneral of the third 
viscount Lonsdale and it had been the wish of the family 
Lowther that a caretaker be given the viscount's 
lieutenancies of Cumberland and Westmorland. However, in 
1756 only Westmorland had been, given to Sir, John-Lowther 
3rd. Bt. of Holker. ' On his death the lieutenancy was given 
to Sir John Penninaton to act in the interests of his 
nephew, the fifth baronet. Ecremont did not retard himself 
as a caretaker. Therefore, his resignation probably 
derived from wishing not toýcontinue in an office made 
contentious by the Militia Acts. 
The haste of the 1756 transferral to Pennincton was 
in marked comparison with the treatment of county Durham 
in the early 1750s, when that county's lieutenancy had not 
been conferred for a number of years. This was because the 
moderate tory the eighth-earl of Thanet wished to secure 
the office for himself and felt able to realistically 
forward himself asýa candidate for it. Since the 1745 
Rebellion party diviBions, had rapidly crown less important 
in high politics. This meant that court-inclined tories 
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had reasonable hopes of securinZ rewards, if they kept in 
line. However, in this instance partv differences at the 
level of low politics were more keenlv felt than on the 
high one, so that party considerations influenced the 
outcome of the matter. 352 
The Harlewite predilection to serve the court was 
still beinx evidenced twenty years after the man's death 
and thirty years after his fall. It was only after the 
Rebellion that the Harlevites were in a minority of the 
tory lords who engaged in pro-court behaviour. The 
predominance of the section among those that so changed 
their politics demonstrates two things. Firstly, that its 
members oriainally had been predisposed towards servine 
the court and that this trait was continuous. And 
secondly, that the continuing strength of the grass root 
tory party is underlined. 
Berore, 1727 verv rew other than Harlevites 
terciversated while before 1745 non-Harlevite tory 
families changed to court BUPPOrt through different 
meMbers of the family havint different politics rather 
than a'sincle individual convertinc. However, that 
mainstream tories did not chance did not necessarilv mean 
that they-continued as active tories, there was always the 
choice of makinz their support latent. The zovernment 
could pass business without worry but it was concerned to 
keep things as quiet as possible, a situation which the 
eighth duke of Somerset and the sixth earl of Denbigh 
exploited since the duke of Newcastle (1715) had known the 
heady days of the Oxford ministry and was therefore 
susceptible to a degree of manipulation. 
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5.5. Low Politics, 1727-1760. 
Langford's 1975 monograph on the Excise Crisis fills 
an important place in the current historiocraphy of the 
period even though its immediate bearint on this thesis is 
slight. The study goes a lone way towards explaininc why 
after nearly two decades of the Supremacy the ministry 
should try to legislate a rather small technical bill into 
law and bring such a welter of opposition upon itself that 
it withdrew the measure. The Crisis was the most important 
instance since the Sacheverell in Anne's reign of a 
popular protest breaking through into high politics. ýIt is 
clear that there were bounds to the political nation's 
patience beyond which the government, trod at its own risk. 
The ministry could conduct public affairs how it liked 
just-so, long as did so within generally accepted confines. 
If it sought to go beyond those limits, e. e. war, it needed 
to have public assent, passive or active. If it met with 
Public dissent it could expect severe electoral 
repercussions, as occurred in the 1710 general election. 
The Crisis was different from Sacheverell in not being a 
church cry but rather it saw the novel Joining together of 
the expandinc-trading interests with a more ancient 
country fears of abuse of the executive. 
The Excise Crisis of 1733 and the Jew bill of 1753 
were the two treat interruptions of low politics onto the 
plain ofýhizh politiCS. In her cogent 1988 article 
Kathleen Wilson has discussed that same vein of political 
life can be seen in the popular, lauding of admiral Vernon 
in the wake of news reachine Encland in March 1740 of his 
victory over the Spanish at Porto Bello in the West 
Indies. The Warýof the Spanish Succession was principally 
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fought on the European continent and the Seven Years' War 
was foucht on three continents- North America, India and 
Europe. The War or the Austrian Succession was a point on 
the route, from to the other. Indeed, the war had a second 
name underlining its dual character- the War of'Jenkins's 
Ear. The name being given to describe the earlv colonial 
conflicts in which Vernon was so prominent. 
Wilson points out that'a variety of factors adjoined 
in order to make the admiral a popular rocus ror rejoicinc 
in anti-ministerial sentiment. The ministry had been most 
wary of being drawn into conflict with Spain, hence the 
Convention of Pardo. With the advent of war it was most 
wary of giving the admiral adequate resources to allow him 
to follow up his initial successes. In addition, Vernon 
had been associated with the OPPosition when he had 
formerly sat in the Commons. Those who traded with the 
West Indies and North America were not collected in aý 
chartered monopoly, therefore, their political wishes 
could not be curbed with the same ease as those of the 
other tradint lobbies could. These all led to a 
conjunction of radical domestic politics with colonial 
tradina interests. 
This link was to have repercussions, after the period 
ended. The unsuccessful attempt of Britain to quell the 
American Rebellion was to lead to severe domestic 
political strain. This, in its turn, was in large part to 
lead to the reforms which began to undermine the political 
state of affairs that had come into beint in the wake of 
1688, although it is made clear that these long-term 
ramifications do not allow the incident to climb into the 
Excise Crisis-JeW bill leazue of Populist politics. The 
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article is a good piece of work although it ignores both 
the fact that Walpole would have easily survived the 
election had it not been for dissentient court elements 
workinZ against him and the fact that ultimately George 11 
was happy for the country to to to war and it was he who 
ultimately'directed how military resources were applied. 
There had been no divisions in the Lords on the 
Jewish Naturalization bill which passed into law. The bill 
was of a limited technical nature and did not naturalize 
an. yone in itself. What it did do was make it possible for 
a professinc Jew to be naturalized. Like the Quakers' 
Tithes bill berore it the Act was meant as a thanks. 
Whereas the Quakers's one had been of an electoral 
character this measure was a mark of thanks to the Jewish 
financial community, notablv Samson Gideon. There was 
moderate opposition to the Act as a bill but instead of 
subsiding with its passage this opposition began rather to 
grow. When, parliament met again the bill was repealed. On 
March 4th 1754 sixty-six peers voted on the repeal of the 
Jew Act and the majority was forty-six. The popular 
campaian subsided. 
While it is clear that there was anti-semitic feelint 
in eighteenth-century feelince T. W. Perry's 1962 monocraph 
makes it clear, that the principal reason for the 
opposition was because of the old whiz/tory divide on 
naturalization which centred on the sacrament. As Perry 
makes clear G. M. Trevelvan's assumption that relizous and 
political passions in the 17508 were "stone-cold" was 
clearly wrong. Nearly half a century after Sacheverell a 
religious matter could force a supposedly "supreme" 
court/whiz ministry to retract a piece of leXislation. It 
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is clear that the ministry was not immune from popular 
pressuree 
The Jew bill struck rather a different chord from the 
Excise Crisis and the Vernon cult but it nonetheless 
showed the way in which there was a whole seam of 
socio-political reality during the period under 
discussion. This reality can be said to have come out to a 
decree In elections and all three or these incidents 
occurred just prior to a general election- 1734,1741 and 
1754. It is arguable that had there not been elections 
shortly to come that these 'campaigns' would not have 
acquired the potency that they did. The politics in which 
the peerage engaged themselves at the centre was mostly of 
a rarefied character. It took Place within a narrow band 
of high politics and there was a whole Political reality 
beyond it. The religious issue had largely been placed to 
the side of politics In the wake of the Succession because 
of the effect it was capable of having on politics. The 
character of British society was changing fundamentally. 
There had always been a middle class but this was both 
growing numerically and growing wealthier. These chances 
to it made it inclined to be more Politicized. In time it 
would want to have its voice heard. 
The Excise Crisis had shown that trade, of which the 
middling sort were the principal practioners, could be 
linked with the old country suspicions of the court, which 
had been principally held by the broader aristocracy since 
the Restoration. The Vernon cult did not reach the same 
intensity but it did show the adding of an 
imperial/colonial dimension which was to be importance 
domestically after the establishment of American 
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independence. The Jew bill showed how Political issues 
coulde, long lie latent in British politics and then emerte 
with immense. vitalitv-, The linkint of the old liberty with 
the new propertv was to prove a powerful blend after the 
Period*s end. In the meantime the existinc system ossified 
overhead. 
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6. Conclusion. 
As a whole the politics of the period 1689-1760 have 
been only partially understood. There has been a failure 
in approach, research has been directed only at the 
period's supposed dynamic parts, something that is rather 
unfortunate in view of the general political torpor of the 
early Hanoverian period. When conclusions of the four 
reigns have been reached they have been the result of 
analyses of only selective areas rather than as a result 
of a broader comprehension. it is history of the victors, 
or rather it has soucht to be the historv of the victors. 
This thesis has successfully contended that the 
Revolution Settlement benefitted not, just parliament but 
also the crown. it is indubitable that the-Settlement 
wroucht a maJor chance on the British constitution. 
However, that chance has been unduly transferred to I 
politics too. Both the hardware and the practice of 
politics change but the latter has had subsequent 
developments transposed on to it. changes that can not be 
justified in terms of the hardware. 
In harnessint the crown* throuch the Settlement, the 
political nation made it a far more powerful creature. At 
the same time it bound itself to Provide for the crown*s 
financial appetites- the price for a lack of friction over 
the prerogative was regular taxation. Both sides, lost and 
cained as a result of the transformation, the crown was 
itself a victor, even if under the early Hanoverians a 
general political lethargy has Iona masked the fact. 
The crown was a considerable force in politics 
overall and especially so on hich politics. Such has been 
a long accepted truism-but it has not been demonstrated in 
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a systematic manner before. Its Presence has been seen as 
part of the political background rather than as the 
Principal political factor of the era. The lolizarchwl 
that came into being in the early Hanoverian period has 
for too lone a time taken to be the captors of the crown 
whereas in fact they were literally what they were- its 
courtiers. The true beneficiary of the Settlement was the 
Political-nation as a whole not a particular part of it, 
that the lolizarchs' came to enJov their positions of 
profit and influence was a by-product of the Settlement, a 
sign of how secure the crown felt. 
Interparty conflict has lone been seen as a factor of 
the first importance. It was taken that the character of 
that conflict was different from its modern counterpart 
but analyses of it assumed that it occurred in some form 
of vacuum, the crown being something that was inert. The 
party variances of low politics were taken to be of equal 
worth throughout politics. Rather, high politics occurred 
in-a. separate environment and there was cross-infection 
both ways. - 
The analysis which was orientated towards interparty 
conflict recognized that the two parties were not 
comparable to modern ones in organizational terms. The 
whics were generally regarded as the more coherent of the 
two, having weathered persecution. Howevers paradoxically 
they were less of a party in terms of having a set agenda 
to achieve; in the departure of James II the party had 
attained its central objective, whereas the tories conduct 
was called into question by that kinCOB conduct. The whigs 
were better able to serve the crown as a court Party, this 
being evidenced even in the early 1690s. After 1714 when 
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the Supremacy was established, it Was the Supremacy of the 
Whigs acting as the court party rather than of the Whigs 
acting as the whiz party. - 
By 1760 there had been considerable chances in 
attitude from 1701 as to the place of the crown in 
politics. However, there had been no parallel material 
constitutional chance since the Act of Settlement. In 
large part, this accounts for the difficulties that George 
III underwent in the 1760s. This thesis has very much been 
constructed in the 'material' vein. It has not soucht to 
overturn the previous general perception of the period's 
politics, rather it has sought to complement that 
fattitudel perception. In the latter, the crown was not 
seen in a light that resulted from a systematic study of 
it as a subject. Rather it was seen in the reflected glory 
of supposed constitutional progress. 
Indeed, one should be careful with the material that 
has been used to build this thesis's arcument. There are a 
number of incidents which can be read in a broader fashion 
than they have previously been viewed, e-C-1746. However, 
to counter this tendenc. Vt some of the evidence that shows 
a strong crown under the earlv Hanoverians can be read in 
more than one wayo e. C., the employment. of kinsmen and 
clients of the Pelhams as Bedchamber lords in the late 
1740s. 
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19. The earl Clinton. the second earl of Godolphin, the 
second earl Poulett (if his being summoned in his father's 
barony and being given the Somerset lord lieutenancy are 
excluded), the second earl Cowper, the sixth baron 
Lovelace, the second earl of Tankerville, the third earl 
Of Jersey the third duke of Manchester, the fourth duke of 
Leeds, the third duke of St. Albans. the first earl 
FitZwilliam, the sixth earl of Coventry, the fourth earl 
Of Essex and the third earl of Orford. 
20. Luttrell ii P-343 and iv 
513-14,516.584 and 659 
H. M. C. Portland iii p. 604 
The Diary of John Evelyn 
and 320-31 
pp-175,480.501,505,511, 
(ed. ) de Beer, E. S. v pp. 86 
21. H. M. C. Carlisle P-111 
B. L. Add-32688 f-3 
B. L. Add. 27732 f-154 
H. M. C. Egmont Diary iii p. 278 
Walpole Correspondence 18 P-350,19 PP-397 and 
B. L. Add-32711 f. 88 
The Letters of Spencer Cowper, dean of Durham, 
1746-1774 pp. ix-x 
The Harcourt Papers (ed. ) Harcourt. Edward iii 
B. L. Add-35414 f. 241 
B. L. Es. 1716 f. 177 
22. Walpole Correspondence 17 P-319 
420 
40 
23. The first duke of St. Albans, the second earl of 
Burlington. the second earl of Stamford. the eighth earl 
Of Pembroke, the third earl of Carlisle. the second baron 
Lexington and the earl of Romney. 
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4. Local Office. 
I. The office of vice admiral in the coast counties 
would be a contender to join but evidence on it was scarce 
in the sources consulted. In addition, it was an office 
which the peeraze did not often hold. 
2. Webb, Sidney and Beatrice. English Local Government 
3. H. M. C. Portland v p. 460 
4. Sainty, J. C. Lists of the Lieutenants of the Counties 
of England and Wales, 1660-1974 Lists and Index Society 
5. Charles II's ducal bastards are excluded from it but 
the first marquis of Rockingham, the second earl of 
Cholmondley and the second earl of Orford are included. 
6. There-were approximately fourteen areas of land that 
were independent of the lieutenancy system. These were 
called liberties. In the cases of Tower Hamlets and 
Peterborough peers did serve as lieutenants for them but 
they have been left out of this study. 
Glassey, Lionel Politics and the Appointment of 
Justices of the Peace, 1675-1720 P. 3 
7. H. M. C. Portland ii P. 189 
Luttrell ii PP-397,419,429 and 433 
B. B. L. Portland Loan 29/85 Misc. 22 Petition to king 
William III 
9. Anclesew. Caernarvonshire, Denbich, Flintshire, 
Merionethshire and Monteomeryshire , 
10. Coxe Shrewsbury pp-37.39-40.89 and 93 
Luttrell iv P. 26 
B. L. Add-57861 f-52 
11. The other peers who held multiples were the fourth 
-earl Rivers, -the seventh duke of Norfolk, the first two 
dukes of-Bedford, the first duke of Leeds, the duke of 
Newcastle (1694) and the third duke of Bolton. 
12. Breconshire. Caermathenshire, Cardicanshire, 
Glamorgan, Pembrokeshire and Radnorshire. 
13. Luttrell iii p. 275 
14. Those involving divided counties and wives' interests 
are numerically too small in incidence to Justify being 
dealt with at this stage. 
15. Counties in which the two counties were adjoined 
during the period- Somerset, Leicestershire, 
Nottinghamshire. Herefordshire, Worcestershire, 
Warwickshire, Northamptonshire, Surrey, Kent, Cornwall, 
Wiltshire, Westmorland and possibly Cumberland. 
16. The Court and City Kalendar 1761 P-184 
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17. Macclesfield may have lost his at the same time as 
Bolton was deprived of Hampshire and Dorset and thus be a 
Previously overlooked victim of Georce II's ancer. 
18. B. L. Add-32687 ff-503-04 
19. Peers who were custodes in Wales during the period: 
Caermarthenshire- the third baron Vaughan and the second 
duke of Bolton; Caernarvonshire- the earl of Orford (1697) 
and the second duke of Ancaster; Cardizanshire- the third 
baron Vaughan; Flintshire- baron Archer (caretaker) and 
the fourth earl of Plymouth; Glamorgan- the eighth earl of 
Pembroke and the fourth earl of Plymouth; Montzomeryshire- 
the fourth baron Herbert, the second earl of Macclesfield 
(1679) and the earl of Powis; Pembroke- the eighth earl of 
Pembroke; Radnor- the first earl of Oxford, the earl of 
Coningsby and the first duke of Chandos. 
20. Luttrell iv PP-540,543,545,559 and 574 
'21. H. M. C. Frankland Shirley Russell i P-139 
22. Bridgwater's candidature was probably aided by the 
prospect or his 1703 marriage to one or the daughters of 
the first duke of Marlborough. 
23. Holmes, Geoffrey British Politics in the Age of Anne 
P-193 
24. The duke of Kent, the third earl of Carlisle, the 
second duke of Bolton (Dorset), the first duke of 
Manchester, the first earl of Rockingham, the first duke 
of Ancaster. the first earl of Scarbrough 
(Northumberland), the second duke of Grafton and the 
seventh duke of Somerset. 
25. The second duke of 
Bradford warn both the a 
who had retained court office 
of their connection with the 
can be logically deduced that 
earl were removed from their 
connection that they both had 
it would be pleasant to have 
literary evidence). 
and the second earl of 
: ociates n? Mpi? -I h---Ii ch 
at Anne's accession because 
first duke of Marlborough. It 
the second duke and second 
lieutenancies because of this 
with Marlborough (although 
substantiating contemporary 
26. Swift, Jonathan Journal to Stella ii p. 656 
Devonshire 
ons of aBS 
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27. The LeveBon GowerB were the other major inheritors of 
the Bath Granville estate. They sold their portion and it 
is probable that settlements forced the two families to 
divest themselves in tandem. Therefore, the earl may have 
felt it improper to retain the office if he was not 
intending to have any-territorial interest in the county. 
However, in the long-term the Carterets did maintain a 
territorial presence in the region (in 1876 Granville's 
heir general possessed over 10 000 acres in Cornwall and 
only 20 in Devon). 
Wordie, James Ross Estate Management in 
eighteenth-century, the building of the Leveson Gower 
fortune. P-83 
Lysons, Daniel and Samuel 
, 
Britannia iv pp. lxxxiv, 
165,243,270.296 and 321, vi PP-51 and 409 
Bateman, John The Great Landowners of Great Britain 
and Ireland p. 441 
28. See this thesis P-259 
29. -In 1741 Sir Robert Walpole successfully resisted the 
first earl of Harrington's subsequent attempt to displace 
Thomas Townshend from his tellerships. That year Walpole 
had his own brother, the first baron Walpole, appointed to 
one of the four offices. 
H. M. C. Eglintoun p. 275 
30. C. U. L. Chol. H. 3110 December 5th, 1741. Third duke of 
Bolton to Sir Robert Walpole 
31. That it would have been hard to find a whig 
replacement may also be another important factor. 'It was 
seen as better to have an opposition whiz in office than a 
tory. Essex was one of the counties that had a very high 
number of interests occupy its lieutenancy over the period 
and therefore may have been hard to fill, while Dorset was 
a county. in which very few PeerB resided. In addition, 
Shaftesbury's opposition was selective rather than 
systematic. 
32. B. L. Add-35600 ff. 167 and 287ý' 
33. B. L. Add-35418 f. 206 
Walpole George II iii PP-58-59 
-Walpole Correspondence 21 P-300 
314. B. L. Add-35352 f. 118 
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5-High Politics, 1689-1760. 
1. Its membership was roughly a third of the Commons but 
a proportion were unable to take their seats in the Lords 
either through catholicism or youth. 
2. Anne saw some minor skirmishing, e. g. the 1709 Regency 
Act. However, there was never any successful encroachment 
against her executive range of action, the efforts being 
designed to come into effect after her death. as was the 
case with the Act of Settlement. 
3. For more data and some discussion of it see Thorold 
Rogers, Maurice Bond, Sainty and Dewar, Sainty, the 
H. L. R. O. Proxy Books and Anita Rees's 1987 Ph. D., 
especially chapters 12.13 and 14. 
4. Holmes, Geoffrey. Review of Dennis Rubini's Court and 
Country, 1688-1702. History 54 (1969). PP-104-05 
5. Colley, Linda and Goldie, Mark. "The Principles and 
Practice of Eighteenth-Century Party. " Historical Journal 
22 (1979). pp. 239-40 
6. Bolton had a regiment throughout the Nine YearsO War, 
although he did not command it in Person. Therefore, he 
was not without profit from the crown. It was Posted in 
the West Indies for part of the conflict and was disbanded 
in 1698. Whether his attitudes and its treatment were 
connected is open to question. 
Luttrell ii P-557 and iv p. 698 
7. History of Parliament 1715-1754 1 pp. 204,218 and 226 
8. Horwitz, Henry Parliament, policy and politics in the 
reign of William III p. 18 
Hill The Growth of Parliamentary Parties, 1689-1742 
PP-35-36 
9. Miller, John James II: a study in kingship PP-38-39 
10. It is arguable whether Halifax was a tory. It is 
certain that he was not a whiz. 
11. There had been growth in the 1680s of the revenue 
service. 
12. Horwitz Parliament p. 96 
13. Lever, Tresham Godolphin. His Life and Times p. 86 
14. Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714. p. 281 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 48 
Foxcroft. H. C. A Character of the Trimmer P-306 
15. Nicholson, Thomas C. and Turberville, Arthur, S. 
Charles Talbot, duke of Shrewsbury pp. 48-49 
Horwitz Parliament pp-57 and 59 
16. Horwitz Parliament P-56 
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17. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. P-51 
Horwitz Parliament p. 64 
Baxter William III p. 267 
18. However, there are'a couple of additional twists in 
that William was later to be reconciled to Torrington and 
therefore may have borne him no personal antipathy at all, 
and that in the later part of Anne's reign the earl was to 
act with the whigs-in opposition to Oxford's ministry. 
Luttrell iv p. 600 
Lords Journals xiv P-536 
19. Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 p. 281 
Horwitz Parliament p. 65 
20. Buckingham had been a beau of Anne. The connection of 
him and Marlborough was through her rather than with one 
another, as 1705 was to demonstrate., 
Gregg Queen Anne pp. 27 and 196 
21. As an issue Treason Trials re-appeared in both the 
1694-1695 and 1695-1696 sessions of parliament. In the 
former it was still attracting a cross-party protest. 
However, the effect of the 1695 general election meant 
that the crown had to build a working relationship with a 
new Commons and the tories were keen for the bill to be 
enacted. The court and tories gave ground on the bill so 
that the now more whiz Commons was prepared to concede to 
the Lords their spoiling amendment. 
22. Horwitz Revolution Politics, the career of Daniel 
Finch second earl of Nottingham, 1647-1730 PP-139 and 
142-46 
23. Browning, Andrew Thomas Osborne, earl of Danby and 
duke of Leeds i pp. 146-329 
Kenyon Sunderland pp. 167-223 and 250-51 
24. Horwitz Parliament p. 210 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-50 
25. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. P-58 
26. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. PP-56-58 
27. In addition, this founded the Bank of England. 
28. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p. 62 
Horwitz Parliament P. 145 
29. Browning Danby i PP-519-22 
Kenyon Sunderland p. 272 
30. Kenvon, Sunderland p. 265 
31. Jones, J. R. The First Whigs PP-13-14 and 18 
32. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 65 
33. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp. 65-67 
Horwitz Parliament P-158 
Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 PP-308-15 
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34. This centered on whether Sir Richard Verney should be 
recognized in the barony. The matter touched both on the 
royal prerogative with its powers of creation and 
recognition and on the interests of those peers who were 
Possessed of similar baronies (even if they might hold 
other titles) which might be affected by the outcome of 
the matter. 
35. Horwitz Parliament pp. 183-87 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-70 
Baxter William III P-337 
36. Coxe Shrewsbury pp. 448-49 and 452 
H. M. C. Buccleuch 2.2 PP-439-40 
37. Even more keen to exploit the Fenwick Plot was the 
the third earl of Peterborough. With his background of 
radical turned turned court whiz. he had not been 
associated as closely with the croup's rise as he could 
have been. With Fenwick he saw an opportunity to advance 
his career. He sought to wring all that could be wrunc. He 
was discovered to be tryinc to manipulate the evidence 
unduly which led to his dismissal both from the Bedchamber 
and the lord lieutenancy of Northamptonshire. 
38. Horwitz Parliament P-177 
39. It is clear that some of the Junto's associates did 
very well out of the war, e. c. George Dodincton, who was 
treasurer of the navy. 
Horwitz Parliament. P. 177 
40. Horwitz Parliament p. 116 
41. Kenyon Sunderland P-303 
Horwitz Parliament pp. 229-31 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-75 
42. Kenyon Sunderland p. 285 
43. Hill Harley PP-44-45 , 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 69 
Kenyon Sunderland p. 278 
44. Lords Journals xvi P-318 
45. Sachse, William L. Lord Somers pp. 161 66 
46. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 82 
47. Horwitz, Parliament p. 267. 
48. Somerville,. ThomaB The History... to the death of King 
William P. 524 
Nicholson and Turberville p. 142 
Sachse P. 166 
49. Somerville William P-524 
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50. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P. 83 
Horwitz Parliament pp. 276-77 
51. Wolf, John B. Louis XIV pp. 613 and 620-25 
52. Horwitz Parliament p. 278 
53. Horwitz Parliament p. 281 
54. Sachse pp-177-79 
Horwitz Parliament pp. 287-88 
55. Lords Journals xvi pp-623-755 
56. Horwitz Parliament p. 291 
57. Horwitz Parliament p. 294 
58. Hill-Parties, 1689-1742 p. 88 
59. Speck, Bill Tory-& Whig P. 110 
60. Horwitz Parliament p. 299 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp. 88-89 
61. Greater London Council (residuary body, thereof) 
Record Office, Islington. Account Book of the third earl 
of Jersey. 
62. Holmes British Politics PP-159 48,312 and 390n. 
See this thesis pp. 210 and 213 
63. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 92 
64. Holmes British Politics P-73 
65. ' Gregg pp. 162-63 
66. Miller P-179 
67. - Greac pp. 162-63,177 and 194 
68. Although the bill was a major party delineator not 
everyone voted as might have been predicted to do so. The 
dancers of dogmatic use of lists are illustrated by the 
tory Feversham, being against it while the whiz second duke 
of Bedford was for it. 
Calamy, Edmund A historical account of my own life... 
i P-. 466 and ii P. 16 
69. He was rescued from further such instances by being 
posted to Berlin the following year. 
The Diary of William Nicolson, archbishop-of Cashel 
(eds. ) Holmes, Geoffrey and Jones# ClVve P-139 
70. Oldmixon P-623 
71. Ansell, "Patricia M.. "Harley's Parliamentary 
Management. " Bulletin of the Institute Historical Research 
34 (1961). pp. 92-95 
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72. Feversham had 
Revolution and his 
That he should not 
more comprehensible 
Gregg p. 166 
led James Il's army during the- 
general sympathies lay with the tories. 
be with them on this matter becomes 
since he had been born a Frenchman. 
73. The second earl died in September 
probable that he would have prospered 
some degree, since in 1700 he astutely 
heir-apparent. the third earl, to one 
Marlborough's daughters. 
Grezz pp. 166-67 
714. Lords Journal xvii P-300 
75. Luttrell v P-371 
Lords Journal xvii P-352 
76. Holmes-British Politics P. ý394 
77. Hill PartieB, 1689-1742 p. 106 
78. Lords Journals xviii p. 212 
1 
79. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 113 
80. Oldmixon P-395 
Coxe Marlborough ii pp-179-80 
1702. It is 
in Anne's reicn to 
married his 
of the first duke of 
81. On February 17th 1703 there had been two votes on the 
Journals of the duke of Ormond and others. The 1702 
expedition had been an attempt to make a raid on Cadiz. 
Previous investigations into service operations had 
concentrated on the sea war. William III had been able to 
screen the Flemish theatre from open scrutiny by his 
Personal command of it. While Marlborough's stock remained 
high with the queen his Low Countries command enjoyed the 
same immunity from interference from parliament and the 
ministry that it had had under the late king. This was 
indicated by the way in which the ministry felt able to 
interfere in Spain but left him alone. 
Scouller, R. E. The Armies of Queen Anne P-57 
82. Coxe Marlborough ii pp. 180-85 
83. Warrington was the second earl. This thesis sees him 
as initially following his father in being a court whig, 
who only metamorphosed into a country one after 1720. 
Oxford tried to exploit the money due on the first earl's 
Pension, which had been given in order that he might be 
supported in a manner fitting the dignity, but did not 
meet with any sustained success. 
B. L. Portland Loan 29/127 April 10th 1714. Second earl 
of Warrington to first earl Of Oxford 
84. Hill Parties, 1689 -17 42 p. 121 
85. Hill Parties, 168 9-1 742 P-39 
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86. Bucholz, ýR. O. The Court in the Reign of queen Anne. 
Oxford D. Phil. p. 89 
Horwitz Parliament p. 235 
Lords Journals xv P-729 
It is possible that Somerset and Bradford may have 
additionally promoted themselves in Anne's eyes through 
their behaviour an matters where she had views, possibly 
such as the Wrought Silks bill in the 1695-1696 session. 
They were the only two protestors to it. 
87. D. N. B. Charles Mordaunt third earl of Peterborouch 
(1658-1735) 
88. D. N. B. Robert Sutton second baron Lexington 
(1661-1723) 
89. H. M. C. Portlandýiii p. 604 
90. Hill Parties, 1689-1742. p. 96 
Feiling Tory Party, 1660-1714. P-370 
91. Hill Parliament P. 99 
Greta P. 180 
Horwitz Nottingham PP-197-99 
Feiling Tory Party, 1640-1714 PP-373-74 
92. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 PP-103-05 
Grezz P. 206 
D. N. B. William Cowper first earl CowPer, (d. 1723) 
93. Grezz pp. 229-30 
94. Speck Whig & Tory p. 111 
95. H. M. C. Portlandýii P-193 
96. Coxe Marlborough ii P-179 
97. -The Letters of Joseph Addison (ed. ) Graham, Walter 
P-89 
98. H. M. C. Portland iv P. 491 
H. M. C. Downshire 1.2 P. 867 
(Wentworth P. 219) 
99. Duchess of Marlborough Correspondence v. 270 
100. Greg& p. 241 
Hill Harley p. 110 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P. 111 
101. Hill PartieB, 1689-1742 p. 119 
102. Greg& p. 284 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 pp. 119-29 
103. GreCZ p. 289, 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 p. 122 
Hill Harley pp. 123-24 
104. Wolf pp. 674-77 
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105. In February 1711 lord Quarendon, the heir-apparent of 
the first earl of Lichfield. was given a company of foot 
guards and in October the fourth earl of Clarendon was 
made caretaker lord lieutenant of Cornwall (on behalf of 
the third earl of Bath).. The beneficiaries were both 
tories and the bestowals can be Perceived as Oxford 
seeking to warm that party to his ministry. However, such 
a view would be wrong. The two were both blood relations 
of Anne. The royal kinship factor accounts for the whig 
second duke, of Grafton being made ranger of Whittlebury 
forest in August that year against the wishes of leading 
tories in Northamptonshire. 
H. M. C. Portland v P-75 
Boyer The Political State of Great Britain I P-159 
Luttrell vi pp. 625 and 693 
106. Coxe Marlborough ii pp. 489-90 
Coxe Sir Robert Walpole i P-32 
Duchess of Marlborough p. 252 
H. M. C. Downshire 12P. 867 
H. M. C. Portland ii P. 208 
107. Holmes perceives Mohun as a loval Junto lieutenant. 
In this he is broadly correct. Oxford thought that the 
baron was susceptible to being made into a supporter of 
his own ministry because the man had been active in the 
House on the whigs' behalf but had never received any mark 
of recognition for his work. However, the baron had no 
objection since he had never. soucht any such sign. Yet 
both Rivers and Shrewsbury were to consider him as a 
Potential fellow member of the ministry. Therefore, being 
a Junto lieutenant did not mean that an individual was 
subservient to the group but rather allied to it. 
H. M. C. Portland iv PP-571-72 and 648 
H. M. C. Bath i PP. 199-200 
State Tracts (ed. ) Yorke, Philip- second earl of 
Hardwicke ii P. 487 
The Private Diary of Lord Chancellor Cowper (ed. ) 
Hawtery, E. C. pp. 47-48 
108. Coxe Marlborough iii p. 27 
109- It should be appreciated that the dean was by no 
means a straight-forward, dogmatic tory himself. 
Swift Stella i p. 84 
Nokes, David Jonathan Swift, a hypocrite reversed: a 
critical biography pp. 108-09 and 119 
110. Wentworth pp-156-57 
111. Rubini, Dennis "Partv and the Aucustan Constitution, 
1694-1716.11 Albion 10 (1978), p. 207 
112. Anne was a staunch anclican (as befitted the head of 
the Church of England). However. it is to be appreciated 
that she had approved of the original sermon, which 
Sacheverell chose to attack, to the extent of ordering 
that it be printed. In addition, she is said to have 
sanctioned the sentence on the doctor. 
Holmes The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell PP-95 and 228 
113. H. M. C. Portland, iv. PP-571-72. vii PP. 3 and 5 
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1114. Horwitz Parliament p. 89 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-301 
115. Wentworth PP-159-60 
In the Union debates Scarbrouch had shown himself to 
be apart from the mass of the whiz party by his being 
apprehensive as to the measure and its potential for 
detrimentally effecting the burgeoning trade of West 
Yorkshire (i. e. the early Industrial Revolution can be 
sited in the 1700s). 
Nicolson pp. 419-20 (and 136) 
116. On-January 24th 1711 Buckingham voted with the 
opposition against the censure of Galway- the soldier, 
Irish peer and continental favourite of the late king. 
This was because of an idiosyncratic Position that the 
duke felt himself compelled to take for semantic reasons. 
Luttrell vi pp. 674-77 
Wentworth P-179 
Nicolson P. 537 
117, Dickinson Bolingbroke P-78 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-131 
118. Szechi. Daniel Jacobitism and Tory Politics, 
1710-1714 pp. 86-87 
119. Gregg P-338 
Hill Robert Harley. Speaker, Secretarv-of State and 
Premier Minister pp-144-45 
120. Hill Parties. 1689-1742 P-131 
Hill Harley P. 148 
121. Hill Harley pp. 144-50 
Dickinson pp. 81-88 
122. D. N. B. Abigail lady Masham (d. 1734) 
D. N. B. John Hill (d. 1732) 
Dickinson P-85 
123. Hill Harley P. 151 
Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-132 
Gregg PP-337-38 
124. Hill Harley pp. 152-53 
125. -Hill Harley P. 155 
126. Hill Harley P-177 
Nicholson and Turberville pp. 186-96 
127. Lords Journals xix-P. 339 
The Diary of Sir David Hamilton, 1709-1714 (ed. ) 
Roberts. Philip pp-32-33 
128. Wentworth pp. 229-30 
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129. The dissenting interest did not find itself 
automatically drawn to the whizs but rather to the crown 
servant Harley, especially since the whics were happy to 
sacrifice them for party ends. 
Hill Harley pp-143n and 170 
130. Somerville, Thomas The History... of queen Anne p. 460 
131. Wentworth pp. 220-21 
132. One of the reasons that the crown was able to use the 
House in this way was because of the amount of patronage 
it had for use on peers. Holmes has made the observation 
that none of the Place bills or Acts ever sought to affect 
the lords. The principal reason for this is that the 
general purpose of these items was to act as a bar against 
the expansion of the number of placemen in the Commons 
Vather than to eradicate their Pronsnoq +, ho-ro-j whqro 4: MW 
acted as a useful and important link between the 
legislature and the executive. The peerage were not being 
given the new placestthat came Into being with the 
expansion of the executive (if the armed forces are 
excluded) and the maJor growth of their House occurred 
after the broader Revolution Settlement had ceased in 
1709. 
. 
Holmes, Geoffrey "The Attack on 'The Influence of the 
Crown' 1702-1691 Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research 34 (1966), p. 68 
133. Swift Stella ii P-501 
Wentworth pp. 276-77 
134. H. M. C. Portland iv P-158 
135. Churchill, W. S. Marlborouch: His Life and Times. iv 
PP-967-76 
Greg& PP-360-61 
136. Dickinson P-93 
137. Swift Stella ii p. 656 
138. Hill Parties, 1689-1742 P-139 
139. Lords Journals xix P-567 
140. Hanmer was encouraged by economic factors in Suffolk, 
the county for which he sat. 
Bolingbroke ii P-437 
The Correspondence of Jonathan Swift (ed. ) Williams, 
H. i P-368 
141. The sixth baron North was additionally rare and 
Paradoxical in being a tory soldiers who had lost his 
right hand at Blenheim. 
Wentworth P-340 
142. Dickinson P. 106 
143. Hill Parties, 
-168971742 
PP-141-42 
144. Nokes pp. 196-98 
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145. Wentworth P-360 
Boyer 7 pp. 71-72 
146. H. M. C. Polwarth I P. 17 
Wentworth PP-366-67 
147. Wentworth P-371 
148. Hill Harley p. 213 
149. Wentworth P. 368 
150. Wentworth P-380 
151. Lords Journals xix P-717 
152. Lords Journals xix P-756 
153. In June 1710 there was the report that Beaufort had 
*bouzhtt Albemarle for 912 000. This probably meant that 
the duke*had tried to secure the man and his vote by 
offering to pay off his debts. Whatever it did mean, the 
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II. Appe dices. 
A. Number of Peers. 
a b c d 8 f 9 h 
1690 160 4 156 25 16. o 
+2 +1.3 
1695 162 6 156 27 17.3 
+2 +5 -1- .7 
1700 164 ý 3 161 29 18.0 
-2 + .6 
1705 162 1 161 - 30 18.6 
-1 -2 .4 
1710 161ý 2 15ý 29 18'. 2 
- +15 +14 +2.0 
1715 176 3 173 35 20.2 
+1 -3 .2 
1720 177 7 170 34 20.0 
+3 +6 -1.3 
1725 180 4 176 33 18.7 
-3 -1 -1.0 
1730 177 2 175 31 17.7 
+2 -4.0 
1735 179 4 175 24 13.7 
-6 -5 -1.9 
1740 173 3 170 20 11.8 
+3 +5 +1.3 
1745 176 1 175 23 13.1 
+1 +1 +2.2 
1750 -177 1 176 27 15.3 
-2 -2 -2.1 
1755 175 1 174 23 13.2 
-4 -3 -3.3 
1760 `171 - - 171 17 9.9 
averaze 27.1 16.1 
a number of peers on January 1st at five yearly 
Intervals 
b differences between 'a's 
c number of sons summoned in baronies within 'a' 
d #at minus Ic' 
e difference between Id's 
f number of recruited peers within 'a' and Id' 
a If' divided by Id' as 9 
h difference between *a's 
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B. Recruitments and Promotion. 
() Title given to male peer of a lower precedence or 
rank than his own. In some instances could pass to female. 
*( ) Title given to a woman, which could subsequently pass 
to a man. 
d duke 
m marquis 
e earl 
v viscount 
b baron 
(i) First instance of a single individual being promoted 
within the period. 
(ii) Second instance of a single individual being promoted 
twice within the period. 
Promotions. 
Date Rank Title Surname 
1689 April 9th m d Bolton Powlett 
v e Fauconberg Belasyse 
V e Peterborough Mordaunt 
b e Montagu Montagu (i) 
b e Marlborough Churchill (i) 
April 10th b v Lumley Lumley (i) 
April 20th e m Caermarthen Osborne (i) 
1690 April 15th v e Scarbrough Lumley (ii) 
April 17th b e Warrington Booth 
April 21st b, v Lonaueville Yelverton 
1694 April 30th e d Shrewsbury Talbot 
May 4th m d Leeds Osborne (ii) 
May 10th e m Normanby Sheffield W 
May 11th e d Bedford Russell 
V e Bradford Newport 
May 12th e d Devonshire Cavendish 
May 14th e d Newcastle Holles 
v e Romney Sydney 
1695 June 11th b e Tankerville Grey 
1697 April 26th b e Coventry Coventry 
October 13th V e Jersey Villiers 
1702 December 14th e d Marlborough Churchill (ii) 
1703 March 23rd m d Buckingham Sheffield (ii) 
March 29th e d Rutland Manners 
1705 April 14th e d Montagu Montagu (ii) 
1706 November 14th e m Kent Grey (i) 
December 21st e m Lindsey Bertie (i) 
December 23rd e m Dorchester Pierrepont (i) 
b e Wharton Wharton (i) 
December 24th b e Poulett Poulett 
December 26th b e Godolphin Godolphin 
December 29th b 8 Cholmondley Cholmondley 
1710 April 28th m d Kent Grey (ii) 
1711 June 29th b e Strafford Wentworth 
September 3rd b, e Ferrers Shirley 
September 5th b e Dartmouth Legge 
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1714 October 19th be Uxbridge 
be Chandos 
be Rockingham 
be Tankerville 
be Halifax 
be Aylesford 
be Bristol 
be Clare 
Paget 
Brydges (i) 
Watson 
Bennet 
Montagu 
Finch 
Hervey 
Pelham Holles 
1715 February 15th 
June 14th 
July -. 16th 
August 10th 
August 11th 
1716 July 2nd 
July 16th 
December 16th 
1717 September 26th 
1718 March 18th 
April 14th 
May Oth 
May 23rd 
October 31st 
1719 April 27th 
Apri I 28th 
April 29th 
Apri 1 30th 
May 8th 
1720 June 17th 
June 18th 
1721 September 11th 
November 15th 
December 27th 
1729 September 13th 
1730 May 14th 
1731 December Sth 
1734 November 19th 
1742 February 9th 
1743 April 11th 
1744 May '::? th 
1746 April 19th 
July 7th 
July Sth 
September 5th 
September 6th 
1748 May 27th 
1749 July 5th 
December 1st 
1750 August 3rd 
1752 April 8th 
1753 June 30th 
1754 April 2nd 
April 3rd 
1756 June 16th 
June 17th 
em Wharton 
be Halifax 
md Ancaster 
md Kingston 
ed Newcastle 
t, v CastletOn 
e d Portland 
m d Wharton 
v e Sussex 
e b Cowper 
v e Stanhope 
b e Cadogan 
b v Cobham 
b v Sherard 
e d Greenwich 
e d Manchester 
e d Chandos 
b e Coningsby 
v e Harborough 
e d Dorset 
e d Bridgewater 
v e Castleton 
v e Harcourt 
b e Macclesfield 
b e Pomfret 
b e Waldegrave 
b e Fitzwalter 
b e Ashburnham 
b e Wilmington 
b e Effingham 
b e Rockingham 
b e Harrington 
v e Portsmouth 
b e Leicester 
e m Rockingham 
b e Brooke 
b e Gower 
b e Buckinghamshire 
b e Fitzwilliam 
b e Powis 
b e Clinton 
v e Harcourt 
b e Hertford 
b e Guildford 
b e Cornwallis 
b e Hardwicke 
b e Darlington 
b e Fauconberg 
b e Ilchester 
Wharton (ii) 
Montagu 
Bertie (ii) 
Pierrepont Oi) 
Pelham Holles 
Saundersort 0) 
Dentinck 
Wharton 
Yelverton 
Cowper 
Stanhope 
Cadogan 
Temple 
Sher-ard -0) 
Camp tie 11 
Montagu, 
Brydges 00 
Coningsby 
Sherard (ii) 
sackville 
Egerton 
Saunderson (ii) 
Harcour-t 
Parker 
Fermor 
Waldegrave 
Mildmay 
Ashburnham 
Compton 
Howard 
Watson (i) 
Ptanhope 
Wal 1 or, 
Coke 
Watson (ii) 
Greville 
Leveson Gower 
Hobart 
Fitzwilliam 
Herbert 
Fortescue 
Harcourt 
Seymour Conway 
North 
Cornwallis 
Yorke 
Vane 
Belasyse 
F o. -. -. 
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Recruits. 
1689 April 9th e Portland Bentinck 
v Romney Sydney 
April 10th b Cholmondley Cholmondley 
May 9th d Schomberg Schomberg 
May 29th e Torrington Herbert 
May 30th b Ashburnham Ashburnham 
1691 March 20th v Villiers Villiers 
1692 April 11th b Capel Capel 
April 12th 11 Pomfret Fermor 
1693 January 23rd b Weston Butler 
1694 April 28th b Herbert Herbert 
1695 May 10th e Grantham Nassau de Z 
June 13th (b Howland Russell) 
1696 May 4th b Haversham Thompson 
May 28th v Lonsdale Lowther 
1697 February 10th e Albemarle Keppel 
May 7th e Orford Russell 
December 2nd b Somers Somers 
1699 July 25th b Barnard Vane 
December 24th e Grantham Nassau d'A 
1700 December 13th b Halifax Montagu 
1703 March 13th b Granville Granville 
March 15th b Guernsey Finch 
March 16th b Gower Leveson Gower 
March 17th b Conway Seymour Conway 
March 23rd b Hervey Hervey 
1705 November 26th e Greenwich Campbell 
1706 December 14th b Cowper Cowper 
December 16th b Pelham Pelham 
December 30th e Bindon Howard 
1708 May 26th d Dover Douglas 
1711 May 23rd e Oxford Harley 
September 3rd b Harcourt Harcourt 
September 5th b Boyle Boyle 
September 10th d Brandon Hamilton 
December 31st b Hay Hay 
1712 January Ist b Mountjoy Windsor 
b Burton Paget 
b Mansell Mansell 
b Middleton Willoughby 
b Trevor Trevor 
b Lansdowne Granville 
b Masham Masham 
b Foley Foley 
b Bathurst Bathurst 
July 7th v Bolingbroke St-John 
1713 July 21st b Bingley Benson 
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1714 October 19th v Tadcaster O'Brien 
b Saunderson Saunderson 
b Harborough Sherard 
b Pierrepont Pierrepont 
b Carleton Boyle 
b Cobham Temple 
1715 January Ist Ve Granville Carteret 
1716 March 10th b Parker Parker 
June 18th b Coningsby Coningsby 
June 19th b Onslow Onslow 
June 20th b Torrington Newport 
June 21st b Cadogan Cadogan 
June 22nd b Romney Marsham 
July 2nd v St-John St-John 
July 10th b Newburgh Cholmondley 
1717 July 3rd v Stanhope Stanhope 
1718 May Oth (b Cadogan Cadogan) 
1720 June 9th V Falmouth Boscawen 
b Ducie Moreton 
June 11th v Lymington Wallop 
1721 September 4th b Lechmere Lechmere 
September 21st v Torrington Dyng 
1722 May 23rd e Graham Graham 
May 24th- e Ker Ker 
1723 June 1st b Walpole Walpole 
1725 May 29th b King King 
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1728 January Sth b, Wilmington Compton 
May 28th b Hobart Hobart 
b Monson Monson 
b Mal ton Watson 
b Lovel Coke 
1730 January 6th b Harrington Stanhope 
1731 January 15th b Raymond Raymond 
1733 November 15th b Hardwicke Yorke 
December 5th b Talbot Talbot 
1735 January 23rd Q Godolphin Godolphin) 
1740 May 19th (m Grey Grey) 
1741 May 9th b Montfort Bromley 
May 11th b Ilchester Fox 
May 12th b Chedworth Howe 
1742 February 6th e Orford Walpole 
April 19th b Fitzwilliam Fitzwilliam 
April 20th b, Mountedgcumbe Edgcumbe 
July 14th e Bath Pulteney 
1743 December 20th b Sandys Sandys 
December 21st b Herbert Herbert 
1746 April 17th Q Bruce Bruce) 
1747 January 12th Q Ilchester Fox) 
February 21st v Leinster Fitzgerald 
June 13th b Anson Anson 
June 23rd b Feversham Duncombe 
June 29th v Folkestone Bouverie 
b Ravensworth Liddell 
July 14th b Archer Archer 
1748 January 8th b Rolle Rolle 
1749 June 12th b Ponsonby Ponsonby 
July 5th (b Fortescue Fortescue) 
October 2nd (e Northumberland Seymour) 
October 3rd (e Egremont Seymour) 
October 16th (b Herbert Herbert) 
October 18th *(e Temple Grenville) 
1750 March 28th b Vere Beauclerk 
1756 June 3rd b Hyde Villiers 
June 4th b Walpole Walpole 
November Sth b Mansfield Murray 
November 17th (d Newcastle Pelham Holles) 
b Harwich Hill 
November 18th b Lyttleton Lyttleton 
1759 November 13th (e Warwick Greville) 
1760 March 27th b Henley Henley 
May 2nd b Sondes Watson 
May 20th b Wycombe Petty 
May 21st *(b Stawel Bilson Legge) 
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C-Senior Office-Holders- 
ReCT'Llits are marked by 
3e Sunderland secretary 
Ireland 
privy seal 
treasury 
groom 
president 
Id Dorset president 
horse 
groom 
steward 
Ireland 
4d Devonshire treasury 
horse 
chamberlain 
Ire 1 and 
7e Pembroke president 
privy seal 
Ireland 
a dm i ra I 
le Romney secretary 
Ireland 
groom 
in as te r-gene ra 1 
Id Shrewsbury treasury 
secretary 
Ireland 
c: hambe rl a in 
2e Granville president 
se c ret A ry 
Ireland 
3d Devonshire privy seal 
Ireland 
steward 
le Wilmington treasury 
president 
privy seal 
ld Kent privy seal 
steward 
chamberlain 
Id Newcastle (1715) chamberlain 
secretary 
treasury 
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4d Bedford 
Id Buckingham 
3d Marlborough 
4e Chesterfield 
le Harrington 
2v Townshend 
se cre tary 
a dmi ra I 
I re land 
president 
steward 
privy seal 
privy seal 
master-gener-al 
steward 
secretary 
I re 1 arid 
steward 
president 
Ire 1 arid 
secretary 
president 
Ire 1 arid 
secretary 
2d Ormond 
Id Greenwich 
2d Devonshire 
3e Briodgwater 
7e Winchilsea 
2d Grafton 
2e Godolphin 
2e Temple 
le Tankerville (1695) 
le Rochester 
le Dartmouth 
2e Gower 
Ireland 
master-general 
master-general 
steward 
president 
steward 
trade 
admiral 
secretary 
president 
chamberlain 
Ireland 
privy seal 
groom 
privy seal 
admiral 
treasury 
privy seal 
president 
Ire land 
privy seal 
sec re tary 
privy seal 
horse 
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Id f. -'ingston president 
privy seal 
le Poulett' steward 
treasury 
2d Bolton chamb er1a in 
Ireland 
6d Somerset president 
master 
lb Somers chancellor 
president 
le Stanhope treasury 
secretary 
1b Trevor president 
privy seal 
le Jersey chamberlain 
secretary 
1m Wharton privy seal 
Ireland 
lb Anson admiral 
le Portland groom 
3e Berkeley: Berkeley admiral 
4b Berkeley: Stratton trade 
lb Carleton president 
Id Brandon master-general 
1v Torrington admiral 
, 
le Cadogan master-general 
Id Devonshire steward 
Ze Cholmondley privy seal 
Id Marlborough master-general 
3b Cýo r-nwa 11 i s. admiral 
le Cowper chancellor 
3e Holder-nesse trade 
4e Holdernesse secretary 
6e Westmorland trade 
4e Winchilsea trade 
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Se Winchilsea admiral 
le Godolpyin treasury 
2e Stamford trade 
IV Harcourt chancellor 
le Oxford treasury 
Ib Henley chancellor- 
Se Pembroke groom 
le Torrington admiral 
b Hervey privy seal 
Id Newcastle (1694) privy seal 
3e Carlisle treasury 
6e Suffolk trade 
3e Albemarle groom 
lb King chancellor 
2d Richmond horse 
le Gower privy seal 
IV Lansdale privy seal 
3V Lonsdale privy seal 
2e Scarbrough horse 
W Rutland steward 
le Fitzwalter trade 
Ib Monson trade 
le Halifax (1714) treasury 
2e Halifax trade 
Id Manchester secretary 
2d Montagu master-general 
4e Sandwich admiral 
Ze Peterborough treasury 
4e Rochford groom 
2b Guildford trade 
ld Leeds president 
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le Macclesfield (1721) chancellor 
le Dath (1742) treasury 
le Orford (1697) admiral 
IV Bolingbroke secretary 
6e Dorset chamberlain 
7. e Rivers master-gen era 1 
Im Halifax privy seal 
ld Schomberg master-general 
2e Sunderland chamberlain 
Ib Talbot chancellor 
2e Waldegrave treasury 
le Strafford (1711) admiral 
le Hardwicke chancellor 
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D-Belichamber Lards. 
* Recruit. 
R Convert from Roman catholicism- 
Son of Bedchamber lord who held office within the 
period. 
Id St-Albans Beauclerk 
le Portland Bentinck 
2e Burlington Boyle 
2d Ormond Butler 
Ib Weston Butler 
2e Essex Capel 
Id Marlborough Churchill 
2e Bath Granville 
3e Carlisle Howard 
*R le Scarbrough Lumley 
3e Peterborough Mordaunt 
2d Bedford Russell 
2b Lexington Sutton 
le Romney Sydney 
20e Oxford Vere 
I'd Portland Dentinck 
3e Berkeley Derkeley 
2d Ancaster Bertie 
Ib Boyle Boyle 
2e Granville Carteret 
7e Lincoln Clinton 
3e Holdernesse Darcy 
3d Bridgwater Egerton 
6e Westmorland Fane 
2d Fitzroy Grafton 
Id Kent Grey 
b Lucas Grey 
3v Lonsdale Lowther 
3d Rutland Manners 
1d Manchester Montagu 
7e Warwick Rich 
R 8b Teynham Roper 
Id Dorset Sackville 
3e Sunderland Spencer 
6e Sydney Leicester 
R Id Shrewsbury Talbot 
3v Townshend Townshend 
R le Waldegrave Waldegrave 
7b Delawarr West 
le Sussex Yelverton 
2e Godolphin Godolphin 
2d Richmond Lennox 
2d Manchester Montaqu 
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2e Ashburnham Ashburnham 
2d St-Albans Beauclerk 
3d St-Albans Deauclerk 
R le Fauconberg Belayse 
2e Tankerville Bennet 
3d Ancaster Bertie 
4e Essex Capel 
19e Lincoln Clinton 
6e Coventry Coven-try 
2e Cowper Cowper 
4e Holdernesse Darcy 
le Fitzwilliam Fitzwillism 
le Clinton Fortescue 
le Harcourt Harcourt 
9e Pembroke Herbert 
2e Buckinghamshire Hobart 
2e Albemarle t-, eppel 
6b Lovelace Lovelace 
3d Manchester Montagu 
cle Rochford Nassau de Z 
4d Leeds Osborne 
2e Northumberland Percy 
2d Kingston Pierrepont 
2e Poulett Poulett 
3d Marlborough Spencer 
3e Jersey Villiers 
2e Waldegrave Waldegrave 
3eýOrford Walpole 
2m Rockingham Watson 
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E NLtfntier- of Cif fi ce-Holders. 
Number of peers employed in the Dedchamber and lesser 
central offices, at five year intervals. 
1690 36 
1695 33 
1700 40 
1705 27 
1710 22 
1715 40 
1720 44 
1725 4: 7. 
1730 38 
1735 41 
1740 40 
1745 45 
1750 44 
1755 41 
1760 47 
Offices included the chief justices in eyre, the 
constable of Tower. ) the lieutenant constable of the Tower-, 
the constable of Windsor, the captain of the Gentlemen 
Pensioner-s, the captain of the Yeomen of the Guard, the 
tellers of the Exchequer, the master-general of the Trish 
ordnance, the lord justices of Ir-eland, lord treasurers of 
Ireland, the lesser lords of the Admiralty, the Treasury 
and Trade, the joint paymasters of the forces, the joint 
postmasters, the treasurer of the navy, the chancellor of 
the Exchequer-, the treasurer of the chamber, the vice 
chamberlain, the cofferer of the Household, the the 
treasurer of the HOUseholdq the comptroller of the 
Household, the masters of the Buckhounds9 the Foxhounds 
and the Staghounds, the master of the Robesq the master- of 
the Jewels, the keeper of the privy purse, the chancellor 
of the duchy of Lancaster- and the lord war-dens of the 
Stannaries and the Cinque Ports. 
Offices which are excluded are colonial 
governorships, Irish governorships, grooms of the 
Bedchamber-, the master- of the Great Wardrobe, members of 
lesser royal households, the ranger-ship of royal parks, 
chases and forests. 
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